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MAHĀBHĀṢYADĪPIKĀ

OF

BHARTṚHARI

Fascicule VIII : Āhnika VII

critically edited by

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BHANDARKAR ORIENTAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE
POONA, INDIA
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The Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute is indebted to the Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Orientabteilung, Berlin, for their kind permission to use a photo-copy of their manuscript (Chambers 553) of the *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā* for this Critical Edition which is based on it.

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Iti śrī ...

The Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute may as well heave a sigh of relief at the successful completion of the project of a *Critical Edition and Exposition of the Mahābhāṣyadīpikā of Bhartṛhari*. The difficulties in the implementation of this project were quite obvious. For one thing, only one manuscript of the *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā* (*MD*) has so far become available — it is deposited in the Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Orientabteilung, Berlin, (Chambers 553) — and for another, this solitary manuscript is fragmentary and frightfully corrupt. But our Editors applied themselves to this challenging task with admirable patience, industry, and ingenuity.

This project may be said to have been marked by three distinct stages :

(1) To begin with, two eminent scholars associated with this Institute, Professor K. V. Abhyankar and Ācārya V. P. Limaye, prepared what they considered to be a tentative edition of the *MD* on the basis of a photostat copy of the Berlin manuscript. They also had before them an edition of this work (up to the end of the fourth Āhnika) prepared by Shri Swaminathan and published by the Banaras Hindu University in 1965. This edition by Abhyankar and Limaye (which originally appeared in instalments in *ABORI* 43-47, 50; 1962-66, 1969) was published (pp. 312) by the BORI in 1970.

(2) In the preface to their edition of the *MD*, Abhyankar and Limaye have said : " We would have liked this edition to contain the exact photostat copy of the (Berlin) manuscript together with our decipherment of it, line by line, so that a critical student of grammar could have had the facility to agree or to disagree with us and even to suggest better readings ". This was not possible at that time. But, in 1980, the BORI brought out a slightly enlarged reproduction of the photostat of the entire Berlin manuscript. This represents the second stage of this project.

(3) And now, as the last stage, the BORI has the satisfaction of presenting to the world of scholars a thoroughly revised Critical Edition of the *MD* with English translation and Exposition (eight Fascicules, 1985-1991, total number of pages 1801).

Finally, the acknowledgements :

(1) Our first word of thanks is naturally due to the Staatsbibliothek Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Orientabteilung, Berlin, for its permission to utilize the manuscript of the *MD* in its possession for this edition.

(2) In 1984, the University Grants Commission, New Delhi, made to the Institute a munificent grant to cover the entire expenditure in connection with the preparation and publication of this edition, for which the BORI is greatly beholden to the Commission.

(3) Our two masters, Abhyankar and Limaye, generated and actively sustained in their younger colleagues a genuine interest in a critical study of this work of Bhartṛhari. As a matter of fact, in the preface to their own edition of the *MD* (1970), they have characterized such a revised critical edition as a necessary desideratum. We sincerely regret that they did not live to see the completion of the present edition. All that we can now do is to express our sense of respectful gratitude to them.

(4) I shall not say anything about the work of our Editors (except for sincerely thanking them for it), but leave it to be judged by competent votaries of Sanskrit Grammar.

Bhandarkar Oriental
Research Institute,
Poona, India
August 15, 1991

R. N. Dandekar

ABBREVIATIONS

AL	=	Abhyankar and Limaye
Bhar.	=	Bhartṛhari
Dīp.	=	*Dīpikā*
Kaiy.	=	Kaiyaṭa
Kāś.	=	*Kāśikā*
Kāt.	=	Kātyāyana
Mbh.	=	*Mahābhāṣya*
MS.	=	Manuscript
Nāg.	=	Nāgeśa, Nāgojibhaṭṭa
NS	=	*Nyāya-Sūtra*
om.	=	omit(s)
P.	=	Pāṇini
Padam.	=	*Padamañjarī*
P. Dh.	=	Pāṇinīya Dhātupāṭha
Pari.	=	Paribhāṣā
Pat.	=	Patañjali
Prad.	=	*Pradīpa*
Sid-Kau.	=	*Siddhānta-Kaumudī*
Sw	=	Swaminathan
Vākyap.	=	*Vākyapadīya*
Vār.	=	*Vārttika*
कै.	=	कैयट
ना.	=	नागेश, नागोजिभट्ट
सि. कौ.	=	सिद्धान्तकौमुदी

Other abbreviations, which occur only occasionally, are self-explanatory, e. g. *TaittSaṁh.* (= *Taittirīya-Saṁhitā*).

ERRATA

Page	*Line*	*For*	*Read*
2	1	[वाक्य]संज्ञा	[वाक्यस्य] संज्ञा
6	27	भवति इद्,	भवति, इद्
13	15	°मितो(°तौ)	°मितो(? °तौ)
21	23	.१०	.८०
22	13	प्रतिपद्य स	प्रतिपद्यस
41	14	अन्यच्छकारस्य प्रयोजनमिति	अन्यच्छकारस्य प्रयोजनमिति
78	10	another ?	another
96	22	fore, lsewhere	for, elsewhere
100	5	*si-*	*śī-*
107	34	*śabdhādyāsa*	*śabdādhyāsa*
142	12	54	46
152	24	*bharuj ais*	*bharuja* is
153	27	*samudāyānta*	*pūrvasamudāyānta*
156	16	*asidha*	*asiddha*
166	11	*di*	*dī*
167	31	vowel) '	vowel)
195	19	°तत्त्वं	°तत्वं
223	11	याद्	यदि
228	last	*nivṛtta°*	*nirvṛtta°*
232	9	substitnte	substitute
232	23	*nirvartake*	*nirvartaka*
233	11	ऊच्चैः	उच्चैः

भर्तृहरिविरचितायां

महाभाष्यदीपिकायां सप्तममाह्निकम्

महाभाष्यदीपिकायां सप्तममाह्निकम्

इग्यणः संप्रसारणम् ॥ १.१.४५ ॥

[१] किमियं वाक्यस्य ... संज्ञा .... आहोस्विद्वर्णस्य ? उभयनिमित्त-संभवात्, यौगपद्याभावादुभयोश्च दोषदर्शनात्, शास्त्रे च द्वयोर्लिङ्गदर्शनात् प्रश्नः। ननु चाख्यातं सविशेषणं वाक्यमित्युक्तम्। नाख्यातपदं श्रूयते। अथैवं कल्प्यते 'अस्तिर्भवन्तीपर ....' इति (वा. २. ३. १. ११), एवमपि विप्रतिषिद्धत्वमापद्यते — 'संप्रसारणं भवती'ति संप्रसारणप्रदेशेषु इदमुपतिष्ठते 'इग्यणोऽस्ती'ति; यद्यस्ति न तर्हि भवति, अथ भवति न तर्हि अस्तीति।

[२] उच्यते। सोपस्कारत्वात्सूत्रस्य 'भवति' वाक्यशेषत्वेन समर्थयिष्यामहे — 'इग्यणो भवती'ति।

एवमपि यौगपद्या(? पदत्वा)भावादस्य वाक्यस्य संज्ञित्वमनुपपन्नम्। प्रथमान्तो हि संज्ञी षष्ठ्यन्तो वा, न च वाक्यं प्रथमान्तं षष्ठ्यन्तं वा। उच्यते। वाक्यार्थो वाक्यमित्यभिधीयते, यथा मत्वर्थो मतुप्शब्देनोच्यते 'मतौ छः सूक्तसाम्नोः' (पा. ५. २. ५९) इति।

ननु चार्थोऽप्यसत्त्वभूतोऽयमिति [किमिति] वाक्यस्येति वाक्यार्थोपलक्षितम् ? उच्यते। संज्ञासंबन्धकाले प्रत्यवमृष्टः, सर्वनाम्ना वस्तुरूपेणोपसंहृतः, 'इदं तद्' इति व्यपदेशार्हः, संज्ञित्वमनुभूय प्रदेशेषु स्वेन व्यापारेण प्रवृत्तोऽसत्त्वभूत एवोपतिष्ठते इति। 'इग्यणो भवती'त्यस्य योऽर्थस्तस्य संप्रसारणसंज्ञायां प्रदेशेष्विदमुपतिष्ठते, इग्यणो भवतीग्यणो जायते इग्यणो निष्पद्यते इति।

[३] आहोस्वित् वर्णस्य ? यणः स्थाने य इक् तस्य संप्रसारणमित्येषा संज्ञेति। अथ वर्णसंज्ञित्वे सति किं यणः स्थाने य इक्तस्य संज्ञा, आहोस्वित् यण एवेत्यनिर्णीतमे[व]। संप्रसारणशब्दे हि स्वरूपपदार्थके यणा संज्ञित्वेन भवितव्यम्। मनणरिन (?) संज्ञिनिर्देशे त्विका भवितव्यम्। उच्यते। यण इति चैषा षष्ठी, नैषा संप्रसारणेन कृते षति (?)। के(?) किं तर्हि ? इका। कुत एतत् ? अन्यथा विरोधात्। एवं हि विज्ञायमाने यणः संप्रसारणसंज्ञेति इगित्यस्योपादा[नं व्यर्थं स्यात्]।

[४] [वाक्य]संज्ञा चेद्वर्णविधिः । वर्णस्य यो विधिः, पूर्वत्वं दीर्घत्वं च न सिध्यति । तस्माद्वर्णस्य विधेया संज्ञेति । तथा हि, वाक्यस्य संप्रसारणसंज्ञायां सत्यामिको यज्जन्म तस्यैषा संज्ञा । जन्म चार्थो, न चार्थस्य पूर्वपरव्यपदेशो न च स्थानित्वमिति । किमर्थं पुनरिदं द्वयमुच्यते, निर्देशस्य कार्यस्य चासंभव इति ? एतत्प्रदर्शयति — यद्यपि अपशब्देन निर्देशः क्रियते, यथा कैरागच्छामीति, एवमपि निर्देशमात्रं स्यात्, कार्यं तु वाक्येऽसंभवान्नैव प्रवर्तते ।

[५] वर्णसंज्ञा चेन्निर्वृत्तिः .... 'ष्यङः संप्रसारणम्' (पा. ६.१.१३) इति । स एव हि तावदिक् दुर्लभः । अलभ्योऽपि लोके दुर्लभ इत्युच्यते । अथापि कथंचिल्लभ्येतेत्य(पि) व्या(ख्या)नपरिकल्पनयोच्यते । केनासौ यणः स्थाने स्यादिति । एवं वर्णयन्ति — अथ वा स एव [हि] तावदि[ग्] दुर्लभः इति शास्त्रान्तरस्याप्रवृत्तिमात्रम् अत्रोच्यते, यथा वृद्धिसंज्ञायामितरेतराश्रय[प्र]सङ्गाद्दोष उक्तः । अथापि कथंचिल्लभ्येतेति 'सिद्धं तु नित्यशब्दत्वात्' (पा. १. १. १, वा. ९) इत्येतदाश्रित्योच्यते । यथोक्तमवस्थिता एवाकारैकारौकाराः । केनासौ यणः स्थाने स्यात् ? अनेनैवासौ व्यवस्थाप्यः । एतत्प्रदर्शयति–नेतरेतराश्रयदोष इग्रूपे । किं तर्हि ? स्थानिप्रतिपत्तौ । यो हि यणः स्थाने इक् तस्य संप्रसारणसंज्ञा, सत्यां च संप्रसारणसंज्ञायां यण्-स्थानिकत्वमिति । विकारविकारिप्रकल्पना शास्त्रान्, न लोकाद्, इतीदमुच्यते त[देत]दितरेतराश्रयं भवति इति ।

[६] विभक्तिविशेषनिर्देशस्तु ज्ञापकः । भूतविभक्त्या निर्देशो व्याकरणे, 'संप्रसारणस्य' (पा. ६. ३. १३९), 'संप्रसारणात्' (पा. ६. १. १०८) इति । वाक्यार्थे च संज्ञिन्येतन्न संभवति । 'ष्यङः संप्रसारणम्' (पा. ६. १. १३) इत्येतच्च वर्णे न संभवति इति इदमनुमीयते — आवर्तत एतत् सूत्रमालस्यात्तु सकृदुच्चारितम् । तन्त्रेण वा द्वौ योगावेतौ । यथैकः शब्दोऽधिकरणभेदेनोच्चार्यमाणो द्विरूपो लक्ष्यते, एवमनेक एकरूप, इति । उभयथा आचार्येण शिष्याः प्रतिपादिताः — केचित् वाक्यस्य, केचित् वर्णस्येति ।

[७] अथ वा पुनरस्तु वाक्यस्य [एव] । अन्तरेणावृत्तिं तन्त्रं च प्रतिपादयति । यथा काकाजातः काकः । अत्र चोद्यते -— स्वजातियोगादेव काकः काको भवति । एवं च कृत्वोक्तम् 'येनैव हेतुना एकः काकस्तेनैवान्योऽपि' इति ।

एवमेवैतत्। इदं तु प्रतिपादयति — सन्ति लोके पितृसमाख्याः पुत्रेषु, बभ्रुर्मण्डुर्लमक इति। बाभ्रव्यमाण्डव्यलामकायनेषु ता अध्यस्ता इति। किं च, यदा काकत्वोपव्यञ्जनानि न विद्यन्ते, तस्यामप्यवस्था[यां] काकः। तत्र यथैव वासितं जातेरस्ति व्यञ्जकमेवं जन्मापीदमुपन्यस्तम्। शब्दोऽपि सोऽयमित्यभिसंबन्धात् क्रियासङ्गाच्च प्रवर्तते। प्रष्ठस्येयं स्त्रीति भेदपूर्वके सोऽयमित्यभिसंबन्धे प्रष्ठशब्दः स्त्रीवृत्तिः। अथ वा, प्रस्थानासङ्गः स्त्रियाम्। आसक्ते प्रस्थाने पुरुष इव निरपेक्ष एव प्रष्ठशब्दः स्त्रियां वर्तते। एवमिहापि काकाज्जात इति भेदः सोऽयमित्यभिसंबन्धे वा निमित्तम्। अथ वा, काकवासितानुषङ्गः क्रियते। जातेरत्रार्थस्याभिव्यञ्जकं जन्मेत्येतत् प्रतिपादयति, यस्मात्काकाज्जातस्तस्मात् काकोऽयमिति। एवं संप्रसारणाज्जातमिति क्रियायास्तद्वतश्चाभेदेन व्यपदेशः। अथ वा, क्रियारूपानुषक्तो वर्णस्तां प्रतिपद्यते, कार्यं तु द्रव्यभूतः प्रतिपद्यते, यथा संज्ञासंज्ञिसंबन्धे वाक्यार्थः प्रत्यवमृष्टः संज्ञित्वमनुभवति, प्रदेशेष्वसत्त्वभूत एवेति।

[८] अथ वा, दृश्यन्ते वाक्येषु वाक्यैकदेशान् प्रयुञ्जानाः। प्रविशेति क्रिया, न च निरधिष्ठाना क्रिया प्रवर्तत इति योग्यसाधनमुपादत्त इति कर्मसाधनम्। प्रविश गृहमित्यस्य योऽर्थः पदद्वयवाच्यः, स प्रविशशब्देनोच्यते। तच्च साधनं केचिदभिधेयत्वेन प्रतिपन्नाः, केचिद्गम्यमानत्वेन। पिण्डीप्रवेशस्यासंभवात् योग्यं साधनमभिधीयते, गम्यते वा। एवं पिण्डीमित्यपि पिण्डीं भक्षयेत् इत्यस्यार्थस्य वाचकः। (साधनानामित्यपि ?) साधनं नान्तरेण क्रियामिति योग्यां क्रियामुपादत्ते। यथा दधिघटादिषु पूर्णादयः क्रिया उपादीयन्ते, एवं 'संप्रसारणात्' इत्येष शब्दो योग्यां क्रियामुपादत्ते। निर्वृत्तिश्च योग्येति संप्रसारणनिर्वृत्तादिति एतमर्थमयमभिदधाति वा संप्रसारणादिति शब्दो,ऽथ वा गम्यमानोऽर्थः। कुतः ? वाक्यार्थे संज्ञिनि पूर्वत्वदीर्घत्वयोरसंभवात्।

[९] पदेषु च पदैकदेशान्। ननु च स्वरूपाधिष्ठानाः संज्ञा रूपान्तरे[ण] युक्ता असमर्थाः प्रत्यायन इति नोच्चरितस्य लोपोऽस्ति। किं च, यदा मातापितृभ्यां तत्रैव कृतं नामधेयम्। तत्र केचिदेवं प्रतिपन्ना — एकदेश उच्चरिते समुदायानुमानम्, तस्मादर्थप्रतिपत्तिरिति। अन्ये मन्यन्ते — समुदायेऽवयवावपि स्तः — देव इति, दत्त इति। तौ च समुदायवत् संज्ञात्वेन संबद्धाविति। अन्ये मन्यन्ते — अनुनिष्पादीनि संज्ञान्तराणि एवैतानि, तेषां तु लोपद्वारेणानुनिष्पादिनः एवंभूताः साधवो न तु द्वा स्वा एवंभूता इति लोपमारभमाणस्य पाणिनेर्मतिः। यथा च संज्ञा अनुनिष्पादिन्यः,

एवं सति नार्था अनुनिष्पद्यन्ते। वाक्यार्थे संज्ञिनि यणः स्थाने [इक्] इति [निर्वृत्ता] इकः संज्ञित्वे नानुनिष्पद्यन्ते। संप्रसारणनिर्वृत्तेः संप्रसारणनिर्देशात् प्रतिपत्तिर्भवति इति।

[१०] अथ वा, पुनराहायमिति। अत्रैतत्प्रदर्शयति — यथा 'ब्राह्मणशतं भोज्यताम्' इति भुजिविशेष [ए]वायम्, एवं संख्या भोजिता भवति यदि संख्येया भुञ्जते। यथा 'व्याघ्रो भोज्यतां, हस्ती भोज्यताम्' इति भुजिविशेषा एवामी। [एवं] 'संप्रसारणस्य दीर्घत्वं भवति', 'पूर्वरूपत्वं भवती'त्येवंभूतमेव दीर्घकरणं वा पूर्वरूपकरणं वा यत्क्रियाफले वर्णे क्रियत इति।

[११] अथ वा, पुनरस्तु वर्णस्य .... भाविनी[यं] संज्ञा विज्ञास्यते। किं संज्ञासंज्ञिसंबन्धे संज्ञाया भावित्वमथ प्रदेशेषु? यदि तावत् संज्ञासंज्ञिसंबन्धे, भूतानां संज्ञासंज्ञिसंबन्धेन भवितव्यम्। अथ प्रदेशेषु, अस्यैव निर्वृत्तौ वर्णो दीर्घविधौ पूर्वविधौ चेति कुतो भावित्वं कल्प्यते? उच्यते। यथैवेतरेतराश्रयदोषो वृद्धिसंज्ञायामुक्तः 'सतो वृद्ध्यादिषु संज्ञाभावात्' (पा. १. १. १, वा. ८) इति, यदि संज्ञाकाले संज्ञिनो भूतत्वेन भावित्वेन वापेक्ष्यन्ते, यत्र तु तदाश्रया आकारादयः 'मृजेर्वृद्धिः' (पा. ७. २. ११४) इति तत्रेतरेतराश्रयम्। एवमिह संज्ञाकाले इग्यण इति संज्ञिनामनपेक्ष्य(? °क्षया) भूते[ष्वि]व प्रवृत्ता संज्ञा। इह तु 'ष्यङः संप्रसारणम् ....' (पा. ६. १. १३) इति संप्रसारणशब्दः कथं प्रवर्तते? न तावत् य इको निर्वृत्तास्त इह [आदेशाः] शक्याः कर्तुम्, तदुपक्षयत्वात्तेषाम्; नापि तदाकृतयो विशेषाभावात्। न हीन्द्रादिषु य इकारो यश्च यणः स्थाने य[इ]गिति तस्य भवति (नास्ति?) विशेषः इति किं प्रतिपद्यामहे?

संज्ञासंज्ञिसंबन्धे यो भावी स भूत एवमुपात्त इति। तत्र 'ष्यङः संप्रसारणम्' इत्येतदुक्तं भवति — ष्यङः तथाभूतमादेशं कुरु यः संप्रसारणमित्येतां संज्ञां प्रतिपद्यते। एतत्संज्ञायोग्यस्यादेशस्य करणोपायोऽयम्। यथा 'अस्य सूत्रस्य शाटकं वय' इति संतानवचने वयतौ शाट[क]शब्दोऽसति शाटके प्रवर्तमानो भाविनं संज्ञासंज्ञिसंबन्धं बुद्धौ कृत्वा भूतत्वेनोपात्त इति प्रतीयते। असति ह्यर्थे शब्दविशेषप्रयोगो विशिष्टार्थप्रतिपत्त्यर्थ इत्येतत्प्रतिपद्यते — य उत्ता एतामाख्यां प्रतिपत्स्यन्ते, तथाभूतं संतानमारभस्वेति।

[१२] इजादियजादिप्रवृत्तिरिति। बुद्धिविपरिणाममात्रं स्थान्यादेशभावो, यथा 'प्राचीनं ग्रामादाम्राः' इति। लोके हीष्टं, यष्टव्यम् इति इजादियजादिप्रवृत्तिरस्ति। शास्त्रात्तु यज, डुवप, वहेति इजादिबुद्धिर्निवर्ति(? र्त)ते, प्रषविगृण(?) 'वचिस्वपि....' (पा. ६. १. १५) इत्यनेन विशिष्टे विषये जन्यते किति ङितीक् साधुर्भवति इति। य एव लोके द्वेधा प्रयोगोऽवस्थितः, स साधुर्भवतीति एतावत् शास्त्रेणान्वाख्यायते इति।

तत्र साध्वभिमतस्येति ग्रन्थः। त एवं वर्णयन्ति — साधूनामभिमतस्येति। इजादिरूपस्य शास्त्रेण किति ङिति च प्रतिपत्तिः क्रियते इति।

एतस्मिंस्तु पक्षे अदुहितरामित्यव्यावृत्तम्। तथा विभक्तिविशेषनिर्देशात् यदा द्वे सूत्रे तदाप्यव्यावृत्तमिति।

आद्यन्तौ टकितौ ॥ १. १. ४६ ॥

[१] समासनिर्देशोऽयम्। तत्र न ज्ञायते इति। किमनेनाधिगतम्? यथासंख्यकत्वं समासनिर्देशे न ज्ञायते, यावता असमासेऽपि देवदत्तस्य यज्ञदत्तस्य चाजा धनमवयश्चेति न ज्ञायते कस्यावयः कस्याजाः इति।

[२] उच्यते। एतदनेन प्रकारेण प्रतिपादयति — लोके शास्त्रान्तरेषु च नास्ति यथासंख्यम्, व्याकरण एव केवलमिति। क्रमश्च नियम्यते —

श्रुतेरर्थाच्च पाठाच्च प्रवृत्तेश्च मनीषिणः।
स्थानान्मुख्याच्च धर्माणामाहुः श्रुतविदः क्रमान्॥

श्रुतेः क्रममाहुः 'हृदयस्याग्रेऽवद्यति, अथ जिह्वाया, अथ वक्षसः' (तै. सं. ६. ३. १०. ४, शतपथब्रा. ३. ८. ३. १६, १७)। अथशब्दोऽनन्तरार्थस्य द्यो[त]कः श्रूयते, तत्रेदं कृत्वा इदं कर्तव्यमिति क्रमप्रवृत्तिः।

अर्थक्रमो — यदाप्येवमुच्यते — देवदत्तं भोजय, स्नापयानुलिम्पोद्वर्तयाभ्यञ्जयेति, अर्थात्क्रमो नियम्यतेऽभ्यञ्जनमुद्वर्तनं स्नापनमनुलेपनं भोजनमिति।

पाठक्रमो नियतानुपूर्वीकेषु वेदवाक्येष्वनेकार्थोपादाने उद्देशिनामनुदेशिनां च सकृदर्थित्वेन व्यवतिष्ठते। यथा स्मृतौ परिमार्जनप्रदाहनतक्षणनिर्णेजनानि तैजसमार्त्तिकदारवतान्तवानामित्येवम्। अन्ये मन्यन्ते — अनेकश्च यदैकार्थे उपादीयते

देवदत्तं [च] यज्ञदत्तं च विष्णुमित्रं च भोजयेति विवृतेनैव(?) क्रमेण भुजिं प्रतिपद्यन्ते। तत्र यदा दर्शनं भिन्ने संबन्धिन्युपादीयमानेऽप्यस्येदमस्येदमित्यनेन प्रकारेण शक्या यथास्वं प्रतिपत्तिः कर्तुम्, यथा घ्रो जिघ्रः, ध्मो धम इति। संज्ञया समासनिर्देशे तु संज्ञाया अक्रमाः संज्ञिनो युगपत्प्रतिपद्यमानाः सर्वैरनुदेशिभिः सं[ब]ध्येरन्। एवं समासनिर्देशेऽपि समुदा[या]त्मक एकोऽर्थोऽभिन्नो द्वंद्वेनोच्यते इति इदमुक्तं वाक्यकारेण 'संज्ञासमासनिर्देशात् सर्वप्रसङ्गोऽनुदेशस्य'। तत्र यथासंख्यादेवं प्रतिपद्येरन् इति तिपो णल् भवति, तसः अतुस् भवति, इत्यतः समासनिर्देशो न कल्पशक्यः(?) संबन्धयितुम् इत्येतदाचष्टे समासनिर्देशोऽयमिति।

[३] यद्यपि [तावत्] लोक एष दृष्टान्तः यद्यपि लोके दर्शनम्। दृष्टान्तस्यापि तु दर्शनस्यापि तु। पुरुषारम्भ इति। अपूर्वमिदमप्रसिद्धं लोके आरम्भसाध्यमिति कथ्यते।

[४] कौ पुनः टकितौ भवतः इति। एतत्पृच्छति — यस्य टकितौ [अ]भिधीयेते कौ तौ तस्य भवतः? किंभूतः आदिर्भवति, अन्तो वा? आगमावित्याह। अवस्थित आर्धधातुके पश्चाद्विधीयमानोऽवयवान्तरमनिवर्तयन्नवयवत्वं प्रतिपद्यते इत्येतदाचष्टे।

[५] युक्तं पुनः [यत्] नित्येष्विति। शास्त्रसिद्धान्तोऽयं न भवतीत्येतत् ब्रवीति। अथ केनचित्प्रकारेण इतव्य एवायं स्वभावतः, किमनेन इट् भवतीति? अथ युक्तं यन्नित्येषु शब्देष्विति। यथैवास्ति[मपमृद्य भवतिं] प्रतिपद्यसे नित्येऽपि शब्द, एवमागममपि प्रतिपद्यस्वेति। शब्दान्तरैरिह भवितव्यमिति। नैवास्तिमपमृद्य भवतिः क्रियते। किं तर्हि? अस्तेः प्रसङ्गे इत्यर्थः।

[६] आदेशास्तर्हीमे भविष्यन्तीति। नैवेयं परिभाषा। संज्ञासंज्ञिसंबन्धोऽयम् — आद्यन्तयोष्टकारककाराविती संज्ञे भविष्यतः इति। आद्यर्थस्यान्तार्थस्य च संज्ञा, अर्थपदार्थयोरेवोपादानात्। 'इति'शब्दो वा स्मर्यते। यद्येवं, टकारककारयोः [इत्]संज्ञा न प्राप्नोति। न हीदानीं टकारककारावाद्यन्तौ भवतः। इत्संज्ञौ च संज्ञेति प्रतिज्ञातम्। तत्रेत्संज्ञकानां यो देशस्तद्देशत्वादिद्धर्मेण व्यपदिष्टौ निवृत्तिसामान्याच्च यथेत्संज्ञो निवर्तते एवमेतावपि इति। तेन इडिति यष्टकारः तेनाद्यर्थ उपस्थाप्यः इत्येतदुक्तं भवति इट्, भवतीति। सर्वस्मिंश्चादेशे इकारादौ प्रसक्ते स्थानेऽन्तरतमत्वात्तव्यस्य इतव्यो भवतीति।

[७] इह तु कथं— .... अड्डुदात्तः (पा. ६. ४. ७१) इति? एवं मन्यते — अडिति बहुव्रीहौ सति अकारादिरादेश इति। अत्राङ्गस्य प्रत्यायनात् उदात्तश्रुतिरङ्गे संपतति। एवं च सत्यनियतोदात्तमङ्गं प्राप्नोति इति। त्रिपदोऽयं बहुव्रीहिरिति वाक्य एवाकार उदात्तं विशेषणं प्रतिपद्यते — अकारः उदात्त आदिरस्येति। तेन वृत्तावपि तत् शक्यानुगमं भवतीति यथा चित्रगुरिति। यत्र तर्हि अनुवृत्त्या। न हि तत्र शब्द उच्चार्यते। किं तर्हि? अनुमीयते, इत्यभिप्रायः। यदा त्विदं दर्शनं तत्सदृशस्य शब्दान्तरस्यानुमानात् वाक्यान्तरमुपजायते इति तदा न दोषः, अत्र च हेतुवाक्यमिदम् 'आडजादीनाम्' (पा. ६. ४. ७२) इत्येवंभूतमिदं वाक्यम् आड्डुदात्तोऽजादीनामिति।

[८] अथ वा, यत्तावदयं सामान्येन शक्नोत्युपदेष्टुमिति परिभाषापक्षेऽपि समाधिमाह। इहास्ति केचित् सकारमात्रमुपदिश्य पित्सु अडागमं विदधति, केचित् अकारस्य लोपम् अपित्सु वचनेषु। एवमयमाचार्यः तव्यादिवलाद्यार्धधातुक[म्] उदा[त्ता]भ्यश्चानुदात्ताभ्यश्च प्रकृतिभ्य उपदिश्य उदात्ताभ्य इटं विदधदेतत्प्रतिपादयति — उदात्तेभ्यो धातुभ्य इतव्यः प्रत्यय इति। एवं च कृत्वाह (तेन) तेन विशेषेण शब्दान्तरं समुदायं प्रतिपद्यते इति। समुदायग्रहणमेतमर्थम् — न तव्यादाववस्थिते पश्चादिकार आगच्छतीति। किं तर्हि? समुदाय एवेकारविशिष्ट इति। तद्यथा खदिरबर्बुरयोरिति। यत्सामान्यं मन्यसे [इ]त्येतदपेक्षा षष्ठी। किं पुनस्तयोः सामान्यम्? खदिरबर्बुरौ गौरकाण्डौ सूक्ष्मपर्णाविति। समुदायमेव विशिष्टं प्रतिपद्यन्त इत्येतदाचष्टे। एवमिहापीकारो नाधीयते नाप्यपनीयते आर्धधातुकान्तरात्, किं तु कस्याश्चित् प्रकृतेरित[व्य]ः, कस्याश्चित्प्रकृतेस्त[व्य] इति।

[९] अथ वैतयानुपूर्व्या ... उपदिशति इति। सर्वोपलवम् (?) एवेदानीमुपन्यस्यति। योऽयं विभागो भवताश्रितः पूर्वं प्रकृतिः पश्चात्प्रत्ययस्तत इ[डि]ति, सर्वमेतत् प्रतिपादनोपायमात्रम, न हि भूत (? भूतार्थ) एव इति। भूवादयः केचिदपि [न] भवन्ति प्रयोगशब्दस्य भवत्यादेः, शपि वर्तमाने लडित्येवमादिः। किं तर्हि? उपाया एते प्रयोगस्य। न च शास्त्र उपायनित्यता प्रतिज्ञाता। किं तर्हि? प्रयोगनित्यता प्रतिज्ञाता। न च प्रयोगोपनिपातिनि समुदाये एष विभागोऽस्ति। पूर्वं प्रकृतिः पश्चात् प्रत्ययस्तत इडागम इत्येतत्पूर्वकं तु समुदायं प्रतिपद्यते। संक्षेपत एतत्प्रदर्शयति — अनृतेन सत्यं प्रतिपद्यस्वेति।

[१०] टकितोराद्यन्तविधाने प्रत्ययप्रतिषेधः । 'आद्यन्तविधान' इति शास्त्रं संबध्यते 'आद्यन्तौ टकितौ' इति । आद्यन्ते वा आदित्वस्य विधाने टित्व-कित्वयोः = प्रत्ययस्य टितः टित्त्वस्य वा प्रतिषेधो वक्तव्यः 'आद्यन्तौ टकितावप्रत्यया-वि'ति । परवचनात् सिद्धम् । परवचनादिति 'विप्रतिषेधे परम्' इत्यस्मात्परवचनात् प्रत्ययस्य परत्वं भविष्यति । आद्यन्ताविल्यस्यावकाश 'इट् वलादेः' (पा. ७. २. ३५), 'भियो हेतुभये षुक्' (पा. ७. ३. ४०) इति । प्रत्ययपरत्वस्यापि 'तव्यत्तव्यानीय[र]ः' (पा. ३. १. ९६) इति । इहोभयं प्राप्नोति 'चरेष्टः' (पा. ३. २. १६), 'आतोऽनुपसर्गे कः' (पा. ३. २. ३) इति । अथ वा, परवचनादिति 'प्रत्ययः', 'परः' (पा. ३. १. १, २) इत्यस्मादेव परवचनात् विप्रतिषेधोपसंहितात् इत्येवं वर्ण्यते । अथ वा, परवचनादिति यः परः स प्रत्ययसंज्ञः, सति च प्रत्ययपरत्वे टकारककारयोरित्संज्ञा, सत्यां चेत्सं[ज्ञा]यां टित्-किद्-व्यपदेशः, टित्-किद्-व्यपदेशे सत्यादित्वमन्तत्वं चेति नास्ति प्र[त्य]यस्य आदित्वमन्तत्वं वा ।

एवं तु बहुजादीनां प्रत्ययत्वं व्याहन्येत । तस्मान्न परत्वप्रतिबद्धः प्रत्ययः । तेन परेण भवितव्यम्; अस्यापवादः पुरस्तात्, प्राक् टेः, अचः पर इति । अन्ये वर्णयन्ति — पञ्चम्या परत्वे सिद्धे पुनः परग्रहणमेवमर्थम्, बाधनार्थम् । तेन परत्वाप-वादः आद्यन्तौ टकिताविति पुनः परग्रहणात् बाध्यते । तस्मात् प्रत्ययः परो भविष्यतीति । विप्रतिषेधस्तु यथोद्देशं संज्ञापरिभाषमित्येतस्मिन् पक्षे उक्तः, कार्यकाले तु 'चरेष्टः' इत्येकवाक्यभावात् पूर्वपरत्वं दुर्लभमेव ।

[११] परवचनात्सिद्धमिति चेत् नापवादत्वात् । एवं मन्यते — षष्ठी-निर्देशे वा टित्-कितौ, प्रत्ययाधिकारे वा । तत्र षष्ठीनिर्देशे 'षष्ठी स्थानेयोगा' (पा. १. १. ४९) इत्येतदस्ति । इतरत्रापि प्रत्ययपरत्वम् । एवं च सति नाप्राप्तेऽ[न्य]-स्मिन्निदमारभ्यते इति यथैव स्थानेयोगत्वं बाधत एवं प्रत्ययपरत्वमपि । दृष्टान्तं चोपादत्ते — तद्यथा 'मिद्चोऽन्त्यात्पर' इत्ययं योगो 'नपुंसकस्य झलचः' (पा. ७. १. ७२) इति, 'रुधादिभ्यः श्नम्' (पा. ३. १. ७८) इति च प्रवर्तमानं स्थानेयोगं प्रत्ययपरत्वं च बाधते ।

[१२] विषम उपन्यासः । इह यद्यपि लक्षणमसंदिग्धं, यत्तु निमित्तं तस्य संदेहादपवादोऽपि संदिग्धप्राप्तित्वाद्दुर्बलोऽनुमीयते । तथा चोक्तं 'तातङि ङित्करणस्य

सावकाशत्वम्' (तु. पा. १. १. ५३, वा. १) इति। ङित्त्वं हि सर्वादेशापवादः। यत् [तु] तातङो ङित्त्वं तत् संदिह्य[ते], प्रयोजनान्तरस्य संभवात्। गुणप्रतिषेधार्थमपि ङित्त्वं संभवति इति संदिह्यते — किमस्य ङित्त्वं गुणनिवृत्त्यर्थमथान्त्यप्रतिपत्त्यर्थम्? निमित्ते संदिह्यमाने संदिग्धनिमित्तं लक्षणं यथानङादिषु एवं तातङि न प्रवर्तेत, इति द्वयोः संदिह्यमानयोः विप्रतिषेध उक्तः। एवमिहापि 'चरेष्टः' इति यदि तन्निमित्तमाद्यन्तपरिभाषायास्तत्संदिह्यते, किमीकारार्थमथाद्यर्थम्, इति यथा इडागमादिषु प्रवर्तेत एवमिहापि प्रवर्तेत; श्रमादीनां तु व्यवस्थितं प्रयोजनान्तराभावादसंदिग्धमिति निमित्तं लक्षणं चासंदिग्धे ततश्चापवादत्वं युक्तमितीदमाह — **विषम उपन्यास** इति।

[१३] **प्रयोजनं नाम [तद्] वक्तव्यं यन्नियोगतः स्यात् तत्प्रयोजनम्।** स (?) चेह निमित्तं यदनपेक्ष्य किंचित्प्रवर्तते, यथा 'कमेर्णिङ्' (पा. ३. १. ३०) इति ङित्करणमात्मनेपदार्थं, वृद्धिप्रतिषेधार्थं, सामान्यग्रहणाविघातार्थं वान्यनिरपेक्षं प्रवर्तते। णकारः सामान्यग्रहणे वृद्धौ च। एवमिह तातङो ङित्त्वं न ङित्त्वमात्रादेव गुणप्रतिषेधे प्रवर्तते। किं तर्हि? सति सर्वादेशे। एवं टित्त्वस्यापि प्रयोजनं शक्यं वक्तुं तदा यदि परः, संभवति ततष्टित्त्वमीकारस्य निमित्तमिति। यस्मात् प्रयोजनात् संदिग्धत्वं टित्त्वस्य परिगृह्यते, तदेव प्रयोजनं परत्वप्रतिबद्धमित्यतः संदेहनिमित्तमित्यसंदेहात् परत्वमनेन बाधितव्यम् इति इदमुच्यते — **नापवादत्वादिति**।

[१४] कथं कृत्वेदमुच्यते — 'परवचनात् सिद्धम्' इति? टित ईकारप्रयोजनसंभवं दृष्ट्वा। संभवतीदं प्रयोजनं परभूतेऽवतिष्ठमाने टित्करणस्य, यदि लभ्येत कथंचित्परत्वमिति संभवमात्रमाश्रित्येदं प्रस्तुतम्। इतरत्र त्वत्यन्तपरत्वे मित्त्वमपरुध्यते। यदा तु तावत्काला प्रवृत्तिराश्रीयते, न प्रयोजनसंभवात्, तदानुपजातमेव निमित्तमीकारस्य। स हि परत्वप्रतिबद्धः। तस्मान्न परत्वप्रतिपत्तिरितरेतराश्रयत्वात्। इदमेवाप्रतिबद्धं सति निमित्ते टित्त्वे किमिति न प्रवर्तिष्यत इति [इ]दमुक्तं 'प्रयोजनं नाम [तद्] वक्तव्यम्' इति।

अथ वा, परवचनात् सिद्धमिति — टित ईकारो भवतीत्येवं तत्रावस्थितं टिदन्तादिति। यदि च प्रत्यय आदिः स्यात्, टिदन्ताभावादीकार एव न स्यात्। तस्माद्वैपरीत्येनेदमेव प्रत्ययपरत्वं बाधकं स्यादिति। अयं तूभयवन्तमाश्रित्य ब्रवीति — 'प्रयोजनं नाम [तद्] वक्तव्यम्' इति। एतमेवार्थमनेन भाष्येण कथयति — **कुतस्त्वेतत् टित्करणादयं परो भविष्यति, न पुनरादिः** इति। कुतः प्रयोजनसंभव

आश्रीयते, न पुनस्तावत्कालः प्रवृत्तिसंभवः ? एकान्तेनाश्रीयमाणे टित ईकारवचनसामर्थ्ये **टितः खल्वपि एष परिहारः** टित एवेत्यर्थः । तत्रादित्वं परत्वप्रविरोधीति विप्रतिषेध उपपद्यते ।

[१५] **कितस्त्वपरिहारः** [अवयवरूपे]णोत्पत्तौ लिङ्गं चास्ति 'नेटि' (पा. ७. २. ४) इति प्रतिषेधः । समीपवचने हि व्यवधानादेवाप्राप्तिः स्यात् । न चावयवः समुदायात्परः इति शक्यः प्रतिपत्तुम् । अथ समासान्ताः कथं समासैकदेशाः सन्तः प्रत्ययपरत्वं प्रतिपद्यन्ते ? एवमिहापि धातुमवस्थाप्य ततः परोऽयमिति प्रतिपद्यस्व, अस्यायमन्तः भवत्विति । तत्रायं दोषः — **आध्योः प्रध्योर्** इति किं धात्वेकदेश इति धातुयणमिति विभक्त्युदात्तत्वं प्रतिषिध्येत, यथा खलप्व इति । एवमाधी इति 'एरनेकाच ....' (पा. ६. ४. ८२) इति यणादेशः स्यात् ।

[१६] **टि[त]श्चाप्यपरिहारः** । प्रयोजनसंभवेऽपि परिगृहीते यश्च स्यादित प्रति (?) । **क्वायं स्यादिति** ।

य उभयवान् 'गापोष्टक्' इति । अत्र हि आद्यन्तयोर्निमित्ते टि[त्त्व]कित्त्वे स्तः । तत्र टिदादिरित्यस्यावकाशः 'इड् वलादेः' (पा. ७. २. ३५) इति । किदन्त इत्यस्यापि 'भियो हेतुभये षुक्' (पा. ७. ३. ४०) । इहोभयं प्राप्नोति 'गापोष्टक्' इति शब्दपरविप्रतिषेधादन्त इत्येतत् भवति । ततश्च टिदन्तादीकारः सिद्धः । 'चरेष्टा'दिषु परत्वं नास्तीत्यपरिहारोऽयं 'परवचनात्सिद्धम्' इति ।

[१७] **सिद्धं तु षष्ठ्यधिकारे वचनात्** (वा. ३) । स्थानेषष्ठ्यधिकारे चायं योगो वक्तव्य इति । यत्र स्थानषष्ठी तत्र टित्कितौ आद्यन्तौ भवतः । प्रत्ययाधिकारे या षष्ठी परत्वेन विरोधात् इति गापोष्टगिति अत्रापि नास्त्यन्तस्य प्रवृत्तिः ।

[१८] **आद्यन्तयोर्वा षष्ठ्यर्थत्वात्** .... (वा. ४) इति । अर्थशब्दो नाभिधेयवचनः, न ह्याद्यर्थः षष्ठ्याभिधेयः । तस्मात्प्रयोजनवचनोऽर्थशब्दः । आद्यन्तयोः षष्ठीप्रयोजनत्वात् **तदभावे षष्ठ्यभावे** प्रतिपद्यामहे — आद्यन्तौ नूनं प्रयोजकं नास्ति, येन प्रयोज्या षष्ठी प्रक्लृप्येतेति ।

इतरः षष्ठी यस्मान्नास्ति तस्मादाद्यर्थोऽपि नास्तीति ब्रुवता शब्दपूर्वोऽर्थोऽभ्युपगतो भवतीत्याह — **युक्तं पुनर्यत् शब्दनिमित्तको नामेति** । इतरः शब्दाभावोऽर्थाभावस्यानुमानमर्थपूर्वक एव तु शब्द इत्येतदाचष्टे — **अर्थनिमित्तक एव शब्द** इति ।

यदि चाद्यन्तार्थः प्रक्रान्तोऽभविष्यत् षष्ठीमेवोदचारयिष्यत् । तस्मादेव प्रतिपत्तव्यम् — आद्यन्तौ टकितावेतद्वर्जमिति । किं च षष्ठी प्रत्यक्षपक्षः आद्यर्थप्रतिपत्तौ, अनुमानपक्षोऽयं टित्त्वात् कित्त्वाच्चेति । तस्माद्युक्तमुच्यते 'तदभावेऽसंप्रत्ययः' (वा. ४) इति । यत्र तु प्रत्ययविधौ षष्ठ्यस्ति, सापि पञ्चम्यर्थे । अथ वा, सुपां सुपो भवन्तीति । अथ वा, गापोर्यो धातुस्तस्मात्, कपिञ्जाल्योर्यत् प्रातिपदिकं तस्मात् इति प्रत्ययोत्पादिका पञ्चम्येव, न षष्ठी ।

मिदचोऽन्त्यात् परः ॥ १. १. ४७ ॥

[१] किमर्थमिदमुच्यते ... स्थानपरप्रत्ययापवादः । परस्य प्रत्य[य]स्यापवाद इति धर्मप्रतिषेधो, न धर्मिप्रतिषेधः । पर इत्येवं वा यः प्रत्ययो = यत्संविज्ञानम्, तस्य प्रतिषेधोऽनेन विज्ञानेनान्त्यादचः पर इति । गुणवचनो वा परशब्दः अन्तरेण भावप्रत्ययम् । प्रत्ययस्य परत्वं प्रत्ययपर इति । राजदन्तादित्वात्पूर्वनिपातः । भाष्यकारस्तु अक्षरार्थमनादृत्यार्थं व्याचष्टे प्रत्ययपरत्वस्य चापवाद इति ।

[२] किमर्थं पुनरिदं नोक्तं पुरस्तादपवादा इति? इदं च सिद्धमेवं स्यात् प्रत्ययौ टित्कितौ परौ भवतो, न पुनराद्यन्तौ इति । स्थानेयोगत्वस्य बाधितत्वान्न प्रत्ययपरत्वस्य । एवं मन्यते — न्यायोऽयं कथम्? शास्त्रापेक्षायां प्रवृत्तौ भेदेन च व्यपेक्षायां यः प्रथमस्तस्मिन्नेव प्रवर्तितव्यम्, उत्तरस्य च वृत्तान्तो न तावत् ज्ञायत इति । प्रयोगापेक्षायां समुदायापेक्षायां वा प्रयोगे पौर्वापर्याभावात्, समुदायस्य चानन्तर्यादिदं नास्ति पुरस्तादिति वानन्तर इति वा । एवं मध्य इति पूर्वस्मिन्नपूर्वस्मिन् उपलब्धे कक्षाप्रवृत्तिः, न तु परस्मिन्ननुपलब्ध इति ।

[३] अयं चेद[त्र] न्यायो नास्ति, कुतः 'श्नमो मित्करणात्' इति? [श्नमो] मित्त्वं कुतो निर्ज्ञातम्? प्रयोगात् — रुणद्धि, भिनत्तीति । एवं ह्युक्तं 'वृत्तज्ञो ह्याचार्योऽनुबन्धानासजति' [मभा. १. २६६. २०–२१] इति । एवं 'ङित्यभस्याप्यनुबन्धकरणसामर्थ्यात्' [मभा. ३. २२५. १५] इति । अथ वा, शास्त्रमप्रतिबद्धं संज्ञां प्रतिपादयति । तत्पूर्वकश्च लोपः प्रवृत्तः । किं पुनरस्य प्रयोजनमिति विचारणायाम् इदं प्रतिपद्यते — विशिष्टदेशत्वमधिकारप्राप्तंपरत्वमपकृष्य 'मिदचोऽन्त्यात्परः' इत्येतत्संबध्यते इत्यनेन दर्शनेन पूर्वत्रायं योगो दृष्टान्तत्वेनोपन्यस्तो 'यथा मिदचोन्त्यात्पर इत्येष योगः' इति ।

[४] कुण्डानि वनानि। 'नपुंसकस्य झलचः' (पा. ७. १. ७२) इति। तत्र यदि नपुंसकस्येत्येतदुक्तं भवति — यथा 'रुहः पः' (पा. ७. ३. ४३) इति रुहेर्हस्य इत्येवं प्राप्ते स्थानेयोगत्वेऽयमपवाद आरभ्यते। अत्र विचार्यते — एकैवेयं षष्ठी नपुंसकस्य इति। तत्र यदि नपुंसकस्येत्यज्विशेषणार्था षष्ठी, नास्ति स्थानेयोगत्वम्। अथ स्थानेयोगत्वम्, अचो विशेषणत्वं नैव संभवति। यथा मिद् इग्विशेषणे नास्ति स्थानेयोगत्वम्। सत्यम्, एवमेतत्। यदा त्वेतावदुपादीयते, नपुंसकस्याजन्तस्याचः परो भवतीति, न पुनरङ्गस्येति एतत्संबन्धिनः अनेन किंचिदपेक्षितं, न तदा स्थानेयोगत्वमस्ति शब्दोपादानम्, संनिधानात् त्वङ्गस्येत्येतत्संबन्धिनमचमन्त्यं प्रतिपद्यते।

[५] भवेदिदं युक्तमुदाहरणं कुण्डानीति। अत्र ह्यचि निवर्तिते संभवो नास्ति यदचोऽन्यात्परः स्यात्। इह त्वस्ति संभवः पयांसीति। निवर्त्य सकारमन्त्यादचः परः स्यादिति।

[६] नैवेश्वरश्चाज्ञापयतीति। शास्त्रे काचिदारब्धा बाधा 'विप्रतिषेधे परम्' (पा. १. ४. २) इति। काचिन्नैवारब्धा 'नित्यमनित्यं बाधत' इति। इयं च 'पक्षेऽन्तरङ्गं बलीयो भवती[ति]'। इयमपि नारब्धा शास्त्रे, [लो]के ह्यारब्धा स्यात् इति। लोकेऽपि त्वनारब्धा। नैवेश्वर आज्ञापयती[ति] दृष्टार्थत्वमाचष्टे। ईश्वरवचनं दृष्टमेवार्थं वधादिमुद्दिश्यानुतिष्ठन्ति। धर्मसूत्रकाराणां त्वदृष्टमर्थमिदं भक्ष्यमिदमभक्ष्यमिदमनेन व्याचष्टे।

[७] किं तर्हि? लौकिकोऽयं दृष्टान्त इति। लौकिकमेतत्प्रदर्शनमिति। दर्शनं दृष्टान्त इत्याह। अथ वा, यद्वक्ष्यमाणं तस्य प्रतिनिर्देशः — तद्यथा दधि ब्राह्मणेभ्यो दीयतामिति। लोके ह्यर्थप्रकरणान्तरेणापि यः कश्चिदुक्तो 'दधि ब्राह्म[णे]भ्यो दीयतां तक्रं कौण्डिन्याय' इति, न जातु कश्चित् कौण्डिन्याय दधि ददाति। तस्मा[द्] दर्शनमेव हेतुः। नात्रोपपत्तिर्वक्तव्या, यथाग्नेरौष्ण्यं नोपपत्तित उच्यते।

[८] उपपत्तिम[द]पि तु क्रियते। (१) इह तु 'दधि ब्राह्मणेभ्य' इति यो ब्राह्मणशब्दः स किं कौण्डिन्ये तात्पर्येण प्रवृत्तो,ऽथ नान्तरीयकत्वात्, यथा 'ग्रामं गच्छन् कुड्यमूलमुपमर्द' इत्येवं प्रवृत्त इति। तक्रदाने तु तात्पर्येणोपात्त इति। यस्मिंश्च नान्तरीयकत्वं यस्मिंश्च तात्पर्यम्, न [त]योः समुदायो वा विकल्पो [वा] युक्त इति। (२) अथ वा, ब्राह्मणशब्दः कौण्डिन्ये संदिह्यते। अस्ति हि ब्राह्मणशब्दः कौण्डिन्योपग्राह्यन्यस्याप्युपग्राही। तत्र कोऽत्र प्रयुक्त इति संदिह्यते।

संदिग्धासंदिग्धयोश्च तुल्यवत् प्रसंख्यानानुपपत्तिः । (३) अथ वा, ब्राह्मणशब्दस्य न पदार्थः कौण्डिन्यः, रूपं तु संभवति; कौण्डिन्यशब्दस्य तु पदार्थ एव । न च प्रत्यक्षानुमानिकयोः समकक्षत्वं युक्तमिति ।

[८.१] अत्रैवोच्यते — न कौण्डिन्यप्रयुक्तं दधिदानमिति ब्रूमः । किं तर्हि ? ब्राह्मणप्रयुक्तम् । अस्ति कौण्डिन्ये प्रवृत्तिः ब्राह्मण्यसङ्गात् तात्पर्येणासंहतदेन-शब्दार्थयो च(?) । तत्र यथैव कौण्डिन्यत्वात्तक्रं प्रतिपद्यत एवं दध्यपि ब्राह्मण्यात् कथं न प्रतिपद्यते ? इति ।

[८.२] (४) अतोऽप्राप्त्यनुमानं बाधेत्येव बाधालक्षणं परिगृह्यते नैयायिकैः । अप्राप्तिश्च नोपजन्यते स्वभावात् । अप्राप्तौ विधिरनुमीयते । तद्यथा — दधि ब्राह्मणेभ्यो दीयताम्, कौण्डिन्याय न दातव्यमिति । सामान्यविशेषभावेन ददाति-निवृत्तिश्च श्रूयते । यदि ब्राह्मण्यात् ददातिः प्रवर्तते एकान्तेन, प्रतिषेधश्रुतिर्बाधिता । अथ विकल्पेन, कदाचि[द्] दीयते कदाचिन्न दीयते, पक्षे निवृत्तिर्बाध्यते । समुदायेनाशक्या प्रतिपत्तिः ददातिनिवृत्त्योर्विरोधादिति प्रतिषेधप्राप्तेरनुमानम् । यद्यपि द्वाव[पि] विधी–सामान्ये विशेषे [च] — दधि ब्रा[ह्म]णेभ्यस्तक्रं कौण्डिन्यायेति, तदापि यथा धूमवतो धूमोऽनुमितो(°तौ) [अ]नुमानत्वेनावतिष्ठते, एवं निवृत्तिवाक्ये सामान्य-विशेषभावोऽस्ति । तस्मात् अत्राप्यप्राप्त्यनुमानमिति अप्राप्तिः प्रतिपद्यते ।

[८.३] (५) अथ वा, दधि ब्राह्मणेभ्यो दीयताम् इत्याकृतावन्यूनायामपरिपूर्णायां [च] शब्दः प्रवर्तमानः कौण्डिन्ये विकलेऽपि प्रवर्तत इति दध्यपि प्राप्नोतीत्येतच्चिन्त्य[म्] । तत्र यथैव 'ब्राह्मणा भोज्यन्ताम्' इत्यत्र माठरकौण्डिन्यौ परिवेविष्टामिति परिवेषणरूपेणोच्यमानौ नानुमानशब्दात् भोजनेऽन्तर्भवतः, एवं तक्रकर्मकः (? °के दाने) कौण्डिन्यः संप्रदानत्वेनोच्यमानो नान्तर्भवति दधिदान इति ।

[८.४] (६) एवं ताव[द्] द्वौ ददाती इति कृत्वोक्तम् । अन्ये मन्यन्ते — एक एवायं ददातिर्भिन्नकर्मको भिन्नसंप्रदानकश्च । यस्यां चावस्थायां ददातेरेको भागो दध्ना विष्यते(?), तदैवैको भागस्तक्रेणेति । शब्दः प्र(? °ब्दप्र)वृत्तिकाले नास्ति विच्छेद इतीदमवसीयते त्यक्तः कौण्डिन्यो दधिदान इति । अयं तु परमार्थः — एक एवायमर्थो (?) लोके विद्यमानोऽदेशविभागः पदार्थवदुपचर्यते । अयं च लोकस्य वाक्यार्थः — कौण्डिन्यं वर्जयित्वान्येभ्यो ब्राह्मणेभ्यो दधि दीयताम्, कौण्डिन्याय तु तक्रमिति ।

[९] अन्त्यात्पूर्वो मस्जेः (वा. २)। अचोऽन्त्यात् मिदुक्त इत्यपूर्वमिदमारभ्यते, बहूनां च संयोगसंज्ञा इत्यस्मिन्पक्षे इदमुच्यते। किमर्थमुदाहरणद्वयमुपात्तं भङ्क्ता इति च मग्न इति वा ? यद्यपि अनुषङ्गलोपे यत्नः क्रियेत — अनुपधास्थस्य च मस्जेरिति, तथापि मग्न इति सिद्धं स्यात्; इदं तु न सिध्यति मङ्क्तेति।

[१०] भर्जिमर्च्योश्च (वा. ३) इति। ऊमीमिति। मरीचिशब्दो बाह्वादिषु इति। अवश्यमयं पठितव्यः, मरीचेरपत्यं मारीचिरिति। भरुजशब्दोऽप्यङ्गुल्यादिषु बा(ब)ह्वादिष्वपि, 'भरुज चन्द्रभागा नद्याम्' इति। तेन भवति भारुजिको भारुजिरिति (? भरुजीति)।

[११] स्वयमेव पक्षानुपपादयति — यद्यन्त इति वर्तते। तेनाचामन्त्यात् परोऽन्त इत्येतद्वाक्यमुपस्क्रियते। [परः] सन्नन्तः किमवयवस्याहोस्वित् समुदायस्येति, यथान्तिमे निगमयिष्यति — 'संघातभक्तोऽसौ नोत्सहत ....' इति, अतोऽवसीयते संघातभक्तोऽयमिति।

अथादिरिति वर्तते, ततः परादिः। न हि संभवतिस्ति (? °वोऽस्ति) यदचोऽन्त्यात्परः स्यात् पूर्वस्य चादिरिति आद्यनुवृत्तौ परादित्वमवसीयते इति।

[११.१] (१) अभक्ते .... कुण्डानि वनानि, नान्तमङ्गं न संभवतीति। ननु च 'तदादिग्रहणं स्यादिनुमर्थम्' (पा. १. ४. १३, वा. १) इत्युक्तम्। अस्मिंश्च पक्षे नुमर्थं [तत्] स्मर्तव्यम्, पूर्वान्ते तु सिद्धमिति। परादावपि दीर्घः सिद्धः, 'अतो दीर्घो यञि', 'सुपि च' (पा. ७. ३. १०१–१०२) इति वक्ष्यति। अस्थीनीति न सिध्यति।

(२) अग्ने त्रीति। प्रातिपदिकान्तो नकारो न भवति। छान्दसः पुंवद्भावो भविष्यतीति, शिभावो दुर्लभः। अथ वर्णलोपः, तस्य सिद्धत्वान्नोपधाया इति दीर्घत्वं न प्राप्नोति। शक्यं तु वक्तुं मध्ये नामायं दृश्यत इत्यतिबहु स्मर्तव्यम्।

(३) सर्वाणि ज्योतींषि। नुमा सुपो व्यवधाना[दा]नन्तर्यं नास्ति। पूर्वान्तत्वे सर्वशब्दग्रहणेन ग्रहणम्, परादौ सुब्ग्रहणे[ना]स्त्यानन्तर्यम्।

(४) क्रियते न्यास एव इति। एतदुक्तं भवति — अवश्यं कर्तव्यं नुम्ग्रहणम्, यः प्रातिपदिकनकारो न भवति, नापि वैभक्तस्तदर्थम्, प्राह्णिवदित्येवमर्थम्।

(५) द्विषंतपः । प्रसङ्गेनोदाहृतमित्येवं वर्णयन्ति । अयं हि तन्मध्यपतितत्वात्तद्ग्रहणेन गृह्यते । संयोगान्तलोपश्चानुस्वारेऽपि सिद्धः, इदानीमयं [प]दान्त इति सिद्धोऽनुस्वारः । इदं तूदाहरणं परंतप इति ।

(६) शीभावश्च न सिध्यति । जतुनी — नित्यत्वाच्च परत्वाच्च नुमि कृते व्यवधानान् नपुंसकस्याप्राप्तिः शीभावस्येति ।

[११. २] (१) परादौ गुणवृद्ध्यौत्व .... । .... त्रपुणे । ङ् इत्यस्य सोऽयं ङिदित्यस्मिन् प[क्षे] दोषो, यदा ङ् एव इत् ङित् इति तदा 'वर्णे यत् स्यात्तच्च विद्यात्तदादौ' इति ङिदादौ भवितव्यम् ।

(२) अनुस्वारश्च न सिध्यति । अत्रापि द्विषंतप इत्यनुदाहरणम् । परादित्वे हि तकारमयं भक्तः, स च पदान्त इति तद्भक्तोऽपि मुम् पदान्तव्यपदेशं लप्स्यते इति ।

(३) शीभावे नकारप्रतिषेधः । नकारस्य शीभावे या निवृत्तिस्तस्याः प्रतिषेधो वक्तव्यः । निर्दिश्यमानस्यादेशा भवन्तीति यथा 'पादः पद्' (पा. ६. ४. १३०) इत्यत्र पादन्तस्य न भवति । किं तर्हि ? करणसंनिपातिनो रूपस्य श्रूयमाणस्य । एवमिहापि नौशब्दस्यौकारान्तस्य न भवति । किं तर्हि ? यदेव रूपमौ इति श्रुतिसंनिपाति तस्यैवेति । यस्तर्हि निर्दिश्यते तस्य ... कस्मान्न भवति ? नुमा व्यवहितत्वात् । श्रुतिसंनिपातिनो रूप आश्रीयमाणे व्यवहितत्वादिति। तत्रायं वाक्यार्थो — नकारप्रतिषेध इति नकारनिमित्तः प्रतिषेधोऽस्येति ।

[११. ३] पूर्वान्ते नपुंसकोपसर्जनह्रस्वत्वं द्विगुस्वरश्च । नपुंसके नुमा संभवादेतावद्वक्तव्यं नपुंसकह्रस्वत्वमिति । अयं त्वभिप्रायः — निष्कौशाम्बिनी इत्यत्र परत्वादुपसर्जनह्रस्वत्वेन भवितव्यमिति । नित्यत्वान्नुमि कृते परत्वाद्वोपसर्जनस्याजन्तता विहता इगन्तता चेति ह्रस्वस्वरौ न प्राप्नुतः ।

[११. ३. १] न वा बहिरङ्गलक्षणत्वात् । ह्रस्वत्वं विभक्तिनिरपे[क्षम्] । स्वरे चोक्तम् — 'पदग्रहणं परिमाणार्थम' (पा. ४. ३. १४०, वा. ४) इति । नुम् तु बाह्यार्थोपादानां विभक्तिमपेक्षत इति बहिरङ्गः ।

संघातभक्तोऽसाविति । समुदाये रूपान्तरयुक्ते नावयवाः स्वरूपं जहति । यथा शबलेऽवयविनि नावयवः शुक्लव्यपदेशं कृष्णव्यपदेशं वा न लभते, एवमङ्गे

नकारान्तरूपे अरत्निशब्दः किमितीगन्तरूपतां हास्यति ? स्वरश्चोत्तरपदे पूर्वपदस्यारभ्यत, इति इगन्तत्वमव्यावृत्तमिति सिद्धः स्वरः ।

एच इग्घ्रस्वादेशे ॥ १. १. ४८ ॥

[१. १] किमर्थमिदमुच्यते ? यस्य यस्य वचनमन्तरेण सोऽर्थः सिध्यति, यस्मिन्नारभ्यमाणे न सिध्यति, प्रसङ्गदोषो वा भवति तत्र [त]त्र प्रश्नः । इह त्वानर्थक्यात् प्रश्नः । यद्वक्ष्यमाणं 'सिद्धमेङः सस्थानत्वात्' (वा. ३), 'ऐचोश्चोत्तरभूयस्त्वात्' (वा. ४) इति ।

[१. २] त्रयश्चात्र प्रक्रियाभेदाः । नानावाक्यानामेकवाक्यता, भूतैकदेशनिवृत्तिः, एकशेषवच इति । एतांश्चोत्तरत्र भाष्य एव दर्शयिष्यामः ।

[१. ३] **सवर्णाकारनिवृत्त्यर्थम्** (वा. १)। **एङो ह्रस्वशासनेष्विति ।** प्रश्लिष्टाव[र्ण]त्वात् [एङः] सवर्णावैधैकाराधौकारौ स्याताम्, न तु विश्लि[ष्टा]वर्णस्यैच इत्युच्यते । नियतविषयाश्च वर्णाः, यथा ओ॑व्यापारः कस्यांचित् शाखायां नैव प्रयुज्यते, एवमेतावधैकाराधौकारावन्यत्राप्रयुक्ताविह तु प्रयुज्येयातामिति ।

[१. ४] **इमावैचौ समाहारवर्णाविति ।** समाहारक्रियमाणवर्णावयवत्वात् समाहारवर्णाविति व्यपदेशात् । **द्विमात्रावैचौ । मात्रा अवर्णस्येति ।** योऽसावष्टादशधा भिन्नः, तस्य या मात्रा = एकदेशः, सोऽवयवोऽस्येति । एवमिवर्णोवर्णयोरपि योज्यम् । **तयोर्ह्रस्वशासनेष्विति ।** एतदाचष्टे — निवर्तकमिदं शास्त्रम्, अन्यस्य तु विधायकमिति । ननु विवृत[त]त्वादैचः विवृता[विवृततरा]विदुतौ भविष्यतः, न तु संवृतोऽकारः । तत्र किमुच्यते 'कदाचिदवर्णं स्यात्' इति ? कथं तावद् विवृततरस्य विवृतौ भवतः ? अपि च स्थानकृतमान्तर्यं बलीयो भवतीति एतच्छास्त्रेऽवस्थितम् । तत्रेदुतोः करणे तालुस्थानतैव परिगृहीता कण्ठस्थानता परित्यक्तैवेति । तत्र स्थानग्रहणात् कदाचिदवर्णं स्यादित्युच्यते । अथ वाकारोऽपि शक्यते विवृततरः प्रवर्तयितुमित्यस्ति प्रसङ्गः, कृतप्रत्यापत्तिस्तु प्रयोक्ष्यत इति ।

[२. १] **दीर्घास्त्विकः प्राप्नुवन्ति ।** ह्रस्वश्रुत्यैकवाक्यतामवगच्छदिकः(?) केवलमपूर्वान् विदधाति इत्यान्तरतम्यात् ईकार ऊकारश्च प्राप्नोति, अतिरि अतिनु

इति। कथं पुनर्भाव्यमानेन सवर्णानां ग्रहणम्? यण (?येन) ग्रहणं संभवति, तस्मिंश्चोद्यते। केन च संभवति? उकारेणेति।

ननु च ह्रस्वादेश इत्युच्यते [ते]न दीर्घा न भविष्यन्ति। दीर्घे हि प्रवर्तमाने ह्रस्वादेशश्रुतिरनर्थिका स्यात्। तस्मादेतदुक्तं भवति 'एच इक् ह्रस्व आदेशो भवति' इति। इतरो यद्यस्य प्रयोजनान्तरं न स्यात्, प्रतिपद्येमहि। अस्ति तत्प्रयोजनम्। किम्? विषयार्थमेतत्स्यात्। एचो [ह्रस्व]प्रसङ्ग इति। ह्रस्वादेशे= ह्रस्वादेशविधौ, इदमुपतिष्ठते 'एच इग्भवति' इति। इतरथा हि ह्रस्वादेश इत्यस्यावचन इहापि प्राप्नोति — दे३वदत्तेति। तस्मात् ह्रस्वशासनविषये 'ह्रस्वो भवति' इति वाक्यभेदेनोपतिष्ठते, प्रातिपदिकस्य ह्रस्वो भवति, एचस्त्विग्भवतीत्येचोऽन्यत्र ह्रस्वो भवति। ततोऽनभिसंबन्धात् सर्वेकां प्रसङ्गे आन्तरतम्यात् द्विमात्रः प्राप्नोति इति। एतत्तु यथा दिग्यादेशो द्विर्वचनापवाद एवं ह्रस्वापवादोऽयं विधिरित्येवमुपात्तम्। अन्यथा तु पुनरपि [ह्रस्वः स्यात्]।

[२. २] प[रम]नयोर्न नानावाक्यत्वम्। ननु चैकवाक्यभावेऽनुवादः, ना[ना]वाक्य[भावे] विधिः? सत्यम्, एवमेतत्। किं त्वाकाङ्क्षावतो निराकाङ्क्षीकरणमयुक्तम्, अनेकक्रियोपादाने च गौरवमित्येकैव क्रियापेक्ष्यते। किं च, नानावाक्यत्वे कल्प्यमाने 'एच इग्' इत्यत्र 'ह्रस्वो नपुंसक' इत्यबाधितं भवत्यसंस्पर्शादस्येति।

ननु [चै]कवाक्यत्वे कल्प्यमाने 'एच इक् ह्रस्वो नपुंसके प्रातिपदिकस्य' इति ह्रस्वश्रुत्याचि स्थानित्वेनोपात्ते एजप्यन्तर्भूतः, स्थानित्वेन पुनरध्यारोप्यते, अध्यारोप्यमाणो ह्रस्वो भवत्येच इतीदमुक्तं भवति — ह्रस्वो नपुंसके भवत्येचस्त्विक् ह्रस्वो भवतीति, एवं हि कल्प्यमाने पृथक् प्रवृत्तिर्ह्रस्वशासनस्यानुगृहीता भवति।

[२. ३] अन्ये पुनरप्येवं वर्णयन्ति निवर्त[क]त्वादिति। अवस्थितस्यैव एच इगिति अनेनैतावत् क्रियते — इगवशिष्यते अनिक् निवर्त्यते इति, यथैकशेषे एकोऽवतिष्ठते अन्ये निवर्तन्त इति। नैवैचाम् इकां च स्थान्यादेशभावं वर्णयन्ति। यथाभूतश्चेगवस्थितस्तथाभूत एवावशिष्यते इत्यकारभागो निवर्ततेऽनिक्, इगवस्थाप्यते। यश्चावतिष्ठते ह्रस्व एव न दीर्घ इति। तस्मात्सुष्ठूच्यते — दीर्घाप्रसङ्गस्तु निवर्तकत्वादिति।

[२. ४] अत्र त्विदं चोद्यते — विवृततरत्वादिनिवपायो(?)र्विवृततरस्य श्रवणेन भवितव्यम्, अतिरि अतिनु इति। इह च भिन्नप्रयत्नत्वादसति सावर्ण्ये अतिरीन् इति सवर्णदीर्घत्वं न प्राप्नोति। उत्तरभूयस्त्वपक्षे चाध्यर्धमात्रस्य श्रवणं प्राप्नोति। प्रश्लिष्टावर्णयोश्चाशक्या विभागप्रतिपत्तिरिति।

[२. ५] नैष दोषः। विवृततरत्वं ह्यवर्णमुपाश्रित्य प्रवर्तते, यथा स्फटिकस्योपाश्रयवशात् तद्रूपम्। व्यपगतोपाश्रयस्य च स्वरूपेऽवस्थानम्। एवमवर्णमुपाश्रित्य च विवृत[तर]त्वम्, तदपगमे चास्य कथमिव स्यादिति विवृत एवावतिष्ठते। उत्तरभूयस्त्वपक्षे च प्रत्या[ख्या]तमेव सूत्रम्। प्रश्लिष्टावर्णयोरप्याचार्यो विभागं प्रतिपादयति, यथा हंसः क्षीरोदकं विभजतीति।

[२. ६] ऐचोश्चोत्तरभूयस्त्वादिति। इह ऐचः समुदायः कण्ठ्यतालव्यः। समुदायस्य च नास्ति ह्रस्व उभयस्थान इत्यान्तरतम्यं समुदायगतं न प्रतिपद्यते। किं तर्हि? यौ तावदवयवौ तयोरेकः कण्ठ्य एकस्तालव्यस्तत्र को वावयवो व्यपदेशे निमित्तम्, स च स्थानि[त्वेन] प्रकृ[तः] स्यात् इत्यस्यां विचारणायामिदमुच्यते — भूयसश्च ग्रहणानि भवन्तीति। योऽवयव आधिक्येनावस्थितः स व्यपदेशनिमित्तम्। तस्यार्धाधिक्यात्तदात्मकत्वं तस्य वर्णस्य लक्ष्यते, यस्तु न्यूनः [स] आगन्तुमि(?°रि)व विज्ञायते। इवर्णोवर्णमात्रा च भूयसी इति तालव्यप(?°व्यौष्ठ्यव्यप)देशं लभते स्थानी, न [कण्ठ्य]व्यपदेशं लभते यथा आम्रवनं(?°णं) शालवनमिति। सत्स्वन्येष्ववयवभूतेषु भूयस्त्वादाम्राः शालाश्च व्यपदेशहेतवो, नान्येऽवयवाः। एवं ब्राह्मणानां भूयस्त्वात्ते व्यपदेशहेतवो, नान्येऽवयवाः। मनुष्येषु च ग्रामशब्दो वर्तत इति दृष्टान्तः। सारण्यके हि ग्रामशब्दवाच्ये स्वामित्वेन व्यपदिश्येरन् — ब्राह्मणा[ना]मयं धर्म[ग्राम] इति।

षष्ठी स्थाने[योगा] ॥ १. १. ४९ ॥

[१] किमिदं स्थानेयोगेति। समासासमासयोर्युगपदसंभवात् [प्रश्नः]। सप्तमीश्रवणादसमासोऽयं स्याद्, योगेति च टाप उपादानात् समासः स्यात्। इतरथा हि युक्तिरि[ति] प्राप्नोतीत्याह — किमिदं स्थानेयोगेति।

स्थाने योगोऽस्याः सेयं स्थानेयोगा । समासेऽर्थप्रतिपत्तिरस्ति, असमासे त्वनुमानादप्यर्थप्रतिपत्तिर्नास्तीति समासनिर्देशोऽयमिति । **निपातनात्तु सप्तम्यलोपः** । एतदुक्तं भवति । प्रयोक्तव्योऽयं शब्द इति । तत्र स्थानेयोगविषयः संबन्धो, नान्यविषय इत्येतदाचष्टे । **तृतीयाया वा एत्वम् । स्थानेन योगोऽस्या** इति । '... आच्छे...' (पा. ७. १. ३९) इति यः शेभावस्तदेत्वमिति मन्यते । अस्य तु छान्दसत्वाद् भाषायां प्रयोगो दुःसंपादः ।

[१. १] दर्शनद्वयं च षष्ठीनिर्देशेषु । 'अस्तेर्भूः' (पा. २. ४. ५२) इति । एके मन्यन्ते — 'अस्तेः' इति या षष्ठी सा नैव भुवः संबन्धिनी । किं तर्हि ? स्थानप्रयुक्ता । आधेयत्वेन तु भवतिरुपादीयते इति । केचिद्धि शब्दा न स्वरूपाद् व्यतिरेकमुपजनयितुं शक्नुवन्ति । तद्यथा — देवदत्तस्य यज्ञदत्त इति । न यज्ञदत्तो यज्ञदत्तरूपात् देवदत्ते व्यतिरेकं जनयति । एवं हि कल्प्यमाने समुच्चयप्रतिपत्तिः स्यात् — देवदत्तो यज्ञदत्तश्चेति । तस्माद्येऽन्येऽर्था — देवदत्तस्य यज्ञदत्तः पिता, पुत्रः, स्वामी, भृत्यः, समीप इत्येतेभ्यो व्यतिरे[कः ।] केचित्तु स्वरूपादेव व्यतिरेकमाहुरिति । यथा दासः, पुत्रः, कर इति ।

अन्ये मन्यन्ते । भूशब्द एव परिगृह्य स्वसमवायिनो धर्मान् सामीप्यादीन् व्यतिरेकहेतुरिति ।

[१. २] स्थानं वार्थः, तिष्ठत्यस्मिन् शब्द इति । अस्मिन् [पक्षे] अस्तेरर्थे भवतिर्भवति । निवृत्तिश्चेतरस्य यस्मात् भवतिस्तदर्थमाहेति ।

[१. २. १] अथ वर्णादेशेषु कः स्थानार्थो, यावता अर्थ एव वर्णानां नास्ति ? तत्रापि 'सर्वे सर्वपदादेशाः' इत्यस्मिन् पक्षे दधिशब्दस्य दध्य् आदेशो, रुहेरपि रुपिरिति युक्तम् ।

[१. २. २] अथ वा, कालः स्थानशब्देनोच्यते — इकः कालं यणोऽधितिष्ठन्तीति ।

[१. २. ३] यथा वा 'अस्तेर्' इत्येतदनुकरणमर्थप्रयुक्तानामस्तिरूपाणाम्, ते च स्थानिनस्तेषामर्थोऽभिधीयते भवतिना, एवम् 'इको यणचि' इत्यत्रापि इको येऽनुकृता दध्यादिस्था इकस्तेषां यत् स्वरूपं सोऽर्थः स्थानमिति ।

[२] **किमर्थं पुनरिदमुच्यत** इति। आरभ्यमाणे सूत्रे सर्वत्र स्थानेयोगत्वं प्रसज्यते। ततश्चावयवषष्ठ्यादी[नां] न प्रक्लृप्तिः। एकस्मिंश्च विशेष्ये संनिपतितविशेषणानामुपकारार्थं च व्याख्यानाद्या ... यमर्थः शक्यो लब्धुमिति।

[२.१] **षष्ठ्याः स्थानेयोगवचनं नियमार्थम्** (वा. १)। **एकशतं षष्ठ्यर्था** इति पाठमाश्रित्योच्यते, स्वस्वामिसंबन्धसमीपसमूह इति। **यावन्तो वेति**। लोके यावन्तोऽर्था इति। अथ वा, 'यावन्तो वा' इति सत्यप्यनेकार्थसंभवे पाठाद् ये संभवन्ति। तावतां प्रसङ्गे नियमार्थमिदमुच्यते।

तत्र केचिदेवं प्रतिपन्नाः — सामान्यापहृतबुद्धेर्विशेषमप्रतिपद्यमानस्य प्रतिपत्तुर्विशेषप्र[तिप]त्त्युपायोऽयम्। 'विशेषोऽत्राचार्यस्य वि[व]क्षितः, स्थानेयोगत्वं नाम। एवं प्रतिपद्यस्व षष्ठीनिर्देशेषु' इति। अपरे मन्यन्ते — 'अस्तेर्' इत्येतत् सामान्यरूपं नोत्सहते विशेषमुपादातुमिति स्थान इत्येतदुपतिष्ठते। तदुपस्थानादिदं वाक्यमनुमीयते — अस्तेः स्थाने भूर्भवति इति।

[२.१.१] **अवयवषष्ठ्यादयस्तु न सिध्यन्ति**। अविशेषस्य विवक्षितत्वात् न सिध्यन्ति। अविशेषस्य विवक्षितत्वा[द]त्र वाक्यान्तरोपप्लवः। गोह इति चोपधाया इति [च] स्थानषष्ठ्यावेते इति गोहश्चान्त्यस्य स्यात्, यत्र विकृतः; क्ङिन्त्सु न स्यात्। उपधामात्रस्य च स्याद् धात्वन्तरस्य पचादेरिति।

[२.१.१.१] **अवयवषष्ठ्यादीनां चाप्राप्तिर्यो[ग]स्यासंदिग्धत्वात्** (वा. ३)। अप्राप्तिरिति [न] षष्ठ्या एवाप्राप्तिः। किं तर्हि? नियमस्याप्राप्तिरिति। कथं यदेतत् भवता प्रतिपाद्यते 'षष्ठ्या वचनं नियमार्थम्' इति? यत्रानेकार्थः संभवति तत्र नियमोऽनेन क्रियते। यत्र चान्योऽर्थो निर्दिष्टस्तत्र च तन्निवृत्तिं स्थानेयोगत्वं कल्पयति इत्येतन्न युक्तम्। यदि हि मया यथा प्रतिज्ञातं तथा प्रतिपद्यसे, नियमस्यानेकार्थसंभवे प्रतिपत्तिर्युक्ता। न त्वर्थान्तरं निवर्त्य तत्र विधेयं स्थानेयोगत्वमिति। अथ त्वेवं मन्यसे, व्याकरणेनैवार्था विधीयन्त इति, एवमपि गोहेरुपधापेक्षया प्रवृत्तस्य कथं त्यागो युज्यते, अपूर्वस्य च स्थानेयोगत्वस्योपादानमिति युक्तं यदनेकार्थसंभवे स्थानेयोगत्वमन्यनिवृत्त्यर्थं स्यात्। लोकेऽपि च नैवंभूतेषूपदेशः प्रवर्तत इत्येतत् प्रदर्शयति — **लौकिकोऽयं दृष्टान्त** इति। यौ हि पन्थानावेकदिक्कौ भवतस्त[त्र] च न ज्ञायते कस्मिन् पथिभागे ग्रामः संनिविष्ट इति, तमेवोपदेष्टार उपदिशन्ति — **हस्तदक्षिणो**

हस्तवाम इति। गुणतोऽसमाख्याने बहुव्रीहावपि परनिपातः साधुः। दाशतेर्दक्षतेर्वा दक्षिणः, न तु व्यवस्थेति। अथ [वा], हस्तसंबन्धेन दक्षिणो यस्तस्य हस्तदक्षिण इति [वाचकः], 'तृतीया तत्कृतार्थेन' (पा. २. १. ३०) इति तत्पुरुष एवेति। तिर्यक्पथं तु नैवोपदिशन्ति, तस्याव्यापारात्। न ह्यसौ संदिह्यते इति। एवमयथा- (? °मा)चार्यो यैव षष्ठी संदिह्यमाना तामेव विशिष्टार्थसंबन्धिनीमाचष्टे, या तु विशिष्टार्थोपनिपातिनी एव, न तामुपदिशतीति।

[२. १. १. २] अथ वा, स्थाने अयोगेति। उपपत्तिनिरपेक्षो यः शास्त्रमेव प्रमाणीकृत्य व्यवहरति, तं प्रतीदमुच्यते। अव्यक्तयोगेति। यद्यपि 'नञो ऽस्त्यर्थानाम्' (पा. २. २. २४, वा. १५) इति उक्तम्, एवमपि योगमन्तरेण षष्ठ्येव नास्ति इति विशिष्टो योगोऽविद्यमानोऽस्या इति परिकल्प्यते।

[२. १. १.३] अथ वा, योगवती योगेति। सर्वस्याः षष्ठ्या योगो ऽस्तीति भूम्नीति व्य[प]दिश्यते। यैवानेकार्थसंबन्धिनी सैव योगा=योगवती। या तु निर्ज्ञातयोगा सा तु नायोगा नापि योगवतीति स्थाने न भविष्यति।

[२. २] विशिष्टा वा षष्ठी स्थानेयोगा (वा. ४)। कलाध्मातं स्वरितं चाश्रित्य स्थानेयोगत्वं वक्ष्यामि, लिङ्गासङ्गाच्च (? °सङ्गस्य च ?) पौरुषेयत्वं प्र[व]क्ष्य इतीदमाह — न च तल्लिङ्गमवयवषष्ठ्यादिषु करिष्यत इति।

इतरोऽसंप्रत्ययादयं लिङ्गासङ्गं न प्रतिपद्यते इत्याह — 'शा हौ' (पा. ६. ४. ३५)। शासिग्रहणं कर्तव्यम् इति। [ए]वं मन्यन्ते — शासिरत्रानुमीयते। स चोपधाविशेषणत्वेन प्रवृत्तोऽनासक्तलिङ्ग इहापि तद्रू[पो]पपन्न उपतिष्ठत इति।

यदेवादः पुरस्तादवयवषष्ठ्यर्थम् इति। कथम्? अधिकारो नाम त्रिप्रकार इति। एतदाचष्टे। यद्येवं मन्येथाः — एकोऽसौ शब्दो, न चैकस्य लिङ्ग[व]त्त्वम- लिङ्गता च युक्तेति, तच्च न; त्रिप्रकारत्वादधिकारस्य। यो हि चेनानुकृष्यते 'ग्रन्थान्ताधिके च' (पा. ६. ३. ७९), 'द्वितीये चानुपाख्ये' (६. ३. ८०), 'अव्ययीभावे चाकाले' (पा. ६. ३. ८१) इति, अस्यानुवृत्तिरभेदेन — योऽसौ 'सहस्य सः' (पा. ६. ३. ७८) इति। स इह च इह च भवतीति। एवं परिभाषायामपि शक्यमवसातुम् — प्रदेशान् लिङ्गवतः समुच्चित्यैव तन्त्रेणावस्थितम् 'इकः' इति। विनियोगे तु यो भेदः, स पुरुषविनियोगभे[दा]दिति।

यस्त्वेवमासक्तस्वरितलिङ्गो योगे योगे [स]मुपतिष्ठते, तत्रेदमवसीयते — तद्वन्त एते योगा इति । भिन्नैरेव शब्दैस्त्या(? °स्तां)स्तद्वतो योगान् प्रतिपद्यमानो यथैव रू[पं] प्रतिपद्यते बुद्ध्या त[थै]व तत्र .... एवमन्य एव शब्दो लिङ्गम् (? °शब्दोऽलिङ्गः), शब्दान्तरं तु लिङ्गवदेवं बुद्ध्या व्यवस्यतीति ।

संप्रत्ययमात्रमेतत् स्यात् । एतत् प्रतिपादयति — 'शासः' इत्युच्चारणा[द्]त्र लिङ्गासङ्गाच्च 'शा हौ' इत्यत्र 'शासः' इत्येतदस्तीति संप्रतीयते समतु (? समं तु) लिङ्गवानित्येतदशक्यं प्रतिपत्तुं श्रुतिमन्तरेणेति [आह] — **न ह्यनुच्चार्य शब्दम् इति** ।

[२. २. १] **एवं तर्ह्यादेशे तल्लिङ्गं करिष्यते** । 'शा हौ' इति 'शा'-शब्दः कलो ध्मातो वा करिष्यते । न चेदं लिङ्गमादेशस्य । किं तर्हि ? प्रकृतेरेव । सा तु नोच्चार्यते । निरधिष्ठानस्य च लिङ्गस्याशक्यं करणमिति स्वरितत्वं संप्रत्ययात्रामानं (? °यमात्रार्थं) लिङ्गकरणं च विशिष्टरूपस्येति ।

[३] **यत्रैका षष्ठी अनेकं च विशेष्यम्** । केचित् वर्णयन्ति — यदनन्तरं लक्षणं तत् संबध्यते । यदि हि लिङ्गेन स्थानेयोगत्वं प्रतिपद्य स इति (?) । वयं तु ब्रूमः — यथा रसामाद्यौ न लिध्यति(?) अङ्गस्येति । यदि संदेहे नियम इति पक्षो, ऽस्ति संदेहः । अथाव्यक्तयोगा अयोगा, एवं योगा योगवतीति, अत्र त्विदं चोद्यते — यदि तावत् अङ्गस्येत्यनाश्रिता अर्थं षष्ठ्यत्यर्थं शब्दमात्रमेतच्च स्वर्यते, आनर्थक्या[द्] योग एव नास्ति, कुतः स्थानेयोगत्वम् ? अर्थप्रतिलम्भस्तूत्तरित्योगै(? °रैर्योगैः) संबन्धे सतीति । अथाप्यर्थमात्रमनाश्रितशब्दव्यापारमाश्रीयते, उत्तरत्र दुपाण(? तूपात्त)-रूपतया प्रवर्तते यथा विभाषाप्रदेशेषु प्रतिषेधविकल्पौ व्यातृतो (? व्यापृतौ) न तु संज्ञासंबन्धकाल इत्यनयोः प्रत्यक्ष(? पक्ष)योर्यद्यस्ति योगो, यदि नास्ति, उभयथापि न दोषः । यदि त्वाश्रितार्थः शब्द आश्रितशब्दो वा अर्थात्माश्रीयते, तदा विशेषापनयना-दु[भ]यत्रापि योगेनोत्सहते तदन्तविधौ सामानाधिकरण्यं प्रतिपत्तुं संप्रसारणेन, अवयवविशेषणेन(? °षणत्वेन) च वैयधिकरण्यमिति ।

एवं तु मन्यते — आश्रीयमाणे सूत्रे इयमपि कल्पनासंभविनी — अङ्गस्यें-त्यत्रापि विशेषेश्चापव्य(? °षार्थस्य व्य)ञ्जनानि इति । .... एवमिहाप्य(? °हापि । अ)ङ्गस्येति विशेषाभिधानपक्षे [तु न] वाक्यविशेषान्तराणामुपजनः, संबन्धसामान्यो-पादाने वाक्यगम्या विशेषा इति ।

ननु चोक्तम्, एकशतं षष्ठ्यर्था इति। **नैष दोषः**। अयमभिप्रायः। केचिदर्थयोग्या एव संबन्धाः शब्देनोपादीयन्ते। तद् यथा -- 'देवदत्तस्य दासभार्या' इति। नायं संप्रत्ययो भवति -- या दासभार्या सा तस्य भगिनीति। किं तर्हि? उपसर्जनविशेषण(द्वय ?)मेव रूढम्। तथा 'एतानि [देवदत्तस्य] दासीगृहाणि' इति रूढान्येव। एवमि[हा]पि 'अस्तेर्भूः' इति य एव योग्योऽर्थः स एव शब्देषु भवितुमर्हति इति। न चान्योऽर्थोऽस्ति [त]स्य [योग्यः] षष्ठ्यर्थ इति स्थानेयोगत्वमेव प्रतिपत्स्यामहे इति।

इतरो योग्यं शब्दसमवायिनं षष्ठ्यर्थमुपादत्त इत्याह — **शब्दस्यापि शब्दे[न] नान्तर्यादयः संबन्धा** इति।

संबन्ध(? संदेह)मात्रमेतत् भवति। एतदुक्तं भवति — यथैव क्रियमाणं सूत्रं व्याख्येयमेवं व्याख्यानादेव प्रतिप[द्य]स्वेति। अथ वा, न संदेहादस्याभावः। यथा समन्धकारे न च तावत् वर्णविशेषोपलब्धिः, अथ चास्ति रूपम्; एवं सर्वदा विशे[षोऽ]स्ति, असंसृष्टः [सं]सृष्टो वा। विशेषप्रतिपत्त्युपायस्तु प्रार्थयितव्यः। एवमिहापि 'अस्तेर्भूः' इति विशेषप्रतिपत्तेरयमुपायः — असे(? °स्ते)रिति स्वरूपमात्मभूतं नित्यं मिथः स्वरूपवदविप्रयोगेनावस्थित[म्] इति शब्दार्थानुपाती स्थानसंबन्धः, समीपादयस्तु स्वरूपार्थाच्च बाह्या इति। न वा समीपे भवतेः प्रयोग उपपद्यते, अस्तिनोक्तत्वात्। अथ वा, भवतिनोक्तत्वादस्ते[रे]व प्रयोग इति।

[४] **षष्ठ्यन्तं स्थानेन यथा युज्येत**, यत् तत् षष्ठ्यन्तं श्रुत्यनुपाति। यत् प्रतीयमानम्, तन्न स्थानेन युज्येत इति। **यतः षष्ठ्युच्चारिता** तस्य कार्ययोगित्वम्, इत्येषोऽर्थः सूत्रारम्भान् लभ्यत इति। इयं च सा परिभाषा 'निर्दिश्यमानस्यादेशा भवन्ति' (वा. १२) इति। तेन 'पादः पत्' (पा. ६. ४. १३०) इति पाच्छब्दः षष्ठ्यन्तः श्रुत्यनुपाती, तदन्तः प्रतीयमान, इति न तदन्तः स्थानेन युज्यते। ननु च 'पादः' इत्येतत् संभू[°श्रु]तं तदन्तं प्रत्याययतीति तदन्तस्यादेशप्रसङ्गः। तत्र केचिद् वर्णयन्ति — तदन्तपरिभाषा बाध्यतेऽनेनेति। एतच्चासत्। इह दोषः स्यात् — पादयतेरप्रत्ययान्तस्य पद्भावः स्या[त]। इह हि न स्यान् — व्याघ्रपाद् इति। तस्मात् प्रातस्थ (? प्राप्तस्य) तदन्तविधेरनेन व्यवच्छेदः क्रियते। यथैव शास्त्रात् 'पादः' इति पादन्तं प्रतिपद्यसे, एवमयं(? °मेव ?) वा[स्मा]च्छास्त्रादिदं वाक्यमेवंभूतं प्रतिपद्यस्व— 'पादः' इति पादन्तस्य यः पाच्छब्दस्तस्य पद्भावो भवतीति। अथ वा, यमुया(? समु-

दाया) एव कार्यसत्त्वे पा(? ऽस्मा)च्छास्त्रादवयवद्वारकं कार्यभाक्त्वं प्रतिपद्यन्ते, न साक्षाद्, इति ।

कथं 'यीवर्णयोर्दीधीवेव्योः' (पा. ७. ४. ५३) इति ? तत्रापि दीधीवेव्योर्निर्दिश्यमानत्वात् सर्वादेशो लोपः प्राप्नोति । सत्यम, एवमेतत् । उपसंहारेण तु 'अलोऽन्त्यस्य' इत्यं[त्य]स्य भविष्यति ।

स्थानेऽन्तरतमः ॥ १. १. ५० ॥

[१. १] किमुदाहरणम् ? 'इको यणचि' (पा. ६. १. ७७) — दध्यत्र, मध्वत्र । उभयोपादानमुदाह्रियते । यस्मिन्न[स्य] संयोगस्तच्चोदाहरणम्, यदर्थं चोदाह्रियते तच्चोदाहरणम् । प्रश्नस्तु लक्षणान्तरेणापि सिद्धत्वादनर्थकमेतदिति । अयं तु वैषम्यमात्रं पश्यन्नुप[न्य]स्यति — 'इको यणचि' इति । एवं मन्यते — इक इति बहवः स्थानिनो भवन्ति । इकारोकारौ प्रत्येकमष्टादशधाभेदात् षट्त्रिंशत् । ऋकार [ऌका]रेण सह त्रिंशदित्येवं षट्षष्टिर्भेदाः । यणोऽपि सप्तेति । अथ वा, ऌकारस्य स्थानित्वं नास्ति असंभवाद्, इति स्थान्यादेशवैषम्यम् ।

संख्यातानुदेशेनाप्येतत् [सिद्धम्] । [अ]पूर्वोऽयं वैषम्यप्रकारः ! अत्र न व्यक्तिभेद आश्रीयते । किं तर्हि ? जातिः । इग्जातिर्यण्-जातिश्च । तासां चोभयतश्चतुष्टयम् । यदप्युक्तं ऌकारो नास्तीति । न प्रयोगविषयं यथासंख्यम् । किं तर्हि ? अनुदेशविषयम् ।

[तस्थस्थमिपां तां]तंतामः (पा. ३. ४. १०१) । अयमभिप्रायो — यदा स्वरितेन चिह्नन यथासंख्यं प्रतिपद्यते, तदा 'इको यणचि' इति इकारस्य प्रयोगेऽसमवायिनोऽनर्थकं स्वरितकरणम् । यणोऽप्येवमेव । यकारस्याज्-गुणो नास्तीति स्वरितकरणमनर्थकं मन्यमानो यथासंख्यं प्रतिपद्यते । तामादीनां तु स्वरितकरणं प्रयोगसमवायिनां श्रुत्यर्थमपि स्यात् इति न यथासंख्यं प्रतिपद्यते । **एकार्थस्यैकार्थ** इति । प्रदर्शनमात्रमेतत् । एवं प्रत्यन्ता(? °क्त्वा)परभावः चैतन्योपाधिरित्ये[ते] **ह्यर्थाः** संभविनो, येषु य(? स)त्सु वचनानां व्यतिकरो न भवति । न हि तामादेशस्थसः स्थाने प्रवर्तते ।

नतु चैतदपि संख्यातानुदेशेनैव सिद्धम् । शक्यमेतत् व्याख्यानात् प्रतिपत्तुं हित(? स्वरित)करणमेषां यथासंख्यार्थम्, न श्रवणार्थमिति ह्यनयोः स्वरितकरणमधिकारार्थमेव, न श्रवणार्थम् ।

[१. २] यत्रानेकमान्तर्यं तत्रेति । अ[त्र] स्वरितकरणाच्छब्दान्तरं सूत्रान्तरे अनुमीयते । अनुमीयमानं चान्तरतम इत्येतत् अपेक्षमाणं व्याप्रियते भेदेन स्थाने स्थान इति । तेनायमर्थो लभ्यते — स्थानेऽन्तरतमो भवति, स्थाने च योऽन्तरतमः स भवतीति । यत्रानेकोऽन्तरतमः संभवति, स चानेकार्थो भिन्नेन निमित्तेन प्रवर्तते, तत्र स्थानान्तरतम्यं बलीय इति । इतरथा ह्येकक्रियासंनिपाते '[स्थाने] स्थानेऽन्तरतमो भवती'ति अर्थगुणप्रमाणान्तरतम्यं निवर्तितमेव स्यात् । अथाप्येतावति व्याप्रियते स्थाने भवतीत्यकिंचित्करं भवतीति । कश्चिदेकेन निमित्तेनान्तरः, कश्चित् बहुभिः । यो बहुभिः स कथं स्यादिति । यथा लोके कश्चिदेकपितृकः नानामातृकः, कश्चिदेकमातृकः नानापितृकश्चेति, कश्चिदेकपितृकः एकमातृकश्चेति । यदि च लौकिकीमयमवस्थां प्रतिपद्यते, तमग्रहणमनर्थकम् । लौकिक्यां प्रतिपत्तौ सूत्रमेव प्रत्याख्यायते ।

[२] किमर्थं पुनरिदमुच्यते । ननु च प्रयोजनमुक्तम्, 'अकः सवर्णे दीर्घः' (पा. ६. १. १०१) इति । उच्यते । एतदयं पृच्छति — यदीदं नोच्येत, किमनिष्टं स्यादिति । स्थानिन एक[त्व]निर्देशात् । कथं स्थानी एकत्वेन निर्दिश्यते ? यदि तावत् संज्ञया, आदेशोऽप्येक एव दीर्घ इति । अथ संज्ञिभेदादनेकत्वमादेश[स्य], स्थानिनोऽप्यनेकत्वम् । तत्र भूतत्वा[त्] स्थानी एकत्वेन निर्दिश्यत इत्युच्यते — 'अकः' इति । भूतविभक्त्या स्थानी अचि सवर्णे निर्दिश्यमानो न संभवति अनेक इति भेदरूपतया नोच्यते 'अकः' इत्यनेन । 'दीर्घः' इति तु भाव्यमानत्वात् बहुरूपतया संभवतीति अनेक इति [नि]र्दिश्यते । यथा लोके 'मृत्पिण्डस्य विकारं कुरु' इति मृत्पिण्डमेकत्वेन प्रतिपद्यते, विकारमेक(? °रमनेक)त्वेन । आतश्चानेकत्वेन, यत्र प्रतिपद्यते विकारं करोमीति । एवमिह 'दीर्घः' इति भाव्यमानत्वादेकैकस्याकः सवर्णे पर्यायेण सवर्णदीर्घाः प्रसक्ता इति ।

अपरे वर्णयन्ति । यथा संज्ञासमासनिर्देशेषु क्रमस्याभावात् मिथोनिर्देशेऽसति, सर्वप्रसङ्गे यथासंख्यमारभ्यते, एवमिहापि 'अकः' इति संज्ञानिर्देशेऽभेदरूपे, मिथोनिर्देशेऽसति, 'दीर्घः' इति च संज्ञानिर्देशे सर्वस्योकालस्याचः प्रवृत्तावयमर्थोऽशक्यो

—ऽस्याकः अयं दीर्घो भवतीति । किमर्थं पुनर्मिथोनिर्देशो न कृत इति । लघ्वर्थम् । इदमत आरभ्यते ‘स्थानेऽन्तरतमः’ इति ।

[३] यथा पुनरियमन्तरतमनिर्वृत्तिः । [यथा पुनरिति ।] येन प्रकारेण । यश्च प्रकारः संहितापाठः । संहितया [पा]ठे च विशेवता संहिताप्यस्वि (?) तत्रानेन संहितया येऽध्येतारस्ते प्रष्टव्याः । तत्रेदं दर्शनम् — पदप्रकृतिः संहिता (ऋप्रा. २. १) इति । संहितैव हि सत्या असत्यानां पदानां प्रकृतिः । ततः पदान्यपोद्ध्रियन्ते कुर्यार्थी(? कुतः ? अर्थ)स्याविच्छेदा[त्] शब्दस्याप्यविच्छेदः । एवं च कृत्वा एकपदेनासंहिता (?) । तत्र ‘स्थानेऽन्तरतम उरण् रपरः’ इत्यस्य किंभूतं पदमपोद्धर्तव्यमित्येत[द्]त्र पृच्छति । ‘स्थानेऽन्तर[त]म’ इत्यत्र ‘षष्ठी’ [इति] वर्तते । तेनात्रादेशस्य या प्रकृतिरन्तरतमा सैव षष्ठ्या निर्दिष्टा, ना(? अ)न्या नैव निर्दिष्टेति प्रकृतिनियमोऽयं विज्ञायते । आदेशान्तरतम्ये तु प्रकृतेरनियमात् सर्वत्र षष्ठी, आदेशस्तु नियम्यते — अयं न [भ]वत्ययं भवतीति ।

इको यणचीति । केचिदिको दूरविप्रकृष्टाः, अर्धमात्रिकेभ्यो द्विमात्राः । मात्रिकास्त्वीषत्संनिकृष्टा इति ह्रस्वैरेव षष्ठी लब्धा, [न] दीर्घैरिति ।

ननु चानुदाहरणमेतदित्यादावुक्तम् । सत्यम्, एवमेतत् । यदादेशान्तर्यपक्षस्तदान्येन सिद्धत्वात् अनुदाहरणम् । प्रकृत्यान्तर्यपक्षे सर्वप्रथममिदमेव प्रयोजनम् । कथम् ? दीर्घा इकः षष्ठीं न प्रतिपद्यन्ते इति । यच्च तदुक्तम् — स्थानान्तर्यं बलीय इति, तत्रानेकेन निमित्तेन द्वौ कश्चित् स्थानेन कश्चित् प्रमाणेनेत्येवमुक्तम् । अयं च यणः स्थानेन प्रमाणेन चान्तर इति ।

एवम् ‘इको गुणवृद्धी’ (पा. १. १. ३) इति । एकार ऐकारश्च दीर्घः । तयोश्च दीर्घा एवान्तरतमा इति दीर्घे षष्ठी ।

ननु नायको लावकः — ‘अचः .... (पा. ७. २. ११५)’ इत्येवं वृद्धि[:], न त्विग्लक्षणा । अत्राप्यच इति चान्तरतमा प्रकृतिरिति योजयितव्यम् ।

तथा ऋवर्णस्य गुणवृद्धिप्रसङ्गे इति । किमर्थं पुनरिदमुच्यते ? ‘इको गुणवृद्धी’ इत्यनेनैव चोदितं स्यात् । एष विशेषः — गुणो मात्रिके स्यात्, वृद्धिमात्रे (? द्विमात्रे) न स्यात् । वृद्धिस्तु द्विमात्रे स्यात्, न मात्रिकस्येति । अत्र त्विको दीर्घस्योभे अपि स्यातामिति ।

'वान्तो यि प्रत्यये' (पा. ६. १. ७९)। स्थानिनिर्देशः कर्तव्यः। सर्वस्यैचो निर्दिष्टत्वात् सर्वस्य वान्त आदेशः स्यात्। प्रकृतिपक्षे तु संश्लि(? °श्रि)ते वान्तस्यान्तरतमा प्रकृतिरोकारौकाराविति नार्थः स्थानि[नि]र्देशेन । अत्र वृत्तिसूत्रे कथमवस्थितम् ? भूतापेक्षायां प्रवर्तितव्यम्। तर्हि 'एचः' इत्येतदनुवर्तते 'वान्तो यि' इत्यत्र। किं तु यो वान्त आदेशोऽन्यत्र दृष्टः, स भवति यि प्रत्यय इति। एतावदपेक्ष्यते — कस्य वासौ दृष्टोऽचि परभूते ? ओकारौकारयोरिति ।

तयोस्तर्हि शक्यार्थादन्यत्रेति । एवं मन्यते — शक्यार्थ इत्यस्य परित्यागे क्षेयादयः [न] शक्यन्ते निर्वर्तयितुमिति । उभयतो नियम इति । योगविभागो[ऽय]मिति व्याचष्टे । क्षय्यजय्याविति अनेन चेयादयो निर्वर्तिताः । शक्यार्थ इत्यनेनाप्येतयोरन्यत्राप्रसङ्गः ।

इहापि तर्हि नियमान्न प्राप्नोति । एवं मन्यते — यदि सामान्यविषयमनुमानम्, सर्वत्र निवृत्तिः। अथ विशेषो राविपादास्यतेति (?)। तुल्यजातीयस्य नियमः। कण्ठताल[व्य]ता विशेष उपादीयते इत्यभिप्रायः। इतरः प्रश्लिष्टावर्णविषयमेतदिति प्रतिपद्यामहे (? °द्याह) — एवमपि .... रैयतीति। .... रायिश्छान्दस इति । यकारपरस्य भा[षा]यां प्रयोगो नास्तीति प्रदर्श्यते । एवं ह्युक्तम् — 'गोसमानाक्षरनान्तात्' इति । एवमधीयते यथा भाषायामप्रयोग इति ।

[३. १] 'ऊदुपधाया गोहः' (पा. ६. ४. ८९) .... उपधाग्रहणं कर्तव्यम् । अत्र चोद्यते । समुदाय एवात्र षष्ठीनिर्दिष्टः । अन्यस्य संभवो नास्ति । तत्र कथं न्विदमुच्यते ? अयमभिप्रायः । यदि लिङ्गाभावादेनां विशेषणषष्ठीं प्रतिपद्यसे, ऽस्माच्छास्त्रादनुसंहारं प्रतिपद्यस्व । उपसंहारश्चायमेवमनुसंहर(? °रे)ति — योऽन्तरतमो न संभवति आदेशस्य, असौ नैव षष्ठ्यां संबध्यते इति । यथालोन्त्यपरिभाषया 'रुहः पः' (पा. ७. ३. ४३) इति रुहो हः इति संप्रत्ययः, एवं गोह इति गोह्युपधायाः संप्रत्ययेन भवितव्यम् ।

क्रियते न्यास एव । यद्यपूर्वं क्रियते ततो दोषः स्यात् । यदि च प्रकृतिपक्षो निर्दोषोऽल्पदोषो वा स्यात् युज्यते वक्तु(म्) इति ।

तकारग्रहणं कर्तव्यम् । अथ कथमसति तकारग्रहणे चरितमिति ? न च निवर्तेत, अनन्तरा हि निष्ठा भवति । किं च, 'आदेः परस्य' (पा. १. १. ५४)

इतीकारस्य प्राप्नोति। अस्यायमभिप्रायः। 'निष्ठायाः' इत्यस्यानेनान्तरतमायां प्रकृतौ उपसंहारान् निष्ठातकारस्यैव नकारो भविष्यतीति। क्रियते न्यास एव। एतदुक्तं भवति। किमिदमनुसंहारान्तरं बाधत, आहोस्विद् बाध्यतेऽनुसंहारान्तरेणेति। यदि तावत् बाधते, 'रुहः पः' (पा. ७. ३. ४३) इति बाधितत्वादलोन्त्यानुसंहारस्य, ओष्ठ्यत्वादुकारे षष्ठीत्युकारस्य प्राप्नोति। तथा त्रयमिति — अत्र यकारस्य स्यात्। अथ बाध्यत इति मन्यसे, गोह ऊकार इति हकारस्य प्राप्नोति।

असति तकारे भिन्नवद्भ्यामित्यत्र जश्त्वस्य सिद्ध[त्वात्], दकारश्चान्तरतमा प्रकृतिर्नकारस्य। एवं ह्युक्तम् — 'यथा तृतीयास्तथा पञ्चमा...आनुनासिक्यमेषामधिको धर्मः' (मभा. १. ६१. १८, १९) इति। अथ मन्यसे — '...पूर्वस्य च दः' इत्यनेन प[र]स्य न भवतीति, अप्राप्तप्रापणार्थमेतत् स्यात्। तस्माद् यथान्यासमेव न्यायः।

[४] किं पुनरिदं निर्वर्तकम् इति। एतद् भाष्यकारो ग्रन्थच्छायार्थं प्रश्नेनोपाक्रमते। वाक्यकारस्य तु यस्मान्निर्वर्तके प्रतिपादके वा योगस्यानर्थक्यं तस्मान्नियमार्थतायामर्थवत्ता भवतीति। यथा तु षष्ठीमनयेन(?) स्वतन्त्रमेव यथा 'इको यणचि' (पा. ६. १. ७७) इति, एवं स्थानेऽन्तरतमं निर्वर्तयति। अर्थश्च संनिहितः, सर्वस्यान्तरतमश्च विद्यते शब्द इति प्रवर्तयितव्यम्। स तु किं समुदायस्य न (? °यस्यैव) भवति, ना(?उता)वयवानाम्? समुदायस्य वा (? °स्य अवयवस्य च) युगपदसंभवात् कदाचित् समुदायस्यादेशः स्यात्, कदाचिदवयवस्य। येऽप्येत आदेशा 'अस्तेर्भूः' (पा. २. ४. ५२), 'रुहः पः' (पा. ७. ३. ४३) इति च, एतैश्च स [श]ब्दः किं विकल्प्यते अन्तरतम आदेशः, आहोस्वित् बाध्यते इत्येतच्च परीक्ष्यम्।

[४. १] स्थानेऽन्तरतमनिर्वर्तके स्थानिनिवृत्तिः (वा. २)। केयं वाचोयुक्तिः — 'स्थानिनां निवृत्तिः प्राप्नोति' इति; यावतात्रावश्यमेव दधिशब्दो निर्वर्तेत? अयमभिप्रायः। दधिशब्दस्य हि दध्य (?दधिशब्द) आदिश्यमाने तुल्यरूपेभ्यः स्व(?°पे सस्व°)रे च किंभूता निवृत्तिः? शून्यता न संभवति। शब्दस्य व्यवहार एवोच्छिन्नः स्यादिति। भिन्नरूप आदेशो यदि प्रवर्तते, एवं च सति अर्थवत्ता न संभवतीत्यानर्थक्यमस्यां कल्पनायामित्येवं प्रक्रम्यते।

यदि चैवं, क्वचिद् द्वैरूप्यम् । केषांचित् ग्रन्थः 'वैरूप्यम्' इति । तत्र ये 'वैरूप्यम्' इत्युदाहरन्ति, विसमित्यादेशसकारत्वात् षत्वं प्राप्नोतीति, त एवं पर्यनुयोक्तव्याः — यद्येवं, न भविष्यति । यदा त्विदं दर्शनम्, अवयवा अपि पर्यायेणादेशं प्रतिपद्यन्त इति, न ह्यत्र समुदायः कार्यभाक्त्वेनोच्यते, यथा 'एकाचो द्वे' (पा. ६. १. १) इति, तदा वा (?तदैव) प्राप्नोति षत्वमिति वैरूप्यं समर्थ्यते । यदा तु समुदायः कार्यभाक् तदा मा भूत् इत्यादेशग्रहणमपि समर्थ्यते इत्ययमपि ग्रन्थः समर्थितो भवति द्वैरूप्यमिति । एवमर्थं च 'क्वचिद्' इत्याह । कस्मिंश्चित् पक्षे वैरूप्यं द्वैरूप्यं वा । एवम् 'अस्तेर् भूः' (पा. २. ४. ५२) इत्येवमादिष्वपि यदावयवयोरादेशस्तदा प्रवर्तते [द्वैरूप्यम्], क्वचित् पक्षेऽस्ति त्रैरूप्यम् ।

अपि चेष्टा व्यवस्था न प्रकल्पेत । स्यादयमभिप्रायः । समुदाये कार्यसमाप्तिरिति य एवार्थप्रयुक्ताः समुदायास्तेषामेव कार्यभाक्त्वमिति न स्याद् वैरूप्यमिति । किं त्विष्टा व्यवस्था न प्रकल्पते । पुनः पुनरन्येनान्तरतमेन निवर्तकेन प्रवर्तितव्यम् । ननु च सकृत् प्रवृत्तावेवास्य निवृत्तिः स्यात् । एतदेव वयं पृच्छामः — सकृत् प्रवृत्तिः किमर्था, यदि तथाभूत एवादेशः ? अथासति प्रयोजने प्रवृत्तः, पुनः [प्रवृत्तः] केन निवर्त्यते ? तत्र यो यः शब्द उपजायते, [स] सर्वो निवृत्त्यभिमुख इति यथैवादेशाभिमुखस्यासाधोर्लाव[स्थ]स्य [एवमस्य] प्रयोगो न संभवति । एवं सर्वः शब्दोऽनवस्थितः । एवं बुद्धावयं साधुरित्यनवस्थाने प्रयोग एवोपरुध्येत । तथा दधि अत्रेति निमित्तं च निमित्ती चादेशाभिमुखाविति न निमित्तं निमित्तत्वेनावतिष्ठते न निमित्ती निमित्तित्वेनेत्ये[त]स्यास्मिन्ननेन कार्येण भवितव्यमित्यप्रतिपत्तिः । यथैव तप्ते भ्राष्ट्रे तिलाः प्रक्षिप्ता अनवस्थिता इत्येतां बुद्धिं जनयन्त्युत्पातनिपातयोरविच्छेदाद्, एवममी अपि साधुत्वेनानवस्थिता निमित्तनिमित्तिभावे[ने]त्यनवस्था[ना]न्न प्रतीयेरन्, इति । तस्मादयं भावः — पक्षो[ऽयं] न संभवति ।

[४. २] अस्तु तर्हि प्रतिपादकम् । 'अकः सवर्णे दीर्घः' (पा. ६. १. १०१) इत्यकारस्य सर्वे दीर्घाः कृताः प्रवृत्ताः निवृत्ताः ।

अन्येन निर्वृत्तानामनेन [प्रतिपत्तिः] क्रियते । 'स्थानेऽन्तरतमः' इति स्थाने योऽन्तरतमः कृतः [स] साधुर्भवति, स प्रयोक्तव्यः । इतरे कृता अपि न प्रयोक्तव्या इति । यथा कश्चित् ब्रूयात् — 'छागा आनीयन्ताम्' इति । आनीतेषु च ब्रूयात् —

'कृष्णमवस्थापय । अन्यानपनय' इति । एवमर्थमिदं सूत्रम्, न चात्रानर्थक्य ति । न च पराङ्गवत् शब्दबाधनमिति ।

[४. २. १] **निर्वृत्तप्रतिपत्तौ निर्वृत्तिः** (वा. ३) । इष्टशब्दानां निर्वृत्तिर्न सिध्यतीत्यभिप्रायः । इतरस्तु निर्वृत्तिसामान्यमुपादाय पर्यनुयुङ्क्ते — **किं तर्ह्युच्यते, निर्वृत्तिर्न सिध्यती**ति ।

इदमिदानीं किमर्थं स्यात् । एवं मन्यते । [यदि] सर्वे सर्वत्र स्युरिदं सूत्रमनर्थकमापद्यते । तस्मात् सर्वप्रसङ्गो न भविष्यतीति ।

[४. २. २] **अनर्थकं च** (वा. ४) । एतदुक्तं भवति । शब्दव्यापारोऽयं न भवति । 'इको यणचि' (पा. ६. १. ७७) इति एतत् साधुत्वे यणो हि संहितायां प्रयोगप्रवृत्त्यङ्गम्, यथैव 'स्थानेऽन्तरतमः' इतीदं प्रवृत्त्यङ्गम् । एवम् 'अकः सवर्णे...' (पा. ६. १. १०१) इत्येतदपि । संप्रति तु निर्वृत्तेषु तेषु तदिदं प्रवर्तमानं न शक्नोति प्रतिपादयितुम् — 'य एते साधवस्ते संप्रत्यसाधवः' इति । अन्यो हि वक्ष्यति — 'त एव साधवः' इति । अतो यथा भुक्तस्य भुजिप्रतिषेधोऽश[क्य]वचन एवमेषां निर्वृत्तानामशक्या निवृत्तिरिति । यथैव कश्चित् ब्रूयात् आनीतेषु छागेषु 'नानीताश्छागाः' इति, तथाभूतमिदम् । तस्माच्छब्दप्रसङ्गमप्रक्रम्य बुद्धौ प्रसक्तस्य निवृत्तिं मन्यते । यदैवैकशब्दप्रक्रमोऽप्रवृत्तिरिको यण् भवतीति । प्रकृते कस्मिंश्चिदादेशे, वकारेऽन्यस्मिन् वा, नेदमस्त्यन्तरतमः प्राक् भवतीति, अनन्तरमस्याभावादिति (?) । अथ प्रवृत्तिरूपं नाश्रीयते प्रसङ्गरूपे च भेदवतां प्रसङ्ग इतीको यणां प्रसक्तानामिति, पक्ष एवायं नास्ति — प्रतिपादकमिदमिति । अत उप(? उक्त)कल्पनायामानर्थक्यम् ।

इतर[स्]त्वाह — **'उक्तं वा'** इति .... ।

उरण् रपरः ॥ १. १. ५१ ॥

[१] **किमिदमु[र]ण्रपरवचनमन्यनिवृत्त्यर्थम्?** इकोगुणवृद्धि(पा. १. १. ३)सूत्रेऽस्य सूत्रस्य विज्ञातं पारतन्त्र्यम् । सत्यपि तु पारतन्त्र्ये षष्ठीनिर्देशविषयत्वमात्रमस्येति यत्र षष्ठी तत्रायमपूर्वमादेशान्तराणां बाधकं निर्वर्तयति । निर्वर्त्य [चा]स्यैव रपरत्वं विधत्ते वाक्यभेदात् — **उः स्थानेऽण् भवति, स च रपर** इति । तत्रोदात्तानुदात्तस्वरितविधाने 'अचः' इति षष्ठी[सद्]भावादिदमुपस्थितम् — **उरण्**

भवतीति। ऋवर्णस्यापूर्वमचिद्योगो(?)ऽनन्तरतमानादेशान् निवर्तयति इति कृतार्थोऽन्यत्र स्थानेन्तरतमपरिभाषा बाध्यते। आहोस्विद् रपरत्वमात्रमनेन क्रियत? इति। गुणासङ्गमात्र[म]स्य योगस्य व्यापारः। उरण् इति तु य उः स्थाने अण् भूतोऽन्येन लक्षणेन तस्य [र]परत्वम् इत्येताव[त्ये]वापेक्षा — उरण् इति य उः स्थानेऽस्ति स रपरो भवतीति अणो भूताः प्राप्नुवन्ति।

[....उदात्तादिषु दोषः। (वा. १)] ते तु किम् उदात्तादिगुणयुक्ता अथ न? उभयथा दोषोऽधिकृतदोषो रूपस्य श्रवणादेवंरूपः स्यात्? एवमपि ऋकारस्याण् रपरः प्राप्नोति। तृत्य इत्येतनुनुक्षार्थं (?) वक्तव्यमेव। प्रतिपदादेशेषु तु 'ऋत इद्धातोः' (पा. ७. १. १००), 'उदोष्ठ्यपूर्वस्य' (पा. ७. १. १०२) इति बाध्यतेऽयम्, 'उरण् रपरः' इति। तत्र हि सर्वेषामणां विधाने उदिति श्रुतिरुपरुध्यते। किं त्वनेन विधीयमानत्वात् एतदङ्गं रपरत्वं दुर्लभम्।

गुणवृद्ध्योरवर्णाप्रतिपत्तिः (वा. २)। सूतवेदनेन (?भूते चेदनेन) रपरत्वमासज्यते, गुणवृद्धिचोदनायाम् अण् ऋवर्णस्य स्थाने दुर्लभो यस्य रपरत्वं क्रियेत। किं हि साधीयः ऋवर्णस्या[स]वर्णे। किमस्ति कारणम् ऋवर्णस्या[स]वर्णे, अथ वा, किं साधुतरं कारणमिति। पूर्वस्मिन्नपि पक्षे एष दोषः। योऽपवादपक्षः प्राक् उपन्यस्तः, तत्रापि अयं दोषः। कः? अवर्णाप्रतिपत्तिः।

न पुनरेङैचौ। किं तर्हि? इदुतावपि प्राप्नुतः इत्यवर्णप्रतिपत्तिरेकान्तेन या सा न संभवतीति। अथ मतमेतत् — उः स्थानेऽणश्चानणश्चेति। यत् पूर्वमुपन्यस्तमपूर्वो बाधकोऽण् निर्वर्त्यते इति, तन्न। किं तर्हि? नियम्यत इति।

तत्र केचिद् वर्णयन्ति। स्थाने इति कृतशेभावोऽनुवर्तते षष्ठीबहुवचनान्तः सप्तमीबहुवचनान्तो वा। तत्रैवमभिसंबन्धः क्रियते — गुणो भवति, वृद्धिर्भवतीति, ऋवर्णस्य स्थाने गुणः अण् रपरो भवतीति, वृद्धिरण् रपरो भवतीति। न चेकारोकारौ गुणवृद्धी इति [इ]दुतौ न भविष्यतः। अथ वा, 'उरण् रपरः' इति या उरिति षष्ठी, नेयमनपेक्षा। किं तर्हि? प्रसज्यमानापेक्षा। उः स्थाने ये प्रसक्तास्तत्राणेव भवति। अन्यो न भवति। स च भवन् रपरो भवति इति। प्रसङ्ग आदेशानां शास्त्रान्तरप्रतिबद्ध इति शुयं (?) नियमो न क्रियते इति कुत इदुतोः प्रसङ्गः? सिद्धा पूर्वस्मिन् पक्षे अवर्णस्य प्रतिपत्तिः। य एत्र ह्यसौ पौरस्त्योऽपवादपक्षः, स एवायमन्यस्य निवृत्ति-

रूपेणाश्रीयते, नाणोऽपूर्वस्य निर्वृत्तिरूपेणेति । एवं च कृत्वा केषांचित् पूर्वत्र ग्रन्थे एवकारो नास्ति । एतावानेव ग्रन्थः — 'उः स्थाने अण्' । न पूर्वस्मिन् विधीयमानोऽन्यं निवर्तयतीति यथैव नियमेऽन्यनिवृत्तिरेवमिहापि इति ।

यत्तु तदुक्तमुदात्तादिषु दोष इति स इह दोषो जायते? प्रश्नेनोपक्रमते, कथं मन्यते भवान्? इति । अभिप्रायः । अयं स्थानेन्तरतमपरिभाषा(? °षया) व्यवस्थानं प्रकुरुते । अच उदात्ताद[यो]ऽन्तरतमा भवन्ति । व्यवस्थापितेषु अन्तरतमेषु नैवास्ति अणः प्रसङ्गः । अथ त्वियमेव परिभा[षा] अच उदात्त इत्याद्यमेव प्रसङ्गमधितिष्ठति, भवति दोष इति । इतर उरण्रपरपरिभाषा(? °षया) पूर्वमवस्थापितेष्वनन्तरतमेष्वप्रवर्तमानोमुचे (?) अन्तरतमपरिभाषामि(?)त्याह — **जायते [स] दोषः । कथम्? उदात्त इत्यनेनाणोऽपि प्रतिनिर्दिश्यन्ते [अनणोऽपि]** इति । **यद्यपि प्रतिनिर्दिश्यन्ते, न तु प्राप्नुवन्ति, स्थानेऽन्तर[त]मो मनि (?) भवतीति ।** अन्तरतमपरिभाषया प्रकृते नियमे तत इदं नियमान्तरं न प्रवर्तिष्यत इत्यभिप्रायः । **कुतो नु खल्वेतत्? द्वयोः परिभाषयोः** .... अन्तरतमपरिभाषाया अवकाशः 'अकः सवर्णे दीर्घः' (पा. ६. १. १०१), 'झयो होऽन्यतरस्याम्' (पा. ८. ४. ६२) इति । 'उरण् रपरः' इत्य[स्या]वकाशः — कर्ता, हर्ता । इहोभयं प्राप्नोति — कृतिः, हृतिरिति । **स्थानेन्तरतमपरिभाषया [व्यवस्था] भवति, न पुनर् 'उरण् रपरः' इत्यनयेति** । एवं वर्णयन्ति । कुत एतत् — पूर्वविप्रतिषेधो भविष्यति, न पुनः परविप्रतिषेध इति? अथ वा, 'अच उदात्तः' इत्येतस्मिन् प्रसङ्गेऽन्तर[त]मे प्रवृत्ते नियमान्तरं [न] प्रवर्तिष्यते, न पुनः पौरस्त्यमेव प्रसङ्गम् 'उरण् रपरः' इति एतदेव नियमयतीति?

ये चाप्येते ऋवर्णस्य इति । यत्र हि नि(? प्र)वृत्तिरन्यस्यास्ति तत्रायं नियमो (? योगो) नियमरूपतां प्रतिपद्यते । इह चेकारोकारयोरेव प्रवृत्तिरिति निय[म]स्याभावात् प्रधानवाक्यमेव न प्रवृत्तम् — 'उः स्थानेऽण् भवति' इति । तदप्रवृत्तौ च गुणवाक्यस्याप्रवृत्तिः 'रपरो भवति' [इति] ।

सिद्धं तु प्रसङ्गे रपरत्वात् । द्वे स्थानग्रहणे अत्रानुवर्तेते इत्येतच्चेतसि वर्तते । यद्यपि द्वितीयः पक्षो रपरत्वमात्रमनेन क्रियत इति स एवायं पक्ष, अयं तु विशेष उपादीयते — पूर्वत्र कालोऽनवधृतः । संप्रति कालोऽवध्रियते । इह तु प्राप्तिनं नियमो

निर्वृत्तिरिति । तत्र नियमं निर्वृत्तिं च परित्यज्य प्राप्तौ=प्रसङ्ग एव रपरत्वं क्रियते । एतदुक्तं भवति — य एव [प्रा]प्त्या नियतकालः स्थाने भवतीति, स एव [र]परत्वकालः । तत्र केन भवितव्यमिति बुद्धिप्रवृत्तिकाल एवाणा प्रतिलब्धं रपरत्वमिति गुणवृद्धिकाले रेफस्यासङ्गादन्तरतमो भविष्यतीति प्रतिपादितमेतत् स्थानेन्तरतमपरिभाषायाः प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तस्याङ्गत्वेनेयमुपप्लवते उरण्रपरपरिभाषेति ।

यद्येवमादेशोऽविशेषितो भवति इति । एवं मन्यते । एकं स्थानमनुवर्तते । तेन च कालोऽवधृतः । स त्ववधृतकालो रपरासङ्ग उः समीपे अनन्तरो वा प्राप्नोति । कथम् ? यत्र हि षष्ठी भूत उपादीयते, तत्र 'षष्ठी स्थाने ....' (पा. १. १. ४९) इति नेयमुपतिष्ठते । आतश्च नोपतिष्ठते यत् पठति — 'उदीचामातः स्थाने ....' (पा. ७. ३. ४६) इति ।

द्वितीयं स्थानग्रहणमनुवर्तते । केचिद् वर्णयन्ति । सप्तम्यन्तमिह सामर्थ्यात् प्रथमान्तं भवति, अण् स्थान इति । वयं तु ब्रूमः — व्याख्यानमेतदेवं तु क्रियते — उः स्थान इति यस्मिन् काले रपरश्चैवे(? °श्चैवं चे)दं स्थानं नावष्टब्धमादेशेनेति तस्मिन्नेव काले [र]परत्वमिति ।

अपरः कल्पः, येनापवादपक्षो नियमपक्षश्च संभवतीति । अङ्गस्य गुणो भवतीति । एवमपि हि षष्ठीनिर्देशेषु 'उरण् रपरः' इत्युपस्थितमेवं व्याप्रियते—अङ्गस्य गुणो भवति, उस्त्वण् भवति स च रपर इति । एवं ताव[द्]पूर्वोऽण् अनेन विधीयते । [अ]तोऽपवादपक्षः । अथ गुणवृद्धिशब्दाभ्यामभिसंबध्य एकवाक्यभावमापद्यते — अङ्गस्य गुणो भवति, उस्तु गुणोऽण् भवति, नान्यो गुणः । वृद्धिरण् भवति, नान्या वृद्धि[रि]ति, एवं नियमो जायते । अस्यां तु कल्पनायामविशेषो दृश्यते यत् पूर्वस्यां कल्प[ना]यां द्वितीयं स्थानग्रहणमाश्रीयतेऽतः स्थानानामप्रसक्तानामणेव भवति । असत्यन्यस्मिन् प्रकारे गुणवृद्धिति(?)स्थानप्रकरणे सामर्थ्यात्प्राप्तानामादेशानामपेक्षाप्रसङ्गेने(?)षामणेव भवति । असत्यस्मिन् प्रकारे गुणवृद्धिचोदनयोरेकवाक्यत्वे उर्गुणो भवति, अण् वृद्धिर्भवतीति । अन्यत्तु सर्वं गणनं दोषाप्रतिविधानं चेति ।

[२] अण्ग्रहणं किमर्थम् ? उत्तरप्रबन्धोपन्यासोऽयम् । पैतृष्वसेयः । लोपवचनं किमर्थमिति चेत्, सर्वादेशार्थम्; परादिपक्षे वा रुत्वार्थमिति । होतापोतारौ । रेफस्य संयोगान्तलोपे कृते नलोपो न स्यात् । यथा पचन्निति ।

[३] **एकादेशस्योपसंख्यानम्** (वा. ६)। अयमभिप्रायः। यथा कन्याप्रतिग्रह एव पठ्यते 'प्रजापतये' इति, न त्वलंकारस्य पृथगग्रय इति, वाससश्च बृहस्पतय इति, एवमिह '.... पूर्वपरयोः' (पा. ६. १. ८४) इति समुदायः स्थानित्वेनोच्यते। स तु पूर्वपरावय[व]त्वात् पूर्वपरयोरित्युच्यते यथा प्रवणमिति समुदायश्च णकारो भवति, इति रपरत्वाभावः।

अवयवग्रहणात् सिद्धम्। अस्त्यस्मिन् समुदाये ऋकारोऽवयवस्तदाश्रय उरिति व्यपदेश इति [र]परत्वं भविष्यति। तद्यथा, **माषा न भोक्तव्या इति [उक्ते] मिश्रा अपि न भुज्यन्ते**। अयं [तु] न्यायो वि[रु]ध्यते। एवं ह्युक्तम् — 'नाव्यपवृक्तस्यावयवे तद्विधिर्यथा द्रव्येषु' (मभा. १. २५. ३) इति। घृतं न विक्रेयम्, तैलं न [वि]क्रेयमिति गावः सर्षपाणि च विक्रीयन्ते। एवं च सति सुरादीनामप्रत(? °नां व्यपवृक्त)व्यपदेशो न दृष्टः। एवं माषादीनां भोजनं नाम्नातम्। केवलमर्थित्वप्रसक्तम्। न च शब्दोऽस्ति लोक एवंभूता मा[म] माषा, नैवंभूता, इति। यावति माषगन्धोऽस्ति सर्वोऽसौ समुदायो माषा एव, तदवयवत्वात्। समुदाये च कार्यं न किंचिदुपदिष्टमिति अवयवाश्रयो भवति व्यापारः।

एवं तु कल्प्यमान — **आदेशे रान्तप्रतिषेधः**। आदेशेऽपि विद्यते अण्रूपं समुदायश्चाव्यापृत इति। यथैव [ऋ]वर्णरूपं विद्यते इति उरिति व्यपदेश एवमादेशोऽपि अणवयवत्वात् अणिति व्यपदिश्यत इति रपरत्वं प्राप्नोति। कथं पुनः न्यायः परित्यज्यते? अयमभिप्रायः। स्थान्यादेशभाव 'उरण् रपरः' इति शब्दवान्। अस्ति मुख्योऽण्, ऋवर्णं च स्थानित्वेनेति। समुदाये स्थानिन्यादेशे च समुदायस्य निवर्त्यत्वान्निवर्तकत्वाच्चावयवरूपतात्ययोगाश्रितं (?) न निवर्त्यं न निवर्तकम्। अथ तु शब्दव्यापारमाश्रित्य तुव्यारूपेतिग्रह (?) आश्रीयते, सिद्धं स्थानित्वम्; आदेशे तु रपरत्वप्रसङ्गः।

यदि पुनः ऋवर्णान्तस्य स्थानिनः। केचित् तु ब्रुवन्ति, अन्तग्रहणं कर्तव्यमिति। अन्ये वर्णयन्ति, यत्र षष्ठी तत्रेदमुपतिष्ठते इति षष्ठ्यन्तस्य तदन्तविधिः। क च विधानम्? अङ्गस्य गुण इति। अत्र चेगन्तस्य ऋवर्णान्तस्य चेति यद्यप्राप्तानुसंहारोऽभिसंबध्यते, कर्तेति व्यपदेशिवद्भावात् सेत्स्यतीत्यत आह — **एतदपि व्यपदेशिवद्भावे-[न] ऋवर्णान्तम्** इति।

अर्थवता व्यपदेशिवद्भावः । तर्ह्यर्थोपादानत्यागाभ्यां भेदः शक्यते कल्पयितुम्, न ह्येकरूपप्रतिबद्धो व्यपदेशिवद्भावः । न हि भवति — घटस्य घट इति । इह च [रपरत्वस्य] प्रतिषेधो वक्तव्यो — मातुः पितुरिति । एवं मन्यते । 'ऋत उत्' (पा. ६. १. १११) इति पूर्वपरयोरुत्त्वे, रपरत्वे च कृते, विभक्तिसकारस्य रुत्वं, 'रो रि' (पा. ८. ३. १४) इति लोपः, दीर्घत्वमिति मातूः करोतीति प्रसज्येत ।

उभयं न कर्तव्यम्, उपसंख्यानं निषेधश्च । इह द्वयोः षष्ठीनिर्दिष्टयोः इति । एतत् प्रतिपादयति । पूर्वपरयोरित्यवयवावेव स्थानिनौ, प्रत्येकं वाक्यपरिसमाप्तेः । तदुपलक्षितः समुदायो, लिङ्गं चैकग्रहणं स्थानिभेदात् भेदो मा भूदिति । यथैवैकः पुत्रः उभयोः संबन्धित्वेन व्यपदिश्यते, एवमादेशोऽपीति ।

'रात् सस्य' (पा. ८. २. २४) इति [सकारस्य] लोपो यथा अत्सा इति । 'अप्रत्ययविसर्जनीयस्य' (तु. पा. ८. ३. ४१) इति षत्वं प्राप्नोति । एवं मन्यते । समुदायाभिनिवेशिनी संज्ञा नाकारमास्कन्दति । तेन रेफः अप्रत्ययः इति । प्रत्ययविसर्जनीयश्चायम् । अयमभिप्रायः । योऽसावकारस्तस्य प्रत्ययावयवत्वात् प्रत्ययव्यपदेशः । ततो रेफः प्रत्ययस्य [व्य]पदिश्यते इति ।

लुप्यतेऽत्र प्रत्ययविसर्जनीय इति । यस्यामवस्थायामुत्त्वं विधीयते तस्यां नैवाकारेण लब्धा प्रत्य[य]संज्ञा । उत्तरकालं सकारेण लब्धा । तद्विनिवृत्तौ पूर्वमकारो ल(? °कारेणाल°)ब्धा इदानीं लभ्यत इत्ययुक्तमिदमुच्यते । तस्मात् षत्वं प्राप्नोति । इदानीं लिङ्गान्निवर्तयति —

भ्रातुष्पुत्रग्रहणं ज्ञापकमेकादेशात् षत्वं न भवतीति । एकादेशो निमित्तं यस्येणस्तस्मान्न भवति परस्य विसर्जनीयस्येति ।

[४] किं पुनरयं पूर्वान्तः ? कथं पुना रपर इति निर्देशे गुणीभूतो रेफोऽन्तत्वेनादित्वेन वा संबध्यते ? स्यान्मतम्, रेफासङ्गमात्रमनेन विधीयते इति प्राधान्यं रेफस्येति । यद्यर्थक्रियायां प्राधान्यम्, त[र्हि] शब्दस्तु न तथाभूतं रेफं चोदयतीति विशेषणानभिसंबन्धः । तत्रैवं ब्रुवते — [ए]तदुक्तं भवति — पूर्वान्ते पक्षे परग्रहणं न कर्तव्यम् । एता[व]द्वस्तु — 'उरण् र' इति । 'अन्त' इति वर्तते । एवं परादिपक्षेऽपि । उरण् इति पञ्चमीपक्षेऽस्याः परत्वे कल्पिते परग्रहणं [न] कर्तव्यम् ।

अथ क्रियते, व्यक्त्यर्थं संपद्यत इति अयं सूत्रार्थः संपन्नः — उः स्थाने यो[ऽणु]क्तोऽस्मात् परो रो भवति, स त्वादिर्भवति। अथोभयं नानुवर्तते, ततोऽभक्त इति।

इयं तु विचारणा नियमपक्षमाश्रित्य युक्ता। तस्मिंश्च पक्षे पूर्वविप्रतिषेधाश्रयणं कृतम्। नियमस्य वा नियमान्तरेण संबन्धः। प्रतिपदादेशेषु सर्वान् षष्ठीनिर्देशा[न्] समुच्चित्य समुदाये, निर्वर्त्यमस्तीति नियमः सिद्ध इति परिगृह्यते। दोषे संभवन्ति त्रयः पक्षाः।

यदा तु 'प्रसङ्गे रपरत्वम्' इत्येव पक्षस्तदा यथैवानङादिषु नकारविषया वि[चा]रणा नास्ति — किमनङो नकारोऽभक्तः परादिरिति, एवमेव विचारणयानया [न] भवितव्यम् — किमयं परादिरभक्त इति। शक्यते त्वस्मिन्पक्षेऽपि आदिशब्दानुवृत्तिसामर्थ्याद् एवं कल्पयितुम् — स्थानिनिवृत्तिकाले तदवयवः, ऊर्ध्वं तु यानि कार्याणि तेष्वयं परादिः स्यादिवत् भवति इति।

तत्र पूर्वान्त इति समुदायस्यैव वान्तः, अथ वाणः। अवयवावयवत्वात् तु समुदायस्यापि भवति। एवं यः परो नियतसंनिधानो विभक्तिप्रत्ययोऽन्यो वा प्रत्ययसमुदायस्तस्यादि[रि]ति।

[४. १] गीः। पूः। अभक्ते ह्यनवयवोऽन्तव्यपदेशं न लभते इति। निजेगिल्यते। अभक्ते रेफे गिर इति एषावयवासंबन्धिनी [ष]ष्ठी अशक्या कल्पयितुम्। गीर्यते स्वयमेव। रेफेण यको व्यवधाने, सत्यपि चोपदेशवचने न सिध्यति, व्यवधानादेव। स्वरविधौ व्यञ्जनमविद्यमानवत् इति। अस्मिन् पक्षे इयमाश्रयितव्या परिभाषा। प्रतिविधेयं दोषेषु। अभ्यस्तस्वरेऽप्येष एव परिहारः। उक्तत्वात्तु न प्रयुक्तः। [हलादिशेष।] यथाभूतः शिष्यते, तथाभूतेन निवर्तितव्यम्। एवमभ्यासः अहल् भवतीति अस्यां कल्पनायां न प्राप्नोति, अनेकदेशत्वाद् रेफस्येति। विसर्जनीयप्रतिषेध इति। अभक्तो हि तदादिग्रहणात् पदान्तो भवति। 'यस्मात् सुप्-तिङ्विधिस्तदादि सुबन्तं [तिङन्तं] च' (तु. परि. २३) इति। प्रत्ययाव्यवस्था च। किरतः, गिरतः इति। को द्विवचनेनानुरोधाभिप्रायः? किर[ती]त्यत्राङ्गं च प्राप्नोति विकरणश्च। नित्यत्वात् विकरणेन भवितव्यम्। आङ्गो हि गुणः अनित्यः। कृते विकरणे प्रतिषेधात्। तस्मात् विकरणे कृते तन्निमित्ते चेत्त्वे साधुत्वस्याभ्यनुज्ञानात् नास्ति अव्यवस्था। इह तु द्विवचने उभयं नित्यम्, आङ्गं विकरणश्च। परत्वात् आङ्गे

कृते पश्चात् विकरण इति रेफोऽभक्तत्वात् तत्र [धात्ववयवो न] भवतीति रेफात् परस्य विकरणस्यासाधुत्वं प्रसक्तम्। अथापि विकरणात् परो रेफः स कल्पते, अणः परो न भवतीति रूपाप्रसिद्धिश्चेति द्विवचने एव प्रत्यया[व्य]वस्थोदाह्रियते।

[४. २] **पूर्वान्ते वैवधारणम्**। 'रोः सुपि' (पा. ८. ३. १६) इति नियमार्थं कर्तव्यम्। **गीर्षु, पूर्षु,** अयं हि सुपि पदान्त इति। परादित्वे सति तु सुब्ग्रहणेनैव गृह्यन्ते इति। अभक्तोऽपि तदादिवचनात् प्राप्नोति इति कर्तव्यं वैवधारणम्। **परादावपि** यः स्वाभाविकस्तस्य निवृत्त्यर्थं [कर्त]व्यम्, इह मा भूत् — **चतुर्ष्विति।**

नार्कल्पिरित्येवमर्थम् । **कल्पिपदसंघा[त]भक्तोऽयं नोत्सहतेऽवयवस्य पदान्ततां विहन्तुम्।** नृकल्पशब्दादिञि विहिते वृद्धौ क्रियमाणायां रेफः परादिः कस्य भवति? प्रत्ययसमुदायस्य कल्पिशब्दस्य। समुदायं प्रति तदवयवो रेफो न शक्यते तस्मिन् पूर्व इति व्यवच्छेत्तुम्। यस्तु कल्पशब्दस्तस्यावयवो न भवतीति अवयवोऽवयवान्तरा[त्] पूर्वः परश्च शक्यते व्यपदेष्टुम्। तस्मात् कल्पप्रत्यये तदादिग्रहणादस्ति रेफस्य पदान्तत्वम्। केयं वाचोयुक्तिः — 'नोत्सहतेऽवयवस्य' इति? अयमर्थः। अस्य संघातभक्तत्वात् [अयं] संघातस्यावयवः। तस्य संघातावयवस्य या कल्पेऽवयवे पदान्तता [तां] नोत्सहते विहन्तुमिति। अन्येषां ग्रन्थः — '**कल्पि(? °ल्प)पदसंघातभक्तोऽसौ**' इति। त एवं वर्णयन्ति। कल्पावयवं पदं कल्पि(? °ल्प)पदमिति व्यपदिश्यते। तेन नार्कल्पिशब्दः कल्पि(? °ल्प)पदम्। तस्य यः संघातोऽवयवः कल्पिरिति।

[४. ३] **[धिनुतः।]** अत्राप्येकवचने धिनोतीति लोपे सत्यसति वा नास्ति विशेषः। [आद् गुणेन वा, विकरणस्य] गुणे कृते वा 'अतो गुणे' (पा. ६. १. ९७) इति [पररूपेण] यथा पच इति। अतो द्विवचनमुदाहृतम्। **आर्धधातुकोपदेशे यदकारान्तमिति।** आर्धधातुकप्रतिपत्तौ यदकारान्तमिति। यस्मिन् हि काले आर्धधातुकं स्वरूपं प्रतिपद्यते, तस्मिन् काले न कदाचिदनेन संनियोगशिष्टयोरनयोरकारान्तता अप्रतिपन्नेति सिद्धो लोपः।

निर्दिश्यमानस्यादेशा भवन्ति इति। ननु चानुसंहारो बाध्यते यथा इति। नैष दोषः। णल इति यत् षष्ठ्यन्तं तेन यः प्रत्यायितः प्रयोगविषयः स आदेशं प्रतिपद्यते। [तदेव] रूपमस्येत्यभेदादेकत्वाध्यवसाय इति इदमुच्यते — षष्ठीनिर्दिष्ट-

स्येति । अतश्चाकारान्तादङ्गाद् अकारस्य औकारो भवति इति । अकाररूपं श्रुतिसंनिपाति, यस्तु तद्भक्तः सोऽनुमीयमान इति [न] भविष्यति 'आदेः परस्य' (पा. १. १. ५४) इति । रेफेण व्यवहितत्वात् । अकारश्च स्वरूपेणाश्रीयते । तद्रूपं च व्यवधीयते । यदि तु लिट इति वा प्रत्ययस्येति वोच्येताव्यवधाना[त्] स्यादादेश इति ।

चङ्युपधाह्रस्वत्वम् । न[नु] च ज्ञापकाद् अनुपधास्थस्यापि स्या[त्, य]दयम् 'अत् स्मृदृत्वर ....' (पा. ७. ४. ९५) इत्यत्वं शास्ति । सत्यम्, एवमेतद्, अतिप्रसङ्गस्तु । इहापि स्यात् — अचीकृतत्, अचिकीर्तत् इति ।

इटश्च व्यवस्था न प्रकल्पते, आस्तरिता इति । एवं मन्यते । गुणश्च प्राप्नो[ति], इट् च । परत्वान्नित्यत्वाच्च गुणः । कृते च गुणे इट्प्रतिषेधः प्राप्नोति, 'नेड् वरमनादौ' इत्य[प्र]वृत्तिरूपाव्यवस्था । प्रवृत्तौ सत्यां रेफात् पूर्वं चेटः श्रवणमित्यनिष्टा व्यवस्था । यदि तु पूर्वमिट् स्यात् पश्चाद् गुणः, न कश्चि[द्] दोषः स्यात् । यथाभूतः परस्तथाविभूतस्यादिर्भवतीति ।

दीर्घत्वं न प्राप्नोति । गीः, पूरिति । यदि तावत् अकृते विलोपे उत्त-(? इदुत्त्वं) रपरत्वं च, विलोप एव न प्राप्नोति, अपृक्तसंज्ञाया अभावात् । [त]स्मादन्तरङ्गत्वात् कृते विलोपे उत्वं (? इदुत्त्वं) रपरत्वं च । सुप्युत्पन्ने यः परः, तस्यादिरयम् इत्यस्यां कल्पनायां 'रात् [स]स्य' (पा. ८. २. २४) इति लोपे कृते न प्राप्नोति दीर्घ इति ।

अलोऽन्त्यस्य ॥ १. १. ५२ ॥

[१] किमिदमल्ग्रहणम् । तुल्यत्वान्निर्देशस्य न ज्ञायते — किं प्रथमाबहुवचनान्तम्, उत षष्ठ्येकवचनमिति । द्वैतं समर्थयन्ते, उत्तरं च ग्रन्थं वर्णयन्ति — यदि पुनर् 'अलन्त्यस्य' इत्युच्येत इति । यद्येवं व्याख्यायेत । प्रथमाबहुवचनान्तमेतदित्यसंदिग्धेन पर्यायेण व्याचष्टे । अन्येषां त्वेवमेव ग्रन्थः । किमिदमल्ग्रहणमन्त्यविशेषणम् एवं भवितुमर्हति, इति अन्त्यसमानाधिकरणमेवालि(?)मध्यवस्यन्ति । यद्यप्यन्त्यविशेषणम् आदेशोऽविशेषितो भवति, इति । अनेकाल्प्यादेशस्य रूपम् अवधृतम् । एवंरूपोऽन्त्यस्यालो भवतीति, अनेका[ल्प्या]देशोऽन्त्यस्य प्रसज्येत । तस्मादस्मिन् पक्षे सूत्रमारब्ध[व्य]म् 'अनेकाल्शित् सर्वस्य' (पा. १. १. ५५) इति । यदि पुनर्

'अलन्त्यस्य' इति उच्येत । यद्येतद् व्याख्यायेत वा । एवं ह्याश्रीयमाणे आदेश-रूपमवष्टान्त(?°मलात्मक)मन्त्यस्य प्रतिपादितं भवति इति लोपः सर्वस्य प्राप्नोति, '.... रहोरजसां लोपश्च' (पा. ५. ४. ५१) इति, विरजीकरोतीति । किं चालसमुदायश्चान्त्यस्य प्राप्नोति इति, अन्यत्र वर्णग्रहणे जातेः प्रतिनिर्देशात् । अल्ग्रहणमिदानीं किमर्थमिति चेत्, लोपार्थम् । लोपश्चान्त्यस्य मा भूदिति । लिङ्गात् तु अयं न जाति-निर्देश इति गम्यते । किं लिङ्गम् ? 'ङिच्च' (पा. १. १. ५३) इति । जातिनिर्देशे हि ङिदप्यन्त्यस्य सिद्ध एव इ[ती]दं नियतसामर्थ्यं भविष्यति । नियमफलत्वा[त्] नियम इति उच्यते । अन्त्यस्यादेशा भवन्तीति अनेनानलोऽप्याक्षेपादल्ग्रहणमनलो व्यावृत्त्यर्थम् ।

एवमप्यन्त्योऽविशेषितो भवति, एवंरूपस्येति । एवं सति यावानन्त्यो व्याकरणे संभवति षष्ठीनिर्दिष्टः, सर्वस्य प्राप्नोति । परमानडुद्भ्याम् इत्यनडुहः षष्ठीनिर्देशात् सर्वस्यानडुच्छब्दस्यान्त्यत्वाद् दकारः प्राप्नोति । **वाक्यस्यापीति** । दोषपरत्वाद् वाक्यस्योपादानम् । न तु संभवति वाक्यमन्त्यं षष्ठीनिर्दिष्टमिति । तस्मा[त्] दोषवानेवादेशविशेषणपक्ष इत्यन्त्यविशेषणपक्ष एव निर्दोषः । **यदि खल्वप्येषोऽभिप्रायः** । एतत् प्रतिपादयति । अवश्यकर्तव्योऽयं योगः पतिष्यति । विप्रतिषेधेऽपवाद-विप्रतिषेधात् सर्वस्य आदेश इति । असति हि पाठे क्रमाभावान्नापि पूर्वो नापि परः संभवतीति । अथ तु लाघवमात्रं दृश्यते, **अन्त्यविशेषणपक्षेऽपि तन्न करिष्यते** ।

[२] अलोऽन्त्यस्येति स्थाने विज्ञातस्यानुसंहारः । 'षष्ठी स्थानेयोगा' (पा. १. १. ४९) इत्येष योगः कृत्स्नः स्मर्यते । तेन या षष्ठी स्थानेयोगत्वेन निर्ज्ञाता, परिच्छिन्ना, विषयान्तरादवच्छिन्ना, नाक्रान्तापवादैः, सान्त्यस्यालो भवति । आदेशो वा यः .... । [अयं] स्थाने[नु]संहारोऽ[न्य]त्र न प्रवर्तते । यथाश्रुतस्यैवादिरन्तो वा षष्ठ्यन्तस्य, परो वा क्रियते, इति ।

इतरथा ह्यनिष्टप्रसङ्गः । यदि षष्ठीत्येतावन्मात्रं स्मर्यते, यावती षष्ठी व्याकरणे सा न श्रूयमाणस्य । किं तर्हि ? अन्त्यस्याल, इति यथैव षष्ठ्यपवादस्याङ्गम् एवम् 'अलोऽन्त्यस्य' इत्येतदप्यङ्गम्, इति आर्धधातुकस्ये[ती]यं षष्ठी [न] समुदायस्य । किं तर्हि ? अन्त्यस्याल इति । सा तु यथार्था(?°र्थं) प्रवर्तते, [क्वचित् स्थान्यादेशभावेन,] क्वचित् स्थान्यादेशोच्छेदेनेति । **टित्-किन्-मितोऽप्यन्त्यस्य स्युरिति** । ऋकारात् पूर्व इडागमः

प्राप्नोति — भवितेति । एवं पुनरप्याकारस्यागमो न समुदायस्येति, यदुक्तम् 'अर्थवतो ह्यागमस्तद्गुणीभूतो गृह्यते' (मभा. १. ७५. ५) इति, तन्न संभवति। तथा च प्रणिदापयतीति णत्वं न सिध्यति। तथा नुम् कस्य ? अन्त्यस्येति पूर्वान्तपक्षेऽप्यङ्गस्य नेति तस्य नलोपो दीर्घत्वं च न प्राप्नोति।

[२. १] यदि पुनरयं योगशेषो विज्ञायेत। षष्ठीमात्रं नानुसंह्रियते इत्येतत् प्रतिपादयति। कथम् ? इदं हि सूत्रम् 'अलोऽन्त्यस्य' इति ....। योगशेषे च। किम् ? अनिष्टं प्रसज्येत। आर्धधातुकस्येति षष्ठीरूपम् अन्त्येऽलि व्यवस्थितमौत्पत्तिकेन (? औत्सर्गिकेण) वाक्येन। तत्रादिष्टिद्व[व]तीति प्रवर्तमानोऽपवादः किं षष्ठीरूपं बाधताम् — नेदमत्र सत्यन्त्यस्याल इति; अथ विषयनियमं बाधताम् — स्थानेयोगा न भवतीति ? युक्तं य[द]त्र षष्ठीरूपमबाधमानो विषयं बाधेत। उपसंहारान्तरमनुरूपमेव बाध्यते, न तु विषयः। ('आदेः परस्य', 'अनेकाल्शित् सर्वस्य' इति।) अस्मिन् पक्षे तुल्यो दोष इत्याह — तस्मात् सुष्ठूच्यते ... 'इतरथा ह्यनिष्टप्रसङ्गः' इति। अयं चानुसंहारोऽनुसंहारान्तरेणासंभवाद् बाध्यते ['आदेः परस्य' इत्यनेन]। 'अनेकाल्शित् सर्वस्य' तु सत्यपि संभवे बाध[क]मिति।

ङिच्च ॥ १. १. ५३ ॥

[१] तातङि ङित्करणस्य सावकाशत्वात् इति। अपवादोऽपि स्थानान्तरप्राप्त्या बाध्यते। देवदत्तपुत्र इति समासान्तोदात्तत्वेन 'कारकाद्दत्तश्रुतयोः ....' (पा. ६. २. १४८) एत्येतद् बाध्यते, एवं 'ङिच्च' इति। यद्यपि सर्वानुसंहारस्य बाधकम्, एवमपि तातङो य[त्] ङित्करणं तदन्यार्थमपि संभवतीति ङित्त्वनिमित्तं संदिह्यते। [ते]न संदेहात् संदिग्धोपस्थानो योगः, यथैव उत्सर्गः। संदिग्धोपस्थान इत्यपकृष्यमाणबलो नोत्सहते बाधितुमिति विप्रतिषेध उच्यते।

[२] प्रयोजनं नाम .... यन्नियोगत इति। न हि .... यथान्यनिरपेक्षं णिङो ङित्त्वमात्मनेपदार्थं सामान्यग्रहणाविघातार्थं [च] संभवत्येवं णित्करणं सामान्यग्रहणार्थं संभवतीति युक्तं णिङि णि[त्]करणस्य सावकाशत्वादिति (? °त्वमिति)। इह तु यदा सर्वादेशत्वं लब्धं स्यात् तदा गुणप्रतिषेधार्थं भवेत् ङित्करणम्। तदेव तु दुःसंपादमिति यदेव निमित्तं संदिग्धोपस्थानतायास्तदेव नास्तीति स्वनिमित्तप्रयुक्तं ङियोऽन्त्यस्येत्येतत् किमिति न प्रवर्तिष्यते ?

[३] एवं तर्हि .... यदेतं ङितं करोतीति । ङित्करणादेवायं सर्वादेशः स्यादित्येवं प्रतिपादयति । कथम् ? एतत् ङित्करणं गुणवृद्धिनिषेधार्थमेवाचार्यस्य । तच्च नासति सर्वादेशत्वे संभवतीति सर्वादेशाभ्युपाय एव ङित्करणम् । यदि त्वन्त्यार्थं ङित्करणं संपद्यते, शक्यते हि प्रकारान्तरेणान्तादेशत्वं प्रतिपत्तुमिति इदमाह — इतरथा हि लोट एरुप्रकरण एव ब्रूयादिति ।

अनेकाल्[शित् सर्वस्य] ॥ १. १. ५५ ॥

नैतदस्ति । शित्करणादेव सर्वादेशो भविष्य[ती]ति । अनेकाल्त्वादित्यर्थः । ननु च शकारस्य श्रवणं प्राप्नोति । नैष दोषः । ए × × × × वा × का × × नन्यार्थो लोप इति । तत्र शकारस्येदं प्रयोजनं समुदायो निवर्तयितव्य इति । समुदाये च निवर्तिते कार्यार्थमुपात्तो निवर्तिष्यते ।

इदं तर्हि 'अष्टाभ्य औश्' (पा. ७. १. २१) इति । पूर्वत्र 'अलोऽन्त्यस्य' इति दर्शितम् । इदानीम् 'आदेः परस्य' (पा. १. १. ५४) इति प्राप्तिः प्रदर्श्यते इति । एवमर्थे वोपादानम् । अथ वोदाहरणसंभवः प्रतिपाद्यते । विशेषणार्थः शकारः । अन्यच्छकारस्य प्रयोजनमिति सर्वादेशार्थं न भविष्यति ।

[अं]त्यस्यायं स्थाने भवन्निति । कथमन्त्यस्य शिभावः शीभावो वा, यावता 'सर्वनाम्नो', 'नपुंसकात्' इतीयं पञ्चमी ? तत्र 'आदेः परस्य' इति प्रभवितव्यम् । एवं मन्यते । 'सर्वनाम्नः' इति इयं संबन्धषष्ठी । 'नपुंसकात्' इति च विहितविशेषण[म्] ।

TRANSLATION

"*i- u- ṛ- ḷ* (in the place) of *y- v- r- l* (are named) *samprasāraṇa*" (P. 1. 1. 45).

[1]

"Is this the name of the sentence ... or of the phoneme?" The question (is asked) because of the possibility of reason(s) (in favour) of both (the views), because of the absence (or impossibility) of simultaneousness, because of the detection of defect(s) in both, and because indications for both are seen in Grammar. — (Objection:) But a *vākya* 'sentence' is defined as the verb along with its qualifications, (and) here no verbal expression is heard. If (a verb *as* in the Present) is assumed on the authority of *astir bhavantīparaḥ* ... (P. 2. 3. 1, *Vār.* 11), even then a self-contradiction results (like this): In the operation-rules in which *saṁprasāraṇa* is taught the sentence viz. 'an *ik* comes in the place of *yaṇ*' presents itself; (now) if (*ik*) is there, then it does not come, and if it comes, then it is not there.

[2]

The reply: Since a sūtra requires details etc. to be supplied, we justify 'becoming' as a supplement of the (sūtra-)sentence, (thus completing the sentence as) *ig yaṇo bhavati* 'an *ik* comes in the place of *yaṇ*'.

Even then, this sentence cannot be the named because of the absence of the designation *pada* (for the sentence). For, what is named is either in the Nominative or in the Genitive, and a sentence is not in the Nominative or in the Genitive. — Reply: By 'sentence', the meaning of the sentence is meant, as e. g. the meaning of *matu* is conveyed by the word *matup* in *matau chaḥ sūktasāmnoḥ* (P. 5. 2. 59).

(Objection:) Even though a meaning, this is not of the nature of a substance. How is it then, that the 'sentence-meaning' is (supposed to be) indicated by 'sentence'? — Reply: (This sentence-meaning which is) taken into consideration at the time of giving the name, furnished finally with the form of a substance, and therefore fit to be mentioned by a pronoun as 'this' or 'that', experiences the status of the named and then, proceeding with its own activity in the operational rules, presents itself (there) in the form of a non-substance itself. When the meaning of (the sentence): *ig yaṇo bhavati* is named *samprasāraṇa*, in the operational rules this presents itself: *ig yaṇo bhavati*,

(or) *ig yaṇo jāyate*, (or) *ig yaṇo niṣpadyate*, (all meaning ' an *ik* is produced in the place of *yaṇ* '.)

[3]

" Or of the phoneme ? " (The meaning is :) Is *samprasāraṇa* the name of *ik* which (comes) in the place of *yaṇ* ? Now, if the status of the named belongs to the phoneme, it remains undecided, whether it is the name of *ik* in the place of *yaṇ*, or of *yaṇ* itself. For if the word *saṁprasāraṇa* has its own form for its meaning, (i. e. is the name,) the status of the named should belong to *yaṇ*. But, if the mention of the named ... then it should belong to *ik*. Reply : *yaṇaḥ* is a Genitive. It (is not connected) with *samprasāraṇam*. With what then ? With *ik*. Whence this (supposition) ? — Otherwise there will be contradiction. For, if it is understood that *samprasāraṇa* is the name of *yaṇ*, it will be purposeless to read *ik* (in the rule).

[4]

" If (it is) a name of the sentence, phonetic operations (cannot be performed) ". The operation pertaining to a phoneme, viz. *pūrvarūpa*, or lengthening, that cannot be performed. Therefore, the name should be laid down for the phoneme. To explain : If *saṁprasāraṇa* is the name of the sentence, this will become the name of the birth of *ik*. And a birth is a meaning and a meaning cannot be said to be former or later, nor can it have a status of the original (to be replaced). — But, with what purpose are these two mentioned — the impossibility of the wording of the rule and of the operation ? — He shows that although the wording is possible by an incorrect word as, e. g. *kairāgacchāmi*, even then it will be a mere wording. The operation, however, does not apply to a sentence, as it is impossible.

[5]

" If it is the name of the phoneme, the production (of *ik* will be impossible [by, e. g.] *ṣyaṅaḥ samprasāraṇam* (P. 6. 1. 13). That *ik* itself is impossible to get ". Even what is ' impossible to get ' (*alabhya*) is described as ' difficult to get ' (*durlabha*) in the world. " Even if somehow it is obtained " is also said by imagining such an interpretation. " By which (rule) can it be in the place of *yaṇ* ? " (They) explain (this) thus (also) : (By the *Mbh.*) ' That *ik* itself is impossible to get ' is just meant that there is no application of any other rule. It is as in the case of the name Vṛddhi where a defect is stated because of the contingency of mutual dependence. " Even if somehow it is obtained " is said on the strength of ' But the goal is achieved because of the eternality of the word '. It is as in the case of *ā*, *ai* and *au* which are said

to be eternal. "By which (rule) can it be in the place of *yaṇ*?" "It is to be established by this very (rule)". (He) shows (thereby) that the defect of mutual dependence is not in the form of *ik*. What then? In understanding the original (of this *ik* substitute). For, the name *samprasāraṇa* belongs to the *ik* that is in the place of *yaṇ*. And when the name *samprasāraṇa* is there (for *ik*), it (*ik*) gets the status of having *yaṇ* for its original. The idea of which the original and which the substitute comes from Grammar, not from the world. So it is said: "This depends on one another".

[6]

"But the use of the specific case is indicative". (On the one hand) the use of the predicate cases like *samprasāraṇasya* (P. 6. 3. 139), *samprasāraṇāt* (P. 6. 1. 108), and (this on the other) when the sentence-meaning is the named — this is not possible. *ṣyañaḥ samprasāraṇam* (P. 6. 1. 13) is not possible on the view that *samprasāraṇa* is the name of the phoneme. Therefore it is inferred that this sūtra is to be repeated, only that out of sloth it is uttered only once. Or, that there are two rules on the device of Tantra. Just as one word, uttered in (two) different places, appears to have two forms, and what are many (appear as) having one form, similarly the disciples were taught in two ways by the Teacher — to some (this was taught as the name) of the sentence: to others, (that) as of the phoneme.

[7]

"Or, let it be, again, (the name) of the sentence". (He) explains, without resorting to the repetition or (the device of) Tantra. "Just as one born of a crow is a crow". Here an objection is (thus) raised: A crow becomes a crow because of its connection with the species of a crow. It is said (in the *Mbh.* on P. 4. 1. 93, *Vār.* 13) for this very reason thus: 'The reason by which one (is) a crow, by that (very reason) another also (is a crow)'. — Indeed, it is so. But, (what he) says is this: In the world, names of fathers are (used) for sons, like Babhru, Maṇḍu, and Lamaka. These (names) are imposed on Bābhravya, Māṇḍavya, and Lāmakāyana. Moreover, when the signs of the species of the crow are not there, (even) in that condition (it is) a crow. Such being the case, just as the cawing is the sign of the species (of the crow), similarly this (knowledge of the) birth also has been adduced (as a sign). The word also proceeds because of the relationship (with the meaning): 'That is this', or because of its connection with an activity. The word *praṣṭha* conveys a woman because of the relationship 'that is this', (even though this) is preceded by a distinction: 'This is a wife of *praṣṭha* (one who walks ahead)'. Or, (the activity) walking ahead is imposed on the woman. When

the walking ahead is imposed, the word *praṣṭha* conveys the woman without expecting anything else, (the same) as it conveys the man. Similarly here also this distinction (implied in) 'born of a crow' becomes a cause of the relationship 'that is this': since it is born of a crow, therefore (it is) a crow. Or, the cawing of the crow is brought into connection. Here he says that the birth is the sign of the species (arguing that) since it is born of a crow, therefore (it is) a crow. Similarly, (a phoneme is called *samprasāraṇa*) because it is born of (the process of) *samprasāraṇa*. Here both the process and what is possessed of it are called by a common name. Or, a phoneme, on which the form of the process is imposed, gets that (name), while (the same phoneme), having the nature of the substance, undergoes the operation. It is like this: The sentence-meaning, considered in the matter of the relationship of the name and the named, experiences the status of the named, but in the region of operation it is of the nature of the non-substance only.

[8]

"Or, (speakers) are seen, who use parts of sentences instead of sentences". 'Enter' is an act. And an act does not proceed without a location. Therefore, it takes a suitable *kāraka* viz. the *karman* 'grammatical object'. The meaning of (the sentence) *praviśa gṛham*, which is expressed by the two inflected words, is expressed by (the single) word: *praviśa*. Further, some regard this *kāraka*-meaning as expressed, others as indicated. Since the entering into a sweet ball is impossible, (another) suitable *kāraka* (i. e. object) is either expressed or indicated. Similarly (the word) *piṇḍīm* also (becomes) expressive of the meaning of *piṇḍīṁ bhakṣayet* 'one should eat *piṇḍī*'. As there is no *kāraka* without an activity, it takes a suitable activity. Just as in the case of words like *dadhighaṭa* an activity like *pūrṇa* 'filled with' is accepted, in the same way the word *samprasāraṇāt* takes a suitable activity. And production is the suitable activity. Therefore, this word *samprasāraṇāt* expresses the meaning of *samprasāraṇanirvṛttāt* 'after (what is) produced by, or born of, *samprasāraṇa*'. Or, (this) meaning is indicated. Why? Because of the impossibility of assuming the form of the preceding or of lengthening, if the sentence-meaning is the named.

[9]

"Parts of inflected words instead of (the full) inflected words". (Objection:) Names based on their phonetic form, if used in a different form, are unable to convey (the intended meaning). Therefore, there cannot be an elision of (the part of the name) that is uttered. Moreover, the name is given in that particular (phonetic form) alone, by the parents. In this respect some

think (thus): When a part is uttered, there is an inference of the whole, from which (there results) the understanding of the meaning. Others think (thus): There are two parts also in the whole, (e. g.) *deva* and *datta*. And these two (parts) are connected (with the named) in the capacity of a name, just like the whole. Yet others think (thus): These are so many different names themselves, become subsequently current by usage. Of these, however, those which are thus subsequently formed by means of elision, they are correct, but not (those like) *drā, khā* — that is the view of Pāṇini who teaches elision. And just as names are thus subsequently formed, similarly objects (meanings) are not so subsequently formed. When it is (decided) that the *ik*-s in the place of a *yaṇ* are the named, then the *ik*-s come into being subsequently as the named. What is born of (the process of) *samprasāraṇa* is understood from the name *samprasāraṇa*.

[10]

"Or, he (Pāṇini) says ...". Here he (Pat.) shows this: Just as (the expression:) *brāhmaṇaśataṁ bhojyatām* 'Let a hundred of the Brāhmaṇas be fed' implies a particular feeding, because if (the Brāhmaṇas) numbering (a hundred) are so fed, the number is fed — just as *vyāghro bhojyatām* 'Let a tiger be fed', *hastī bhojyatām* 'Let an elephant be fed' are certainly particular feedings — similarly, (when it is said:) 'There is a lengthening of the *samprasāraṇa*', 'the form of the preceding is taken (by the *samprasāraṇa* and the following phoneme together)', the lengthening or taking the form of the preceding is such as can be done (only) in the case of the phoneme which is a product of the activity.

[11]

"Or, let this rather be (a name) of the phoneme. ... It will be understood as a future name". — Does (this) future character of the name pertain to (the rule teaching) the relationship between the name (*samprasāraṇa*) and the named (*ik*), or to the rules of operation? If (it pertains) to (the rule teaching) the relationship between the name and the named, the relationship of the name and the named is possible in the case of (those named) which already exist and also those which are yet to come into being. If (it pertains) to the rules of operation, only after the establishment of this (relationship) a phoneme (which undergoes) the operation of lengthening and the taking of the form of the preceding (is available). Whence, then, this assumption of the future character? — Reply: Just as the fault of mutual dependence was pointed out in the case of the name Vṛddhi thus: 'since in the case of (names) like Vṛddhi the naming can be done only with regard to what exists', (it is all right) even if,

at the time of giving the name, the (objects) named are expected to be either already existing or to be present in future; but, where the phonemes *ā* etc. depend on it (i. e. the name), as in *mṛjer vṛddhiḥ* (P. 7. 2. 114), there will be (the fault of) mutual dependence. Similarly here, by the rule *ig yaṇaḥ* there may be the name (*samprasāraṇa*) as though the (*ik*-s) were already existing; but how will the name *samprasāraṇa* proceed in (rules like) *ṣyaṅaḥ samprasāraṇam* ?

As for the *ik*-s which are already produced, they cannot be made (the substitutes), because they are already exhausted thereby. Nor those with the same form as these, because of the absence of any particularity. There is no difference between (the criginal) *i* in *indra* etc. and *i* in the place of *yaṇ*. So what do we understand ?

— What is yet to be is looked upon as (already) existing when establishing the relationship of the name and the named. Such being the case, by *ṣyaṅaḥ samprasāraṇam* this is meant : Put such a substitute in the place of *ṣyaṅ* as will get the name *samprasāraṇa*. This is a means of having a substitute (which is) fit for this name. Just as (when it is said :) 'Weave a sari of this thread !' The root *ve* is expressive of continuity; so, when the word sari is used when there is no sari, it is understood that it is used after mentally going over the future relationship of the name and the named and thus taking it as *fait accompli* For, the use of a particular word when an object in not there is for the sake of understanding a particular meaning. Therefore, this is understood : 'Undertake such a weaving, that the threads, when woven, will get this name (viz. sari).

[12]

"The use of the (forms) beginning with *ij* and those beginning with *yaj* (in the world)". The relationship of the original and the substitute is merely a mental transformation, as in 'the mango trees are to the east of the village'. In the world, verily, there is a use of the (forms) beginning with *ij* and *yaj* as in *iṣṭam* (and) *yaṣṭavyam* (respectively). But in the science of grammar, being prohibited (by the Dhātupāṭha which reads as) *yaja, ḍuvapa, vaha* the notion of (forms) beginning with *ij* etc. is generated (again) by the rule *vacisvapi ...* (P. 6. 1. 15) in a specific domain, (thus indicating) that *ik* is correct when (a suffix) with (a code letter) *k* (or one) with *ṅ* follows. (It means) that the very twofold usage which is current in the world, that is only certified as 'correct' by grammar.

There is a reading *sādhvabhimatasya* (for *asā°*). (Those who follow it,) they explain it by *sādhūnām abhimatasya* 'approved by the respectable

(people) '. (They add that thus) sanction is given by Grammar to (forms) beginning with *ij* (which are approved by the respectable people).

But on this view the form *aduhitarām* does not escape (the undesired name *samprasāraṇa* and the resultant lengthening). Similarly, it still does not escape, even when the rule is regarded as (constituting) two rules on the strength of the utterance of two specific cases.

* * *

" (Augments) having *ṭ* and *k* as code-letters, become the initial and the final parts (of the element to which they are affixed) respectively " (P. 1. 1. 46).

[1]

" This is a mention in the form of a compound. As such, it is not understood ... etc." What is gained by this (statement) ? If (it is meant that) the idea of respectivity is not understood, (it is equally not understood) in an uncompounded expression. (For example, in the sentence) ' Sheep are the property of Devadatta and Yajñadatta, and goats also ', it is not understood to whom the sheep belong, and to whom the goats.

[2]

Here is the reply : This is what he says, by this means : The idea of respectivity is not there in the popular speech and in other sciences. It is there only in Grammar. (Elsewhere) the sequence is regulated (by the following factors) :

> The wise people who are versed in the Veda ascertain the sequence from word, from purpose, from text, from *pravṛtti* (?), from place, and from the principal action.

(They) ascertain the sequence from the word (as in) : ' He first cuts (a portion) of the heart, then of the tongue, then of the breast ' (*TaittSaṁh.* 6. 3. 10. 4. etc.). (Where) the word *atha* ' then ', indicative of ' what follows immediately ' is heard, there the sequence : ' having done this, this is to be done ' takes place. The sequence (ascertained by) purpose : When it is said : ' Feed Devadatta, bathe (him), annoint (him) with sandal, massage (him), annoint (him) with oil, then the following sequence is restricted : annointing with oil, massaging, bathing, annointing with sandal, and (finally) feeding. (The sequence by text) : when many items are mentioned in the Vedic texts which have a definite order of sequence, the sequence by text is fixed since the subject and the predicate are expected only once. For instance, in the Smṛti,

cleansing, burning, hewing and washing (are taught respectively) for metallic, earthen, wooden and woven from threads (articles). Others think (thus): When many persons are mentioned (as taking part) in a common activity, as e. g. in 'Feed Devadatta, Yajñadatta, Viṣṇudatta!' they get the meal in the same order. Such being the case, when it is viewed that inspite of separate mentions of related (things), respective pairing off as 'of him, this', 'of him, this' can be done in this way as e. g. 'Of *ghrā*, *jighra*' (is the substitute), 'Of *dhmā*, *dhama*'; that in names and compounds, however, the named items known from a name, without a sequence, will be connected with all the predicates simultaneously; that, similarly, even in a compound, a single, undiffertiated meaning, of the nature of a whole, is conveyed by a Dvandva — (on such a view) the Vārttikakāra says: When there is a mention in the form of a name and a compound there (results) the contingency of the predicate being connected with all (the subjects). There it will be known from the principle of respectivity that *ṇal* is (the substitute) of *tip*', '*atus* is (the substitute) of *tas*-. Therefore, mentioning by a compound is not capable of bringing about the connection. That is what (Pat.) says in "This is a mention in the form of a compound".

[3]

"Even though that is the *dṛṣṭānta* of the world" (i. e.) even though that is the view of the world. "Still, of the *dṛṣṭānta*" (i. e.) still, of the view. "Human effort". It is said (by Pat.) that this (respectivity) (taught by P. 1. 3. 10) is unprecedented, unknown in the world and something that can be achieved by effort.

[4]

"But what are these two, (furnished) with the code-letters *ṭ* and *k*, which become the initial and the final?" This is what (he) asks: What is their relation with that in connection with which these two are taught? What sort of an initial is (this), or the final? "(They are) two augments, says he". He says that being enjoined later when the *ārdhadhātuka* suffix is (already) there, (it) becomes a part (of it) without deleting another part (of it).

[5]

"But is it proper, when (words are) eternal?" He says that this is not the doctrine of Grammar. And if, somehow, the suffix is *itavya* by nature, what is the use of this teaching of *iṭ*? "And is (this too) reasonable, when words are eternal ...?" — Just as you accept *bhū*- setting aside *as*- even though word is eternal, similarly accept an augment also. "The (whole) words should

be here different ". *Bhū-* is not made after setting aside *as-*. What then? What is meant is that (*bhū-* is used) when *as-* is due.

[6]

" Well, then these will be substitutes." This is not a rule of interpretation. This is a relationship of the name and the named : (it means) " the code-letters *ṭ* and *k* become the names of the initial and the final ". So the name (is) of two meanings, the initial and the final, as (the words *ādi* and *anta*) have been used in their capacity of conveying the meaning. Or, the word *it* is regarded as read with the Svarita (and so present in this rule from P. 1. 1. 44). — If so, the phonemes *ṭ* and *k* do not get the name *it*. For, the phonemes *ṭ* and *k* are not now initial and final. And the enunciation is that (*ṭ* and *k*) named *it* are names. Such being the case, being in the same place as those called *it*, and having a common property viz. withdrawal they have the designation *it*. Therefore just as (any other phoneme) called *it* withdraws, similarly these two also. Therefore, by the statement ' *iṭ* comes in ', it is meant that the phoneme *ṭ*, which is a part of *iṭ*, should present the meaning ' initial '. When all substitutes beginning with *i* present themselves, *itavya* takes the place of *tavya* ' being similarmost when many are due.'

[7]

" But, how here, viz. in connection with the rule : ... *aḍ udāttaḥ* (P. 6. 4. 71) ? " (He) thinks thus : If *aṭ* is a Bahuvrīhi, (the meaning will be that) the substitute (will be) with *a* as its initial. Since *aṅgasya* is understood (because of *adhikāra*) in this rule, the word *udātta* falls on (i. e. is connected with) *aṅga*. Under these circumstances the *aṅga* becomes uncertain as regards the Udātta accent. " This Bahuvrīhi consists of three constituents, therefore the phoneme *a* gets the qualification Udātta in the (original) sentence itself (which thus means) : ' An Udātta *a* is its initial ' " Therefore, it is possible to have that understanding in an integrated formation (i. e. a compound) also, as, e. g., in *citragu* ' having a variegated cow '. " Well, then, where by continuation (*udātta* is present) ". The (relevant) word is not (actually) uttered there. What then ? The idea is that (it is) only inferred (to be there). When, however, this (other) view (is held, viz.) that owing to the inference (of presence) of a word similar to that another sentence is generated, then here is no defect. For, here *āḍ ajādīnām* (P. 6. 4. 72), the *hetuvākya* results into the sentence *āḍ udātto 'jādīnām*.

[8]

" Or, he (i. e. Pāṇini, first teaches that) what he can teach in a general way ", — by this (Patañjali) gives a solution even on the Paribhāṣā view,

Here (in grammar) some grammarians state $\sqrt{}$*as*- merely as $\sqrt{}$*s*- and then teach a prefixed augment *aṭ* when suffixes furnished with a code letter *p* follow, while some (teach) elision of (the radial) *a* when suffixes without (this) *p* follow. Similarly this Teacher teaches *ārdhadhātuka* suffixes like *tavya*, which begin with a consonant except *y*, both after Udātta and Anudātta verbal roots, and then, teaching *iṭ* after the Udātta ones, he (thereby) says: After the Udātta roots the suffix is *itavya*. It is with this idea that (Pat.) says: "By means of these particular statements (the student) understands the whole, (which is) a different word". The use of the (word) 'whole' (is to convey) that it is not that *tavya* etc. is already there and that the phoneme *i* comes in subsequently, (but to convey) that the whole (comes in) qualified by the phoneme *i*. "It is as in the case of *khadira* and *burbura*". This Genitive depends upon what you look upon as common. But what is common between the two? "Both *khadira* and *burbura* have a white stalk and very small leaves". By this (he) says that (they) understand the qualified whole itself. Similarly here also the phoneme *i* is neither inserted (before some *ārdhadhātuka*), nor removed from some other *ārdhadhātuka*. (What is done is) *itavya* (is taught) after some (verbal) base and *tavya* after some other.

[9]

"Or, by this order of sequence ... (he) teaches." (He) now introduces (the view that) all (grammatical analysis is) a fiction. This division that you have taken recourse to — first the base, then the suffix, and then (the augment) *iṭ* — all this is merely a means of explaining; it is not a-thing-that-exists. *Bhū* etc. are not in any way related to the forms in actual use like *bhavati*; similarly *laṭ* etc. which are taught in the sense of Present when *śap* follows. What then? These are means of (explaining) the usage. Nor is eternality of means declared in Grammar. What then? The eternality of usage (of word) is declared. And this division is not there in the whole (word) which is involved in the usage. But one understands the whole (word) through the series, (understood) initially, viz. first the base, then the suffix, and then the augment *iṭ*. In short, (he) shows: 'Understand the real by means of the imaginary!'

[10]

"In the matter of the injunction that a *ṭit* (becomes) the initial and a *kit* the final, there should be a prohibition of a suffix." The rule *ādyantau ṭakitau* is meant by (the expression) *ādyantavidhāne*. Or, in the matter of the initiality (and the finality) taught by this rule: *ādyantau ṭakitau* the *ṭit* status of a *ṭit* suffix and the *kit* status of a *kit* suffix should be prohibited

in connection with a suffix. (In other words, the rule should be :) *ādyantau ṭakitāv apratyayau.* " This is achieved by the statement of *para* ' the following '." By ' the statement of the following ' i. e. by the Pari. *vipratiṣedhe paraṁ* (*kāryam*) (P. 1. 4. 2) which enjoins the succeeding one, there will be a succeeding position of the suffix. For *ādyantau*, the scope will be *iḍ valādeḥ* (P. 7. 2. 35), or *bhiyo hetubhaye ṣuk* (P. 7. 3. 40). For (the rule which teaches) the succeeding position of a suffix, (the scope will be) *tavyattavyānīyaraḥ* (P. 3. 1. 96). Here, in *careṣ ṭaḥ* (P. 3. 2. 16), *āto 'nupasarge kaḥ* (P. 3. 2. 3), both (rules) become due. Or, ' by the statement of the following ' is explained as meaning that (there will be a succeeding position for the suffix) by the very statement of " the following " in *pratyayaḥ, paraḥ ...* (P. 3. 1. 1, 2), combined with the *vipratiṣedha* rule (P. 1. 4. 2). Or, ' by statement of the following ' (is meant that) what follows is named as *pratyaya* ' suffix '; when a succeeding position of the suffix is there, then the name *it* ' a code-letter ' for the phonemes *ṭ* and *k*; when the name *it* (for *ṭ* and *k*) is there then the name *ṭit* and *kit* (for the suffix), and when the name *ṭit* and *kit* is there, then the initial and the final position — thus there is no initial position or the final position for the suffix.

But, in this way, the suffixal status of *bahuc* etc. will be destroyed. Therefore, a suffix is not linked with a succeeding position. It should (normally) follow; exception to this (is its position) before, before that part (of an element) which begins with the final vowel, or after the (final) vowel. — Others say : The suceeding position being already achieved by the Ablative, the fresh statement of *paraḥ* ' the following ' is for this purpose : for the supersession (of the exception). Therefore, the statement *ādyantau ṭakitau*, which is an exception of the succeeding position (of a suffix), is superseded by the fresh mention of ' the following '. Therefore the suffix will follow. As for *vipratiṣedha* ' mutual conflict (of the equals) ', that is taught on the *yathoddeśaṁ saṁjñāparibhāṣam* view. On the *kāryakāla* view, however, *careṣ ṭaḥ* (P. 3. 2. 16) being a single sentence the relation of the preceding and the following is difficult to get.

[11]

" If (it is held that) the goal is achieved by the statement of the following, (we say :) No, because of the status of exception ". (He) is thinking thus : The *ṭit* and the *kit* (elements are taught) either in connection with the use of Genitive, or in the section of suffixes (P. 3. 1. 1 ff.). Out of these two, the rule *ṣaṣṭhī sthāneyogā* (P. 1. 1. 49) is there in the case of the Genitive, while in the other context the succeeding position of the suffix is there. Such being the case this (rule viz. P. 1. 1. 46) is framed when another (operation) is

already there necessarily. Therefore, just as it will supersede substitution, it will also supersede the succeeding position of the suffix. (He) adduces a parallel also (when he says) : " It is like this : The rule *mid aco 'ntyāt paraḥ* (P. 1. 1. 47) ", proceeding in connection with *napuṁsakasya jhalacaḥ* (P. 7. 1. 72) (and) *rudhādibhyaḥ śnam* (P. 3. 1. 78) supersedes substitution and the succeeding position of the suffix respectively.

[12]

" The parallel is not appropriate ". Even though the rule (P. 1. 1. 46) is without any doubt, still there is doubt about the purpose (of the *ṭit* character). Therefore the exception also becomes doubtful as regards its application and is consequently inferred to be weak. Thus it has been said (in the *Mbh.*) ' The furnishing of the code-letter *ṅ* has a different scope in *tātaṅ*'. (This is so) because the *ṅit* status (which leads to the substitution for the final) should supersede the substitution for the whole. (But) the *ṅit*-status of *tātaṅ* is doubtful, since there is a possibility of (its having) another purpose : The *ṅit* status may be meant for prohibiting the Guṇa, therefore, there is a doubt, whether its *ṅit*-status is for prohibiting the Guṇa or for indicating the final (for substitution). When the purpose is in doubt, the rule, with such a doubtful purpose, does not proceed towards *tātaṅ* in the same way (as a powerful exception) as it proceeds towards *anaṅ*. Since both (*utsarga* and *apavāda*) are (equally) doubtful, conflict of the equals (where the later rule supersedes) has been accepted here. Similarly, here also in *careṣ ṭaḥ* (P. 3. 2. 16), if (the *ṭit*-character of the suffix *ṭa*) is the cause of (the operation of) the *ādyanta* metarule, it is in doubt, viz. whether (it is) for *ī* (in the feminine) or for (the augmentation as) the initial. Therefore, it applies here also, as in the case of the augment *iṭ* etc. In the case of *śnam* etc., however, the purpose is fixed because of the absence of any other purpose. Thus both the rule and the purpose are without a doubt and so there the status of an exception is reasonable. Therefore (he) says : " The parallel is not appropriate ".

[13]

" That purpose indeed, should be stated which would be invariably there ". That, verily, is the purpose which does not depend on anything. Just as the furnishing of the code-letter *ṅ* in *kamer ṇiṅ* (P. 3. 1. 30) proceeds for the purpose of Ātmanepada, for prohibiting Vṛddhi, or for the preservation of a common comprehension, without expecting anything else; (the code-letter) *ṇ* (proceeds) for the common comprehension, and for (bringing about) Vṛddhi. (But) here the *ṅit*-character *tātaṅ* does not, in the same way, proceed, merely because of the *ṅit*-character, to prevent Guṇa. What then ? When there is a

substitute for the whole. Similarly the purpose (viz. *ī* in the feminine) of the *ṭit*-character can be said (only) then when it follows : then the *ṭit*-character can be the cause of *ī*. That purpose (viz. *ī* in feminine), on account of which the (other) purpose of the *ṭit*-character is in doubt, that purpose itself is linked with a succeeding position (of the suffix) and so itself of a doubtful nature. Therefore, the succeeding position should be superseded by this, as there is no doubt. Therefore it is said : " No. Because of the status of the exception..."

[14]

With what idea is it said that ' the goal is achieved because of the statement of the following ' ? — With an eye on the *ī* (in the feminine) for the *ṭit* as the purpose. This purpose of furnishing (the suffix) with the code-letter *ṭ* is possible when (-*ṭu*) stands after it, if somehow the succeeding position is available. Thus, merely resorting to (this) possibility, this (argument) has been introduced. As regards the other (suffix viz. *śnam*), however, if there is an absolutely succeeding position, the *mit*-status suffers. When, however, an application (of the rule) is resorted to without thinking of future, without the thought of any (future) possibility of a purpose (being achieved), then there is no cause of *ī* in existence. For, it is linked with the succeeding position (of the *ṭit* suffix). Therefore, there is no achievement of the succeeding position, because of mutual dependence. Since this (P. 1. 1. 46) itself is not linked (with any other thing), why will it not proceed when the cause, viz the *ṭit*-character is there ? — In view of such a question it was said (in the *Mbh.*) : ' That, indeed, should be stated, as a purpose ...'.

Or, *paravacanāt siddham* is said (with this idea) : when it is said that there is *ī* after a *ṭit* (suffix), what is meant there is that *ī* comes after what ends in a *ṭit* (suffix). If the suffix were to be the initial (part of the base), there would be no (feminine suffix) *ī* for want of (a base) ending in a *ṭit* (suffix). Therefore, this succeeding position of the suffix itself, contrarily, will supersede this (P. 1. 1. 46). But, resorting to (an element) having both (code-letters, *ṭ* and *k*), (he) says : ' That, indeed, should be stated as a purpose...' He expresses the same idea by the Bhāṣya : " But whence this, that this (suffix *ṭa*) will be the follower because by the furnishing of the code-letter *ṭ* (the feminine suffix is desired), and not the initial (by P. 1. 1. 46) ? ". Why is the possibility of a purpose (being served) is already resorted to, and not the possibility of the immediate application (of the rule) ? If the power of the statement of (the feminine suffix) *ī* for a *ṭit* is accepted absolutely " this indeed, is solution for the *ṭit* ". This means ' of *ṭit* only '. There the initial position is opposed to the final one and so the conflict (of the equals) is justified.

[15]

" But [this is] not a solution for a *kit* one ". And there is an indicatory sign in favour of the (augment) coming into being as a part, viz. the prohibition (of Vṛddhi) (by the rule) *neti* (P. 7. 2. 4). For, if (mere) vicinity is expressed, (Vṛddhi) would not have become due on account of the intervention (of *iṭ*) itself. Nor can a part be understood as following the whole. Now, how can the *samāsānta* suffixes, being parts of the compound, get the succeeding position of the suffix ? Similarly here also, having placed the verbal root, understand this (suffix) as following it, (saying) ' Let this be the final part of it '. — There, this is the defect. In *ādhyoḥ, pradhyoḥ,* (the suffix) *ki* becomes a part of the root. Therefore the prohibition of the Udātta on the case-ending in connection with a *yaṇ* belonging to a root becomes due (in *ādhyoḥ, pradhyoḥ*), as in *khalapvaḥ.* Similarly, in *ādhī* there will (undesiredly) be a *yaṇ* (as a substitute) by *er anekācaḥ* -- (P. 6. 4. 82).

[16]

" (This is) not a solution for a *ṭit* one also ". Even if the possibility of a purpose (being achieved) is accepted ... " Where will this be ?

(Where) (the suffix) has both (the code-letters) as in *gāpoṣ ṭak* (P. 3. 2. 8). For, here the *ṭit* and the *kit* characters are causes of the initial and the final (respectively). Of the two, the *ṭit*, which is to become initial, finds scope (in *iṭ* taught) by '...*iḍ valādeḥ* (P. 7. 2. 35). The *kit*, which is to become the final, finds scope (in *ṣuk* taught) by *bhiyo hetubhaye ṣuk* (P. 7. 3, 40). Both become due in *gāpoṣ ṭak*, where, on the strength of the conflict of equals on the part of the word-elements (in the rule), the ' final ' prevails. Thus (the feminine suffix) *ī* is established after (a nominal stem) ending (in a suffix) having the code-letter *ṭ*. In the case of (the suffixes like) *ṭ* after *car* there is no succeeding position, and so *paravacanāt siddham* is no solution.

[17]

" (The goal) is achieved by (bringing) this rule under the jurisdiction of *ṣaṣṭhī* (P. 1. 1. 49) ". This rule should be read in the jurisdiction of the *sthāne-ṣaṣṭhī*. Where (in a rule) the Genitive of place (is used), there the elements furnished with the code-letters *ṭ* and *k* become the initial and the final (respectively). In the jurisdiction of the suffix (*Aṣṭ.* III-V), there is an incompatibility of the Genitive with the succeeding position. Therefore there is no application of the (' initial ' and the) ' final ' in *gāpoṣ ṭak* (P. 3. 2. 8.) also.

[18]

" Or, since (the meanings) 'initial' and 'final' are the purpose (or the cause) of the Genitive ... ". The word *artha* does not mean (here) 'meaning'. For the meanings 'initial' and 'final' are not expressed by the Genitive. Therefore the word *artha* means (here), *prayojana* 'purpose', 'cause'. Since (the meanings) 'initial' and 'final' are the cause (of the use) of the Genitive, " in its absence, i. e. in the absence of the Genitive " we understand that (here) the cause (of the use of Genitive), viz. 'initial' and 'final' is not there which would have required a Genitive here. 'By saying that since there is no Genitive, therefore (its) meaning, viz. 'initial', is also not there, you have conceded that the meaning is preceded by word' — with (this idea) the other (disputant) says : " And is it really proper that (the meaning) should be caused by word... ? " By " the word is certainly caused by the meaning " the other (disputant) says that the absence of the word is merely a means of the inference of the absence of the meaning and that the word is certainly preceded by the meaning. If the meaning 'initial' and 'final' had been present in (his) mind, he would have uttered the Genitive itself. From that very (circumstance) it should be understood that the *ṭit* and the *kit* become the initial and final excepting this (domain of the suffix). Moreover, Genitive is a matter of direct perception in the understanding of the meaning 'initial' (and 'final') while its dependence on the basis of the *ṭit* status and the *kit* status is a matter of inference. Therefore it is rightly said : " In its absence, an absence of understanding (*Vār.* 4)". Further, where a Genitive is there when a suffix is laid down, even there it (is) in the meaning of the Ablative. Or, (the statement) 'case-endings substitute other case-endings' (should be resorted to). Or, (*gāpcḥ* should be interpreted as) after the root of *gā* and ***pā***, (similarly *kapijñātyoḥ* as) after the nominal stem of *kapi* and ***jñāti***. Thus there is only Ablative which produces the suffixes, and no Genitive (at all).

* * *

" (An augment) having a code-letter *m* (comes) after the last among the vowels (of that in which it is inserted) " (P. 1. 1. 47).

[1]

" With what purpose is this said ? " " (It is) an exception to (the substitute which occupies) the place (of the original) and to the suffix which takes the succeeding position ".

An exception to the succeeding suffix means a negation of the property (of the suffix), not of the object (i. e. the suffix itself). Or, *pratyaya* means *saṁvijñāna* 'understanding'. A negation of (the understanding) that (a suffix) succeeds (is effected) by this understanding, viz. that (a *mit* comes) after the last vowel. Or, the word *para* is expressive of a quality even without a suffix expressive of a state; *pratyayapara* means *pratyayasya paratvam* 'the succeeding position of the suffix'. (The word *para* takes) the preceding position on the strength of its inclusion in the *rājadantādi* list (P. 2. 2. 31). The Bhāṣyakāra, however, ignoring the literal meaning, explains the (net) meaning (of the *Vār.*) as : *pratyayaparatvasya cāpavādaḥ* 'Also an exception to the succeeding position of a suffix'.

[2]

But why is it that this (metarule), viz. *purastād apavādāḥ*... 'Exceptions stated before (apply to only the injunctions which follow immediately' is not stated ? This (other thing) also would have been (then) established, viz. that the suffixes furnished with the code-letter *ṭ* and *k* follow (the root etc.), and not become its initial and final (parts). The substitution in the place is superseded, not the succeeding position of a suffix. — This is what (Pat.) is thinking : How is this metarule (to be applied) ? If one proceeds on the basis of grammar only, and also on the understanding that each general rule is separate, then (the metarule) should apply only to the first (general rule). (This is so) because there is no knowledge yet of a second (general rule). (However) when the proceeding is to be in consideration of the usage, or when the understanding is that all (general rules) form one whole (it is a different thing). Since there is no relationship of the earlier and the later in the usage, and since the whole group (of general rules) is immediately close, neither (the metarule) *parastād apavādāḥ* ... nor (the other metarule) *anantarasya vidhir* ... (applies). Similarly (the metarule) *madhye 'pavādāḥ* ... applies when what precedes and what does not precede are known; not when the following one is not known.

[3]

If this metarule is not (applicable) here, how (is the *Mbh.*) *śnamo mitkaraṇāt*... 'because of the furnishing of the code-letter *m* to *śnam*...' (to be accounted for) ? How is the *mit* character of *m* in *śnam* known ? — From the usage : *ruṇaddhi, bhinatti*. Thus, indeed, is said : 'The teacher (Pāṇini), conversant with the fact (of the language), furnishes the code-letters'. Similarly, 'on the strength of the furnishing of the code-letter (*ḍ*) even when a *ḍit* follows that which is not (named as) *bha*'. Or, grammar teaches a name with-

out any restraint. The elision, preceded by it (name), applies. When an enquiry viz. ' But what is the purpose of it ? ' (starts), this occupation of the specific region is known : the succeeding position which was obtained by the section-heading rule (P. 3. 1. 2) is withdrawn and (the rule) *mid aco 'ntyāt paraḥ* ' (an augment) having a code-letter *m* (comes) after the last among vowels ' is connected with it. It is on such a view that this rule was previously introduced as a parallel with the words : *yathā mid aco* ... etc.

[4]

" *Kuṇḍāni, vanāni* ". (Here the augment *num* comes in by) *napuṁsakasya jhalacaḥ* (P. 7. 1. 72). Here, if by *napuṁsakasya* is meant the same thing as in the case of *ruhaḥ paḥ* ... (P. 7. 3. 43) which means ' (*p*) (in the place) of *h* of *ruh* ', then this rule (P. 1. 1. 47) becomes a superseding rule when connection with place is already due.

Here this is to be considered : There is a single Genitive in *napuṁsakasya*. Such being the case, if *napuṁsakasya* is a Genitive for qualifying *acaḥ*, then there is no connection with place. If, (on the other hand,) there is connection with place, (the Genetive) cannot be a qualifier of *acaḥ*. (This is) as in the case of the root *mid-* which, if a qualifier of *ik*, has no connection with place. — True. It is so. But when only this much is taken up, viz. that (a *mit* augment) follows the vowel of a neuter (stem) ending in a vowel, — (if) *aṅgasya* which is connected with it (*num*) is not expected by it — then the connection with the place is not expressed in so many words; still, by the mere presence of it (i. e. of *aṅgasya*) (the student) understands the final (phoneme) of it (i. e. of the *aṅga*).

[5]

" This may be a proper illustration, viz. *kuṇḍāni* ". For, here when the (final) vowel is ruled out (as a substituendum), there is no possibility that (the *mit* augment) may come after the final vowel. But in this (other illustration) there is (such) a possibility, viz. in *payāṁsi*. Having ruled out *s* (as substituendum) it may come after the final vowel.

[6]

" Neither the king orders...". In grammar some supersession is laid down, (e. g.) ' In the case of conflict (of equals), the succeeding (operation) should be effected (P. 1. 4. 2).' Some (other) is not laid down, (e. g.) ' An obligatory (operation) supersedes a non-obligatory (one) '. Similarly this one : ' An inner (operation) optionally supersedes an external (one) '. This is not laid down thinking that it may be laid down in the world. In the world too it is not

laid down. (The *Mbh.*) "Neither the king orders" indicates that (the prohibition) has a seen purpose. (They) obey a king's word with reference to something seen like killing. However, (they obey the word) of the authors of the Dharmasūtras with an unseen purpose (in view) (e. g.) 'This may be eaten', 'this may not be eaten'. This he states by this.

[7]

"What then? This is a wordly *dṛṣṭānta.*" It means, this is a wordly *pradarśana*. By *dṛṣṭānta* he means *darśana* 'observation'. Or, this is a reference to what is being shortly said (in the *Mbh.*) viz. "It is like this: 'Let curds be given to the Brāhmaṇas'". Verily, in the world, when anybody, who is not aware of the context, is addressed thus: 'Let curds be given to the Brāhmaṇas, buttermilk to Kauṇḍinya', he never gives curds to Kauṇḍinya. Therefore observation is the cause. No reasoning is to be given here, the same as the hotness of fire is not pleaded by means of reasoning.

[8]

Still, it is furnished with reasoning. (1) Here the word *brāhmaṇa* in *dadhi brāhmaṇebhyaḥ...*, does it apply to Kauṇḍinya with definite intention, or does it apply only incidentally as in 'while going to the village trample over the base of the wall?' In the (matter of) giving buttermilk, however, he is mentioned with a definite intention. Now neither a combination nor an option of those two things is possible, where there is a definite intention in one, and an incidental reference in the other.

(2) Or, the word *brāhmaṇa* is doubtful as regards Kauṇḍinya. For, the word *brāhmaṇa* refers to Kauṇḍinya, (it) refers also to another one. Such being the case, there is doubt as to which (of the *brāhmaṇa*-words) is used here. And it is not reasonable to treat as equal both: what is doubtful and what is not doubtful.

(3) Or, (the person named) Kauṇḍinya is not the word-meaning of the word *brāhmaṇa*, but the form (of a Brāhmaṇa) is possible (in him). But (he) is the very word-meaning of the word Kauṇḍinya. And it is not proper to give an equal status to what is directly perceptible and what is (only) inferential.

[8. 1]

This is said here (by way of objection to the above): We do not say that the giving of curds (to Kauṇḍinya) is required by (his being) Kauṇḍinya. What then? Required by (his being) a Brāhmaṇa. Because of his associatian with the Brāhmaṇa class there is such a possibility (in his case).

...Such being the case just as he gets buttermilk because of his status as Kauṇḍinya, why does he not similarly get curds because of his Brāhmaṇahood ?

[8. 2]

(4) Therefore, 'Supersession (is) inference of (something) not becoming due' is accepted as the definition of supersession by the Naiyāyikas. And 'not becoming due' does not come into existence automatically. An injunction is inferred in the (matter of) not becoming due. It is like this : 'Let curds be given to the Brāhmaṇas, let (it) not be given to Kauṇḍinya'. The giving and the refraining (from giving) are heard in a general and a particular form (respectively). If the giving takes place because of the Brāhmaṇahood, the statement of prohibition is absolutely superseded. If (it) is given optionally : (that is) sometimes given and sometimes not given, the prohibition is optionally superseded. A combination is unthinkable, because of the contradiction between giving and not giving. Hence the inference of the becoming-due of prohibition. Although both (are) injunctions : 'Let curds be given to Brāhmaṇas, buttermilk to Kauṇḍinya', one in general and the other in particular, still, just as the smoke stands as a means of inference in inferring the fire, similarly the relation of the general and the particular (statements) (is the means of) inferring the prohibition. Therefore, here also there is an inference of not-becoming-due. Therefore, not-becoming-due is accepted.

[8. 3]

(5) Or, the word (*brāhmaṇa*) which applies to the entire Brāhmaṇa class [and] also to a part of it, applies, in the sentence : 'Let curds be given to the Brāhmaṇas', to Kauṇḍinya, (who represents) a part (of that class). So (he) gets curds also. Hence this discussion. There, just as, when it is said : 'Let Brāhmaṇas be fed...' Māṭhara and Kauṇḍinya, who are mentioned as serving the food in *māṭharkauṇḍinyau pariveviṣṭām*, are not included in the meal, simply because of an inferential word, similarly *kauṇḍinya* who is mentioned as a recipient of the gift of buttermilk is not included in the gift of curds.

[8. 4]

(6) This is said on the view that there are two *dā* verbs. Others think (thus) : This verb *dā* 'to give' is just one, with many grammatical objects and recipients. In that stage where one part of the verb *dā* is connected with curds, at that very time another (part is connected) with buttermilk. At the time of the application of the word there is no disruption. So it is inferred that Kauṇḍinya has been excluded from the gift of curds.

This, then, is the final decision : ... This is the meaning popularly understood from the sentence (under discussion) : Let curds be given to other Brāhmaṇas excepting Kauṇḍinya; buttermilk, however, to Kauṇḍinya.

[9]

" Before the final (phoneme), in the case of the root *masj* (*Vār*. 2) ". A *mit* (element) has been taught after the final vowel. Therefore, this fresh rule (i. e this *Vār*.) is laid down. It is framed on the view that (in the case of a cluster of more than two consonants), the name *saṁyoga* belongs to more than two consonants. — Why are two illustrations taken up, *maṅktā* and *magnaḥ* ? — Even when effort is made for the elision of the non-penultimate *n* by (framing the rule) : ' In the case of the root *masj*, however, (*n* is dropped) even when it is not final ', still (the form) *magna* will be achieved, but this one will not be achieved, viz. *maṅktā*.

[10]

" Also of the roots *bharj-* and *marc-* ". *Ūm* and *īm* (are augments in *bharūjā* and *marīci*). The word *marīci* has to be read, of necessity, in the *bāhvādi* list (P. 4. 1. 96) in order to derive (the form) Mārīci in the sense of ' a descendant of Marīci '. The word *bharūja* also (has to be read) in the *aṅgulyādi* list (P. 5. 3. 108) and the *bāhvādi* list (It has been read) as *bharuja candrabhāgā nadyām.* So (there are the forms) *bhārujikaḥ*, *bhārujiḥ* (? *bharujī*).

[11]

(Pat.) himself accounts for the (three) views [in ' if the (word) *antaḥ* is continued ' etc.]. Therefore, ' (a *mit* element) comes after the last among the vowels, — (is) the final part ' — that is how the statement (stands) when furnished with necessary supplements. Whether (a *mit* which follows) is the final part of a part or of the whole — it is decided that it belongs to the whole, since (Pat.) will be concluding thus : ' Belonging to the whole, it is not capable of ... '.

" If *ādiḥ* ' initial ' continues ...". There is no possibility that (a *mit*) will come after the last among the vowels and be the initial of what precedes at the same time. So if *ādiḥ* ' initial ' continues, the initiality of what follows is decided.

[11.1]

(1) " If (a *mit*) does not belong to either, ... (in forms like) *kuṇḍāni*, *vanāni* a long substitute is not available ", because an *aṅga* ending

in *n* is not there. — But it is said that the reading of *tadādi* 'beginning with that' is for (the *vikaraṇa-s*) such as *sya* and for *num*'. That has to be remembered (i. e. said) for the sake of *num* on this (*abhakta*) view, for the goal is achieved on the view that (a *mit*) is the final part of what precedes. Pat. will say (later on) that even on the view that (a *mit*) is the initial part of what follows, a long (substitute) by *ato dīrgho yañi* (P. 7. 3. 101) and *supi ca* (102) is achieved. (The long substitute in) *asthīni*, however, is not achieved.

(2) '*Agne trī*'. The phoneme *n* is not at the end of the nominal stem. If (it is held) that there will be an assumption of the masculine gender which is peculiar to the Chandas, then *śi*-substitution (becomes) difficult to have. If an elision of phoneme (is accepted), then there will be no long substitute taught by *nopadhāyāḥ* (P. 6. 4. 7–8) because the elision, as the elision of a phoneme, is *siddha*. But it is possible to say that this is seen in the midst. Thus quite a lot has to be remembered.

(3) '*Sarvāṇi jyotiṃṣi*'. Because the case-ending is separated by *num*, there is no close contiguity. On the view that (a *mit*) is the final part of what precedes, it will be comprehended by the word *sarva*. On the view that it is the initial of what follows it will be comprehended by the mention of the case-ending and so there will be close contiguity.

(4) "This is (already) done in the Sūtra (as it is)". This is (what is) said: The reading of *num* has to be done necessarily (for *num*) which is neither a part of a nominal stem nor of an ending e. g. (*n* in) the form *prāhiṇvat*.

(5) "*Dviṣaṃtapaḥ*". They do say that this is cited just incidentally. For, this (*mum*) is comprehended by the mention of that in whose midst it is. Further the elision of the final consonant of (a pada) that ends in a conjunct is *siddha* even when an *anusvāra* (is to be substituted). The *anusvāra* is achieved because now it is the final of a *pada*. The (proper) illustration, however, is *paraṃtapaḥ*.

(6) "*Śī*-substitution also cannot be achieved". (In) *jatunī* after *num* is inserted because of its obligatoriness and succeeding position there is intervention of the neuter stem. Therefore *śī*-substitution does not become due.

[11. 2]

(1) "If (a *mit* is regarded as) the initial of what follows, Guṇa, Vṛddhi (are to be prohibited) ... (About the form) "*trapuṇe*", (there will be)

a defect, (only) on the view that *ṅit* means that which has a *ṅ* (named) *it*. When *ṅit* means a *ṅ* which is named) *it* it means that 'when an operation is taught before a phoneme, it takes place when (an element) beginning with that phoneme follows'. So it will take place before what begins with a *ṅit*.

(2) "The *anusvāra* also is not achieved". Here also *dviṣaṁtapaḥ* is not an illustration. For, on the view that (a *mit*) is an initial part of what follows this (*mum*) belongs to the phoneme *t*. And as it (*t*) is the final of a *pada*, *mum* also, which belongs to it, will get the designation '*pada*-final'.

(3) "Prohibition of the (withdrawal of the) phoneme *n* in the matter of *śī*-substitution". Prohibition of the withdrawal of *n* in the matter of *śī*-substitution should be taught. Just as in the case of (P. 6. 4. 103) '*pādaḥ pad*', (the substitute *pad*) is not for what ends in *pād*, but for that form which comes into contact with the auditory organ and is heard, because of (the Pari.) 'substitutes are for what is actually uttered', similarly here also in the case of *au*. It is not for *nau* that ends in *au*, but for the very form *au* which comes into contact with the auditory organ. "Then what is actually uttered (does not get the substitute)". Why not? "Because of its being intervened by *num*". Because it is intervened when the form which comes into contact with the auditory organ is insisted on. There this is the sentence-meaning : *nakārapratiṣedhaḥ* means that whose prohibition is due to the phoneme *n*.

[11. 3]

(1) "If (a *mit* is regarded as) the final of what precedes, the shortening of a neuter nominal, of (a word named) *upasarjana*, and the accent of a Dvigu (cannot be accounted for)". Only 'the shortening of a neuter nominal' be mentioned, because the shortening is not possible because of *num* in neuter (only). But this is the idea (in mentioning *upasarjanahravatvam* also) : In the form *niṣkauśāmbinī* 'the two who have left Kauśāmbī' shortening of the *upasarjana* should take place by reason of its being a succeeding (operation). After the augment *num* is inserted, either because it is obligatory or because it is succeeding, the character of ending in a vowel and ending in an *ik* on the part of the *upasarjana* is destroyed and therefore the two short substitutes and the accent are not available.

[11. 3. 1]

"Or, rather not, because of the external nature (of *num*)". The shortening is irrespective of the case-ending. And about the accent it is said that the mention of *pada* is to indicate the boundary. The *num*, however, expects a case-ending depending on external objects. Therefore it is external.

"Belonging as it does to the whole, it ...". The parts do not lose their form in a whole which takes a different form. Just as in a variegated whole it is not that a part is not called white, or is not called black, similarly, in a stem ending in *n* why should the word *aratni* lose its character of ending in *i* ? Also an accent is taught for the earlier constituent of a compound when the later constituent follows. Since thus the character of ending in *ik* (on the part of the later constituent) is intact, the accent is established.

* * *

"*i*, *u*, *ṛ* and *ḷ* are (substitutes in the place) of *e*, *o*, *ai* and *au* when short substitutes are taught" (P. 1. 1. 48).

[1. 1]

"Why is this being stated ?" Wherever a desired object is accomplished without making a rule, where it is not accomplished if a rule is made, (or) when some defect results out of it, there (this) question (is asked). Here the question (is asked) because of redundancy (of the rule). It will be said : "(The object) is accomplished because *e* and *o* have the same place of articulation" (*Vār*. 3), "and because of the greater duration of the later components in *ai* and *au*" (*Vār*. 4).

[1. 2]

Here there are three different processes : (combining) different sentences into one sentence, withdrawal of a part of what exists, and the statement of a single remainder. We shall demonstrate those later in (our commentary on) the Bhāṣya itself.

[1. 3]

"For the withdrawal of the homogeneous (phoneme) and of the phoneme *a*" (*Vār*. 1). "When short substitutes are taught for *e* and *o* ...". The homogeneous half *ĕ* and *ŏ* will be (the substitutes) [for *e* / *o*] because of the complete coalescence; not for *ai* and *au* where there is a loose coalescence of *a*. Therefore, (*e* and *o*) are (here) spoken of. The domain of phonemes is fixed, as for example the use of *ŏ* (?) is never resorted to in some (Vedic) recension. Similarly, these half *e* and half *o* phonemes, not used elsewhere would, however, be used here.

[1. 4]

"These two *aic* phonemes (i.e. *ai* and *au*) (are) component phonemes". They are called *samāhāra* 'unification' because of the parts formed by

phonemes which are unified. They consist of two moras (each). " (One) mora belongs to the phoneme a ". (This means that) a part of it (*ai* or *au*) consists of a *mātrā* i. e. a kind of (the phoneme *a*) which (latter) is of eighteen kinds. (This) should be similarly applied in the case of (the parts), the phonemes *i* and *u*. " When the short substitutes are taught for them ". He says : This rule is for causing (*a*) to withdraw. But, according to another, it is for teaching (something) positively ".

(Objection :) But *ai* and *au* being more open, (more) open *i* and *u* will be (the substitutes), not the close *a*. Such being the case, how is it said that the phoneme *a* could alternately be (the substitute) ? — How could open sounds (be substitute) for more open sounds ? Moreover, it is established in this science that the nearness caused by place of articulation is stronger. There if *i* and *u* are made (the substitutes), the character of having the palate [and the lips] as the place of articulation is alone admitted; the character of having the velum as the place is altogether abandoned. — (Reply :) Since *sthāna* is mentioned there (i. e. in P. 1. 1. 50), it may have been said : ' the phoneme *a* could alternately be (the substitute) '. Or, even the phoneme *a* can be made more open, and so there is the possibility (of *a* as the substitute). When used, it will be the one reverted (to the short *a*).

[2. 1]

" But the long *ī*, *ū*, *ṝ*, *ḹ* become due ". Not knowing that this (rule) forms a single sentence with the one which teaches the short substitute, (he thinks that) this rule teaches the substitution of entirely new *i*, *u*, *ṛ*, and *ḷ* (sounds). Therefore, the long *ī* and *ū* become due (in) *atiri*, *atinu* on account of the nearmostness.

— But how can a homogeneous (phoneme) be comprehended by (another phoneme) which is still brought into existence ?

— The objection has been raised in connection with that (phoneme) in connection with which (such) comprehension is possible.

— And by which (phoneme) is it possible ?

— By the phoneme *u*.

" But the rule says *hrasvādeśe* ' when a short substitute is due '. So long substitutes will not be there ".

For, if a long (vowel) were to proceed (as substitute), the reading of *hrasvādeśa* ' a short substitute ' (in the rule) would be meaningless. So this is what is said : ' For *e*, *o*, *ai*, *au* the short substitutes are *i*, *u*, *ṛ*, *ḷ*'. The other

(disputant) (argues differently like this): If there had been no other purpose of this rule, we would have accepted (your interpretation). But there is a purpose. — Which ?

" This (rule) may be for (mentioning) the domain: *i*, *u*, *ṛ*, *ḷ* become substitutes of *e*, *o*, *ai* *au* where a short (substitute) is laid down. "

This (expression) viz. '*i*, *u*, *ṛ*, *ḷ* take the place of *e*, *o*, *ai*, *au*' presents itself in the *hrasvādeśa* i. e. in the rule which teaches a short substitute. For, otherwise, (i. e.) if *hrasvādeśe* is not read (in the rule), (an *ik*) becomes due even here in De3vadatta. Therefore, in a rule which teaches a short substitute (saying:) 'a short substitute takes place', this (i. e. *eca ik*) presents itself as an independent sentence (thus resulting in the meaning:) (1) There is a short substitute for (the final of) a nominal stem, (and) (2) for *ec* (i. e. *e*, *o*, *ai*, *au*), however, *ik* (i. e. *i*, *u*, *ṛ*, *ḷ*) is the substitute. Thus a short (substitute) will be there except for *ec*. Since there will be no connection between *ik* and short (substitute), all kinds of *ik* vowels will become due (at first); but on the principle of nearmostness a two-mora *ik* (i. e. *ī*, *ū*, *ṝ*) will (finally) prevail. This, however, is pleaded on the view that this (*ec*>*ik* substitution) supersedes the shortening, just as the substitute *digi* supersedes reduplication. Otherwise there will be a short substitute once more. ...

[2. 2]

But these two are not different sentences.

(Objection:) But on the view that there is a single sentence, (there is the defect ot) repetition. (On the other hand) on the view that there is a plurality of sentences (P. 1. 1. 48 becomes) a rule which teaches something new. — (Reply:) True. It is so. But what has (a natural) expectation (of something) cannot, with propriety, be made devoid of (that expectation). And if many actions are adopted, there (results) prolixity, so a single act is expected. Moreover, if a plurality of sentences is assumed, *hrasvo napuṁsake* ... is not sublated by *eca ig* ..., as it has no connection (with it).

But when a single sentence is assumed, viz. *eca ik hrasvo napuṁsake prātipadikasya*, because of the word *hrasva* read (in the rule), *ac* is adopted as the original to be replaced. *Ec* (i. e. *e*, *o*, *ai*, *au*) is also included in *ac*, and therefcre it is also dragged in as the original. The word *hrasva* also will be similarly dragged in as a substitute of *ec*. So this will be the meaning: In the neuter there is a short substitute (for the final of a nominal stem); for *ec*, however, a short *ik* is the substitute. On this interpretation the separate application of the injunction of the short substitute is favoured.

[2. 3]

Others again interpret *nivartakatvāt* 'because of its character of causing to retreat' thus: *ik* is a substitute of *ec* that already is there. So all that is done by this (rule) is: *ik* remains, the non-*ik* retires. This is as in the case of *ekaśeṣa* 'a single remainder' where one remains, others retire. They do not look upon the relation between *ec* and *ik* as that between an original and a substitute. Exactly the same kind of *ik* remains, as it has been there. So the *a* portion, which is a non-*ik*, retires, *ik* is established. And that which stands is short only, not long. So it is well said: "But there is no contingency of a long (vowel), because of the character of causing to retreat".

[2. 4]

But here this objection can be raised: As both (the parts of the diphthongs) are more open, the (short) will be heard as more open, (e. g.) in *atiri* and *atinu*. Also, in *atirīn* no long homogeneous (substitute) will be available, as there will be no homogeneity on account of the difference in the efforts. Moreover, on the view that the later components (of a diphthong) have a greater duration, (the short substitute) will be heard as consisting of one and a half moras. In (*e* and *o*) where *a* is completely merged, the perception of division is impossible.

[2. 5]

This objection is not (valid). For, the more open character (of the short substitute) proceeds, depending on the phoneme *a*, just as a crystal has the colour of a nearby object. When, however, (that) nearby object is gone, (the crystal) remains in its own form. Similarly, there is a more open character depending on the nearby *a*- phoneme, but how will it be on its withdrawal? So the open alone remains. Also, on the view that the later components have a greater duration the sūtra is altogether rejected. Even (in *e* and *o*) where *a* is completely merged the Teacher explains the division like a swan who separates milk and water.

[2. 6]

"Because of the greater duration of the later components in *ai* and *au*".

Here *aic*-s are each a group (which is) palato-velar. As there is no such a short (substitute) of a diphthong as could have that twofold place of articulation, nearmostness is not (here) understood as referring to the (whole) diphthong. What then? Of its two parts, one is velar, one palatal. Of these

two, which part could be the cause of naming, (the part) which could be regarded as the original to be replaced? It is with reference to such an investigation that it is said: "That which has a greater extent, that is always admitted (when it comes to naming)." That part which is characterized by greater extent becomes the cause of a name. As (the later component) has an additional half a more, it is looked upon as that diphthong itself, while (the other i. e. the first) part which is less, is looked upon as an external one. Since the mora of the phonemes *i* and *u* is greater, the original to be replaced (i. e. *aic*) is named as palatal and labial, and not as Guttural It is as in the case of (expressions like) *āmravaṇa* 'a mango-grove', *śālavana* 'a śāla-grove'. Even when there are others (trees), having the status of parts (of groves), the mangoes and the śālas become the cause of the name (*āmravaṇa* etc.) because of (their) majority, and not the other parts. Similarly, the Brāhmaṇas become the cause of the name (*Brāhmaṇagrāma*) because of (their) majority, and not other parts. The word *grāma* denotes people also, hence the parallel. When, however, (the region) including (the adjoining) forest, (i. e. a village,) (is) denoted by the word *grāma*, (the Brāhmaṇas) will be named in the capacity of the owners, as in 'this *dharmagrāma* belongs to the Brāhmaṇas'.

* * *

"The Genitive has connection with place (as its meaning)" (P.1.1.49).

[1]

"What is this (expression) *sthāneyogā*?" (The question is asked) because of the impossibility of the presence and the absence of a compound simultaneously. This is probably not a compound because the Locative is heard, while it could be a compound because of the use of (the feminine suffix) *ṭāp* in *yogā*, since otherwise *yukti* would be legitimate. Hence the question: "What is this (expression) *sthāneyogā*?"

"(The Genitive) which has connection with place, that (Genitive) is (called) *sthāneyogā*". There is an understanding of (the intended) meaning when (the expression is taken as) a compound, but if not a compound there is no understanding of meaning even by resorting to inference. So this (has to be understood as being in the) form of a compound. "The absence of the elision of the Locative case-ending, however, (is to be accounted for) on the strength of this very utterance". This is (what is) said: This word is fit to be used. There the relationship is such as has connection with place as its domain, not one having (connection with) any other thing as its domain. "Or the *e*-substitution in the place of the Instrumental case-ending: (the Genitive) which has

connection with the place". He understands by *e*-substitution the *śe*-substitution taught by P. 7. 1. 39. But this (*śe*) being peculiar to the Veda its usage in the non-Vedic language is difficult to account for.

[1. 1]

There are, to be sure, two views regarding the words used in the Genitive. Thus *aster bhūḥ* (P. 2. 4. 52): Here some think (thus): The Genitive in *asteḥ* is not at all connected with *bhū*. What then? It owes itself to (the word) *sthāna* (not actually used). The root *bhū* is employed in the capacity of the thing which is the occupant. Some words, verily, cannot bring about, by their mere form, any additional property in the other word (in Genitive), as e. g. in *Devadattasya Yajñadattaḥ* 'Y. of D.' (The word) Yajñadatta, by its form Yajñadatta, does not bring about any additional property in (the word) Devadatta. For, if it were so assumed, there would be an understanding of addition: Devadatta *and* Yajñadatta. Therefore it is the other objects, (e. g.) Yajñadatta is the father of Devadatta, (or) the son, the master, the servant, adjacent — it is to these that the additional property is due. Other (words), on the other hand, express an additional property by their very form, (words) like *dāsa* 'servant', *putra* 'son', *kara* 'hand'.

Others think (thus): The word *bhū* itself, assuming the properties like vicinity which are inherent in it, is the cause of additional property.

[1. 2]

Or, *sthāna* (here means) 'meaning', because word is situated in it. On this view, (*aster bhūḥ* means:) √*bhū* is in the meaning of √*as*. And the other (i. e. √*as*) recedes, as √*bhū* expresses its meaning.

[1. 2. 1]

Now, what is the meaning of *sthāna* in the case of substitution of a phoneme, inasmuch as phonemes have no meaning at all? — Even there, on the view that 'all (substitutes) are substitutes of the whole *pada*-s', it is proper that *dadhy* is the substitute of the word *dadhi* and *rup* of *ruh*.

[1. 2. 2]

Or, (it is) time (that) is denoted by the word *sthāna*. (*Iko yaṇ aci* thus means:) The *yaṇ*-s occupy the time of the *ik*.

[1. 2. 3]

Or, just as *asteḥ* (also) is an imitative name of the phonetic forms of √*as* that are employed (in parlance) to convey meaning; they are the originals and their meaning is conveyed by √*bhū*; similarly in the case of *iko yaṇ aci*

also, the *ik*-s in (the real) words *dadhi* etc. which are named imitatively, — their meaning, viz. the form, is denoted by *sthāna* (in this rule).

[2]

" But for what reason is this stated ? " When the sūtra is formulated the place-connection status (of the Genitive) becomes due everywhere undesiredly. And then there is no possibility of the partitive Genitive etc. And when a number of qualifiers present themselves simultaneously in connection with a single qualified, [a commentarial explanation is essential] to help the qualifiers. And from (that same) commentarial explanation, this object also can be achieved.

[2. 1]

" The statement of the connection-with-place is meant for restriction " (*Vār.* 1). (The statement) " (There are) a hundred and one meanings of the Genitive " is made on the basis of a text, — (meanings such as) the relationship of the property and the proprietor, vicinity, collection. " Or, as many as " (means) as many meanings as are there in the world. Or, " or, as many as " (means) those which are possible, although there may be a possibility of many on the strength of the text. There being (the possibility of) so many (meanings) presenting themselves undesiredly, this (*Vārttika*) is stated for the sake of restriction.

Here some think thus : This is a means of understanding the specific (relationship) for the sake of the student whose mind is carried away by the general and who (therefore) cannot understand the specific. ' A specific is here intended by the Teacher, viz. the status of connection-with-place. Understand thus in the case of the uses of Genitive ! '. — Others think : This general form, viz *asteḥ* is unable to take on the specific ; so the word *sthāne* presents itself there. Because of its presence the sentence '$\sqrt{}$*bhū* takes the place of $\sqrt{}$*as*' is inferred.

[2. 1. 1]

" But the partitive Genitive etc. cannot be accomplished ". They cannot be accomplished because (now) absence of distinction is intended. Since absence of distinction is intended the sūtra is here multiplied (in two). Both *gohaḥ* and *upadhāyāḥ* are now place-Genitives, so there will be (a substitute *ū* for the final) of *goh,* where (the reference is in) the modified form ; (the substitute) will not be there before *kit* and *ṅit* suffixes. It will also be there for every penultimate of (any) other verbal root, of $\sqrt{}$*pac* etc.

[2. 1. 1. 1]

"(In the case) of partitive Genitive etc. there is no possibility (of restriction), because of the absence of ambiguity of the connection (denoted by the Genitive) " (*Var.* 3).

'Absence of possibility of becoming due' does not mean absence of the possibility of the Genitive itself becoming due. What then ? Absence of the possibility of the restriction becoming due. — In what way is this maintained by you viz. 'The statement of the Genitive (is) for the sake of restriction' (? It) (means) that a restriction is made there by this (rule) where a plurality of meanings is possible. Where another meaning is (already) stated, it is not proper (to think) that the status of the connection-with-place is capable of cancelling it. If you accept what I hold, then it is proper to understand that the restriction (applies there) where there is a possibility of many meanings, and not that the other meaning is cancelled and the status of connection-with-place is enjoined. If, however, you think that meanings are enjoined by grammar itself, even then how is it proper to abandon (the partitive denotation) of (the Genitive) *goheḥ* which has already proceeded in regard to (its part, viz) the penultimate, and to admit the status of connection-with-place which was not there ? So it is proper (to hold) that the status of the connection-with-place is there for the sake of cancelling others (only) when a possibility of plurality of meanings is there.

In the world also there is never instruction given in such matters, which (he) shows thus :

"Here is a worldly parallel". When two roads are (going) in one direction and it is not known along which road the village is situated, only then the advisers advise: "The right hand, the left hand". When an expression is not (intended to be) a qualifier, relegation (of a constituent) to the second place (in the compound) is correct even in a Bahuvrīhi. (The word) *dakṣiṇa* (is derived) from $\sqrt{}$*dāś* or $\sqrt{}$*dakṣ*; (it is) not (a *sarvanāman*) implying fixation (of its meaning by a relative term). Or, *hastadakṣiṇa* is a Tatpuruṣa by P. 2. 1. 30: *tṛtīyā tatkṛtārthena* ... etc., (being expressive) of (the road) which is 'right' on account of the contact with the right hand. They, however, never advise "a transverse road", as it does not come in, simply because there is no uncertainty about it. Thus this Teacher speaks about that Genitive as connected with a particular meaning which is doubtful; that (Genetive) which, however, is linked with a specific meaning, he does not teach it.

[2. 1. 1. 2]

" Or, (*sthāneyogā* is to be analysed) as *sthāne ayogā* ". The one who, not requiring a logical explanation, goes about, accepting the Grammar alone as the authority — to him is this said. " (Genitive) whose connection is not clear ". Although it is said that ' (nominals) coming after the negative particle *nañ* and meaning ' existing ' (form a Bahuvrīhi), still here (*ayogā* is understood) as ' (Genitive) whose specific connection is not existing ', since without some connection there cannot be a Genitive at all.

[2. 1. 1. 3]

" Or, *yogā* means *yogavatī* ' having a number of connections ' ". Every Genitive has (some) connection, so (*matup*) is stated as denoting plurality. Only that (Genitive) which is connected with many meanings, only that is called *yogā*, i. e. *yogavatī* ' having many connections '. But that (Genitive) whose connection is definitely known, it is neither *ayogā* nor *yogavatī*. So that will not indicate place.

[2. 2]

" Or, a marked Genitive (shows) connection with place " (*Vār*. 4). (Thinking) ' I shall declare the connection-with-place (as the meaning of Genitive) by resorting to (some intonational mark) like *kala* or *ādhmāta* and (also) *svarita*, and I shall declare (this) by making a mark ' (he) says: " And that mark will not be made in the partitive Genitive etc. ".

The other one says that this (form viz. *śāsaḥ*) cannot admit the making of the mark because of the absence of its (own) cognition : " The root *śās* will have to be mentioned in (the rule) *śā hau* (P. 6. 4. 35) ". (He) is thinking thus: $\sqrt{}$*śās* is here inferred (as continued from P. 6. 4. 34). And that (root) proceeds (in P. 6. 4. 34) as the qualifier of *upadhā* ' penultimate ' and as one without the mark affixed to it. It will (therefore) present itself here (in P. 6. 4. 35) also in the same form.

" That very (form read) earlier for the partitive Genitive ... ". " How ? A word authorised (for being present elsewhere) is of three kinds ". (He) is saying this : If you are thinking that it is one and the same word and that it is not proper that one and the same (word) be (considered) both as having the mark and also as not having the mark — that is not so. For a rule of interpretation is of three kinds. That which is dragged down by *ca* ' and ', as in *granthāntādhike ca* ', ' *dvitīye cānupākhye* ', ' *avyayībhāve cākāle* ' (P. 6. 3. 79-81), its continuation is (marked) by identity viz. *sahasya saḥ* (P. 6. 3. 78). It is there in each and every rule. It can similarly be under-

stood in the case of a rule of interpretation also: *ikaḥ* (in P 1. 1. 3) (for instance) stands, combined, by (the method of) *tantra* with all injunctive rules having (that particular) mark. As regards the difference, however, (which is there) in its application, that is due to the difference in the application by the individual.

The (other) one, however, which, with the circumflex mark thus made, presents itself in every rule, with regard to it this is inferred: These rules are furnished with it. Getting into those rules which (thus) possess it, in the form of different words, whatever form it assumes, that is [ascertained] by the mind. Thus the word without the mark is quite one, and the one with the mark is another — thus (he) decides by the mind.

"This will be merely (an inferential) cognition". This (is what he) means: Because of the utterance '*śāsaḥ*', and of the making of the mark, (we admit that) there will be (an inferential) cognition of the existence of *śāsaḥ* in (the rule) *śā hau*. But it is impossible to understand at the same time (that word) as possessed of the mark as it is not heard. [So he says:] "Surely, without uttering a word ...".

[2. 2. 1]

"Well, then the mark will be made in the substitute". The word *śā* in *śā hau* will be uttered either soft or 'blown'. And, (actually) it does not belong to the substitute. (To) what, then? To the stem itself. Only, it is not uttered. And since a mark cannot be made without a substratum, the device of Svarita is for the sake of just the cognition (of *śāsaḥ*) while the mark is made in connection with the qualified form (i. e. *śā*).

[3]

"(Where there is) a single Genitive and many (syntactically connected nominatives) as (its) qualified". Some explain: The definition which immediately precedes is meant. If you understand connection-with-place ... But we say ... If the restriction (is there) when there is uncertainty, (here, in *aṅgasya*, there) is uncertainty. If (the *Sū*. is understood as reading) *ayogā*, (meaning) *avyaktayogā* 'one whose connection is not clear' or (reading) *yogā* (meaning) 'having many connections', here, then, it is objected to thus: If the Genitive *aṅgasya* is (understood as) having no meaning at all and it is the mere word that is furnished with the Svarita accent, — then because of the meaninglessness, there is just no connection; whence then the connection with place? The understanding of meaning, however, (will be there) when there is a connection (of *aṅgasya*) with the later rules. If, on the other hand, mere meaning (of *aṅgasya*), without depending on the activity of (that) word is

resorted to, (with the further understanding that) the word proceeds, later on assuming its form, then there is no harm in these two views, whether there is a connection or whether it is not there; just as in the rules teaching *vibhāṣā* the prohibition and the option are active, but not in the rule (P. 1. 1. 44) where (that) name (viz. *vibhāṣā*) is brought into relationship (with its named). If, however, (*aṅgasya* as) a word (that) has resorted to meaning is resorted to, or (such) a meaning-entity as has resorted to (that) word (is resorted to), then, because of connection with both on account of the removal of the particular, (the Genitive *aṅgasya*) is capable of entering into collocation with (the *aṇ* vowel, named) *samprasāraṇa* in the matter of *tadantavidhi*, or into *vaiyadhikaraṇya* so as to be a qualifier of the part.

But (he) is thinking thus : If (this) Sūtra is accepted, this interpretation also is not possible, viz. that there are manifestors of the particular meaning in connection with *aṅgasya* also. ... Similarly here also. – But on the view that (the Genitive in) *aṅgasya* has a particular meaning (viz. connection-with-place) there is neither a generation of other particular sentences, (nor) the particularities to be known from the sentence with the initial general sense (of *aṅgasya*).

" But it is already said that there are a hundred and one meanings of the Genitive ". — " There is no harm ". This is the (underlying) idea. Only connections, that suit the meaning, are taken up by word. It is like this : (when it is said) ' Devadatta's servant-wife ', this is not the understanding, viz. that the woman who is servant's wife is Devadatta's sister. What then ? (The Genitive *devadattasya*) is established as a qualifier (?) of the subordinate constituent of the compound.

(But) in ' These (are) Devadatta's maidservants-quarters ' (' Devadatta's) is established (as a qualifier of the principal constituent of the compound). Similarly, here also in *aster bhūḥ* only that meaning which is fit can be there in words. And no other meaning is here fit as the meaning of the Genitive. So we shall understand connection-with-place alone (as the meaning of the Genitive).

The other (disputant) says (thus) that the Genitive takes up another fit meaning inherent in word : " Even for word there (are) such connections as immediacy etc. with (another) word ".

" This is merely (an apparent) doubt ". This is (what is) said : Just as a Sūtra, when framed, has to be commented on, understand similarly from the commentarial explanation (when a Sūtra is not framed) ! Or, (what is meant is :) there cannot be an absence of this (particular). Just as in partial dark-

ness, on the one hand there is no perception of a particular colour, on the other hand, the form is still there; similarly, the particular is always there, whether mixed or unmixed. Only a means to cognize that particular has to be sought. Similarly, here in *aster bhūḥ* this is the means of cognizing the particular : The own form of √*as* is its very soul, it always stands undivorced from it. So the connection-with-place closely follows the word entity. The (connections) such as nearby etc. are external, removed from the (basic) meaning, viz. the form. Also, neither the use of √*bhū* near (that of √*as*) can be accounted for, since (its meaning) is already expressed by √*as*; nor the use of √*as* itself, (its meaning) being expressed by √*bhū*.

[4]

" So that what ends in the Genitive be connected with place ", — (i. e.) that *ṣaṣṭhyanta* (what ends in the Genitive) which presents itself after the hearing. That which is (subsequently) understood (from it), that shall not be connected with place. " That, after which the Genitive (ending) is uttered ", that participates in the operation, — this meaning is derived from the formation of the Sūtra. This is (the same as) the Paribhāṣā (12) : *nirdiśyamānasyādeśā bhavanti* ' substitutes take the place of that which is mentioned (in a rule) '. Therefore, in *pādaḥ pat* (P. 6. 4. 130) the word *pād*, (which) ends in the Genitive (is the one) which presents itself after the hearing. What ends in it is (subsequently) understood, therefore, what ends in it (i. e. in *pād*) is not connected with place. — (Objection :) *pādaḥ* (which) ends in the Genitive, conveys what ends in it (i. e. in *pād*) So there is the undesired contingency of the substitute replacing (the whole i. e.) what ends in it (i. e. in *pād*). — Here some say : The *tadanta* dictum (i. e. P. 1. 1. 72) is (here) set aside. But this is wrong. (For, if it were so) there will be *pad*- substitution (for *pād*) which is formed with a zero suffix from the causative of √*pad*. (That is all right,) but (the substitute) will not be there in the case of *vyāghrupād*. Therefore, the *tadanta* operation (i. e. the operation for that which ends in *pād*), which becomes due here, is delimited. Just as, on the strength of the grammatical rule (P. 1. 1. 72), you undetstand, by *pādaḥ*, what ends in *pād*, similarly, on the strength of this rule (P. 1. 1. 49) understand this sentence (*pādaḥ pat*) thus ! : the substitute *pad* takes the place of *pād*, i. e. of the word *pād* which is (the final part) of what ends in *pād*. Or, on the strength of this rule, the wholes themselves, when there is an operation, get the capacity of undergoing the operation through their part, (and) not directly.

How about *yīvarṇayor dīdhīvevyoḥ* (P. 7. 4. 53) ? There also, since *dīdhī* and *vevī* are (specifically) mentioned, the elision of the whole becomes due as the substitute. — True, it is so. Still, by coordinating (that rule) with

alo 'ntyastya (P. 1. 1. 52) (the substitute) will be (only) for the final (phoneme).

* * *

" In the contingency (of a number of substitutes becoming due), the nearmost (substitute comes in) ". (P. 1. 1. 50).

[1. 1]

" What is the illustration ? " " *iko yaṇ aci* (P. 6. 1. 77) : *dadhy atra, madhv atra* ". Both kinds (of illustration) are illustrated : That (rule) with which this one is connected, — that also is an illustration. That for which the illustration is given — that also is an illustration. The question, however, (is asked) because the object (of the rule under discussion) is achieved by another rule. This one (who has given the reply), however, thinking only of disparity, quotes (the rule) *iko yaṇ aci* (P. 6. 1. 77). (He) thinks thus : There are many *ik*-s, the originals (to be replaced). (The vowels) *i* and *u*, both of them eighteenfold each, (number) thirtysix. The phoneme *ṛ*, along with *ḷ*, (comes to) thirty. Thus there are sixtysix kinds (of the originals). The *yaṇ*-s (to be substituted) also (are) seven. Or, there is a disparity between the originals and the substitutes because there is no status of original for the phoneme *ḷ* because of impossibility.

" This is achieved by the respectiveness of the substitutes also ". Unique, indeed, is this (alleged) disparity ! Here the individual separateness is not resorted to. What then ? The class : the *ik*-class and the *yaṇ* class. And there is a set of four on both the sides. Also, as regards the statement that there is no *ḷ*, — the respectivity does not refer to the actual linguistic usage. What then ? To the rule (laying down the substitution).

" *tas-thas-tha-mipāṁ tām-tam-tāmaḥ* " (P. 3. 4. 101). This is the idea : When the respectivity is known from the Svarita sign in *iko yaṇ aci* the use of Svarita is (otherwise) superfluous as the phoneme *ik* does not figure in the linguistic usage. Similarly in the case of *yaṇ*, which cannot have (Svarita which is) a property of a vowel. Therefore, one regards the use of Svarita as (otherwise) superfluous and (thus) understands respectivity. In the case of *tām* etc., however, thinking that the use of *svarita* may be also for the sake of the audition (of the Svarita of *tām* etc.) which appear in the linguistic usage, one does not understand respectivity.

" (An ending) denoting a singular in the place of another denoting a singular ". This is only an illustration. Similarly (the delimiting factors of

the spirit e. g.) ' I ' consciousness etc, are other possible meanings in connection with which there is no confusion of finite endings (because of P. 1. 1. 50). Surely the substitute *tām* does not take the place of *thas*.

" But this, too, is achieved by the respectivity of substitutes itself ". It is possible to understand from commentarial explanation that the use of Svarita in their case is to ensure respectivity, not for their audition. Thus furnishing of these two with Svarita is for a technical purpose, not for its audition.

[1. 2]

" Where there is a manifold nearness, there...". Here, a word (viz. *sthāne*) is inferred (to be present) in another ? (i. e. this) Sūtra by the use of Svarita. When (thus) inferred, (the word) *antaratamaḥ* ' expects it and becomes active independently with the two *sthāne* words. So this meaning is obtained : ' The nearmost (substitute comes) in the place (of the original. The one which is nearmost in the matter of place, that one takes place '. Therefore, this meaning is obtained : Where more than one nearmost is possible, and where plurality of this thing (viz. nearmostness) owes to plurality of factors, there nearmostness by reason of place is stronger. For, otherwise (i. e. if two different rules are not understood), with the acceptance of a single act, nearmostness in the matter of meaning, quality and length will be debarred if it is ruled that (the substitute) which is nearmost in the matter of place takes the place. And even if *antaratamaḥ* were active with reference to only *sthāne bhavati*, it achieves nothing. Some one is near by one reason, some (other) by many. How will that (one alone take the place) which (is near) by many ? — Just as in the world, some (brother) has a common father (with another brother) but a different mother, some one has a common-mother but a different father, while (a third) one has a common father and a common mother. — If this (phoneme) follows worldly arrangement, the reading of *-tama* (will be) superfluous. With worldly practice, the Sūtra itself is rejected.

[2]

" But for what reason is this (rule) framed ? " — (Objection :) But the purpose is already stated, (viz. for) *akaḥ savarṇe dīrghaḥ* (P. 6. 1. 101). — Here is the reply : He (the questioner) is asking this : If this (rule) is not framed, what harm will there be ? " Because of the mention of the original in singular ". — How (do you say that) the original is mentioned in singular ? If it is because of the grammatical name (viz. *akaḥ*), the substitute also, named *dīrghaḥ*, is (equally) singular. If the plurality of the substitute is due to the plurality of the (phonemes) named, (there is equally) a plurality of

the original. — Here the original is said to have been mentioned by *akaḥ* in singular because it already exists. The original which is mentioned with a case ending for the existing one cannot possibly be more than one and so it is not expressed in plural by *akaḥ*. The 'long' one (i. e. the substitute), however, being brought into existence can possibly have plurality and is (therefore) said to be in plural. Just as in the world, (when it is said :) 'Make a product of this ball of clay', (the listener) understands the ball of clay in singular, (but) the product in plural. In plural for this reason also, viz. where (the listener) undertakes it (saying) 'I shall make the product'. Similarly here, since 'the long one' refers to what is being brought into existence, (many) long homogeneous (substitutes) become alternately due for each *ak*, when a homogeneous (vowel) follows.

Others explain : When (*uddeśin*-s and *anudeśin*-s are) mentioned by their technical names or in the form of a compound, no successive order is possible; when (thus) mutual statement is not there, there results the undesired contingency of all (*anudeśin*-s getting connected with all *uddeśin*-s — (to avoid which) P. 1. 3. 10 is framed. Similarly here also when there is a mention viz. *akaḥ* (of phonemes) by (their technical) name without a differentiation and (further,) when there is no mutual statement, then all vowels having a duration of two moras become due, because of (the predicate) 'long' mentioned with a technical name. It is difficult (in such a situation to decide) that such-and-such a long (vowel) (is the substitute) for such-and-such an *ak*. — But why is not a mutual statement made ? — For economy. So this (rule), viz. *sthāne 'ntaratamaḥ* is framed.

[3]

"As regards the manner in which this bringing about of a near-most...". *Yathā punar* means *yena prakāreṇa* 'the manner in which'. 'The manner which' means the acceptance of continuous text (as the authoritative one) ....

One should ask those who recite the continuous text. This is their view : 'The continuous text is the origin of the individual words'. The continuous text alone, (which is) real, is the origin of the unreal (individual) words. From it the (individual) words are abstracted. (In reality, however,) since there is no division of the meaning, there is no division of the word also.

Such being the case, he is asking here as to which form of the word is to be abstracted in this (rule) *sthāne 'ntaratama ur aṇ raparaḥ*. (The word) *ṣaṣṭhī* is there (by continuation) in *sthāne 'ntaratama*. So the original which is similar to the substitute, that alone is mentioned by *ṣaṣṭhī*, and not any

other. So (the rule) is understood as a restriction of the original. On the view of the nearmostness of the substitute, however, there is *ṣaṣṭhī* everywhere, as (there is) no restriction on the original. The substitute, however, is restricted : 'this one does not take place (here), this one takes place'. [To illustrate :] *iko yaṇ aci*. Some *ik*-s are far removed (from *yaṇ*-s), (e. g.) the two-mora (*ik*-s) from half-mora (*yaṇ*-s). The one-mora (*ik*-s), however, are a little close. So *ṣaṣṭhī* is obtained by short (*ik*-s) alone, not by the long ones.

(Objection :) But it was pointed out before that this (i. e. *iko yaṇ aci*) is not (a proper) example (for the present rule). — True. It is so. When the view that the substitute has to be the nearmost (is adopted), then, the goal being achieved by other (rule : P. 1. 3. 10), (this is) not an example. (However,) on the view that the original has to be the nearmost, this very (rule : P. 6. 1. 77) has the foremost reason (for being discussed) here. — Why ? — Because the long *ik*-s do not get *ṣaṣṭhī*. As regards what was said viz. nearmostness by place is more powerfull — that was said with regard to the situation where there are two nearmost (substitutes) by reason of different qualifications — one by place and the other by length. This (short *ik* in our present case) is near to *yaṇ* both by place and by length.

Similarly in the case of *iko guṇavṛddhī* (P. 1. 1. 3). Both *e* and *ai* are long. Only the long (originals) are nearmost to them and the long (originals) (alone) get (the designation) *ṣaṣṭhī*. (Objection :) But in (cases like) *nāyakaḥ, lāvakaḥ* the Vṛddhi (takes place) by *acaḥ* ... (P. 7. 2. 115), it is not for *ik* as such. — (Reply :) Here also (in the case of Vṛddhi) '*acaḥ*' and 'the nearmost original' are to be added.

"Simiiarly, when there is an occasion for the Guṇa and Vṛddhi (substitutes) for the phoneme *ṛ*". — But for what reason is this being said ? An objection (in this case) could be (regarded as) taken by the one in connection wlth *iko guṇavṛddhī*. — This is the difference : Guṇa will be (a substitute) for a one-mora (*ṛ* only). It will not be there for a two-mora one. Vṛddhi will be there for a two-mora (*ṝ*), not for a one-mora (*ṛ*). In the case of a long *ik* here, however, both (substitutes) will be there. This is the difference.

"*Vānto yi pratyaye*" (P. 6. 1. 79). "Mention of the original (becomes) necessary". Since the whole *ec* (group of vowels) is mentioned, there will be a substitute ending in *v* for that whole group. If, however, the view (of the restriction) of the original is resorted to, the nearmost originals of (a substitute) ending in *v* are the phonemes *o* and *au*, and so there is no need of mentioning the original. What is the position in the *Vṛttisūtra* here ? ... In that

case *ecaḥ* continues in (the rule) *vānto yi* ... But (what the Sū. means :) the substitute ending in *v* which is seen before a vowel, — that takes place (also) before a suffix beginning with *y*. This much is needed : Of which (original) is that substitute seen when a vowel follows? — Of the phonemes *a* and *au*. " Of those two, then, when the meaning is other than 'possibility'". (He) is thinking thus : In the absence of the meaning of possibility, (forms) like *ceya* cannot be derived. " A both-way restriction ". (He) is explaining that here is a splitting-into-two of the rule. By the rule *kṣayyajayyau* (forms) like *ceya* are derived; and by *śakyārthe* the two are prevented from resulting in a different (meaning).

" Because of the restriction, (the substitute *av* etc.) does not become available here (: *lavyam, pavyam*; *avaśyalāvyam, avaśyapāvyam*) ". (He) is thinking thus : If the inference has a universal application, (then) non-application (of the rule) should be there everywhere. If, on the other hand, the inference is a specific one, then there is no room for controversy. " The restriction is for what belongs to the same category ". What is meant is that a specific feature, viz. palato-velarness is adopted. The other disputant, thinking that this (*Mbh.*) is referring to (a diphthong) where *a* is merged completely (i. e. *e*) says : " Even so, in *raiyati*...". " The root *rāya-* Vedic ". (By this) it is stated that in the classical Sanskrit there is no usage (of *rai*) followed by *y* (i. e. *kyac*). Thus, verily, is said : '(*kyac* should be taught) — after *go*, after (a noun ending in) simple vowels, and after (stems ending in) *n* (P. 3. 1. 8, *Vār.* 2). This is laid down because there is no usage (of *rai*+*kyac*) in the classical Sanskrit.

[3. 1]

" (In) *ūd upadhāyā gohaḥ* (P. 6. 4. 89) ... (the word) *ūpadhāyāḥ* has to be read ". An objection : Here the whole (word : *goh*) is mentioned in the Genitive. There is no possibility of any other (element to be replaced). Such being the case how can this be said? — This is the idea (behind the objection) : In case you understand the Genitive (in *gohaḥ-*) (merely) in the capacity of a qualifying word, then understand the connection (of the Genitive) from this rule! To sum up : connect (the Genitive) thus : that (word element) which cannot be the nearmost to the substitute, that is never connected with the Genitive. Just as by the metarule P. 1. 1. 52, in (the rule) *ruhaḥ paḥ* (P. 7. 3. 43) it is understood (that there is a replacement) of *h*, similarly (here) the understanding has to be that (there is a replacement) of the penultimate of *goh*.

" This is (already) done in the rule as it is." If something unprecedented is done, then that is a defect. If the view that the original (is restricted) had

been faultless, or had a minor defect, then (only) it would have been proper to say (so).

"The reading of the phoneme *t* has to be done". — Well, how is the (the form) *carita* (available) in the absence of the reading of the phoneme *t*? And (the *n*-substitution) will not withdraw, for, the past passive participle suffix *-ta* is immediately close. Further, because of *ādeḥ parasya*' (P. 1. 1. 54), (*n*-substitution) becomes due for *i*. — This is his idea: Since (the Genitive in) *niṣṭhāyāḥ* will be connected with the nearmost (element in) the original because of this rule (P. 1. 1. 50), the phoneme *n* will be substituted for the phoneme *t* of the past passive participle *-ta* only.

"This is (already) done in the rule as it is". This is (what is) said: Does this connecting (of the Genitive) supersede the other (rival) connecting, or is it (itself) superseded by the other connecting? If, to begin with, it supersedes, then in *ruhaḥ paḥ* (P. 7. 3. 43) the connecting with final phoneme by (P. 1. 1. 52 will be superseded; so the Genitive will be connected with the phoneme *u*, and consequently (*p*-substitution) becomes due for the phoneme *u*) .... If, on the other hand, you think that it is (itself) superseded the phoneme *ū* (taught as a substitute) for *goh* becomes due for the phoneme *h*. If the phoneme *t* is not (read in the rule), then, since the *jaś* status (of *t*) is a *fait accompli*, the phoneme *d* becomes the nearmost original of *n* in *bhinnavadbhyām* Thus, indeed, has been said: 'As the thirds, so (are) the fifths, only nasality is their additional property'. And if you think that, because of (the statement): 'and, of preceding *d*', there is no (*n*-substitution) for a following (*d*), this may be for securing (*n*-substitution) which is not (otherwise) had. Therefore, it is better that the rule be as it is.

[4]

"Now, is this (rule) a producer ... ?" The author of the Bhāṣya thus begins with a question in order to get a clear understanding of the text. In the view of the author of the Vārttikas, however, the usefulness (of this rule) lies in its capacity of being meant for restriction because (in his view) there is superfluousness of the rule whether it is a producer or a bestower (of correctness). But, when the rule is independent even without a Genitive, like P. 6. 1. 77: *iko yaṇ aci*, then it produces the nearmost in the place (of the original). The meaning is always there, and there is a nearmost word for every (word); so the rule has to proceed. (Only) this is to be examined: Is the substitute for the whole only, or for the part? Or, because of the impossibility (of its being for both) simultaneously, is it alternately for the whole and alternately for the part? (Further) the substitutes like (those taught in the rule) *aster bhūḥ* (P. 2. 4.

52), *ruhaḥ paḥ* (P. 7. 3. 43) — do they make the nearmost substitute optional, or do they supersede it ?

[4. 1]

"If (the rule) *sthāne 'ntaratamaḥ* is a producer, a withdrawal of the originals (becomes due) (*Vār.* 2)". What sort of an expression is this — viz. 'a withdrawal of the originals becomes due'? For, a (new) word *dadhi* is necessarily produced. — This is the idea : What sort of a withdrawal (is this), when the word *dadhi*, having the same form and the same accent, is substituted? Void is not possible, for, (then) the use of word itself will come to an end. If a substitute with a different form proceeds, in that case meaningfulness is not possible. (There is) thus uselessness in this supposition, that is what is thus conveyed.

"(Even) if so, a duality of forms (results) alternatively". The text of some (is) *vairūpyam* 'dissimilarity of form' (instead of *dvairūpyam*). As regards these (two readings), those who read *vairūpyam*, thinking that ṣ-substitution becomes due in the word *visa* 'a lotus-fibre' because of the (now acquired) status of substitute belonging to the phoneme *s*, — they should be told thus : (Even) if so, (ṣ-substitution) will not take place. Of course when the view (is) that parts also get a substitute alternately (with the whole), and that the whole is not stated as undergoing the operation, unlike in *ekāco dve...* (P. 6. 1. 1), only then (the reading) *vairūpyam* is justified. When, however, the whole is (regarded as) undergoing the operation, with a view to prohibiting (ṣ-substitution), then the reading of *ādeśa* (in P. 8. 3. 59) is justified; and so this text also, viz. *dvairūpyam* become justified. And it is just for this purpose that, (he) says *kvacit*. (It means) 'On one alternative' there is dissimilarity of form or duality of forms. Similarly in *aster bhūḥ* (P. 2. 4. 52) etc., when the substitute is for the two parts individually, the duality of forms proceeds; in the other view there is the triad.

"Moreover, the desired arrangement does not become possible". Perhaps it may be thought : An operation is complete with a whole. So only those which form wholes which are used for (conveying) meaning undergo operations and, consequently, there will not be a dissimilarity of form. — But the desired arrangement does not become possible. Another (and another) nearmost (substitute), causing (the original) to recede, has to operate again and again. — (Objection :) But, at the first application (of the rule) there will be a recession of it. — (But) that is exactly what we are asking. Why should the application be (only) once, if the substitute is just like that ? And, further, if it proceeds without a purpose, by whom is it repulsed when it proceeds again ?

Such being the case, whichever word comes into being, all that is heading towards recession. Therefore, its employment is not possible, like that of (verbal ending) when it is (still) in the *l*-stage and is awaiting the substitute. Thus every word (becomes) unsteady. — Thus, if (the impression) 'this is a correct (word)' does not stand fast in the mind, all linguistic usage will be obstructed.

Similarly in *dadhi atra* 'the curds here', both, the cause and (the element) undergoing the operation, are awaiting the substitute; thus neither the cause stands fast as cause nor (the element) undergoing the operation as (the element) undergoing the operation. Therefore there is no understanding that such-and-such (an element) has to undergo such-and-such an operation when such-and-such (an element) follows. Just as "sesame seeds, when thrown on a hot frying pan", create the mental impression that they are unsteady, because of the uninterrupted action of rising and falling, similarly these (speech sounds) also, because of their unsteadiness, will not be felt steadfast, as correct in the relationship of cause and the object of the operation. Therefore, this is the (resulting) idea : This view is not reasonable.

[4. 2]

"Let it, then, be a bestower (of correctness)". All the long (vowels) are produced by *akaḥ savarṇe dīrghaḥ* (P. 6. 1. 101); they procede and retire. "Bestowing of correctness on those which are produced by another (rule) is done (by this rule)". (The rule) *sthāne 'ntaratamaḥ* means : The nearmost (substitute), already produced, is correct; that should be used. Others, though produced, should not be used. Just as somebody says : 'Let the goats be brought'. When they are brought, he says : 'Keep the black one. Remove the others'. This rule is for a similar purpose; there is no superfluousness. ...

[4. 2. 1]

"The production (of substitute is not achieved) on the view that there is bestowing (of correctness) (on substitutes) produced (by another rule)" (*Vār*. 3). The idea is that the production of desired words is not achieved. The other one, however, understanding production in a general way, questions : "Why is it then said that the production is not achieved ?"

"What would then this (rule) be for ?" (He) is thinking thus : If all (substitutes) were to take place everywhere, then this (rule) would become meaningless. Therefore, there will be no undesired contingency of all (substitutes becoming due everywhere).

[4. 2. 2]

" Also, (the rule will be) futile " (*Vār*. 4). This is (what is) said : The activity of word is not like that. (The rule) *iko yaṇ aci* (P. 6. 1. 77) is, in the matter of correctness, an accessory for the appearance of *yaṇ* in euphony, just as *sthāne 'ntaratamaḥ* (P. 1. 1. 50) is an accessory for the sake of operation. So also this one, viz. *akaḥ savarṇe* ... (P. 6. 1. 101). But now, with those (substitutes) produced, when this (rule) proceeds, it cannot say : ' These, the (erstwhile) correct (substitutes) are now incorrect '. For another one will say : ' Those alone are correct '. So, just as prohibition of eating cannot be made by words in the case of one who has already eaten, similarly impossible is the retirement of these (substitutes, when) already produced. It would be like saying ' Goats have not been brought ' when they have been (actually) brought.

Therefore, instead of presenting (the phenomenon) as (annulling) a word which has already materialized, (he now) looks upon it as something that has become due only in the mind. The moment there is an utterance of a word, there is no application of *iko yaṇ aci*. When some substitute, either *v* or any other one, is effected, there is no (guarantee) that the nearmost one will take place first.

If, on the other hand, an actually effected form is not resorted to, then in the form which becomes due mentally, the different substitutes become due and so the (combined rule means) : Of the various *yaṇ* phonemes which become due (the nearmost one materializes). On this interpretation, this view, viz. this (rule, P. 1. 1. 50 is) a bestower (of correctness) remains no longer. So there is no utility in the concept under discussion.

The other one, however, says : " Or, it was already said ".

* * *

" An *aṇ*- phoneme (i. e. $\breve{\bar{a}}$, $\breve{\bar{i}}$, or $\breve{\bar{u}}$) coming in the place of $\breve{\bar{ṛ}}$ (is invariably) followed by *r* " (P. 1. 1. 51).

[1]

" Is this statement, viz. that a phoneme $\breve{\bar{a}}$, $\breve{\bar{i}}$, or $\breve{\bar{u}}$ coming in the place of $\breve{\bar{ṛ}}$ is invariably followed by *r*, meant for preventing other (substitutes) ? " The subservience of this rule is known from (the *Mbh.* on) the rule *iko guṇavṛddhī* (P. 1. 1. 3). Inspite of its being subservient, all (rules) containing a Genitive (of *ṛ*) form its province. Therefore, where(ever) there is a Genitive (of *ṛ*), there it produces a new substitute (viz. *aṇ*) which supersedes other substitutes.

And having produced it, it enjoins a *r* to follow that (substitute) only, this (latter) on the basis of the splitting of the sentence (in two): "(1) *aṇ* takes the place of *ṛ*, and (2) that (*aṇ*) is followed (invariably) by *r*". Such being the case, when a Genitive *acaḥ* is there in consequence of the laying down of an *Udātta*, Anudātta, or Svarita (substitute), this rule, which says that an *aṇ* phoneme takes the place of *ṛ*, presents itself.... The metarule *sthāne 'ntaratamaḥ*, having found a scope elsewhere where it wards off substitutes which are not nearmost, is (here) superseded.

"Or, is it that only a *r* is made to follow?" That is, the activity of this rule consists in merely adding an appendage (to the substitute). When *aṇ* is mentioned (in this rule) as being in the place of *ṝ*, only this much is meant — an *aṇ* which has been there in the place of *ṛ* by reason of another rule, that is to have a *r* following. Since the rule *ur aṇ* says that that (*aṇ*) which is in the place of *ṛ* is to be followed by *r*, so *aṇ*-s, which are already there, present themselves.

[*Udāttādiṣu deṣoḥ.*] (Now) when phonemes in the form of *aṇ* become due, are they possessed of qualities like the Udātta pitch, or not? Both ways there is defect ... But this (rule) *ur aṇ raparaḥ* is superseded in the case of specific substitutes by *ṝta id dhātoḥ* (P. 7. 1. 100), *ud oṣṭhyapūrvasya* (102). For, if all *aṇ*- phonemes were to be laid down there, the (specific) mention of *ud* (etc.) will suffer. But the *r*-suffixion will be difficult to have as it is taught by this (rule) as a subordinate part of it.

"Non-availability of the phoneme *a* in the case of Guṇa and Vṛddhi (substitutions) (*Vār.* 2)". If *r*-suffixion is taught by this rule (for *aṇ*) which is already there, when the Guṇa and the Vṛddhi (substitutes) are taught, *aṇ*, which could undergo *r*-suffixion, (will be) difficult to get in the place of *ṛ*. "What is special (about *ă*) when dissimilarity (is common)?" (Here *kiṁ hi sādhīyaḥ* means) 'what is the reason?' or 'what is the better reason?' "This defect is there in the earlier view also". This defect is there even in the supersession view which was introduced earlier. Which (defect)? "Non-availability of the phoneme *a*".

"But not *eṅ* and *auc*". What then? Even *i* and *u* become due. So the invariable availability of the phoneme *a* does not become possible. "And if it is held that (when there is a possibility) of *aṇ* and a non-*aṇ* in the place of *ṛ* ...". (The view) which was introduced earlier, viz. that a new (substitute) *aṇ*, which supersedes (others) is produced (by this rule) — that is not so. What then? A restriction is made.

Here some explain: (The word) *sthāne*, having the case-ending *śe*, denoting either Genitive plural or Locative plural, is continued (in this rule). Such being the case, this is the syntactical connection: '(When it is laid down that) a Guṇa takes place, (or) a Vṛddhi takes place, (it is understood) that (a phoneme) *aṇ* (named) Guṇa comes in, followed by a *r*, (a phonome) *aṇ* (named) Vṛddhi comes in, followed by a *r*'. And surely the phonemes *i* and *u* are not (named) Guṇa and Vṛddhi. So *i* and *u* will not come in (as substitutes).

Or, this Genitive (*ur*) in (the rule) *ur aṇ raparaḥ* is not free of expectation. What then? It expects what has become due. (So the rule means:) Among the phonemes which become due (as Guṇa or Vṛddhi) in the place of *ṛ*, only an *aṇ* materializes, no other one materializes; and while materializing, it is followed by *r*. Thus the possibility of substitutes is controlled by other rule. ...

Whence then the possibility of *i* and *u* (resulting as substitutes)?

" The availability of the phoneme *a* in the earlier view is established ". That one, viz. the earlier supersession-view, that itself is now resorted to in the form of recession of other (phonemes as substitutes), but not in the form of production of a new *aṇ*. That is why some do not read *eva* in the earlier text (of the *Mbh.*). (Their) text is just this: '*aṇ* (comes) in the place of *ṛ*'. (*Aṇ*) which is laid down in the earlier (view) does not cause to retire (other substitutes). Here (i. e. in this later view) there is the retirement of others as in a restrictive rule. ...

" As regards what was said, viz. 'A defect (results) in the case of Udātta etc.,' does that defect result in this (revised view)?" He begins with a question, (asking) 'What do you think?' — (This is) the idea (in asking the question): (The opponent) seeks to decide on the basis of the metarule *sthāne 'ntaratamaḥ*. (He thinks thus:) nearmost (phonemes), high-pitched etc., take the place of a vowel; (once) the nearmost (phonemes) are established, there is no possibility whatever of *aṇ* (coming in as a substitute). If, however, this metarule (P. 1. 1. 51) itself supersedes the earlier one (P 1. 1. 50) in the context: 'an Udātta is substituted in the place of a vowel', then a defect arises. The other one, thinking that once the non-nearmost (phonemes) are established on the basis of the metarule *ur aṇ raparaḥ* the metarule *sthāne 'ntaratamaḥ* does not proceed, says: " That defect results: How? Both the *aṇ* and the non *aṇ* (phonemes) are referred to by *Udātta*. — Even though thus referred to, (they) do not become due, because the rule *sthāne 'ntaratamaḥ* is there ". The idea is that (once) the restriction is made

in accordence with the metarule *sthāne 'ntaratamaḥ*, then this other restriction (viz. P. 1. 1. 51) will not proceed.

" Whence, indeed, is it that of the two metarules ... ? " The *antaratama* metarule (P. 1. 1. 50) has its scope in *akaḥ savarṇe dīrghaḥ* (P. 6. 1. 101), in *jhayo ho 'nyatarasyām* (P. 8. 4. 62). (The metarule) *ur aṇ raparaḥ* (P. 1. 1. 51) has its scope in (the forms like) *kartā, hartā*. Both (metarules) become due here in *kṛtiḥ, hṛtiḥ*. " (Whence will the correct form) be decided by the metarule *sthāne 'ntaratamaḥ*, and not by *ur aṇ raparaḥ* ? " That is how they explain: — (But) whence this, viz. the supersession (of the later rule) by the earlier one, and not the supersession (of the earlier rule) by the later one? Or, (according to another explanation) when an *udātta* (substitute is taught) in the place of a vowel, (whence is it that) with the *antaratama* metarule proceeding the other restrictive rule will not proceed ? Why not that *ur aṇ raparaḥ* will restrain the application of the previous rule ?

" Also, these (specifically taught substitutes) of *ṛ* ... ". Verily, this rule takes the form of a restrictive rule where (a substitute) other (than the desired one) has become due. But in the present case *i* and *u* alone proceed. Since there is no restriction, the main sentence itself does not proceed viz. '*Aṇ* takes the place of *ṛ*'. In the absence of its proceeding, there is no proceeding of the subordinate sentence also, viz. '(The substitute) is followed by *r*'.

" But (the goal) is achieved since the *r*-suffixion (becomes due) even while the substitute becomes due " (*Vār*. 3). It is in the mind (of the Vārttikakāra) that the two readings of *sthāna* continue here. It is true that this is the same as the second view according to which only the *r*-suffixion is taught by this rule; still, this is the difference which is made : In the earlier (view), time (of *r*-suffixion) is not fixed; here the time is fixed. Further, here it is the becoming due (that is resorted to), not the restriction or production. This being the case, the restriction or the production (view) is given up, and *r*-suffixion is effected the moment there is the *prāpti* i. e. the *prasaṅga* 'the becoming due' (of the relevant substitute). This is (what is) said : The very time of (the substitutes) becoming due that itself is the time of the *r*-suffixion. Such being the case, *r*-suffixion is received by (the substitute) *aṇ* just at the time when the mind starts thinking : 'Which (of the substitutes) should take place ?' Therefore, at the time of (substitution of) Guṇa and Vṛddhi the nearmost one will take place, with the phoneme *r* already suffixed. By this it is stated that this metarule *ur aṇ raparaḥ* applies, as a subordinate part of the cause of the application of the the metarule *sthāne 'ntaratamaḥ*.

"If so, the substitute remains unqualified". (He) is thinking thus : One (reading of) *sthāna* continues here. By that the time (of *r*-suffixion) is fixed. However, that *r* suffixion, with its time fixed, takes place near or immediately close to *ṛ*. How ? The rule *ṣaṣṭhī sthāneyogā* (P. 1. 1. 49) does not present itself where a Genitive refers to what has already taken place. It does not present itself for this reason, viz. that (Pāṇini) reads (*sthāne* in the rule) : *udīcām ātaḥ sthāne* ... (P. 7. 3. 46).

"A second use of (the word) *sthāna* continues". Some explain (thus) : (The word) ending in the Locative becomes (modified into) the one ending in the Nominative : *aṇ sthānam*. We however say : This is merely an explanation. This is how it is to be done : *uḥ*, (then) *sthāne* (which means) 'at the time when', then *raparaḥ*. (Thus, this is what is meant :) *r*-suffixion takes place at that very time when this place (of *ṛ*) is yet to be occupied by the substitute.

(Here is) another alternative, on which both the supersession view and the restriction view become possible. (When there is an injunction :) 'A Guṇa (phoneme) is (the substitute) for *aṅga*', even there (the rule) *ur aṇ raparaḥ* presents itself where there are mentions of Genitive and becomes active in this way : There is a Guṇa substitution for *aṅga*, for *ṛ* however there is *aṇ*; and that (*aṇ*) is followed by *r*. That is how a new *aṇ* is laid down by this (rule). Hence the supersession view. If, (on the other hand) (this rule) gets connected with the words Guṇa and Vṛddhi and (thus) forms one sentence (with rules which teach Guṇa and Vṛddhi) thus : 'There is a Guṇa substitution for *aṅga*, for *ṛ*, however, *aṇ* alone is the Guṇa, (there is) no other Guṇa; *aṇ* alone is the Vṛddhi, (there is) no other Vṛddhi, — then the rule becomes a restriction — But on this view ...

[2]

"What is the purpose of reading *aṇ* ?" This is an introduction to the following text. "*paitṛṣvaseyaḥ*". If it is asked : What is the purpose of (teaching) elision, (the reply is that) it may be for the replacement of the whole (stem), or for (securing) the *ru*-substitution on the view that *r* is the initial part of the following element. "*Hotāpotārau*". On the elision of *r* as the final part of a conjunct, elision of *n* will not be available, as in *pacan niti*.

[3]

"A single substitute (for two) should be recognized (as a substitute for *ṛ*) (in the matter of *r*-suffixion)" (*Vār*. 6). This is the idea : It is read (in the text about accepting the bride) : 'for Prajāpati'; but (there is) no separate mention of ornaments as 'for Agni', or of garments as 'for Bṛhaspati',

Similarly, here the whole group is mentioned as undergoing replacement in the rule *pūrvaparayoḥ* 'in the place of (both) the preceding and the following (phonemes)' (P. 6. 1. 84). (The whole group) is mentioned, however, in terms of (the individual constituents as) 'in the place of the preceding and the following (phonemes)' as the constituent parts are the preceding and the following. This is as in the case of cerebralization of the whole group *pravaṇa*. Therefore, there will be absence of *r*-suffixion.

"(The goal) is achieved by understanding the part". In this group there is a part viz. *ṛ*. The word *uḥ* 'in the place of *ṛ*' refers to it, so the *r*-suffixion is achieved. It is like this: "When it is said that the beans are not to be eaten, even the mixed beans are not eaten". — (But) this maxim contradicts (another). For, it is said: "An operation (taught) for a part is not (effected) when it (the part) belongs to an integrated whole, as in the case of substances" (*Mbh.* I. 25. 3). (When it is said) 'Ghee shall not be sold', 'Oil shall not be sold', cows and mustard seeds *are* sold. — (But even) if so, the wines etc. are not seen to be termed as *vyapavṛkta* 'distinctly separate'. Similarly, eating of beans etc. (even when mixed) is not laid down. It is only a result of desire. Nor is there a verbal authority in the world (saying:) Such-and-such (are termed) beans; not such-and-such. The whole, no matter how little mixture (lit. scent) of beans there may be in it, is beans themselves, because they are a part of it. Further, no operation is taught (here) for the whole as such. Therefore, the activity based on part takes place.

But, if that attitude is taken — "Prohibition of *r*-substitution (becomes necessary) (when *aṇ* is) a part of the substitute", because the *aṇ*-form exists in the substitute and the whole is not active. Just as the statement 'in the place of *ṛ*' (is justified) because the form of the phoneme *ṛ* exists (in the original), similarly the substitute also is designated *aṇ* because *aṇ* is a part of it. Therefore, *r*-substitution becomes due. — But how is the maxim (to be) cast aside? — This is the idea. The relationship of the original and the substitute is worded as *ur aṇ raparaḥ*. And here is an *aṇ* in the primary sense (as substitute) and the phoneme *ṛ* in the capacity of the original. — When a whole group is the original and (similarly) also the substitute, it is (one) whole that is replaced and (another whole) that replaces it. Therefore, (a word element) which has the form of a part ... is neither to be replaced nor is it a replacer. If, however, relying on the word-activity one resorts to ..., then the status of being the original is established (for *ṛ*); but then *r*-suffixion results in the substitute.

"If, however, (*r*-suffixion is taught) for what ends in *ṛ*". But some say: The word *anta* 'end' should be read (in the rule). Others say: This (word;

anta) presents itself where(ever) a Genitive (is read in a rule). Therefore, there is *tadantavidhi* by which what ends in the Genitive (is understood). — But where is the injunction (in Genitive) ? — The Guṇa taught by *aṅgasya* (P. 6. 4. 1).... " This also (can be said to be) ending in *ṛ* on the strength of the extension-of-a-special-designation ".

" Extension-of-a-special-designation (is possible) in the case of a meaningful (word-element only) ". In that case, difference can be assumed by means of admitting and giving up the meaning (alternately); certainly extension-of-a-special-designation is not compatible with an identical form. Verily, it is not (said) : ' The jar of the jar '.

" Also, prohibition will have to be made here : *mātuḥ*, *pituḥ* ". (He) is thinking thus : When (here) there is (a single substitute) *u* for the preceding (-*ṛ*) and the following (*a*-), and *r*-suffixion is done, (there will take place) *ru*-substitution for -*s* (a part) of the case-ending (*as*), (after which there will be) deletion (of the first *r* by) *ro ri* (P. 8. 3. 14), and (with the consequent) lengthening (the wrong form) *mātūḥ karoti* will result.

" Both need not be done ", the additional rule and the prohibition. " Here, of two (originals) (both) read with Genitive endings ". This (is what) he is pleading : The parts only (are mentioned as) the originals in the rule *pūrvaparayoḥ* (P. 6. 1. 84), because the sentence is complete in every constituent. The whole is qualified by them (the parts). And the reading of the word *eka* ' one ' in the rule is to prevent two (substitutes) which is a clue to the duality of the originals. Just as a son, who is one, can be named on the basis of relationship with both (the parents), similarly a substitute also.

" Elision of *s* after *r* " (P. 8. 2. 24), as in *atsāḥ*. — " *ṣ*-substitution for the Visarga which is not a suffix becomes due (undesirelly) by P. 8. 3. 51 ". This is the idea (behind this objection) : The name (*pratyaya*) attaches to the whole (i. e. *as*), it does not cover the phoneme *a* alone. Therefore the phoneme *r* is not a *pratyaya*. — " (It is) a Visarga coming from a *pratyaya* ". This is the idea : The name *pratyaya* belongs to (the Visarga coming from the suffixal -*a*) because that phoneme *a* is a part of the suffix. Therefore, the phoneme *r* is designated as *pratyaya*. — " Here the Visarga, (designated as) *pratyaya*, is dropped ". The name *pratyaya* is never received by the phoneme *a* at the time when *u*-substitution is taught. It is received by the phoneme *s* at a later time. To say now that (the name *pratyaya*,) which was not previously received by *a*, is received after its (i. e. of *s*) withdrawal is saying what is not proper. Therefore the *ṣ*-substitution becomes due (undesiredly). Now (he) wards (it) off on the strength of a clue :

" The reading of *bhrātuṣputra* (in the *kaskādi* list) is a suggestive sign that there is no ṣ-substitution after (an *iṇ* phoneme) which is the result of a single substitute ". There is no (ṣ-substitution) in the place of Visarga after an *iṇ* that is caused by a single substitute.

[4]

" Well, now is this (*r*) the final part of what precedes ? " — But how possibly can the phoneme *r*, which occupies a subordinate position in the expression *rapara* ' having a following *r* ' be construed either as the initial or as the final ? Perhaps it way be the idea that the suffixion of *r* is all that is done by this (rule), hence the principal position of the phoneme *r*. (But) if this principal position belongs only semantically, then the rule does not lay down such a (principal) phoneme *r* and so (it will have) no connection with a qualifying expression. — In this respect they say : This is (what is) said : On the *pūrvānta* view the word *para* need not be read in the rule. Let there be this much : *ur aṇ ra*. The word *antaḥ* is there (by *anuvṛtti*). Similarly on the *parādi* view. If (*ur* in) *ur aṇ* is understood as Ablative and the Ablative is understood as indicating a following position, then the word *para* need not be read. If (it is) done, it will be (merely) for the sake of clarity. Therefore this finally becomes the meaning of the rule (on the *parādi* view) : (The phoneme *aṇ*,) which is taught in the place of *ṛ*, after that comes *r*; only, it is the initial (of what follows). " And if both are " discontinued, " then (*r* is) independent ".

However, this discussion is based on the restriction view. On that view, ' supersession by the earlier rule ' was resorted to. Or, there is a connection between one restriction and another ... the three views become possible.

But when the ' *r*-suffixion simultaneous (with the substitution) ' view is (alone adopted), then this discussion cannot be there - viz. whether this (*r*) is the initial (part) of what follows or whether it is independent, just as there is no discussion regarding the phoneme *n* in *anaṅ* etc. — viz. whether *n* in *anaṅ* is independent or an initial (part) of what follows. But even on this view it can be assumed, on the strength of the continuation of the word *ādi* ' initial ', that (the phoneme *r*) is a part of it at the time of the retiring of the original, but it becomes an initial (part) of what follows with regard to operations (which become due) later on.

As regards these (viws), the final of what precedes is either the final of the whole group, or of *aṇ*. It can become (a part) of the whole group, as it is a part of a part. Similarly, (it is) an initial (part) of what follows and is invariably present — whether a case- or verbal-ending or any other group of suffixes.

[4. 1]

"*Gīḥ, pūḥ*" If independent, (*r*) not being a part, does not get the designation 'final'. "*Nijegilyate*". If the phoneme *r* is independent, the Genitive *giraḥ* unconnected with the part is impossible to construe.

"*Gīryate svayam eva*". When there is an intervention of *yak* by the phoneme *r*, (the goal) is not achieved in spite of the statement about the *upadeśa*, for the very reason of intervention. "A consontant is as good as not existing where a rule of accent is concerned". This metarule should be resorted to on this (*abhakta*) view. Remedial measure should be taken in the case of an undesired result. This very solution (holds good) in the case of accents of reduplicated stems. Being already mentioned, it is not stated again.

["*Halādiśeṣa-*."] What kind (of a consonant) survives, that kind (of a consonant) has to go. On this (*abhakta*) view, the reduplication is left without a (final) consonant. Therefore, on this view (deletion of *r*) does not become available, as *r* is not a part (of reduplication).

"Prohibition of a Visarga". For, what is independent becomes the final of a Pada by the dictum *yasmāt suptiṅ* ... etc. (cf. Pari. 23)

"Also the absence of a settled arrangement of the suffix. *Kirataḥ, girataḥ*". — What is the idea in preferring the dual? — In (arriving at) *kirati*, operation of the stem becomes due, and also the Vikaraṇa. Being obligatory, the Vikaraṇa has to materialize. For, the Guṇa, which is an *aṅga* operation, is not obligatory, as it is prohibited if the Vikaraṇa is put there (first). Therefore, when the Vikaraṇa is put there and *i*-substitution is there because of it, there is sanction for the correctness, and so there is no absence of a settled arrangement. Here in dual, however, both are obligatory, the *aṅga* operation and the Vikaraṇa. When being subsequent (in the order of the *Aṣṭ.*) the *aṅga* operation is performed (first) and afterwards the Vikaraṇa (is brought in), the phoneme *r* is (already) there, an independent element. So the Vikaraṇa has to be after the phoneme *r* which results in its incorrectness. And if the phoneme *r* is understood to be after the Vikaraṇa, then it is not after an *aṇ* and so the (desired) form does not result. That is why the objection about the absence of the settled arrangement of the suffix is illustrated in the dual only.

[4. 2]

"When (*r* is) the final of what precedes, the restriction that (*r* of) *ru* alone (is replaced by Visarga) (becomes necessary)". The rule *roḥ supi* (P. 8. 3. 16) has to be framed necessarily for making a restriction; (e. g.) *gīrṣu, pūrṣu*. For, this (*r*) is *pada*-final when *sup* (the Loc. plu. ending)

follows. When, however, it is the initial part of what follows, it is understood by (i. e. as a part of) the *sup* word-element itself. — Even when (considered as) *abhakta*, (substitution cf Visarga) becomes due because of the statement *tadādi* ..., so restriction about *ru* has to be made (on that view also). — " Even when (*r* is regarded) as the initial of what follows " (the restriction about *ru*) has to be made for averting (*visarga*-substitution) for an original (*r*); so that it will not be there (for example) in *caturṣu*.

" For the sake of (the form) *nārkalpi*. This (*r*) which belongs to the group of suffixes, viz. *-kalpi*, cannot destroy the *pada*-final status of the part (i. e. of itself) ". When Vṛddhi is being substituted after (the suffix) *i*(*ñ*) is made to follow the word *nṛkalpa*, whose initial part is the phoneme *r* ? Of the word *-kalpi* which is a group of suffixes. The phoneme *r*, which is a part of a group, cannot be said to precede it when the group follows. But it is not a part of the word *-kalpa* and so a part can be said to precede or follow another part. Therefore, when the suffix *-kalpa* follows, there is the *pada*-final status for the phoneme *r* by the dictum *tadādi* .... What sort of an expression is this — ' cannot distroy (the *pada*-final status) of the part ' ? This is the meaning : Belonging to the groups, this (*r*), which is a part of the group, cannot destroy the *pada*-final status of the part of the group (i. e. of itself), which it has when (another) part, viz. *-kalpa*, follows. The text of others (is) as follows : *kalpapadasaṁghātubhakto 'sau*. They explain (it) thus : A *pada* which has *-kalpa* as its part is called *kalpapada*. So the word *nārkalpi* (is here) the *kalpapada*. That group which is its part, viz. *-kalpi*.

[4. 3]

[" *dhinutaḥ* ".] Here also, in the singular form *dhinoti* there is no difference whether there is elision (of the final *a*) or not. By reason of the Guṇa (substitution) by (P. 6. 1. 87 :) *ād guṇaḥ* (for $a+u$), or the *Guṇa* (substitution) for the Vikaraṇa, (followed by the *pararūpa*) by (P. 6. 1. 97 :) *ato guṇe*, as in *pace*. Therefore a dual form is cited as an example. " What ends in *a* at the time of (a suffix designated) *ārdhadhātuka* " means what ends in *a* at the time of coming into existence of the *ārdhadhātuka*. Verily, at the time when an *ārdhadhātuka* realizes its form, at that time this (root *dhinv*) is never without an *a*-ending, as the two are taught simultaneously. So the elision is established.

" The substitutes are (replacers) of what is specifically mentioned (in the rule) ". But then the coordination with the Pari. (*nirdiśyamānasya* ... etc.) does not become possible, as in ... This is no defect. That which is conveyed by the word ending in Genitive, viz. *ṇalaḥ* (in the place of *ṇal*) — that (word

element), an object of actual use, receives the substitute. Since there is an assumption of identity on the basis of (this) non-difference, so it is said : 'Of what is mentioned in the Genitive ...'. And it is for this reason that the phoneme *a* following an *aṅga* that ends in *ā* is replaced by *au*. (While) the form *a* becomes an object of audition, what belongs to it (i. e. *r*), however, is (only something which is) inferred. Therefore the rule *ādeḥ parasya* (P. 1. 1. 54) will not operate (and no wrong form will result). " Because of its being intervened by the phoneme *r* ". The phoneme *a* is resorted to in its own form. And that form is intervened. If, however, the wording had been *liṭaḥ* 'in the place of *liṭ*', or *pratyayasya* 'in the place of a suffix', then there would (certainly) have been (the undesirable) substitute (*au* in *cakāra* etc.) because of the absence of intervention.

" Shortening of the penultimate when *caṅ* follows (is not available) ". (Objection :) But it may be (available) even when (the long vowel) is not the penultimate on the strength of a suggestive sign, viz. that (Pāṇini) teaches *a*-substitution for the reduplication in P. 7. 4. 95. — True. It is so. But (then) there would be an over-extension here also, (viz. in) *acīkṛtat, acikīrtat*.

" A fixed position for *iṭ* is not possible, (e. g. in) *āstaritā* ". He is thinking thus : (Here) the Guṇa becomes due, and so also *iṭ*. The *Guṇa* (takes precedence) because of its succeeding position and obligatoriness. And once the Guṇa (substitution) is carried out the prohibition of *iṭ* becomes due because of the rule *neḍ varamānādau* (P. 7. 2. 8, *Vār*. 1). Consequently (there results) 'the absence of fixed position' in the form of non-application (of *iṭ*). If (on the other hand), there is its application, *iṭ* will be heard before the phoneme *r*, and so (there results) an undesired position (for *iṭ*). If, however, *iṭ* takes place first, Guṇa afterwards, then there will be no defect whatever, for, (*r*) becomes the initial of the following (suffix) in whatever form the latter emerges.

" Lengthening does not become available, (e. g. in) *gīḥ, pūḥ* ". If, to begin with, *i/u*-substitution and *r*-suffixion (are effected) before the elision of *vi* is effected, (then) the elision of *vi* itself does not become available, as the name *apṛkta* is not there (applicable). Therefore, the elision of *vi* is (first) effected as it is internal, and (afterwards) the *i/u*-substitution and the *r*-suffixion. On the understanding that this (*r*) is the initial of that following (word-element which is there) when the case ending has come into being, (that case-ending -s) is elided by *rāt sasya* (P. 8. 2. 24). (Consequently) the long (substitute) is not available.

* * *

" (A substitute taught for a word in Genitive is actually) for its last phoneme " (P. 1. 1. 52).

[1]

" This reading of *al* ' a phoneme ', — is it ... ? " It is not understood whether (*alaḥ*) is Nominative plural or Genitive singular, as the form is the same (in both the cases). They justify both (the interpretations) and (accordingly) interpret the following text : " If, on the other hand, *al antyasya* is read ". (It means :) if it is so interpreted. (He) (thus) explains, in unmistakable terms, that this (*alaḥ*) is Nominative plural. Others, however, have just this as (their) text. " This reading of *al* ' a aphoneme ', — is it a qualification of *antya* ' the final ' ? " Because this deserves to be so ; so they decide *al* to be coreferencial with *antya*. " Even if a qualification of *antya* ' the final ' the substitute remains unqualified ". A polysyllabic form of a substitute has also been established. Since such (i. e. an unqualified substitute is there) for the final phoneme, " a polysyllabic substitute will become due for the final ". Therefore, on this view, the rule *anekāl-śit sarvasya* (P. 1. 1. 55) has to be framed.

" If, on the other hand, *al antyasya* is read ". Or, if that is so interpreted. When it is looked upon thus, a substitute consisting of phoneme(s) is taught for the final. So (a substitute in the form of) an elision becomes due for the whole, (e. g. in) *virajīkaroti* ' makes (a thing) dustless ' by (the rule) : ... *rahorajasāṁ lopaś ca* (P. 5. 4. 51). Moreover, a cluster of phonemes becomes due (as a substitute) for the final, fore, lsewhere, when a phoneme is mentioned the whole class is referred to. — What is then the object in reading *al* here ? — For the *lopa* substitute. In order to avoid the *lopa* substitute for the final. — But it is gathered from an indication that this is not a reference to the class.—What is that indication ? –The rule *ṅic ca* (P. 1. 1. 53). For, in the case of a reference to the class, a substitute furnished with the code-letter *ṅ* also is already established and so this (word *al*) will have a restrictive force (in conveying the meaning). It is called a restrictive rule because it has a same result as a restrictive rule. When (it is said that) the substitutes are for the final, that implies a non-*al* (substitute) also. So the reading of *al* is to exclude a non-*al*.

" Even then the final remains unqualified, " viz. (the final) of such-and-such a form. Such being the case, (the substitute) becomes due for whatever final is possible in grammar, as mentioned in Genitive. In *paramānaḍudbhyām* ' by two excellent bulls ', the phoneme *d* becomes due (as a substitute) for the whole word *anaḍuh*, as *anaḍuh* is read in Genitive (in P. 8. 2. 72, which teaches the *d* substitute). " In the place of a sentence also ". The sentence has been mentioned just for fault-finding. (Actually) a sentence is not possible as a

final mentioned in the Genitive. Therefore the view that (*al* is) a qualification of the substitute is certainly faulty, and so the view that (*al* is) a qualification of the final is alone faultless.

" If, indeed, this is the idea that ... ". This is his argument. This rule will have to be framed necessarily, so that in the event of conflict of two (equally powerful exceptions) the substitute will be for the whole on account of the supersession of the earlier exception (P. 1. 1. 54) (by the later one viz. P. 1. 1. 55). In the absence of the rule neither (the designation) ' earlier ' nor ' later ' is possible. And if the eye is on brevity alone, " that (rule, viz. *anekāl*) need not be framed even on the view that (*al* is) a qualification of *antya* ".

[2]

" By the rule *alo 'ntyasya* (P. 1. 1. 52), (the Genitive) of place is connected (with the final phoneme)." The whole rule *ṣaṣṭhī sthāneyogā* (P. 1. 1. 49) is furnished with a Svarita. Therefore that Genitive which is ascertained to be connected with place, (which is thus) delimited, segregated from other domains, (and) is not subjected to superseding rules — that (Genitive) belongs to the final phoneme. Or, the substitute, which ... This linking with the place-(-Genitive of the final phoneme) does not proceed elsewhere. (The element taught) is made the initial, or the final, of the (word) read in Genitive as it is heard, or it is suffixed to it.

" Otherwise, an undesired contingency (results) ". If (the word) *ṣaṣṭhī* (in P. 1. 1. 49) alone is furnished with a Svarita, (then) the entire Genitive in grammar belongs, not to the word which is heard, but to its final (phoneme). Just as the Genitive is subservient to the superseding rule (which teaches *ṭit* ... etc. augments), similarly (the rule) *alo 'ntyasya* is also so. Therefore, the Genitive *ārdhadhātukasya* (P. 7. 2. 35) belongs not to the whole, but to its final (phoneme). That (Genitive), however, proceeds in accordance with purpose, sometimes in the relationship of original and substitute, sometimes destroying the original-substitute (relationship).

" (Elements) with code-letters *ṭ*, *k* and *m* also will be (substitutes) for the final (phoneme) ". In *bhavitā*, the augment *iṭ* will come before *ṛ* (of *-tṛ*). Again, the augment similarly belongs to the phoneme *ā*, not to the whole; so what was said, viz ' an augment belongs to a meaningful (linguistic element), it becomes a subordinate part of it and is so comprehended ' (*Mbh.* 1. 75. 5) — that is not possible. Similarly, *ṇ*-substitution is not achieved in *praṇidāpayati*. Similarly, to whom does *num* belong ? — To the final (phoneme). Therefore, even on the *pūrvānta* view, it does not belong to the *aṅga*. So there will be no *n*-elision and lengthening for it (*aṅga*).

[2. 1]

" If this (rule) is understood as a supplement of the rule (P. 1. 1. 49)." He is saying that the word *ṣaṣṭhī* alone is not connected. How? this (whole) sūtra: *alo 'ntyasya* ... " Also (on the view that this rule is) a suppliment (of P. 1. 1. 49). What? An undesired contingency will result ". The Genitive form *ārdhadhātukasya* is firmly connected with the final phoneme by the general rule. Such being the case, the superseding rule : '(a suffix) furnished with a code-letter *ṭ* becomes the initial part ', when it proceeds, — should it set aside the Genitive form (thus) : When this (*ṭit* etc.) is there, this, i. e. 'for the final phoneme ' is not there? Or, should it set aside the restriction about the domain, viz. that it has connection with the place? — It is proper (to regard) that the superseding rule sets aside the domain without setting aside the Genitive form ... Therefore, the defect is common in this view also. Therefore " it is well said : 'Otherwise, an undesired contingency results'." This connection (taught by P. 1. 1. 52) is set aside by another connection (taught P. 1. 1. 54 :) *ādeḥ parasya* because of impossibility (of both applying). The rule *anekāl-śit sarvasya* (P. 1. 1. 55), however, sets aside (P. 1. 1. 52) in spite of possibility (of both applying).

* * *

" Also (a substitute) furnished with a code-letter *ṅ* (replaces the final of the original) " (P. 1. 1. 53).

[1]

" Because in the case of *tātaṅ* the affixion of the code-letter *ṅ* finds a scope (elsewhere) ". Even an exception, when it presents itself at a different place, is superseded. (This rule) *ṅic ca* is superseded (by P. 1. 1. 55), just as, in *devadattaputra*, (the rule) *kārakād dattaśrutayoḥ* ... (P. 6. 2. 148; which teaches the Udātta on the final syllable of *datta*) is superseded by the Udātta taught for the final syllable of a compound (P. 6. 1. 223). Although (the rule *ṅic ca* is) a superseder of (the rule which teaches) the replacement of the whole, still the furnishing of the code-letter *ṅ* in *tātaṅ* can be for another purpose also, and therefore the *ṅit* status becomes doubtful as the reason (for the replacement of the final). Therefore, (this exceptional) rule, on account of this doubtfulness, has a doubtful presence like a general rule. Having a doubtful presence it suffers in strength and so it cannot supersede (this general rule). That is why (the present clash) is called a conflict of the equals.

[2]

" Purpose, verily (is that which) is there invariably ". The *ṅit* status of *ṇiṅ* can, without being in need of anything else, be for the sake of indicating

the Ātmanepada, or for preventing the hindrance in the way of a common comprehension; similarly, the addition of the code-letter *ṇ* can be for the sake of a common comprehension; and so it is reasonable (to say) that the addition of the code-latter *ṅ* in *ṇiṅ* has a scope (elsewhere). In the present case, however, when the substitution for the whole is already achieved, then the addition of the code-letter *ṅ* can be for preventing the Guṇa and the Vṛddhi (substitutes). But that itself is difficult to achieve. So, that very (thing), which is the cause of doubtful presence (of the exception), that is not there. Such being the case, this (phenomenon), which is a result of just itself i. e. the code-letter *ṅ*, viz. that (a substitute) which is furnished with a code-letter *ṅ* takes the place of the final — why should it not take place here ?

[3]

" Well, then ... since (he) furnishes (the substitute) with the code letter *ṅ* ". (He) says that this will be a substitute for the whole on the strength of (Pāṇini's) furnishing it with the code-letter *ṅ* itself. How ? This furnishing (the substitute) with the code-letter *ṅ* by the revered teacher is certainly for prohibiting the Guṇa and the *Vṛddhi* substitutes. And since that is not possible unless the substitute is for the whole, the furnishing (of the augment) with the code-letter *ṅ* itself is a means (to indicate) that the substitute is for the whole. If, on the other hand, the furnishing with the code-letter *ṅ* had been for (indicating that the substitute is for) the final, the substitution for the final could be understood in another way. Thus he says : " otherwise, (he) would have taught (this substitute *tāt*) in the context of the *u*-substitution for *i* of the Imperative ".

* * *

" What consists of many phonemes and what has a code-letter *ś* (are the substitutes) for the whole " (P. 1. 1. 55).

" It is not the purpose. (*Iś*) will be a substitute for the whole by the affixing of *ś* itself ". Because of the circumstance that (the substitute) consists of many phonemes, — that is the meaning. (Objection :) But then the phoneme *ś* will be actually heard. — This defect (is not there) ... There, the purpose of (using) the phoneme *ś* is this : The whole should be replaced. When the whole is replaced, (the phoneme *ś*,) resorted to (as a means) for a purpose, will retire. " This then : *aṣṭābhya auś* (P. 7. 1. 21) ". In the previous example *alo 'ntyasya* (P. 1. 1. 52) was shown as becoming due undesirably (in the absence of *ś*). Now *ādeḥ parasya* (P. 1. 1. 54) is being shown as (similarly) becoming due. (So) the use (of *ś* is) either for this purpose (mentioned

above), or the possibility of illustration is (thereby) pointed out. " The phoneme *ś* is meant to be a qualification. (So) there is (another) purpose for *ś* ", so it will not be for (indicating) substitute for the whole.

" This one, taking the place of the final ". How can the final (of *jas*) have the *śi*-substitution or the *sī*-substitution, inasmuch as there is Ablative in *sarvanāmno* and *napuṁsakāt* ? So *ādeḥ parasya* (P. 1. 1. 54) should operate there. He is thinking thus : *sarvanāmnaḥ* is Genitive of connection. *Napuṁsakāt* qualifies *vihita* ' prescribed ' (which is understood after *napuṁsakāt*).

* * *

NOTES

ig yaṇaḥ samprasāraṇam / P. 1. 1. 45

[1]

The *Mbh.* begins thus : किमियं वाक्यस्य संप्रसारणसंज्ञा क्रियते — 'इग् यण' इत्येतद्वाक्यं संप्रसारणसंज्ञं भवतीति। आहोस्विद् वर्णस्य — इग् यो यणः स्थाने वर्णः स संप्रसारणसंज्ञो भवतीति. The *Dīp.* उभयनिमित्तसंभवात् etc. explains this *Mbh.* Both the alternatives are theoretically possible. Both find some indirect support in the *Aṣṭ.* But neither is wholly free from defects. (These will be demonstrated in details in the course of the *Mbh.* and elucidated in the *Dīp.*) A combination of the two is also out of question, since it violates the unity of the sentence. No alternative is apparently satisfactory. Hence the querry : किमियं वाक्यस्य संज्ञा ... आहोस्विद्वर्णस्य ?

ननु चाख्यातं सविशेषणं ... etc. An objection is here raised against the alternative : वाक्यस्य संज्ञा. A वाक्य is defined as आख्यातं साव्ययकारकविशेषणं वाक्यम् (P. 2. 1. 1, *Vār.* 9). Here there is no *khyāta* ' Verb ' in इग् यणः. Since there is no *vākya* in this expression, how can the question be asked whether this sentence *ig yaṇaḥ* gets the name *saṁprasāraṇa* ?

अथैवं कल्प्यते ... etc. The objector anticipates a defence against the above objection. It does not matter if there is no verb read directly. On the authority of the *Vār.* 11 : अस्तिर्भवन्तीपरः ... etc. on P. 2. 3. 1, a verb *as* ' be ' in the present tense can be supplied. So the full sentence, including the verb is : इग् यणः अस्ति. So the question : किमियं वाक्यस्य संज्ञा stands.

In the *Dīp.* : एवमपि विप्रतिषिद्धत्वम् ... the objector refutes this justification. In rules like ष्यङः संप्रसारणम् (P. 6. 1. 13) where *samprasāraṇa* is taught, what is meant is that *i* etc. come into the place of *y* etc. (e. g. *y* of *ṣyaṅ*). In other words, यणः स्थाने इग् भवति is understood. Now if you supply अस्ति there, the sentence will be : यणः स्थाने इग् अस्ति भवति, which is self-contradictory. An *ik* either *asti* ' is there ' or *bhavati* ' comes there '. The two do not go together. (यद्यस्ति न तर्हि भवति, अथ भवति न तर्हि अस्तीति as the *Dīp.* says.) This is the *vipratiṣiddhatvam* ' self-contradiction '.

[2]

This *Dīp.* answers the above objection and establishes the वाक्यस्य संज्ञा view. Here, apparently, the proposal of adding *asti* is abandened (though the

Dīp. does not say so expressly). It is now maintained that *bhavati*, which in any case is to be supplied in the operational rules also, will function as the verb that is necessary for the status of a sentence. It is well known that the Sūtras usually require additions (*upaskāra*) to make them complete, grammatically and semantically. Well, instead of *asti*, we shall supply *bhavati*.

एवमपि पदत्वाभावाद् ... etc. Granting the above defence, a fresh objection is taken against the वाक्यस्य संज्ञा view. A *saṁjñin* is mentioned in either Nominative (as वृद्धिरादैच्; अयं देवदत्तः) or Genitive (as अणुदित् सवर्णस्य चाप्रत्ययः; अस्य देवदत्त इति संज्ञा). The word, denoting the *saṁjñin*, therefore, has to be a *pada*. In the present case, however it is not a *pada*, but a *vākya* which the opponent wants to be the named. That is impossible in the absence of the *pada* status (पदत्वाभावात्, which is our emendation of the MS. यौगपद्याभावात्. The latter seems to be due to the influence of यौगपद्याभावात् in [1] above).

उच्यते । वाक्यार्थो ... answers this objection. It is suggested by the *vākyasaṁjñāvādin* that *vākya* may be understood in the sense of *vākyārtha* ' sentence-meaning ' (evidently by *lakṣaṇā* or some such means). A parallel of the word *matu*(*p*) (in P. 5. 2. 59) is advanced, where, it is claimed, *matu* means *matvartha* ' the meaning of *matu* '. Here as the *vākyārtha* does not consist of words, the *pada*-status is not necessary for being a *saṁjñin*.

On P. 5. 2. 59 : मतौ छः ... the *Kāś.* comments thus : ' मतौ ' इति मत्वर्थे उच्यते । प्रातिपदिकान् मत्वर्थे छः प्रत्ययो भवति सूक्ते सामनि चाभिधेये । ... अच्छावाकशब्दोऽस्मिन्निति अच्छावाकीयं सूक्तम् ।

ननु चार्थोऽप्यसत्त्वभूतो ... A fresh objection. Even this interpretation (वाक्य=वाक्यार्थ) will not do. For, after all, a वाक्यार्थ is not of the nature of a substance (असत्त्वभूतो). It cannot be expressed by a nominal stem, a *prātipadika*. So the difficulty of applying the Nominative or the Genitive case is still there.

This objection is replied to in the *Dīp.* : उच्यते । संज्ञासंबन्धं .... This is the idea[1] in brief : The object to be named has to be something tangible. The relationship of the name and the named cannot be established with something which is not tangible. It does not matter if a tangible form, given to the object for this purpose, is imaginary. Accordingly, here in P. 1. 1. 45 the sentence-meaning is assumed to be tangible (वस्तुरूपेणोपसंहृतम्), a form such as can be expressed by a nominal stem. इदं तदिति व्यपदेशार्हम् ' what can be referred to by ' this ', ' that ' practically means what is denoted by a nominal stem, a substance (सत्त्वम्). Cf. the Nir. (1. 1) : अद इति सत्त्वानामुपदेशः, गौरश्वः पुरुषो हस्तीति.

1. See also the *Dīp.* (introduction part) on P. 1. 1. 44 : न वेति विभाषा for the same idea.

Once this relationship of the name and the named is established, the sentence-meaning resumes its intangible form when the *saṁjñā* rule presents itself in the operational rules (प्रदेशेषु ... असत्त्वभूत एवोपतिष्ठते). This is necessary for the integration of the *saṁjñāsūtra* with the *vidhisūtra* both of which are sentences. So the rule ष्यङः संप्रसारणम्, for instance, means : ष्यङः यो यण् तस्य स्थाने इग् भवति.

The sentence-meaning (of P. 1. 1. 45), i. e. the process, is illustrated by three different verbs in the *Dīp.*, viz. भवति, जायते, and निष्पद्यते.

[3]

This *Dīp.* discusses the वर्णस्य संज्ञा view (यणः स्थाने य इक् तस्य[1] संप्रसारण-संज्ञा).

To start with, a question — which may rather appear quite elementary to us and therefore unexpected — is asked : Assuming that this is a *varṇasaṁjñā*, which is the named in the rule, *yaṇ* or *ik* ? (The cases of *yaṇaḥ* and *ik* are not decisive, as both the Genitive and the Nominative can be used after the named.) It is suggested in the *Dīp.* that since *samprasāraṇa*, being a name, conveys its own form here, both *yaṇ* and *ik* could equally be the named. The *Dīp.* adds that the *Mbh.* does not say anything as to how *yaṇ* cannot be the named here. This question seems to be thus answered in the *Dīp.* that if *yaṇ* is the named, *ik* would be superfluous. It would be unconnected.

Observation : The passage is corrupt in the MS. Apart from some words which are repeated at different places (संप्रसारणेन कृते षति के) and some which have been hopelessly corrupted (मनरणिन ; कृते षति के), and some dropped (नं व्यर्थं स्यात्), the text from [सं]प्रसारणेन कृते षति up to इगित्यस्योपादा(नं) is read prematurely after अनिर्णीतमे[व].

It seems that कृते षति (both times) in the MS. is corrupt for some original word meaning अन्वेति, संबध्यते etc. which means : 'is connected syntactically with'. के (after कृते षति ; both times) is probably a scribal anticipation of the following किं.

AL have already shifted the misplaced passage to its proper place. They have, however, dropped altogether the *Dīp.* from किं तर्हि upto °पाद[नं] व्यर्थं स्यात् which we have restored.

[4]

The *Vār.* (1) : संप्रसारणसंज्ञायां वाक्यस्य संज्ञा चेत् (completed as वर्णविधिर्न सिध्यति in the *Mbh.*) points out a defect in the वाक्यस्य संज्ञा view. The phonological operations such as lengthening (P. 6. 3. 139 : संप्रसारणस्य), assuming the

1. Not इग्भवनस्य as in the previous view.

form of the preceding vowel (P. 6. 1. 108 : संप्रसारणाच्च), which are taught for a *samprasāraṇa*, are possible in the case of vocalic phonemes only. They cannot be executed if the name *samprasāraṇa* denotes the sentence (i. e. the process of substitution of *ik* in the place of *yaṇ*).

तथा हि, वाक्यस्य संज्ञायां ... etc. This explains the argument. वाक्यस्य संज्ञा means वाक्यार्थस्य संज्ञा. The वाक्यार्थ here is a process, viz. the coming into existence (*janma*) of *ik* in the place of *yaṇ*. By its very nature it is incapable of being the preceding or the following, or of lengthening, taught in the above mentioned rules.

किमर्थं पुनरिदं द्वयमुच्यते ? This refers to the *Mbh.* : न हि वाक्यस्य संप्रसारणसंज्ञायामेष निर्देश उपपद्यते । नाप्येतयोः कार्ययोः संभवोऽस्ति । The *Mbh.* points out that (1) apart from the impossibility of the operations taking place, (2) the phrasing (निर्देशः) of the rules (संप्रसारणस्य दीर्घः, संप्रसारणात् पूर्वरूपम्) will itself be wrong. The *Dīp.* seems to suggest that the specific mention of the two is unnecessary. The incorrectness of the wording alone would have done. The *Dīp.* एतत् प्रदर्शयति ... etc. gives the reply. It says that, in rare cases, a rule may be worded incorrectly. But even then, it will fail to have any effect. A rule will be there (निर्देशमात्रं स्यात्), that is all.

The example कैरागच्छामि (AL केरो गच्छामि) is cited in the *Dīp.* Nothing can be said as to where it comes from, the irregularity involved therein, or its meaning. (Has it anything to do with the *Mbh.* अतिसखेरागच्छामि on P. 6. 1. 112 : ख्यत्यात् परस्य ? (Incidentally, अतिसखेः also is an irregular formation).

[5]

Here the view वर्णस्य संज्ञा is taken up for discussion. The defect in this view pointed out by Kāt. is that production (निर्वृत्तिः) of *ik* will not be possible on this view.

According to this view, the name *samprasāraṇa* is given to *ik* which comes into the place of *yaṇ*. But, the objector argues, the basic question is : How does an *ik* come at all into the place of *yaṇ* ? By which authority ? If it is believed that by the present rule itself, no. For, all that this rule says, on the वर्णस्य संज्ञा view, is that the name of an *ik* is *samprasāraṇa*, if it has come into the place of *yaṇ*. The rule does not teach substitution. So there will be hardly any such *ik* available for claiming this nomenclature (स एव हि तावदिग्[1] दुर्लभः, यस्य संज्ञा क्रियते, as the *Mbh.* says). Bhar. improves on this, saying that by

1. तावदिह in some eds.

durlabha 'difficult to get' Pat. means *alabhya* 'not available (at all)'. And even if it is somehow available, the two things cannot be achieved by one and the same rule as it involves *itaretarāśraya* (as in the case of Vṛddhi).

Having first said स एव हि तावदिग् दुर्लभः ..., the *Mbh.* immediately says : कथंचिल्लभ्येत. This कथंचित् 'somehow' is paraphrased by Bhar. with व्याख्यानकल्पनया 'on the assumption that there is some such commentarial explanation'. After all, a *vyākhyāna* is the highest authority to appeal to. (Actually, here व्याख्यान is our emendation. The MS reads : लभ्येतेत्यख्यानपरि°. पि and ख्या are our additions. AL read : °भ्येतेति । अथ च परि°).

The *Dīp.* एवं वर्णयन्ति introduces another explanation of अथापि कथंचिल्लभ्येत. The others (who give this explanation) say that on the doctrine of *nityaḥ śabdaḥ* (eternality of word), it is possible to say : कथंचिल्लभ्येत, since, on their view, Grammar does not coin words, it only analyses those which, being eternal, are already there. So the question : केनासौ यणः स्थाने स्यात्, they say, is not that formidable. A parallel given is that of the term *vṛddhi* where a similar objection and a similar reply occur. Read 'सतो वृद्ध्यादिषु संज्ञाभावात् तदाश्रय इतरेतराश्रयत्वादप्रसिद्धिः' (वा. ८)।...'सिद्धं तु नित्यशब्दत्वात्' (वा. ९)।... नित्येषु शब्देषु सतामादैचां संज्ञा क्रियते, न संज्ञयादैचो भाव्यन्ते (*Mbh.* on P. 1. 1. 1; I. 40. 18–28)। Kaiy. gives only this explanation.

Incidentally, it may be mentioned that the *Dīp.* शास्त्रान्तरस्याप्रवृत्तिमात्रमत्रोच्यते, which gives the justification for the objection (... इग् दुर्लभः । केनासौ यणः स्थाने स्यात्), is presupposed by both the alternative solutions, although it occurs in the midst of the second explanation. Ideally, it should have been immediately after the first occurrence of केनासौ यणः स्थाने स्यादिति.

एतत् प्रदर्शयति — नेतरेतरा° ... etc. The *Dīp.* now says that (according to the *Mbh.* itself), the solution of the eternality of word will not do here. It was one thing with the *Vṛddhi*. That name is given to all *ā*, *ai* and *au* sounds (both *tadbhāvita* and *atadbhāvita*, as the *Mbh.* there says), irrespective of their origin. But that is not the case here. Not every *ik*, but only that *ik* which has taken the place of *yaṇ* is called *samprasāraṇa*. Now, *ik*, being *nitya*, may be there for all times and there will not be any difficulty in recognizing it. But how is one to know which particular *ik* has come into the place of *yaṇ*? One has to know it, again from the Grammar itself, and not from the practice of the world, in spite of *śabdanityatva*. That is why, says Bhar., the *Mbh.* asks the question : केनासौ यणः स्थाने स्यात्?

Bhar. has stated very precisely the exact nature of the difficulty, and the fault of mutual dependence involved, when he says : नेतरेतराश्रयदोष इग्रूपे । किं तर्हि? स्थानिप्रतिपत्तौ ।... विकारविकारिप्रकल्पना शास्त्रात्, न लोकाद्, इतीदमुच्यते तदेतदितरेतराश्रयं भवति, इति ।

[6]

The *Vār.* (3) : विभक्तिविशेषनिर्देशस्तु ज्ञापक उभयसंज्ञात्वस्य and the *Mbh.* thereon now state the view that the name *samprasāraṇa* is given to both, (1) the *vākyārtha* (i. e. the process of substitution of *ik* in the place of *yaṇ*) and (2) the phoneme (*ik*, the substitute, the product of the process). The use of specific cases after the stem *samprasāraṇa* is adduced as evidence for this twofold interpretation. The use of the Genitive in संप्रसारणस्य (P. 6. 3. 139) 'There is a lengthening of the *samprasāraṇa*', of the Ablative in संप्रसारणात् 'A vowel which comes after the *samprasāraṇa* assumes the form of the preceding' shows that by *samprasāraṇa* is here meant the *ik* phoneme (in the place of *yaṇ*). On the other hand, in ष्यङः संप्रसारणम् (P. 6. 1. 13) 'An *ik* comes in the place of *yaṇ* of *ṣyaṅ*' *samprasāraṇa* stands for the *vākyārtha*, the process.

In the *Dīp.*, the word भूतविभक्ति means the case-ending after a nominal stem which denotes an object that is already in existence (*bhūta*), i. e. the cases other than the Nominative, the subject cases. The Nominative, on the other hand, is the predicate case.

The commentators like Bhar. are interested in the mechanism of how to derive these two meanings (उभयसंज्ञात्व) from a single utterance. The two usual means are mentioned in the *Dīp.* (इदमनुमीयते ... etc.), *tantra* and *āvṛtti*. In the case of *āvṛtti*, we have to read the rule twice (आवर्तते एतत्सूत्रम्), although Pāṇini could dispense with the repetition. Incidentally, is not the word आलस्यात् rather sarcastic ?

Kaiy. mentions एकशेष as the third means : तत्र तन्त्रावृत्त्येकशेषाणामन्यतमाश्रयणेनोभयोः संज्ञा सिध्यति. Nāg. attacks the use of *āvṛtti* here on the ground that it is superfluous : अनेकमर्थमुद्दिश्यैकस्याः संज्ञाया एकवाक्यतयैव विधातुं शक्यत्वादत्रावृत्तेः क उपयोग इति चिन्त्यम्।

[7]

The *Mbh.* here goes back to the first alternative (अथ वा पुनरस्तु वाक्यस्य). The *Dīp.* observes that Pat. is here showing how both the objects (वाक्यस्य संज्ञा and वर्णस्य संज्ञा) can be achieved, without having to take recourse to the *tantra* or *āvṛtti*, by following the वाक्यस्य संज्ञा view.

The argument of the *Mbh.* is that what is born of X gets the name X. What is born of a crow gets the name crow. Similarly what (i. e. *ik*) is born of *samprasāraṇa* (process), will get the name *samprasāraṇa*. So the objection वाक्यस्य संज्ञा चेद्वर्णविधिः [न सिध्यति] (*Vār.* 1) no longer stands. संप्रसारणस्य दीर्घः=यणः स्थाने य इक् तस्य दीर्घः and so on.

Bhar. discusses at length the illustration of काकाज्जात: काक: occurring in the *Mbh.* He says that a young one of a crow is also called a crow because it possesses the common characteristic 'crowness'. Both belong to the same species (स्वजातियोग). But that is not the case between the sentence-meaning of *samprasāraṇa* and the *ik* born thereof. So the name of sire cannot straightway pass on to the son. The parallel of काकाज्जात: काक: will not do. Bhar. also quotes Pat.'s own words (येनैव हेतुनैक: काकस्तेनैव हेतुनान्योऽपि) occurring elsewhere (P. 4. 1. 93, *Vār.* 13) in connection with the same parallel, where a common species is insisted upon as the basis of the common name. How can Pat. now go back on his own word?

एवमेवैतत्। इदं तु प्रतिपादयति ... etc. The *Dīp.* now puts forth a defence of the *Mbh.* Bhar. first cites proper names like Babhru which, properly belonging to fathers are extended to their sons, who also are so called, along with their proper names, Bābhravya etc. Then Bhar. immediately returns to the parallel of the crow and seeks to justify it. Bhar. suggests that even when the external signs of crowness (like black colour, shrill cawing etc.) are not there, the young one gets the name 'crow' if it is known that it is born of a crow. Thus without the characteristics of a crow species, the name crow is got by mere birth. That is all that is meant here, says Bhar. Kaiy. puts Bhar.'s idea more clearly thus: नैष दोष:। यदानुपजातजात्यादिव्यञ्जकसंस्थानविशेष: काको भवति, निर्ज्ञातं च तस्य काकाजन्म भवति, तदैतदुक्तम्। एवमिहापि संप्रसारणाज्जातत्वादुपचाराद्वर्णोऽपि ताच्छब्द्यं लभत इति भाव:।

शब्दोऽपि सोऽयमित्यभिसंबन्धात् ... etc. Bhar. now gives two reasons for the figurative extension of a name: (1) सोऽयमित्यभिसंबन्ध: 'an assumed identity', and (2) क्रियासङ्ग: 'participation in the same activity'. In order to explain the application of these principles in the case of the name *samprasāraṇa*, Bhar. takes the example of the word *praṣṭha* (which literally means 'one who goes or walks ahead'). Now a person who is legitimately called a *praṣṭha* and his wife are two different persons. But on account of the close contact between the two one may assume an identity (सोऽयमित्यभिसंबन्ध:) between the two, as a result of which the *praṣṭha's* wife also can be called *praṣṭha*. Or, the mode of walking ahead may be imposed (क्रियासङ्ग) on the wife and so also she can be called *praṣṭha*. (In the technical language, there is only a *śabdhādhyāsa* in the first alternative while there is an *arthādhyāsa* in the second.)

The *Mbh.* has discussed the case of the use of the word *praṣṭha* in feminine under P. 4. 1. 48, from which we reproduce some extracts: पुंयोगादाख्यायाम्' (पा. ४. १. ४८)। किं पुनरिहोदाहरणम्? प्रष्ठी, प्रचरी। कथं पुनरयं प्रष्ठशब्दोऽकारान्त: स्त्रियां वर्तते? तस्येदमित्यनेनाभिसंबन्धेन। यथैव ह्यसौ तत्कृतान् स्नानोद्वर्तनपरि-

षेकाल्ँ लभत, एवं प्रष्ठशब्दमपि लभेत। ... यदि पुनस्तस्यामेव प्रष्ठशब्दो वर्तेत? कथं पुनस्तस्यामप्रतिष्ठमानायां प्रष्ठशब्दो वर्तते? यथैव ह्यसावकुर्वती किंचित् पापं तत्कृतान् वधबन्धनपरिक्लेशाल्ँ लभत, एवं प्रष्ठशब्दमपि लभते। ... अथ वा पुनरस्तु तस्येदमित्यभिसंबन्धेन। ननु चोक्तं 'पुंयोगादाख्यायां तद्धितवचनम्' इति। नैष दोषः। नावश्यमयमेवाभिसंबन्धो भवति तस्येदमिति। अयमप्यभिसंबन्धोऽस्ति, सोऽयमिति। कथं पुनरतस्मिन् स इत्येतद् भवति? चतुर्भिः प्रकारैरतस्मिन् स इत्येतद् भवति — तात्स्थ्यात्, ताद्धर्म्यात्, तत्सामीप्यात्, तत्साहचर्यादिति। (II. 217. 13-218. 15)

एवमिहापि काकाज्जात: etc. Here the *Dīp.* returns to its original parallel and applies to it the two principles (सोऽयमित्यभिसंबन्धः and क्रियासङ्गः) whcse working he has so far demonstrated in the case of the grammatical parallel of the word *praṣṭhī*. The young one of the crow is certainly different from its father. But you can assume their identity in imagination. Or, alternatively, you can say that its cawing is the same as that of its father. Either of these suppositions would be sufficient for giving the name 'crow' to the young one.

Here one point has to be noted : If you actually hear the cawing of the young one, then no other proof is necessary. You identify the bird, and give name 'crow' to it. But in the absence of such a direct proof, if you have the knowledge that the young one is born of a crow, then on the basis of such a knowledge you can identify its species and give it the name 'crow'. The *Dīp.* : जातेरत्रार्थस्याभिव्यञ्जकं जन्मेत्येतत् प्रतिपादयति says that this is what Pat. means when he gives the parallel of काकाज्जात: काकः.

Just as काकाज्जात: काकः, similarly संप्रसारणाज्जातः (वर्णः) संप्रसारणम् — that is the final step taken in the *Dīp.* : एवं प्रसारणाज्जातम् ... etc. Here the activity, i. e. the process (of substitution, the *vākyārtha*) and its product, the *ik* phoneme (possessed of the activity of being produced) are looked upon as identical and so the name of the process, *samprasāraṇa*, is given, figuratively, to the substituted *ik* phoneme also (... क्रियायास्तद्गतश्चाभेदेन व्यपदेशः).

The *Dīp.* (अथ वा क्रिया°) says that here also the other alternative (viz. क्रियासङ्ग) is possible. The *samprasāraṇa* in its action-form gets the name but the operation is undergone by the *samprasāraṇa* in its substance form. (This applies to sūtras like संप्रसारणस्य.) The *Dīp.* adds that this is similar to what was said above [2] with reference to the establishment of the संज्ञासंज्ञिभाव. There is also a similar twofold character of the term *samprasāraṇa*. The *saṃjñin* i. e. the *vākyārtha* is assumed to be something substantial there for receiving the name, while afterwards, in operational rules, it assumes a non-substantial fcrm in the case of rules like ष्यङः संप्रसारणम्.

Observation : In the last line the MS reads प्रदेशेष्मुसत्त्वभूत. Being evidently corrupt, AL read it as °शेषु सत्त्व°. We think that °शेष्वसत्त्व° must

have been the original reading in view of what is said in [2] above : प्रदेशेषु स्वेन व्यापारेण प्रवृत्तोऽसत्त्वभूत एव ... etc.

[8]

अथ वा दृश्यन्ते ... etc. This *Mbh.* offers an alternative explanation as to how a *varṇavidhi* is possible even when the name *samprasāraṇa* is given to the *vākya* (i. e. *vākyārtha*). Sometimes people use elliptical sentences or even such words. When they say simply *praviśa* 'enter!', an object like *gṛham* 'the home' is inferred. This is so, says the *Dīp.*, because an activity like entering is impossible without a location. So a suitable object like 'house' is supplied on the strength of context etc. There, प्रविश=गृहं प्रविश. Similarly in the rule like संप्रसारणात् or संप्रसारणस्य a word *nirvṛtta* 'produced' will be understood, thus making *samprasāraṇāt* = *samprasāraṇanirvṛttāt* 'after what is produced by (the producers of) *samprasāraṇa*'. So the *Mbh.* concludes : तेन निर्वृत्तस्य विधिं विज्ञास्यामः — 'संप्रसारणनिर्वृत्तात्', 'संप्रसारणनिर्वृत्तस्य' इति ।

Nāg. remarks that in the previous explanation [7], the word *samprasāraṇa* means 'produced by *samprasāraṇa*' by the figurative use of the word, while here it expresses that meaning directly (पूर्वपरिहारे संप्रसारणपदस्य तज्जन्यवर्णे उपचारात् प्रयोगः। अत्र त्वेकदेशेनैव शक्त्या तदर्थप्रतिपत्तिरिति भेदः।). This is only putting in a technically perfect way what Bhar. says in the simple language : 'प्रविश गृहम्' इत्यस्य योऽर्थः पदद्वयवाच्यः, स 'प्रविश' शब्देनोच्यते.

The *Dīp.* तच्च साधनं ... etc. elaborates on this idea. It says that the *kāraka* thus understood is believed by some to be directly expressed by the word *praviśa*, while others take it as being indicated or suggested by it. (The MS text of this sentence is corrupt. It reads : °नोच्यतेतश्च साधनं केचिदभिधेयत्वेन प्रतिपन्नाः केचिद्वाच्यमानत्वेन. Here, firstly, तश्च has to be read as तच्च, as AL do. Extracting an ऽतश्च from °नोच्यतेतश्च of the MS will be both misleading and unwarranted. Secondly वाच्यमानत्वेन [retained by AL] has to be read as गम्यमानत्वेन. There are three reasons for this emendation : (1) वाच्यमानत्वेन is synonymous with अभिधेयत्वेन, and so constitutes tautology. A word having a contrastive meaning is required which can possibly be गम्यमानत्वेन. (2) In the next sentence occurs the constrast अभिधीयते, गम्यते वा which is suggestive and throws light on the genuine text in the present case. (3) In Sanskrit, वाच्यमान in the sense of expressed (meaning) is not a very happy expression. It is simply वाच्य. This suggests that वाच्यमान is not the original reading. For the two reasons given above, it could very possibly be गम्यमान which became वाच्यमान through scribal error. Orthographically, such a corruption does not seem improbable).

यथा दधिघटादिषु ... etc. A final parallel for वाक्येषु वाक्यैकदेशप्रयोगः. The compound *dadhighaṭa* 'a pot full of curds' is formed (P. 2. 1. 34, *Vār.* 4) for दध्ना पूर्णः घटः. Here the action of filling is implied in the shorter expression दधिघटः, as that is the suitable action. योग्यं साधनम् = योग्या क्रिया.

In *l.* 17 the MS reads साधनानामित्यपि after वाचकः. This expression seems to be irrelevant, and therefore an obtruder here. We have ignored it in the Translation. The *Dīp.* concludes by saying that the word संप्रसारणात् conveys the same meaning as the word संप्रसारणनिर्वृत्तात् (qualifying वर्णात्) either directly, or merely indicates or suggests it.

[9]

पदेषु च पदैकदेशान्. This occurs in the *Mbh.* along with वाक्येषु वाक्यैकदेशान्, while describing speech habits of people. Sometimes people use parts of words (especially names) for full words (like English Prof and Doc). The *Mbh.* gives usual examples like Datta for Devadatta and Bhāmā for Satyabhāmā.

Actually this part of the discussion has nothing to do with our subject matter, viz. the suggestion that *samprasāraṇa* is to be understood as equivalent to *samprasāraṇanirvṛtta*, Datta is a broken down part of Devadatta, but not so *samprasāraṇa* of *samprasāraṇanirvṛtta*. *Samprasāraṇa* itself is the full original name (*pada*, not *padaikadeśa*). Nor does it seem that Pat. meant this also as a parallel along with वाक्येषु वाक्यैकदेशान्. It just came in along with the allied habit of वाक्येषु वाक्यैकदेशान्. But since it is there, Bhar. plunges into a philosophical discussion, suggesting ways and means which could account for such an apparently irregular practice. The objection is that the essence of a name consists in its phonetic form, the sound sequence (स्वरूपाधिष्ठानाः संज्ञाः). When this original form is not there, how does a broken down part of it continue to perform its function viz. to denote the named? And, secondly, when once a name, as given by the parents, is established, how does a part of it cease to be employed?

Three explanations are advanced: (1) The full form is inferred from the part that is heard. The whole expression, thus completed, conveys meaning (i. e. the object named). (2) The parts (like Datta) are also equally connected with the (person) named, and so have as much a denotative power as the full name. (3) The short forms need not be regarded as partes of the full names. They are independent full names themselves, coming into existence at a subsequent time (अनुनिष्पादीनि). The *Dīp.* adds one point about this third explanation. In his rule ठाजादावूर्ध्वं द्वितीयादचः (P. 5. 3. 83), Pāṇini teaches an optional elision of a part of the noun in some circumstances. So we have both

देवदत्तकः or देविकः (with the elision of दत्त). The *Dīp.* observes here that Pāṇini intends to convey that only such short forms as देव or दत्त (for देवदत्त) be regarded as correct and not those like *drā*, *khā* etc.

This idea is expressed in the *Vākyap.* II. 353-362, particularly the last stanza:

तुल्यायामनुनिष्पत्तौ ज्ये द्रा खा इत्यसाधवः ।
न ह्यन्वाख्यायके शास्त्रे तेषु दत्तादिवत् स्मृतिः ॥

The three abbreviations are supposed to represent ज्येष्ठा, आर्द्रा and विशाखा respectively. It may be noted that whereas here in the *Dīp.* the three views are only mentioned, they are subjected to a criticism in the *Vākyap.* Also, ज्ये might have been dropped at some stage in the transmission of the *Dīp.*

Observation: The words लोपमारभमाणस्य पाणिनेः are misplaced in the MS. There they are read after लोपोऽस्ति। किं च. We have removed them to their proper place. Similarly इक् and निर्वृत्ता are supplied in the penultimate sentence as being required for conveying a complete meaning.

[10]

Now the *Mbh.* puts forth its last argument in favour of वाक्यस्य संज्ञा. It reads : अथ वा आहायं संप्रसारणात् परः पूर्वो भवतीति, संप्रसारणस्य दीर्घो भवतीति। न च वाक्यस्य संप्रसारणसंज्ञायां सत्यामेष निर्देश उपपन्नः । नाप्येतयोः कार्ययोः संभवोऽस्तीति तत्र वचनाद् भविष्यति।

The idea is that if *samprasāraṇa* is not interpreted as meaning *samprasāraṇanirvṛtta*, the framing of the rule will be in vain. For neither can a phoneme follow the process thus making the use of the Ablative meaningless, nor can the operations be performed if *samprasāraṇa* is the name of the *vākyārtha* i. e. the process. So, if Pāṇini's rule is to have any meaning, *samprasāraṇa* has to be interpreted as *samprasāraṇanirvṛtta* on the वाक्यस्य संज्ञा view.

Bhar. gives a parallel viz. ब्राह्मणशतं भोज्यताम् . Now, strictly, the number (hundred) cannot be fed. So, if this sentence is to have any meaning, the sentence has to be understood in the sense : शतं ब्राह्मणानि भोज्यन्ताम् . Then it becomes meaningful. Similarly here also. Nāg. concludes : एवं च यथा तत्र संख्यान्वयः संख्येयद्वारा तथा प्रकृते स्वनिर्वृत्तद्वारेति भावः । The grammatical injunctions about the lengthening etc. of a *samprasāraṇa* can be carried out only if *samprasāraṇa* is understood in the sense of the *ik* phoneme which is substituted in the place of *yaṇ* (संप्रसारणस्य दीर्घत्वं ... यत् क्रियाफले वर्णे क्रियत इति ।)

Kaiy. repeats here the same parallel, ब्राह्मणशतं भोज्यताम् , that is given by Bhar. The examples व्याघ्रो भोज्यताम् , हस्ती भोज्यताम् are not quite clear. Perhaps

by tiger 'a man ferocious as a tiger' is meant. But what Bhar. really meant remains uncertain. Perhaps that is why Kaiy. simply ignores them. Before व्याघ्रो भोज्यताम्, AL read अश्वो भोज्यताम्. Where they bring this from, we do not know.

Readings: (1) The word पुनर्, read in the *Dīp.* in the *pratīka*: अथ वा पुनराहायमिति, is not seen in the *Mbh.*—(2) (*p.* 4, *l.* 5) The MS सोजिता is emended into योजिता by AL. Of course, भोजिता must be the original text. (3) The MS पररूपत्वं (retained by AL) and परपूर्वकरणं (emended into पररूपकरणं by AL) have evidently to be emended into पूर्वरूपत्वं and पूर्वरूपकरणं, as we have done.

[11]

Here the *Mbh.* again reverts to the वर्णस्य संज्ञा view. The mutual dependence, which was pointed out as a defect in this view previously [5], is now remedied thus: It is the future name (भाविनी संज्ञा) that is implied. The ***Mbh.*** gives a wordly parallel for such a use. It reads: एवं तर्हि भाविनीयं संज्ञा विज्ञास्यते। तद्यथा। कश्चित् कंचित् तन्तुवायमाह—'अस्य सूत्रस्य शाटकं वय' इति। स पश्यति—यदि शाटको न वातव्यः। अथ वातव्यो न शाटकः। शाटको, वातव्यश्चेति विप्रतिषिद्धम्। भाविनी खल्वस्य संज्ञाभिप्रेता। स मन्ये वातव्यो यस्मिन्नुते शाटक इत्येतद् भवतीति। एवमिहापि स यणः स्थाने भवति, यस्याभिनिर्वृत्तस्य संप्रसारणमित्येषा संज्ञा भविष्यति। When the customer says to the weaver: 'Weave a sari out of this thread!' a mutual dependence is involved. If the speaker is speaking of a sari, it is there, it is not to be woven. If it is to be woven, one cannot speak of a sari at this stage. But the the weaver is wise. He is aware of the limitations of a language. He understands: such an article of clothing is to be woven out of the threads, as will be called a sari when woven. The same applies to our problem. Such an *ik* is to take the place of *yaṇ* as will be termed ***samprasāraṇa*** when it comes in.

Bhar. first challenges the very necessity of such a future name. It is maintained that this is necessary neither in the context of the present rule which teaches the name, nor in the case of the operational rules which are to follow. It is not necessary in the context of the present *saṁjñā* rule, because a name can be given to what is yet a future entity as well as to what already exists. The name *vṛddhi*, for instance, can convey the phoneme *ā* which comes in forms like *devābhyām* by P. 7. 3. 102, as well as to *ā* in *śālā*, *mālā* etc. where it is original. Similarly, in our present case also an *ik* can get the name *samprasāraṇa* even before it has taken the place of a *yaṇ*. The device of a future name is not necessary for it. On the other hand, there is no sense in understanding a future name in the context of operational rules because, with the operation of the present rule, *ik* will be in existence and easily available for

operations like the lengthening. The concept of a future name is not reasonable. This objection is contained in the *Dīp.* : किं संज्ञासंज्ञिसंबन्धे ... भावित्वं कल्प्यते ?

The *Dīp.* : उच्यते । यथैवेतरेतराश्रय ... etc. rejects this view. Here it is held that the fault of mutual dependence is as much common to the name *samprasāraṇa* as to Vṛddhi. (See the *Vār.* 8 : सतो वृद्ध्यादिषु ... etc. on P. 1. 1. 1 : वृद्धिरादैच्.) It is conceded that there will be no difficulty in merely giving the name *samprasāraṇa* to *ik* (one can assume that *ik* is there – भूतेष्विव प्रवृत्ता संज्ञा), just as there will be no difficulty in merely giving the name Vṛddhi to *ā*, *ai*, and *au*. But there will be a difficulty in the case of operational rules like ष्यङः संप्रसारणम् ... How will the desired phonemes be available there ? They will not be available because of the fault of mutual dependence.

The *Dīp.* : न तावत् य इको निर्वृत्ताः ... etc. explains this position in detail. It will perhaps be suggested that *ik*-s which are named *samprasāraṇa* will come in the place of *yaṇ*-s by rules like ष्यङः संप्रसारणम्. The *Dīp.* denies this by saying that theoretically *ik*-s are already exhausted in the naming process. Until an *i*, e. g. actually comes in the place of *y* of *ṣyaṅ* it cannot be called *samprasāraṇa*, and unless it is called *samprasāraṇa* it cannot take the place of *y*. Nor can any other *ik*-s come in, simply for the reason that they have the same form as the *ik*-s which are named *samprasāraṇa*. For there is no difference between the two kinds of *ik*. How is then there the application of the name to be understood (किं प्रतिपद्यामहे) ?

The *Dīp.* : संज्ञासंज्ञिसंबन्धे यो भावी ... etc. gives the final reply on the *bhāvinī saṁjñā* view. It brings out the meaning of the *Mbh.* भाविनीयं संज्ञा विज्ञास्यते. It is shown above that the naming of the inexistent *ik* phonemes does not help one out of the defect of mutual dependence. So what is now done is that the naming is not done before bringing in the *ik*-s. It is left for the subsequent stage. The rule इग् यणः ... is so interpreted as to mean that such an *ik* comes in the place of *yaṇ* as will be called a *samprasāraṇa*. The rule *ṣyaṅaḥ samprasāraṇam* ... e. g. means that one is to substitute such an *i* in the place of *y* of a first constituent of a Tatpuruṣa compound ending in *ṣyaṅ* when *pati* or *putra* follows as a second constituent, as will be called a *samprasāraṇa*. Here the bringing in of *ik*-s is not dependent on the name *samprasāraṇa*. *Ik* first comes into the place of *yak*. Thus existent, it gets the name *samprasāraṇa*.

अस्य सूत्रस्य शाटकं ... etc. The *Dīp.* explains the parallel cited in the *Mbh.* The customer who gives a quantity of thread to the weaver and asks him to weave a *sari* out of it already visualizes the *sari* and so he uses the word *sari* when actually its named is not there (शाटकशब्दः ... भाविनं संज्ञासंज्ञिसंबन्धं बुद्धौ

कृत्वा भूतत्वेनोपात्त:). And when a word is used even when its object denoted is not in existence, the speaker does it with some intention. Here the intention in saying अस्य सूत्रस्य शाटकं वय is to ask the weaver to weave in such a pattern, or in such a way, that the resulting article will be called a sari (य उता एतामाख्यां प्रतिपत्स्यन्ते, तथाभूतं संतानमारभस्वेति ।). Similarly in the case of the name संप्रसारण. So, coming back to the two alternatives mentioned at the beginning of this section, it is seen that the naming is done in the context of the operative rules ('ष्यङः संप्रसारणम्' इति विधिप्रदेशेषु भाविसंज्ञाविज्ञानम्).

Observations : (1) The MS is corrupt at some places. We have made following emendations : (i) (*p.* 4, *l.* 10) for संबध्यते (in किं संज्ञा ...), we read संबन्धे. — (ii) (*p.* 4, *ll.* 12–13) उक्तस्य इतो is emended (with AL) to उक्तः सतो. —We understand यदि in the sense of यद्यपि 'even if'. — (iii) (*p.* 4, *l.* 16) The MS संज्ञिनामनपेक्ष्य is emended to °नावपेक्ष्य by AL. We prefer to read संज्ञिनामनपेक्षया. — (iv) In the same sentence, भूतेव of the MS is read as भूते च by AL. We are more inclined to read भूतेष्विव. — (v) (*p.* 4, *ll.* 19–20) The MS reads भवति नास्ति विरोध इति. — There is not much difficulty in understanding विरोध as a corruption of विशेष. But the presence of two readings — and those too of opposite meanings — viz भवति and नास्ति, poses a problem. Of course भवति is the correct text from the point of view of the meaning intended. But then who should have inserted नास्ति after it, and why ? On the other hand it is natural for an educated scribe to insert भवति there, thinking that नास्ति does not suit the context. But, on the other hand, how could the author himself have used the word नास्ति fo रअस्ति ? A case of Homer nodding ? — (vi) (*p.* 4, *l.* 26) The last sentence is grammatically queer. य उता ... तथाभूतं संतानं is not regular, for य उता obviously goes with threads.

(2) Apart from the above corrupt places, there are some other places where the meaning is not quite clear. (i) In *l.* 11 the sentence अस्यैव निर्वृत्तौ वर्णो दीर्घविधौ पूर्वविधौ चेति lacks a finite verb. (ii) In *l.* 13 यदि has to be taken in the sense of यद्यपि. (iii) The *Dīp.* reads merely भूतानाम् (in *l.* 11), but in *l.* 14, which gives a reply to the question raised, the *Dīp.* reads भूतत्वेन भावित्वेन वा, which makes the text of the objection, and, therefore, its content, uncertain. (iv) The phrase न तावत् य इको निर्वृत्तास्त इह शक्या: कर्तुम् (*p.* 4, *ll.* 17–18) lacks a predicate (like संज्ञिन:) which the infinitive कर्तुम् would govern. (v) In *l.* 18, तदुपक्षयत्वात् is ungrammatical. The suffix *tva* which forms an abstract noun cannot be added to उपक्षय which is already an abstract noun. The expression is not clear. (vi) In *l.* 21, एवम् seems to have been used for इव. Partly for these textual reasons, and partly because Bhar.'s thought itself is not very clear, we are not sure that we have understood the *Dīp.* correctly, particularly the *Dīp.* : संज्ञासंज्ञिसंबन्धे यो भावी ... etc. We have tried to make the most of what we have, but we ourselves are not very happy with it.

[12]

The *pratīka* इजादियजादिप्रवृत्तिः stands for the following *Mbh.* : अथ वा, इजादियजादिप्रवृत्तिश्चैव हि लोके लक्ष्यते । यजाद्युपदेशात्त्विजादिनिवृत्तिः प्रसक्ता । प्रयुञ्जते च पुनर्लोका — इष्टम्, उप्तमिति । ते मन्यामहे — अस्य यणः स्थान इममिकं प्रयुञ्जत इति । तत्र तस्यासाध्वभिमतस्य शास्त्रेण साधुत्वमन्वाख्यायते — किति साधुर्भवति, ङिति साधुर्भवतीति ।

This alternative explanation is based on the *śabdanityatva* view as Kaiy. says ('सिद्धं तु शब्दनित्यत्वाद्' इत्येतत्समर्थनार्थमाह). According to this view, both *yaj* and *ij* forms, for example, are current in the world (only, each in its own place). The word being eternal, it is impossible to remove *yaṇ* and bring *ik* in its place. So all that is done is this : The root *yaj*, e. g. is read in this form in the Dhātup. A novice who depends on grammar too much (without being attentive to the actual usage) is likely to regard a form with *ik* e. g. *iṣṭa* 'sacrified' as incorrect. So, to remove this misunderstanding, all that the grammar does is to say that the *ik* form (viz. *iṣṭa* etc.) is also correct in its proper domain, i. e. when a *kit* or *ṅit* suffix follows. (This *Mbh.* runs on the same lines as that in the case of the terms like Vṛddhi in the third Āhnika.[1])

The *Dīp.* gives the idea in one pointed sentence : बुद्धिविपरिणाममात्रं स्थान्यादेशभावः. (The °भावौ of the MS is evidently to be so corrected with AL.) The parallel प्राचीनं ग्रामादाम्राः is taken from the *Mbh.* on P. 1. 1. 56 (स्थानिवदादेशो), ***Vār.*** 14. This is the idea : A person who is told that there are mango trees to the east of the village tends to think that *all* trees to the east of the village are mango trees. But subsequently further information is given to him that those trees, however, which, along with other marks, have broad leaves are fig trees. What happens ? The misunderstood mango trees are not transformed now into the fig. trees. The mangoes remain mangoes and figs remain figs. There is only a change in the understanding of the person.[2] Similarly here. The *yaṇ-s* remain *yaṇ*-s and the *ik*-s remain *ik*-s. Only the misunderstanding that *ik* is wrong in *iṣṭa* is removed by the right knowledge that it is correct there.

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1. 'सिद्धं तु नित्यशब्दत्वात्' (वा. ९)। सिद्धमेतत्। कथम्? नित्यशब्दत्वात्। नित्याः शब्दाः। नित्येषु शब्देषु सतामादैचां संज्ञा क्रियते, न च संज्ञया आदैचो भाव्यन्ते। यदि तर्हि नित्याः शब्दाः 'किमर्थं शास्त्रमिति चेन्निवर्तकत्वात् सिद्धम्' (वा. १०)। निवर्तकं शास्त्रम्। कथम्? मृजिरस्मा अविशेषेणोपदिष्टः। तस्य सर्वत्र मृजिबुद्धिः प्रसक्ता। तत्रानेन ('मृजेर्वृद्धिः', पा. ७.२.११४) निवृत्तिः क्रियते — मृजेरक्ङित्सु प्रत्ययेषु मृजिप्रसङ्गे मार्जिः साधुर्भवतीति। (*Mbh.* I. 40. 26–41. 4).
2. तद्यथा। कश्चित् कस्मैचिदुपदिशति — प्राचीनं ग्रामादाम्रा इति। तस्य सर्वत्राम्रबुद्धिः प्रसक्ता। ततः पश्चादाह ये क्षीरिणोऽवरोहवन्तः पृथुपर्णास्ते न्यग्रोधा इति। स तत्राम्रबुद्ध्या न्यग्रोधबुद्धिं प्रतिपद्यते। स ततः पश्यति बुद्ध्याम्रांश्चापकृष्यमाणान् न्यग्रोधांश्चाधीयमानान्। नित्या एव च स्वस्मिन् विषय आम्राः, नित्याश्च न्यग्रोधाः। (*Mbh.* I. 137.19-22).

Incidentally, it may be mentioned that in the *Vākyap.* 2. 178 :

भिन्नाविजियजी धातू नियतौ विषयान्तरे ।
कैश्चित् कथंचिदुद्दिष्टौ चित्रं हि प्रतिपादनम् ॥

Bhar. mentions a different view according to which some regarded *yaj* and *ij* as two independent roots, restricted to specific environments.

तत्र साध्वभिमतस्येति ग्रन्थः. Bhar. here mentions a variant reading साध्वभिमतस्य (for असाध्व°). He says that those who follow it understand it as a Tatpuruṣa, dissolving it into साधूनामभिमतस्य. The *Mbh.* with this reading is interpreted as saying that this desired (अभिमत) *ijādi* form is recognized by grammar when a *kit* or *ṅit* suffix follows.

एतस्मिंस्तु पक्षे[1]. ... etc. This points out a defect in this last alternative solution. It is pointed out that an undesired lengthening in अदुहितराम् (>*अदुहीतराम्) remains unrectified on this view. अदुहितराम् is formed by adding a comparative (adverbial) suffix *-tarām* to *aduhi* (Imperf. 1 sing. mid.). Here the ending *i* (technically *iṭ*) takes the place of *l* (P. 3. 4. 77 : लस्य). Since the condition *ig yaṇaḥ* is satisfied, *i* gets the name *samprasāraṇa*. Further, as it follows the consonant *h*, P. 6. 4. 2 : हलः will operate, bringing about an undesired *ī* in the place of *i*.

The *Dīp.* adds that the defect will not be rectified even if the Sū. is repeated, and understood as two rules, on the strength of the use of many cases of the word *samprasāraṇa* in the *Aṣṭ.* The reference is to the *Vār.* **3** above which implies such a repetition of the rule.

This remark of Bhar. could be, in a way, a dig at Pat. for having allegedly failed to take into consideration such a possibility. Kaiy. and Nāg. take due note of Bhar.'s remark and provide solution to get over the difficulty.

Readings : (1) (*p.* 5, *l.* 1) MSAL °देशभावौ. — (2) (*p.* 5, *l.* 3) MS तुवय, AL वय (for दुवप). — (3) (*p.* 5, *l.* 3) MS निवर्तिते. — (4) (*p.* 5, *l.* 3) MS प्रषविगृण (unintelligible); AL इष्टमिग्रण (for our conjectural emendation वचित्स्वपि). The emendation is purely a stop-gap, with an eye on the meaning. What original the MS letters stand for is a mystery.

* * *

1. एतस्मिंस्तु तु पक्षे does not refer to the v. l. साध्वभिमतस्य, but to the solution proposed by this last section of the *Mbh.* : अथ वा, इजादियआदिप्रवृत्तिः etc.

ādyantau ṭakitau / **P. 1. 1. 46**

[1]

The *pratīka* : समासनिर्देशोऽयं ... etc. stands for the following *Mbh.*: समासानर्देशोऽयम् । तत्र न ज्ञायते क आदिः, कोऽन्त इति । तद्यथा — अजाविधनौ देवदत्त-यज्ञदत्तावित्युक्ते तत्र न ज्ञायते, कस्याजा धनं कस्यावय इति ।

The *Mbh.* ascribes the indicision as to which of the two, *ṭit* and *kit*, is to be initial and which final to the linguistic form viz. compound (in both the subject and the predicate). It is supported by adducing a similar case of a compound, apparently leading to indecision, from ordinary language. The argument seems to be that a compound is characterized by *ekārthībhāva* 'integration'. You cannot extract an entity from integrated expressions like *ṭakitau* or *Devadatta Yajñadattau* and attribute separate properties to it. The *ekārthībhāva* obstructs the principle of यथासंख्य 'respectivity'. The *Dīp.* यावता असमासेऽपि etc. differs from the *Mbh.* It thinks that the indecision is not due to the compound as such. It can be there where a phrase is used, instead of a compound The *Dīp.* shows this by turning the example of the *Mbh.* itself from a compound into a phrase.

Taking his cue from Bhar. Kaiy. observes : यद्यपि देवदत्तस्य यज्ञदत्तस्य चाजा अवयश्च धनमिति वाक्येऽपि क्रमव्यवस्था नास्ति, तथापि समासे सुतरां नास्तीति प्रतिपादयितुं 'समासनिर्देश' इत्युक्तम् ।

Readings : (1) (*p.* 5, *l.* 12) MS यथासंख्यं कच (for °संख्यकत्वं as emended in AL). — (2) (*p.* 5, *l.* 12) AL °निर्देशेन ज्ञा°. — (3) (*p.* 5, *l.* 12) MS चाज (for चाजा). AL च अजा अवयश्च धन°.

[2]

The objection raised in the previous section is replied to here. The object in introducing that point in the *Mbh.* is to show that यथासंख्य 'respectivity' is a speciality of Grammar.

मश्च (read as यच्च by AL) is unintelligible as it is, but evidently an initial letter क्र is lost in the MS. Before this क्रमश्च, there may have been some word like शास्त्रान्तरे.

श्रुतेरर्थाच्च ... etc. The source of this stanza is not known. It lists in the Mīmāṁsā tradition six principles which guide when an order of sequence is to be determined. Bhar. explains only three out of these six principles.

हृदयस्याग्रे ... etc. which illustrates the श्रुतिक्रम is from *Taitt. Saṁh.* 6. 3. 10. 4, *Śat. Br.* 3. 8. 3. 16, 17. It lays down the order in which the parts of the

sacrificial victim are to be cut and extracted from the victim's body after killing it. Here the word *atha* 'then' is specifically used to state the sequence of the *avadāna*-s. (Also *agre* 'at the beginning' though not specifically mentioned by Bhar.)

The series of instructions : देवदत्त भोजय etc. illustrates अर्थक्रम, the natural sequence of activities. (Incidentally, we have emended अनुलिप्योद्वर्तय of the MS [retained by AL] to अनुलिम्पोद्व° [which yields two verbs in the Imperative] in view of the separate mentions of उद्वर्तनम् and अनुलेपनम् in the *Dīp.* which follows where the natural order of a person's daily routine activities is mentioned.)

The पाठक्रम is explained in two alternative ways in the *Dīp.*, one way in connection with scriptural passages (where word-order is fixed) and another way in connection with the ordinary speech, in view of the difference of opinion about the interpretation of पाठाच्च. For the first Bhar. mentions a practice of the Smṛti texts (in spite of his initial statement : नियतानुपूर्वीकेषु वेदवाक्येषु !) where different kinds of processes are laid down for cleansing different kinds of articles. Here it is to be supposed that the Smṛti texts mention तैजसान्, मार्त्तिकान् ... etc. on the one hand and then परिमृज्यात्, प्रदहेत् ... etc. on the other, in the relevant sequence. (or तैजसानाम्, मार्त्तिकानाम् etc. on the one hand, परिमार्जनेन, प्रदाहेन etc. on the other. Cf. *Manu.* 5. 110 ff. particularly तैजसानां मणीनां च सर्वस्याश्ममयस्य च। भस्मनाद्भिर्मृदा चैव शुद्धिरुक्ता मनीषिभिः (111)॥ ... दारवाणां च तक्षणम् (115)॥ ... पुनःपाकेन मृन्मयम् (122)॥)

तत्र यदा दर्शनं ... etc. The *Dīp.* is driving at the *Vār.* 1 on P. 1. 3. 10 : संज्ञासमासनिर्देशात् सर्वप्रसङ्गोऽनुदेशस्य तत्र यथासंख्यवचनं नियमार्थम्. The *Vār.* says that ordinarily the *pāthakrama* can serve the purpose of linking the related items, the *uddeśin*-s and the *anudeśin*-s. However, this cannot be done when a name (*saṁjñā*) is used, or when the items are mentioned by a compound. Take the case of P. 3. 4. 82 : परस्मैपदानां णलतुसुस्थलथुसणल्वमाः. Here तिप् etc. which are to be replaced by णल् etc. in the Perfect, are not mentioned by their own names, but by the technical name *parasmaipada*. So, what happens is that all the named items of *parasmaipada*, the nine endings *tip* etc. present themselves simultaneously and claim to be replaced by each of the substitutes *ṇal* etc. (अक्रमाः संज्ञिनो ··· संबध्येरन्), thus creating an awkward situation. The यथासंख्यसूत्र is meant for such situations. Similarly in the case of a compound. The Sū. P. 4. 3. 94 : तूदीशलातुर ... etc. lays down the four suffixes *ḍhak*, *chaṇ*, *ḍhañ*, and *yak* after the four stems तूदी, शलातुर, वर्मती, and कूचवार. Here also, because of the *ekārthībhāva*, the whole (i. e. all the four stems simultaneously) presents itself, with the result that all the four suffixes have to be added after each of the four stems. Here also P. 1. 3. 10 : यथासंख्यमनुदेशः

समानाम् helps. Kaiy. remarks on P. 1. 3. 10 thus : परस्मैपदानां णलतुसित्यत्र संज्ञया सर्वे युगपत् (= अक्रमा: of *Dip.* here) प्रत्याय्यन्ते इति नास्ति पाठक्रमाद् व्यवस्था। लोकेऽप्यजाविधनौ देवदत्तयज्ञदत्ताविति[1] समासनिर्देशे नास्ति क्रमनियमः। द्वंद्वेऽनेकावयवात्मकः समुदाय एकेनैव शब्देन प्रत्याय्यत इति कुतः क्रमनियमः स्यात्?

घ्रो जिघ्रः, ध्मो धमः ... etc. It is to be presumed that Bhar. is here referring to some (real or imaginary) grammar which read Pāṇini's पाघ्राध्मा ... धौशीयसीदाः (7. 3. 78) with the *uddeśin*-s (the roots *pā*-, *ghrā*. ets.) and also the *anudeśin*-s (the substitutes *piba*, *jighra* etc.) in an uncompounded form, unlike as in the *Aṣṭ*. The *Dip*. says that even when the *uddeśin*-s and the *anudeśin*-s are thus mentioned separately (भिन्ने संबन्धिन्युपादीयमानेऽपि) still they can be paired off, as e. g. घ्रो जिघ्रः, ध्मो धमः etc. (if they are not mentioned in a compound form).

But when the related items are mentioned by a technical term (like *parasmaipada*), or when they are mentioned by a compound form, the pairing becomes impossible. That is why यथासंख्य (P. 1. 3. 10) is devised by Pāṇini which works even in a compound. In the absence of P. 1. 3. 10, the compound would be a hindrance in the way of linking the *uddeśin*-s and the *anudeśin*-s.

That is how, finally, the *Dip*. justifiss the initial doubt expressed in the *Mbh.* : निर्देशोऽयम्। तत्र न ज्ञायते ... etc. With the doubt thus sustained, the stage is set for the discussion to follow (यद्यपि तावल्लोक एष दृष्टान्त ... etc.).

Readings : (1) (*p*. 5, *l*. 15) Our reconstruction क्रमश्च, and (2) (*p*. 5, *l*. 21) अनुलिम्प have been already mentioned above. — (3) (*p*. 6, *l*. 1) MS वत्तेनैव; AL °वत् तेनैव. We are not able to decide what the original text was. If तेनैव alone is original, what should वत्र mean? Also, तेनैव by itself is not sufficient, in the absence of a co-relative येनैव ... — (4) (*p*. 6, *l*. 3) MS AL संज्ञाया (for our emendation संज्ञया). — (5) (*p*. 6, *ll*. 7–8) MS कल्पशक्यः; AL शक्यते. Either कल्प or शक्य should be original, not both, since they are almost synonyms.

[3]

The *Mbh.* proceeds : यद्यपि तावल्लोक एष दृष्टान्तः, दृष्टान्तस्यापि तु पुरुषारम्भो निवर्तको भवति। अस्ति चेह कश्चित् पुरुषारम्भः? अस्तीत्याह। कः? संख्यातानुदेशो नाम।

Bhar. paraphrases दृष्टान्त both times by दर्शन, Kaiy. and Nāg. by निश्चय ' decision '. The *Mbh*. says that although in the ordinary usage there may be indecision in the case of a compound, the special effort (पुरुषारम्भः) in framing the संख्यातानुदेश rule (P. 1. 3. 10) helps to secure respectivity in a compound also.

1. Taken from the *Dīp*. [1] on P. 1. 1. 46 ?

[4]

Nāg. explains straightway the *Mbh.* thus : **यौ टकितावाद्यन्तौ तौ किमागमौ उतादेशाविति प्रश्नः।**

The *Dīp.* **अवस्थित आर्धधातुक** brings out very clearly the concept of **an** *āgama*. It is an element that comes (*āgama*) subsequently, and becomes **a** part of the *āgamin*, without disturbing any of the previous integral parts of it. Nāg. infers the status of a part for the *āgama* on the basis of the use of words *ādi* and *anta* in the rule ([अवयवविशेषवाचि]आद्यन्तपदसत्त्वादिति भावः).

[5]

The *pratīka* युक्तं पुनः [यत्] नित्येषु stands for the following *Mbh.* : **युक्तं पुनर्यन्नित्येषु नाम शब्देष्वागमशासनं स्यात्? न नित्येषु नाम शब्देषु कूटस्थैरविचालिभिर्वर्णैर्भवितव्यम्, अनपायोपजनविकारिभिः? आगमश्च नामापूर्वः शब्दोपजनः।**

An objection against the *āgama* view. It is argued that on the view that word is eternal, no addition (*āgama*=*upajana*) is possible. That contradicts the basic tenet of Grammar.

इतव्य, the *seṭ* form of *-tavya*. If, after all, *itavya* is the suffix, why not teach it straightway, instead of teaching *-tavya* first and then teaching an addition of a prefix *i* to it ? — that is an additional question.

अथ युक्तं यन्नित्येषु. The *Mbh.* represented by this *pratīka*, viz. **अथ युक्तं यन्नित्येषु शब्देष्वादेशाः स्युः?** is a counter-objection (प्रतिबन्दी) by the opponent. If augmentation contradicts the eternality of word, so does substitution also equally. The *ādeśavādin* also is sailing in the same boat. Augmentation is not worse than substituting, for example, *bhū-* in the place of *as-*.

The *Mbh.* शब्दान्तरैरिह भवितव्यम् justifies the *ādeśa* view. In substitution (*iha*) you deal with the whole words. Here you do not bodily remove one word and substitute another in its place. All that you do is that you use *bhū-* when *as-* is theoretically due (*asteḥ prasaṅge*). The *śabdanityatva* is not violated thereby.

After **अस्तेः प्रसङ्गे** the MS reades a letter which looks like **थैः**, and which AL read as भू. We have ignored it.

[6]

The *Mbh.* represented by the *pratīka* आदेशास्तर्हीमे runs as: **आदेशास्तर्हीमे** भविष्यन्ति। अनागमकानां सागमकाः। तत् कथम्? **संज्ञाधिकारोऽयम्।** आद्यन्तौ **चेह संकीर्त्येते।** टकारककारावितावुदाहियेते। तत्र 'आर्धधातुकस्येड् वलादेः' इत्युपस्थितमिदं भवति — **आदिरिति। तेनेकारादिरादेशो भविष्यति।**

The argument advanced here is based on the assumption that the Sū. आद्यन्तौ टकितौ is not a Paribhāṣā, but a *saṁjñā* rule. The letter *ṭ* is the *saṁjñā* of *ādi* and similarly *k* of *anta*. This is regarded as helpful to the *ādeśa* view which is discussed here. The *Dīp.* आद्यस्यार्थस्य etc. explains this argument. The code letter *ṭ* means the beginning (*ādi*=*ādyartha*), and a similar *k* means the end (*anta*=*antārtha*). The rule आर्धधातुकस्येड् वलादेः (P. 7. 2. 35), for example, means that an *ārdhadhātuka* suffix beginning with *val* (any consonant except *y*) is replaced by the corresponding suffix beginning with *i* (thus *itavya*, *iṣya* etc.). (The *Mbh.* here says that *iṭ* in this sūtra has to be understood as a Bahuvrīhi : इ(कार): आदिर्यस्य.[1])

The *Dīp.* आद्यर्थस्यान्तार्थस्य च ... etc. is meant to solve a difficulty. In grammar, a word-form stands for itself (P. 1. 1. 68 : स्वं रूपं ...). Therefore the rule आर्धधातुकस्येड् वलादेः will have to be interpreted as meaning 'An *ārdhadhātuka* suffix beginning with a *val* phoneme is replaced by (the word) *i-ādi* ', which is absurd. So the *Dīp.* says that the words *ādi* and *anta* are to be understood as denoting their meaning and not form (अर्थपदार्थयोरेवोपादानात्).

'इति' शब्दो वा स्वर्यते. Another solution for the same difficulty. The word *iti* is made to continue in P. 7. 2. 35 from the previous rule (34), by an assumption of its Svarita. It is well known that the word *iti* indicates a change of meaning from the usual one (इतिशब्दो हि पदार्थविपर्यासकृत्, *Nyāsa* on P. 1. 1. 44). So, *ādi* (and *anta*) will be understood as *arthapara*, not *śabdapara*.

Incidentally, this part of *Dīp.* (which is ignored by Kaiy. and others) seems to be a dig at Pat. for having ignored the undesired contingency and for having failed to find out a solution for it.

यद्येवम् , टकारककारयोः ... etc. This *Dīp.* raises an objection against the whole procedure of making *ṭ* and *k* the names of *ādi* and *anta*. The status of being a name (संज्ञा; of *ādi* and *anta*) depends on the *it-* status of *ṭ* and *k*. This *it-* status in its turn depends upon *ṭ* and *k* being final (P. 1. 3. 3 : हलन्त्यम्) or initial (P. 1. 3. 7 etc). But *ṭ*, e. g. is not final. It is a single consonant. It is not final of anything. For nothing precedes it (cf. the *Mbh.* : यस्मात् पूर्वोऽस्ति, परश्च नास्ति, सोऽन्तः). Since it is not final, it is not *it*. Since it is not *it*, it cannot be a name. And the *Mbh.* has positively said : टकारककारावितौ संज्ञे भविष्यतः.

तत्रेत्संज्ञकानां यो देशः ... etc. answers this objection. The two letters *k* and *ṭ* are called *it*, not because of any final or initial position of their own, but because in suffixes like *iṭ* they occupy a similar final position as a consonantal

1. कथं पुनरियता सूत्रेणेकारादिरादेशो लभ्यः ? लभ्य इत्याह । कथम् ? बहुव्रीहिनिर्देशात् । ... इकार आदिरस्येति ।

code-letter would occupy, so they are secondarily looked upon as *it*. Another reason is that these *ṭ* and *k* retire after they have introduced their *saṁjñin*-s — viz. the meaning of *ādi* and *anta* — like any other ordinary *it*. Hence also their name *it*. So आर्धधातुकस्य इट् भवति means आर्धधातुकस्य स्थाने इकारादिः (प्रत्ययो) भवति.

Observation: Kaiy. also has brought up this point. He does not expressly say that the *it* status is not available for *ṭ* and *k*, but he merely suggests it. But what is noteworthy is that he does not make the availability or otherwise of the *it*-status as the main issue. He rather questions its necessity. Read: यद्येवं संज्ञा संज्ञिप्रत्यायनार्था संज्ञिनं प्रत्याय्य स्वयमेव निवर्तत इति किमिद्ग्रहणेन ? टकावित्येवास्तु । नैष दोषः । इत्संज्ञत्वेन देशविशेष उपलक्ष्यते । तेनेत्संज्ञकस्य यो देशस्तद्देशावस्थितौ टकौ संज्ञे भवतः ...। On उपलक्ष्यते, Nāg. observes, following Bhar. : एवं चानयोरित्त्वमेव नेति भावः.

सर्वस्मिंश्चादेशे ... etc. In this *Dīp.* a final difficulty for the *saṁjñā* view is anticipated and a solution given. Since the rule आर्धधातुकस्येड् वलादेः means that a suffix beginning with *i* takes the place of a *valādi ār°*, many suffixes like *iṣya*, *-ita* etc. will present themselves for substituting *-tavya*. *Itavya* will not be the only claimant. The reply given is that on the basis of *āntaratamya* only *itavya* will be entertained. Others will retire. Similarly Kaiy.: तत्रेड्ग्रहणेनेकारादिशब्दो गृह्यते । स्थानेन्तरतमश्चादेशो भवति । तव्यस्य इतव्यो भवतीति सिद्धमिष्टम् ।

[7]

The *pratīka* इह तु कथं ... etc. represents the following *Mbh.*: यद्यपि तावदत्रैतच्छक्यते वक्तुम्, इह तु कथम् — 'लुङ्लङ्लृङ्क्ष्वडुदात्तः' इति यत्राशक्यमुदात्तग्रहणेनाकारो विशेषयितुम् ?

A difficulty in the *saṁjñā* (or the *ādeśa*) view. It is pointed out it was all right in the case of आर्धधातुकस्येड् वलादेः. But in the case of P. 6. 4. 71 : लुङ्लङ् ... there will be a difficulty. Here अङ्गस्य is present by *adhikāra*. The meaning of the rule will be : लुङादिषु परत अङ्गस्य स्थाने अट् = अकार आदिर्यस्य तादृशः आदेशः स्यात्. So far it is all right. But what about उदात्तः in the rule ? Being out of the compound (*aṭ*), it cannot qualify *a*, and so it will have to be connected with the *aṅga*. Which syllable of the *aṅga* will be accented is also a moot point, says Bhar. (अनियतोदात्तमङ्गं प्राप्नोति). Bhar. does not expressly say why अनियतो°. Kaiy. says that the accent will be on the final syllable of the *aṅga* (because of अलोऽन्त्यस्य), while Nāg. says that it could be on the initial syllable *a*, प्रथमातिक्रमे कारणाभावात्. Anyway there is no certainty that it would be on the *a* only as desired. (See also *observation* 1 below).

त्रिपदोऽयं बहुव्रीहिरिति. This stands for the *Mbh.*: नैष दोषः। त्रिपदोऽयं बहुव्रीहिः। तत्र वाक्य एवोदात्तग्रहणे नाकारो विशेष्यते—अकार उदात्त आदिरस्येति, which replies the above objection.

This reply says that अडुदात्तः is not to be regarded as two words (अट् उदात्तः), but a single compound consisting of three constituents (त्रिपदो बहुव्रीहिः). So now *udātta* is connected with *a* becoming its qualifier in the original sentence (the *vigrahavākya*) itself as in the case of words like चित्रगु. This relationship continues in the compound. So no difficulty. The rule means : उदात्त अकारः आदिर्यस्य तादृश आदेशो भवति.

यत्र तर्हि अनुवृत्त्या. The *Mbh.* represented by this *pratīka* runs as: यत्र तर्ह्यनुवृत्त्यैतद् भवति—'आडजादीनाम्' इति? वक्ष्यत्येतद्—'अजादीनामटा सिद्धम्' इति।

The difficulty with *aṭ* somehow removed, now comes the question of *āṭ*, the augment which comes instead of *aṭ* if the root begins with a vowel (P. 6. 4. 72). It was possible to look upon *aḍ udāttaḥ* as a single *tripada* compound. But that facility is not now available with *āṭ*, because *udāttaḥ* is not actually read in this rule. It is only inferred to be continued (अनुमीयते) from the previous rule, P. 6. 4. 71. So how can *udāttaḥ* be connected with *āṭ* in the *vigrahavākya* ?

The *Mbh.* brushes off this objection by referring to the *Śloka-Vār.* अजादीनामटा सिद्धम् on P. 6. 4. 74, which makes *āṭ* superfluous, the object being achieved by *aṭ* itself. But Bhar. who is interested in the scholastic training of the student replies the objection in a theoretical way in the *Dīp.* यदा त्विदं दर्शनम् ... etc.

Bhar. says that there are two ways of understanding an *anuvṛtti.* One way is merely to infer that some expression is present from a previous rule. It is not actually uttered there. It does not become a part of it. The other way is to utter a similar expression and to make it an integral part of the rule. The rule as uttered by Pāṇini, where the *anuvṛtti* is to be understood, is called *hetuvākya*, here आडजादीनाम्. After adding a fresh उदात्तः to it, the rule now becomes आडुदात्तोऽजादीनाम्. With this latter type of *anuvṛtti* there is no difficulty in connecting उदात्तः with आट्.

Observations : (1) There is some doubt whether Bhar's statement : एवं च सत्यनियतोदात्तमङ्गं भवति is correct. Firstly : the *Mbh.* itself does not say so. It merely says : अङ्गस्योदात्तत्वं प्रसज्येत, i. e. the accent will undesiredly fall on the *aṅga* (instead of on the augment *aṭ*). Kaiy. makes the Bhāṣya statement specific by saying that the accent will be on the final syllable of the *aṅga* by अन्तोऽवत्याः. There is no uncertainty of the accent for Kaiy. also. Nāg. offers,

as a *pūrvapakṣa* to Kaiy.'s statement, the following: **ननु प्रथमातिक्रमे कारणाभावादाद्युदात्तत्वेनेष्टसिद्धिः** and then introduces Kaiy., saying: **अत आह—तच्चेति।** Thus he too does not seem to think that there will be an uncertainty about the place of accent, since **अलोऽन्त्यस्य** must be here authoritative. On the *Uddy.* **प्रथमातिक्रमे कारणाभावात्** etc. the *Chāyā* remarks : **प्राचामनुरोधेनेदम्.** So some ancient grammarians might have held that the accent will be on *a*(*ṭ*). But Bhar. cannot be meant by *prācām*, because his view is that the accent will be uncertain, not that it will be on *a*(*ṭ*). (2) **हेतुवाक्यम्** is uncertain. Our interpretation is tentative. Could the original have been **हेतु(:) वाक्यम्**? (3) There are some currupt readings which we (also previously AL) have silently corrected. AL preserve **अस्य** (in *l.* 7), which we have corrected to **अत्र.**

[8]

The *pratīka* अथ वा, यत्तावदयं ... etc. stands for the following *Mbh.*: **अथ वा यत्तावदयं सामान्येनोपदेष्टुं शक्नोति तत् तावद् उपदिशति — प्रकृतिम्, ततो वलाद्यार्धधातुकम्, ततः पश्चादिकारम्।**

The purport of this *Mbh.* is to show that even on the Paribhāṣā view (which looks upon *iṭ*, *aṭ* etc. as augments) there is no harm to the *śabdanityatva.* If Pāṇini teaches first the suffix *-tavya* and afterwards a prefixion of *i*(*ṭ*) to it in some roots, that does not mean that the finished suffix *-itavya* comes into being in two stages. It is a single event. If a sequence is there, it is in the grammatical description of the suffix, not in the suffix itself. For the facility of description, the grammar states the part *-tavya* which is common to potential participles from all roots, and afterwards teaches the prefixion of *i*(*ṭ*) to *-tavya* in the case of some roots (which are marked with an *Udātta* accent on the radical vowel).

इहास्ति केचित् सकारमात्रम् ... etc. Here Bhar. cites a grammatical parallel to show that there is no reality about the grammatical procedure. After all it is a means, and you can follow any procedure, provided, of course, that you arrive at the correct form. The illustration given is that of the root *as-* 'to be'. It is read in this form by all the grammatical systems known to us. But the *Mbh.* (on P. 1. 3. 22) tells us that it was read as simply *s-* by some (अस्ति सकारमातिष्ठते। आगमौ गुणवृद्धी आतिष्ठते।). While the root *s-* straightway gave forms like *staḥ*, *santi* etc., for accounting forms like *asti* etc. the Guṇa vowel *a* was taught as a prefix (to *sti*). Haradatta tells us that it was Āpiśali who followed this unique procedure : **स्तः, सन्तीति सकारमात्रस्य दर्शनात् 'स भुवि' इत्येव धातुः पाठ्यः। अस्तीत्यादौ पिति सार्वधातुकेऽडागमो विधेयः, आस्तामासन्नित्यादौ आडागमः स्यादित्यापिशला मन्यन्ते।** (*Padam.* on the *Kāś.* **अस्ति सकारमात्रमातिष्ठते.**)

उदात्तेभ्यश्चानुदात्तेभ्यश्च प्रकृतिभ्यः = **सर्वेभ्यो धातुभ्यः। — उदात्तेभ्य इटं विदधत् :** Actually *iṭ* is taught for *all* roots (**आर्धधातुकस्येड् वलादेः,** P. 7. 2. 35), in the

first instance. It is then prohibited in the case of the roots read with an Anudātta vowel by P. 7. 2. 10 : एकाच उपदेशेऽनुदात्तात्. So the *Dīp.* is here merely stating the net result.

In the *Mbh.*, तेन विशेषेण means 'by the teaching of this particular feature, viz. the prefixion of the augment *i*'. शब्दान्तरम् = 'तव्य 'प्रत्ययाद् भिन्नम्. समुदायम्, viz. इतव्यम् (which is a *whole*, and not just a combination of इ + तव्य). The *Dīp.* समुदायग्रहणमेवमर्थम् ... etc. makes the argument very clear.

तद्यथा खदिरबर्बुरयोः. The *Mbh.* runs thus : तद्यथा। खदिरबर्बुरयोः — खदिरबर्बुरौ गौरकाण्डौ सूक्ष्मपर्णौ। ततः पश्चादाह — कण्टकवान् खदिर इति। तेनासौ विशेषेण द्रव्यान्तरं समुदायं प्रतिपद्यते। The *Mbh.* means to say that the *khadira* tree has all the three properties simultaneously. Although only two are mentioned first, that is just to bring out the similarity between the two trees; it does not mean that the *khadira* develops its third property (thorniness) later on. Much less does it mean that the *barbura* becomes a *khadira* by developing thorns. The same is the case with *-tavya* and *-itavya*. *Itavya* is, from the beginning, as much a different whole from *-tavya*, as the *khadira* is from the *barbura*. *Itavya* does not come into existence by prefixing *i* to *tavya*.

Nāg. explains प्रतिपद्यते as तव्यबुद्धिनिवर्तनेन (इतव्यबुद्धिं प्रतिपद्यते) इत्यर्थः.

नाधीयते should be better looked upon as न + आधीयते in view of अपनीयते which follows. — The first कस्याश्चित्प्रकृतेः = उदात्तवतो धातोः. The second = अनुदात्ताद् धातोः.

Readings : (1) (*p.* 7, *l.* 11) MS AL इहास्ते (AL इहास्तेः). — (2) (*p.* 7, *l.* 13) MS इड्; AL इट् (for our emendation इटं). — (3) (*p.* 7, *l.* 14) MS AL इति यः (for our emendation इतव्यः). — (4) (*p.* 7, *l.* 14) In तेन तेन विशेषेण, repetition of तेन may be a scribal error. — (5) (*p.* 7, *ll.* 17, 18) On both the occasions the MS does not write the word बर्बुर correctly. — (6) (*p.* 7, *l.* 17) MS यत्र सामान्यमन्यसित्ये°; AL यत्र सामान्यमन्यदिति ए°. — (7) (*p.* 7, *l.* 19) MS AL इकार अ(AL आ)धीयते (for our emendation °रो नाधीयते). — (8) (*p.* 7, *l.* 20) Although the MS reads इतः and तः (retained by AL), we believe इतव्यः and तव्यः must have been the original readings in view of their consistent occurrence so far.

[9]

अथ वैतयानुपूर्व्या ... उपदिशति. The following *Mbh.* is represented by this *pratīka* : अथ वैतयानुपूर्व्यायं शब्दान्तरमुपदिशति, प्रकृतिम्, ततो वलाद्यार्धधातुकम्, ततः पश्चाद् इकारम्, यस्मिंस्तस्यागमबुद्धिर्भवति।

This section looks much like the preceding one [8], and the difference between the two (suggested by अथ वा) is not clear at the first sight. We note

that the concepts of *sāmānya* and *viśeṣa* mentioned in the previous section do not appear here. The sequence of grammatical teaching — *prakṛti, -tavya* (वलाद्यार्धधातुकम्), *iṭ* — is still meant here. This *ānupūrvī* 'order of sequence', the *Mbh.* concludes, is responsible for *iṭ* misunderstood as a subsequent addition.

In the previous solution it was said that *tavya* is first taught because it is common (*sāmānya*) to all roots, and *iṭ* is taught afterwards because it is special (*viśeṣa*) to the Udātta roots. Actually, *itavya* was one indivisible suffix. In the present explanation the general-particular point is given up. There is no comparison, or relative discussion of Udātta and Anudātta roots. The *Mbh.* simply says that since the elements are taught successively (*ānupūrvyā*), an illusion is created that *i(ṭ)* is a part which is prefixed successively. It is not so. Sequence, as said previously, is only in the description, not in the form. This seems to be the simple, faithful interpretation of the *Mbh.*

Bhar., however, — and following him the whole grammatical tradition — understands this *Mbh.* in quite a different way. He takes the *Mbh.* to mean that all linguistic analysis is a fiction. The grammatical elements like *dhātu, pratyaya, āgama* do not exist in reality. It is only a make-believe. When the Grammar speaks of eternality of word, it is the full, finished word, the word as actually spoken, that is meant. The grammatical elements are not declared to be *nitya* 'eternal'. So the आगमबुद्धि does not contradict *śabdanityatva.*

Cf. the *Uddy* : ... अयं पाणिनिः, शब्दान्तरं बोधकशब्दापेक्षया भिन्नं रेखागवयस्थानीयम् उपदिशति प्रतिपादयति। तत्रागमबुद्धावपि न शब्दनित्यताहानिरिति।

The text is not certain at some places in this section. The MS सर्वापलवम् (*p.* 7, *l.* 21) makes no sense. AL read सर्वपेलवम् which is no better. The original could be something like सर्वोपप्लवम् or सर्वापलापम् meaning 'illusion of everything' and 'denial of everything' where सर्व refers to the grammatical elements like the *dhātu* etc. — (*p.* 7, *l.* 22). The MS सवता is read as सर्वत्र by AL. It is better to read भवता. — (*p.* 7, *l.* 23) AL retain भूत एव of the MS but it does not make sense. We tentatively suggest भूतार्थ एव in its place. There is another difficulty. The sentence seems to end at इति. But then the next sentence भूवादयः केचिद् etc. lacks one न, which we have supplied. — By the way, the statement शपि वर्तमाने लट् is strange. It should have been लटि वर्तमाने शप्!

[10]

The *pratīka* टकितोराद्यन्तविधाने ... etc. stands for the following *Mbh.* : 'टकितोराद्यन्तविधाने प्रत्ययप्रतिषेधः' (वा. १) । टकितोराद्यन्तविधाने प्रत्ययस्य प्रतिषेधो

वक्तव्यः । प्रत्यय आदिरन्तो वा मा भूत् । 'चरेष्टः' । 'आतोऽनुपसर्गे कः' इति । This is the first comment of Kāt. on this rule. He wants it to be made expressly clear that the *pratyaya*-s (suffixes) are an exception to the rule under discussion. For instance, the suffix *-ṭa* taught after the root *car-* (P. 3. 2. 16) should not become its initial part, nor *ka* (P. 3. 2. 3) the final part of roots in *ā*. A suffix must always follow (P. 3. 1. 2).

The *Dīp*. interprets आद्यन्तविधाने of the *Vār*. in two ways : (1) आद्यन्तविधाने = आद्यन्तविधायके शास्त्रे i. e. in P. 1. 1. 46. (2) 'In the matter of the position of the initial and the final part'. According to the first interpretation the suffixes are excluded, according to the second their *ṭit* or *kit* status is prohibited, in spite of the presence of the letters *ṭ* and *k* (we have supplied अन्तत्वस्य वा as required evidently). In short, the Sū. should read as : आद्यन्तौ टकितावप्रत्ययौ.

The following *Mbh*. is represented by the *pratīka* परवचनात् सिद्धम् : 'परवचनात् सिद्धम्' । परवचनात् प्रत्यय आदिरन्तो वा न भविष्यति । The *Mbh*. simply refers to the [प्रत्ययः ।] परश्च (P. 3. 1. 2), a general rule for the suffixes, and brushes away the suggestion.

परवचनादिति विप्रतिषेधे ... etc. This *Dīp*. brings out the technical point involved in परवचनात्, a part of the next *Vār*. (2) anticipated by Pat. Bhar. explains the expression in three ways. (1) It is pointed out that the rival rules — आद्यन्तौ टकितौ and परश्च — have their own exclusive domains where the other cannot apply and that in the case of conflict where both may claim a common example, परश्च, being later in the order of rules in the *Aṣṭ*., will have an upper hand. So a *pratyaya* will always be *para*. The exception, proposed to be included in the Sū., is not necessary.

The examples cited by the *Dīp*. are आर्धधातुकस्येड् वलादेः and भियो हेतुभये षुक् for आद्यन्तौ टकितौ (where a *pratyaya* is not taught and so there is no possibility of परश्च) and तव्यत्तव्यानीयरः (P. 3. 1. 96) for परश्च (where there is no *ṭit* or *kit* element and so no possibility of आद्यन्तौ टकितौ). In चरेष्टः (P. 3. 2. 16) and आतोऽनुपसर्गे कः (P. 3. 2. 3), on the other hand, both rules come into conflict. Since *-ṭa* and *-ka* are suffixes, परश्च demands a subsequent position for them after *car* etc. while the *ṭit* character of the suffix requires an initial position and *kit* a final one. P. 1. 4. 2 : विप्रतिषेधे परं कार्यम् comes into play, and ultimately परश्च wins. (In the *Dīp*., after आतोऽनुपसर्गे कः इति, some words such as परत्वात् प्रत्ययपरत्वं भविष्यति are missing.)

(2) According to this second explanation, पर in परवचनात् refers to the परश्च itself (and not to पर in विप्रतिषेधे परं कार्यम् as in the first explanation). Of

course, here also परश्च has to depend on the support of विप्रतिषेधे परं कार्यम्, but that is a different thing.

(3) Here also पर refers to पर in परश्च, but not so much to the word as to its meaning. Here Bhar. gives the whole sequence of grammatical operations which makes it clear that the suffix has to come after the stem at the very first step. (Otherwise it will not be a *pratyaya* at all.) Its succeeding position is a *fait accompli* by the time the present rule enjoins the initial and the final positions for the *ṭit* and *kit* elements. That is how the present rule does not affect the succeeding position of a suffix. The present *Dīp.* is based on the *Mbh.* on P. 2. 1. 2, *Vār.* 1 : अथ वा यदस्य परस्य सतः संज्ञा स्यात्.

सति प्रत्ययपरत्वे टकारककारयोरित्संज्ञा. Since the name *it* is given to initial consonants *ṭ* and *k* only if they lead a *pratyaya* (आदिर्ञिटुडवः। षः प्रत्ययस्य। चुटू। लशक्वतद्धिते। P. 1. 3. 5–8). — टित्किद्व्यपदेशः, i. e. for a suffix.

एवं तु बहुजादीनां ... etc. This *Dīp.* controverts the preceding view. If the arrangement यः परः स प्रत्ययः is accepted, the suffix बहुच् (P. 5. 3. 68 : विभाषा सुपो बहुच् पुरस्तात् तु) which precedes the stem, and others, which, like *akac* take the place before the *ṭi* portion of the stem (P. 5. 3. 71 : अव्ययसर्वनाम्नामकच् प्राक् टेः), or the *mit* suffixes (like *śnam* which come after the final vowel of the stem ; P. 1. 1. 47 : मिदचोऽन्त्यात् परः) will be deprived of the status of *pratyaya*. So that solution is unacceptable. The *Dīp.* तेन परेण भवितव्यम् etc. continues the objection. It is admitted that as a rule the suffix will be *para*. But the exceptions have to take their own place (पुरस्तात्, or प्राक् टेः, or अचः परः as the case may be.) So, this *Dīp.* concludes, यः परः स प्रत्ययसंज्ञः is not a sound argument.

(4) अन्ये वर्णयन्ति ... etc. gives the last alternative explanation advanced by some others (probably Kāt. in his *Vār.* 1 on P. 3. 1. 2). It is claimed that P. 3. 1. 2 : परश्च is superfluous. Even without it a *pratyaya* will follow the *prakṛti* (stem) because the stem (*dhātoḥ* P. 3. 1. 7, or *prātipadikāt* P. 4. 1. 1) is mentioned in the Ablative. And, according to the Pari. तस्मादित्युत्तरस्य (P. 1. 1. 67) a suffix will follow. (It will not take any other position.) That makes the rule परश्च (P. 3. 1. 2) superfluous. But this superfluousness is only outward. Actually this makes doubly sure the succeeding position of a suffix by superseding the Pari. आद्यन्तौ टकितौ, thus removing the bar in the way of परश्च.

परत्वे सिद्धे : 'तस्मादित्युत्तरस्य' इति परिभाषया. — बाधनार्थम् means बाधकबाधनार्थम्. — तस्मात् प्रत्ययः परो भविष्यति implies that the suggestion of the *Vār.* is superfluous.

विप्रतिषेधस्तु यथोद्देशं ... etc. Finally, Bhar. points out limitations of the Pari. विप्रतिषेधे परं कार्यम्. That Pari. is applicable only on the यथोद्देशं संज्ञापरि-

भाषम् view. For, on this view, the Sūtras teaching the Saṁjñās and the Paribhāṣās remain where they are taught. That helps ascertain their positions in the *Aṣṭ.* as regards *para* and *pūrva*. On the कार्यकालं संज्ञापरिभाषम् view, however, the Sūtras teaching the Saṁjñās and the Paribhāṣās are believed to leave their places and join the operational rule concerned to form one sentence with it. When the conflicting rules thus occupy the same place, there is simply no question of deciding the *para* (and the *pūrva*), with the result that the Pari. विप्रतिषेधे ... is of no use.

Readings : (1) After आदित्वस्य (*p*. 8, *l*. 2), अन्तत्वस्य च is to be supplied; similarly कितश्च कित्त्वस्य after टित्त्वस्य (*p*. 8, *l*. 3).—(2) (*p*. 8, *l*. 2) AL आदिरन्तो वा (for आद्यन्त्ये वा). — (3) (*p*. 8, *l*. 8) After °कः इति, some words like परत्वात् प्रत्ययपरत्वं भवति are to be understood. — (4) (*p*. 8, *l*. 13) MSAL सुवा(AL °बा)दीनां (for बहुजादीनां). — (5) (*p*. 8, *l*. 13) MS प्रतिषिद्धं (for °बद्धः). AL तस्मान्न परत्वं प्रतिषिद्धम्। प्रत्ययः। तेन परवर्णेन भवितव्यम्।

[11]

The MS repeats from परवचनात् सिद्धमिति चेत् upto लक्षणमसंदिग्धं यत्तु (*l*. 26) after कितस्त्वपरिहारः (*p*. 10, *l*. 3).

The *Vār*. (2) परवचनात् सिद्धमिति चेन्नापवादत्वात् is followed by the following *Mbh*. : परवचनात् सिद्धमिति चेत्, तन्न। किं कारणम्? अपवादत्वात्। अपवादोऽयं योगः।

The *pūrvapakṣa* in this *Vār*. is already explained in the previous section [10]. Here the *uttarapakṣa* is explained. Here it is argued that the relation between P. 1. 1. 46 : आद्यन्तौ टकितौ and P. 3. 1. 2 is not of two equally powerful rules clashing in some common example (*vipratiṣedha*). It is that of *utsarga* and *apavāda*. P. 1. 1. 46 is the *apavāda* of P. 3. 1. 2. It will supersede the *utsarga* (P. 3.1. 2). So the threat of *ṭa* becoming the initial part of the root *car*- is still there.

The *Dīp*. एवं मन्यते ... etc. explains how P. 1. 1. 46 is an *apavāda* of P. 3. 1. 2. The *ṭit* and *kit* elements are taught in two different environments — either with a mention of *ṣaṣṭhī* 'genitive' (in which case they are called *āgama*-s 'augments'), or in the jurisdiction of *pratyayaḥ* (P. 3. 1. 1), the so-called *pratyaya*-s 'suffixes'. In either case, the *ṭit* and *kit* elements have strong rivals who are already established. If a *ṭit/kit* is taught with a mention of Genitive (e. g. आर्धधातुकस्य इट् वलादेः), P. 1. 1. 49 : षष्ठी स्थानेयोगा will already claim it, and the *ṭit/kit* element will have to be treated as a substitute. If it is taught in the jurisdiction of *pratyayaḥ* (P. 3. 1. 1), it will always have to follow. The *ṭit/kit* element will thus never be able to occupy the initial or the

final position as intended by P. 1. 1. 46. Therefore, lest it should become meaningless, P. 1. 1. 46 will have to be an *apavāda*. Consequently, it will supersede both, P. 1. 1. 49 : षष्ठी स्थानेयोगा, when a *til-kit* is an augment, and it will supersede P. 3. 1. 2 when it is a suffix (*pratyaya*). But the latter possibility is not desired. A suffix must always follow. Hence *Vār*. 1 : टकितोराद्यन्तविधाने प्रत्ययप्रतिषेधः.

In *l*. 21, इतरत्र = प्रत्ययाधिकारे. — यथैव स्थानेयोगत्वं बाधते : This is explained above. The *Mbh*. gives the parallel of P. 1. 1. 47 : मिदचोऽन्त्यात् परः thus : तद् यथा। 'मिदचोऽन्त्यात् परः' इत्येष योगः स्थानेयोगत्वस्य प्रत्ययपरत्वस्य चापवादः। The *Dīp*. cites the example of P. 7. 1. 72 : नपुंसकस्य झलचः, where, because of the Genitive (नपुंसकस्य), *num* will have to be a substitute. In P. 3. 1. 78 : रुधादिभ्यः श्नम्, being a suffix *śnam* has to follow. Both positions are undesired, because then P. 1. 1. 47 will become meaningless. To avoid it, it becomes an *apavāda* and itself supersedes both. What happens in the case of मिदचोऽन्त्यात् परः will also happen in the case of आद्यन्तौ टकितौ. Hence the *Vār*. 2.

[12]

The *pratīka* विषम उपन्यासः stands for the following *Mbh*. : विषम उपन्यासः। युक्तं तत्र यदनवकाशं मिद्ग्रहणं स्थानेयोगत्वं प्रत्ययपरत्वं च बाधते। इह तु पुनरुभयं सावकाशम्। टित्करणस्यावकाशः 'टितः' इतीकारो यथा स्यात्। कित्करणस्यावकाश 'किति' इत्याकारलोपो यथा स्यात्।

This *Mbh*. refutes the argument made in the previous section [11]. It is now maintained that it is one thing with *mit* and quite another with *ṭit-kit*. If the *mit* suprsedes प्रत्ययपरत्व, it is all right because otherwise it will be totally without any scope, and hence meaningless. But that is not the case with *ṭit-kit*. True, it may have no scope in the case of an *āgama*. But that is not the case with a *ṭit-kit*. The *ṭit* character of a suffix indicates that the feminine of a noun formed with it will be in *ṅīp* (P. 4. 1. 15 : टिड्ढाणञ् ... etc.) while the *kit* character indicates that the final *ā* of a root will be dropped when a *ṭit* suffix follows (P. 6. 4. 64 : आतो लोप इटि च). So P. 1. 1. 46 may at the most supersede P. 1. 1. 49 (which teaches स्थानेयोग) in the case of *āgamas*; but it cannot supersede P. 3. 1. 2 in the case of suffixes because it is not totally scopeless in view of the utility pointed out just now. So P. 3. 1. 2 stands, and the *Vār*. is unnecessary in order to assure the प्रत्ययपरत्व.

The *Dīp*. इह यद्यपि लक्षणम् ... etc. explains the above *Mbh*. and brings out the technicalities which the *Mbh*. did not think necessary to expand on. Two points are stressed in the *Dīp*. : (1) The *apavāda* character of P. 1. 1. 46 becomes uncertain because of the uncertainty of the purpose of the code-letters *ṭ* and *k* in the case of suffixes. (2) As a result of this, the relation between

P. 1. 1. 46 and P. 3. 1. 2 becomes that of *vipratiṣedha*. So : विप्रतिषेधे परं कार्यम्. The प्रत्ययपरत्व stands.

The *Dīp.* gives the illustration of the suffix *-tātaṅ* (P. 7. 1. 35 : तुह्योस्तातङ् ... etc.) as a parallel. Theoretically, the code-letter *ṅ* serves many purposes. For instance, it indicates that if a substitute is *ṅit*, it will take the place of the last phoneme of the original (P. 1. 1. 53 : ङिच्च). It also indicates that a verbal stem will not undergo Guṇa or Vṛddhi if the suffix is *ṅit* (P. 1. 1. 5 : क्ङिति च), and so on. Now when *-tātaṅ* is taught (P. 7. 1. 35 : तुह्योस्तातङ् ...) it creates a problem. Since it consists of many phonemes, it should replace the whole suffix *-tu* or *-hi* according to P. 1. 1. 55 : अनेकाल्शित् सर्वस्य. But P. 1. 1. 53 : ङिच्च also claims it as its domain because of the code-letter *ṅ*. Now ङिच्च is an *apavāda* of अनेकाल्शित् सर्वस्य and so should normally prevail over it, and accordingly *-tāt* should have replaced only the final phoneme of *tu/hi*. But *ṅ* has many other purposes to serve, e. g. the prohibition of Guṇa/Vṛddhi as said above. So the purpose of *ṅ* in *tātaṅ* becomes doubtful. So ङिच्च loses its supremacy over अनेकाल्शित् सर्वस्य. Therefore both the rules come down on the same level and अनेकाल्शित् सर्वस्य prevails as it is the later rule. The same thing happens, says Bhar., in the case of P. 1. 1. 46. Although an *apavāda*, it loses strength as *ṭ/k* are of a doubtful purpose (संदिग्धनिमित्तम्), and ultimately P. 3. 1. 2 prevails. For the parallels, see also *Dīp.* under P. 1. 1. 53 which reads as follows :

' ङिच्च ' इति । यद्यपि सर्वानुसंहारस्य बाधकम् एवमपि तातङो यत् ङित्करणं तदन्यार्थमपि संभवतीति ङित्त्वनिमित्तं संदिह्यते । तेन संदेहात् संदिग्धोपस्थानो योगः, यथैव उत्सर्गः । संदिग्धोपस्थान इत्यपकृष्यमाणबलो नोत्सहते बाधितुमिति विप्रतिषेध उच्यते । (*p.* 40, *ll.* 18–21)

In the *Dīp.* (*p.* 8, *l.* 26), लक्षणम् means P. 1. 1. 46 : आद्यन्तौ टकितौ. निमित्तम्, the purpose (of a code-letter).—Cf. संदिग्धप्राप्तिकत्वात् here with संदिग्धोपस्थानो योगः in the *Dīp.* on P. 1. 1. 53 quoted above. Similarly दुर्बलः with अपकृष्यमाणबलः. – तथा च चोक्तं — तातङि ... This citation is from the *Mbh.* on P. 1. 1. 53. Read : ' तातङि ङित्करणस्य सावकाशत्वाद् विप्रतिषेधात् सर्वादेशः ' (वा.) । तातङि ङित्करणं सावकाशम् । कोऽवकाशः ? गुणवृद्धिप्रतिषेधार्थो ङकारः । ङित्करणस्य सावकाशत्वाद् विप्रतिषेधात् सर्वादेशो भविष्यति ।

Readings : (1) (*p.* 8, *l.* 26) MS असंविद्यं (for °दिग्धम्). — (2) (*p.* 9, *l.* 7) MS प्रयोजनांतयाभावाद् ; AL °जनम् । आद्यन्ताभावाद् . — (3) (*p.* 9, *l.* 8) MS वासंदिग्वा ; AL वा संदिह्यते (for चासंदिग्धे).

[13]

The *pratīka* प्रयोजनं नाम तद् ... etc. stands for the following *Mbh.* : प्रयोजनं नाम तद् वक्तव्यं यन्नियोगतः स्यात् । यदि चायं नियोगतः परः स्यात्, तत एतत् प्रयोजनं स्यात् ।

कुतो नु खल्वेतत् — टित्करणादयं परो भविष्यति, न पुनरादिरिति ? किल्करणाच्च परो भविष्यति, न पुनरन्त इति ?

This *Mbh.* refutes the argument made in the previous [12] section. It regards the scope shown for code letters *ṭ* and *k* of a suffix as doubtful. That is so because this so-called utility is not independent. It depends on the assumption that a suffix will always follow. But what is the guarantee for such an assumption ? If it is finally shown that a suffix will follow, well and good. Then the *ī* in the feminine in the case of a *ṭit* and the elision of a radical final *ā* in the case of a *kit* could be claimed to be the benefits of the *ṭit* and *kit* nature of the suffixes. But not before it. To come to our examples, you could form the feminine *-carī* from *-cara* (*kurucarī* etc.), only if it is shown conclusively that the suffix *-ṭa* will follow the root. But what is the authority for this ? The same applies to *godaḥ* also. So P. 1. 1. 46 has to be understood as an *apavāda* of P. 3. 1. 2. The *Vār.* (1) is necessary in order to ensure प्रत्ययपरत्व.

The *Dīp.* explains this argument by means of a parallel of the suffix *ṇiṅ* taught after the root *kam-* by P. 3. 1. 30 : कमेर्णिङ्. The *Dīp.* says that both the code-letters of this suffix, *ṇ* and *ṅ*, indicate various operations, without being dependent on any other factor (अन्यनिरपेक्ष). Thus, *ṅ* indicates (1) Ātmanepada (P. 1. 3. 12 : अनुदात्तङित आत्मनेपदम्) and (2) prohibition of *Vṛddhi*[1] (P. 1. 1. 5 : क्ङिति च). It also serves the purpose of *sāmānyagrahaṇāvighāta*. This is the idea : If Pāṇini had said merely *कमेर्णिः then the rules like P. 6. 4. 51 : णेरनिटि, or P. 3. 1. 48 : णिश्रिद्रुस्रुभ्यः कर्तरि चङ् etc., which mention only *ṇi* without any code letter, would have applied only to *kam* because of the use of pure *ṇi* in its case. They would not have applied to the causative stems, or to the roots of the *cur-* class, since the suffix taught in their case is *ṇic* (with the code-letter *c*). And that would have been technically correct in view of the Pari. (82) : तदनुबन्धकग्रहणे नातदनुबन्धकस्य. — The code tetter *ṇ* also is useful without depending on any other thing. The code-letter *ṅ* indicates Vṛddhi (P. 7. 2. 116 : अत उपधायाः). It also serves, as in the case of *ṅ*, to ensure *sāmānyagrahaṇa*.

The *Dīp.* now refutes the parallel cited by the opponent (in [12]), viz. of the suffix *-tātaṅ*. Here the code-letter *ṅ* is not able to indicate prohibition of Guṇa on its own. To be able do it, it also requires that the suffix *tāt* replaces the whole (सति सर्वादेशे) of *hi* or *tāt*, e. g. (कुरु+हि) > (कुरु+तात्). Here the Guṇa-substitute of the final of *kuru* will be prohibited by *ṅ*. If, however, *tāt*

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1. Bhar. seems to be ' nodding ' here. P 1. 1. 5 prohibits only that Vṛddhi which is taught specifically for *ik*. The Vṛddhi in the case of *kam-* is due to P. 7. 2. 116 : अत उपधायाः : it is not *iglakṣaṇa*.

replaced only the final, i. e. (कुरु+हि) > (कुरु+ह्+तात्), then the Guṇa will not be prohibited, for in that case the suffix (*tāt*) does not immediately follow the stem *kuru*. The *Dīp*. points out that the *ṭit-kit* suffixes in the matter of *ī* and *ā*-elision are like *tātaṅ* in the matter of prohibition of the Guṇa. The *ṭit* character of the suffix *ṭa* can demand that the noun formed with it should end in *ī* in feminine, but it is not in its own power. For that it has to depend upon the suffix following the root (यदि परः). If it does not follow, there cannot be forms like *kurucarī*. That benefit is doubtful. On the other hand, the initial position is a certain utility. Since the utility of *ī* in the feminine base is to be given up on account of its uncertainty, the rule will press for its certain utility, viz. the initial position. Therefore, as an *apavāda*, it tends to supersede P. 3. 1. 2. Therefore, to ensure the प्रत्ययपरत्व, the suggestion of the *Vār*. (1) has to be accepted.

Just as the *pūrvapakṣa* in the previous section [12] about the capacity of *ṅ* in *tātaṅ* to indicate the absence of Guṇa was based on the *Mbh*. *pūrvapakṣa* under P. 1. 1. 53. similarly its refutation here is also based on the continuation of the *Mbh*. under the same rule. Read : प्रयोजनं नाम तद् वक्तव्यं यन्नियोगतः स्यात्। यदि चायं [=तातङ्] नियोगतः सर्वादेशः स्यात्, तत एतत्प्रयोजनं स्यात् । कुतो नु खलु एतत् — ङित्करणादयं सर्वादेशो भविष्यति, न पुनरन्त्यस्य स्यादिति ?

Readings : (1) (*p*. 9, *l*. 9) The MS drops तद्, and inserts तत् प्रयोजनम् after नियोगतः स्यात्. — (2) (*p*. 9, *l*. 14) MS AL तथा (for तदा). — (3) (*p*. 9, *l*. 15) MSA ङित्वस्य (for टित्वस्य). — (4) (*p*. 9, *l*. 15) MS AL संदेहः (AL °हो) (for संदेह-).

[14]

The *Dīp*. कथं कृत्वेदमुच्यते ... etc. raises a question as to how, even as a *pūrvapakṣa*, the Vārttikakāra could say : परवचनात् सिद्धम्. The reply given is that that statement is based on the mere possibility of the utility (प्रयोजनसंभवं दृष्ट्वा) of *ṭ* in indicating *ī* in the feminine. The realisation of this possibility of course depends on the *ṭit* taking a succeeding position. But one does not think much of such a practical restriction when one thinks of advantages only theoretically. It is pointed out that a *mit* differs in this respect. If a suffix like *śnam* is also made to follow on the strength of प्रत्ययपरत्व, then the affixion of *m* will be simply futile and superfluous. So P. 3. 1. 2 is superseded in that case. Not so in the case of a *ṭit* suffix, at least *prima facie*.

यदा तु तावत्काला ... etc. The *Dīp*. now looks at the situation from another angle and justifies the *Mbh*. प्रयोजनं नाम तद् वक्तव्यम् ... etc. If one does not think of a future utility (*ī* dependent on the problematic प्रत्ययपरत्व of a *ṭit* suffix) and acts in the present (तावत्काला प्रवृत्तिः), and makes a *ṭit* suffix

precede, then of course there is no reason whatsoever for the emergence of the feminine in *ī*. In that *case* the *ṭit* character bringing about the precedence of the suffix will itself supersede, since it is not dependent on any other factor (अप्रतिबद्धम्). Thus the code-letter *ṭ* may not be fruitful in the matter of *ī* in the feminine, and so it cannot be cited as *prayojana*.

अथ वा, परवचनात् ... etc. Here the *Dīp.* offers an alternative explanation of परवचनात् सिद्धम्. Pāṇini teaches *ṅīp* (i. e. *ī*) after the code letter *ṭ*. Now 'after *ṭ*' means 'after what ends in *ṭ*' (P. 1. 1. 72), i. e. 'after a nominal stem which ends in (i. e. is formed with) a *ṭit* suffix'. Now if a *ṭit* suffix were to be initial (i. e. were to precede the verbal root), there will not be any nominal stem in a *ṭit* suffix, and as a result of it the rule teaching *ī* in feminine in connection with the code-letter *ṭ* will be rendered meaningless. To avoid this undesirable eventuality the rule परश्च will have to be looked upon as an *apavāda* as a result of which it will supersede P. 1. 1. 46, contrary to (वैपरीत्येन) what is assumed by the opponent.

But then how is it that this *Mbh.* denies the utility of *ṭ* in ensuring *ī* in the feminine and says : प्रयोजनं नाम तद् वक्तव्यम् ... etc. ? The *Dīp.* अयं तूभयवन्तमाश्रित्य ... etc. answers this question.

The *Mbh.* कुतो नु खल्वेतत् (quoted in the *Dīp.* as कुतस्त्वेतत्) ... etc. means this (according to the *Dīp.*) : you believe that in order to give scope to *ī*- indicating function of *ṭ*, a *ṭit* suffix will follow the root. But what guarantee is there for it ? Such a suffix may even precede the root in order to give scope to P. 1. 1. 46. Why do you count on the possible future utility, and not on the immediate application of the rule (तावत्कालः प्रवृत्तिसंभवः) thus resulting into the *ṭit* suffix preceding the rule ? (The same argument applies *mutatis mutandis* to the *kit* also).

The *Dīp.* एकान्तेनाश्रीयमाणे टित ... etc. explains the following *Mbh.*: टितः खल्वप्येष परिहारः, यत्र नास्ति संभवः — यत् परश्च स्यादादिश्च. The *Mbh.* accepts, for the sake of argument, that P. 3. 1. 2 will supersede P. 1. 1. 46 in the conflict. But this establishment of प्रत्ययपरत्व will be restricted to *ṭit* suffixes. (The *Dīp.* says that टितः खल्वेष means टित एव.) The problem will still remain for *kit* suffixes where there is no विप्रतिषेध and consequently विप्रतिषेधे परं कार्यम् does not apply.

According to this argument, here there is a mutual conflict (विप्रतिषेध). P. 1. 1. 46 says that a *ṭit* precedes the root while P. 3. 1. 2 says that a suffix follows. The two positions are contradictory (तत्रादित्वं परत्वप्रविरोधीति विप्रतिषेधः). So विप्रतिषेधे परं कार्यम्.

Readings : (1) (*p*. 9, *l*. 21) MS -प्रतिबंध: (for °बद्ध:). — (2) (*p*. 9, *l*. 21) MS AL तस्माच्च (for °न्न). — (3) (*p*. 9, *l*. 26) MS विपरीत्येन (for वैप°). — (4) (*p*. 9, *l*. 26) MS [उ]भयवतमाश्रित्य; AL [उ]भयमनाश्रित्य. — (5) (*p*. 9, *l*. 28) MS अनादिर् (for आदिर्). — (6) (*p*. 10, *l*. 2) AL परत्वस्य वि°.

[15]

कितस्त्वपरिहारः. This *pratīka* stands for the following *Mbh.* : कितस्त्वपरिहारः। अस्ति हि संभवो यत् परश्च स्यादन्तश्च।

The *Mbh.* says that in the case of a *ṭit* there was at least some semblance of विप्रतिषेध, and so the rule विप्रतिषेधे परं कार्यम् could operate. But there is no such justification in the case of a *kit*. There is no conflict between a *kit* suffix being a final part of the root and also following it at the same time. Since there is no conflict, विप्रतिषेधे परं कार्यम् does not apply. So the opponent cannot say विप्रतिषेधात् सिद्धम्.

The *Dīp.* अवयवरूपेणोत्पत्तौ लिङ्गं etc. first resolves what looks like a contradiction in the *Mbh.* How can the *Mbh.* say : अस्ति हि संभवो यत् परश्च स्यादन्तश्च ? A *para* is a different entity which merely follows another entity. It does not become a part of it. An *anta*, on the other hand, does not just follow what precedes. It becomes a part - the final part - of it. And an *āgama* like इट् *is* a part, an initial part of the following suffix. The *Dīp.* cites P. 7. 2. 4 : नेटि as the clue indicating that the *iṭ* comes into being as a part of the suffix *sic* (a sign of Aorist). This rule prohibits Vṛddhi when *is* (i. e. *iṭ* + *sic*) follows the root (e. g. *amoṣīt* from *a* + *muṣ* + *iṭ* + *sic* + *ī* + *t*). If *iṭ* had merely come before *sic* and just stood near it, there would not have been Vṛddhi, (by P. 7. 2. 3 : वदव्रजहलन्तस्याचः), for *sic* does not immediately follow the root. Then there would not have been any need for Pāṇini to frame the prohibitive rule नेटि. The intervention of *iṭ* would have already prevented the Vṛddhi (समीपवचने हि व्यवधानादेवाप्राप्तिः स्यात्). Still Pāṇini frames the rule नेटि. That suggests that an *āgama* like *iṭ* is an integral part of the *āgamin*. And once it is thus decided that a *ṭit* or *kit* is a part, it cannot be said to follow (न चावयवः ... शक्यः प्रतिपत्तुम्).

The *Dīp.* अथ समासान्ताः ... etc. answers this objection. Bhar. gives the parallel of the समासान्त suffixes (P. 5. 4. 68). They are taught in the jurisdiction of P. 3. 1. 1 : प्रत्ययः. So they follow the stem (P. 3. 1. 2 : परश्च). Still they are called the final parts of the compound stems to which they are added. Similarly a *kit* suffix also will be both *para* and also *anta*. For the objection and its reply read the following Kaiy. : ननु परत्वावयवत्वयोर्विरोधात्

कथमुच्यते 'परश्च स्यादन्तश्चेति'? नैष दोषः, परस्य सतोऽन्तवत्कार्यप्राप्त्यान्तत्वमुच्यते, यथा समासान्तानाम्।

"Accepted. But so what?" the oppenent will ask. The *Mbh.* puts this question and answers it thus: तत्र को दोषः? 'उपसर्गे घोः किः' — आध्योः, प्रध्योः। 'नोङ्धात्वोः ...' इति प्रतिषेधः प्रसज्येत.

The words आधि and प्रधि are formed from आ+धा+कि and प्र+धा+कि by the rule P. 3. 3. 92: उपसर्गे घोः किः. आध्योः, प्रध्योः are Genitive (or Locative) dual forms. They are accented on the case ending (*ādhyòḥ*: svarita according to P. 8. 2. 4; उदात्तस्वरितयोर्यणः ... etc.). But now if the *it* is regarded as a part of the root (किर्धात्वेकदेश इति) the rule P. 6. 1. 175: नोङ्धात्वोः (= 'अनयोर्यणः परे शसादय उदात्ता न स्युः' *SidKau.*) will prohibit the *udātta* on the case-ending because *y* in that case will be a part of the root and P. 6. 1. 175 prohibits the Udātta on the case ending — from *śas* onwards if the latter follows a *yaṇ* phoneme that comes from *ūṅ* (substitute of final *u* in feminine, P. 4. 1. 66) or that which belongs to a root.

खलप्वः is cited as a regular example of P. 6. 1. 175, where the *yaṇ* phoneme *v* comes from the root *pū*. Another difficulty pointed out by Bhar. is that in Nom. and Acc. the dual form will be आध्यौ (instead of आधी) because, *i* now being the final part of the root, P. 6. 4. 82: एरनेकाचो ... will step in, demanding a *yaṇ* Saṁdhi, instead of the सवर्णदीर्घ.

Readings: (1) (*p.* 10, *l.* 4) MS °स्त्वपरीहारः. — (2) (*p.* 10, *l.* 4) After परीहार', the MS repeats from °परवचनात् सिद्धमिति चेत् (*p.* 8, *l.* 19) up to यद्यपि लक्षणमसंदिग्धं यत्तु नि (*p.* 8, *l.* 26). — (3) (*p.* 10, *l.* 8) MS स्यान्मतं (for अस्यायमन्तः). — (4) (*p.* 10, *l.* 9) MSAL °देशा इति धातुयणा (MS °ण)म्. — (5) (*p.* 19, *l.* 9) AL खलप्वे.

[16]

टितश्चाप्यपरिहारः. This is followed in the *Mbh.* by स्यादेव ह्ययं टित्करणादादिः न पुनः परः. The *Mbh.* gives up its stand (टितः खल्वप्येष परिहारः ...) which it had taken for the time being and now says that परवचनात् सिद्धम् is not a solution for the *ṭit* suffixes also. A *ṭit* suffix is bound to take the preceding position because P. 1. 1. 46 does not depend upon anything else for this preceding position.

प्रयोजनसंभवेऽपि परिगृहीते. After this the *Dīp.* is corrupt. It reads यश्च स्यापितप्रति, which is not intelligible. AL read it as यश्च स्यादिति तत्प्रति-, further reading the next two letters as च्छायं, but they are better taken as क्वायं (a v. l. of the *Mbh.* क्व तर्हीदानीमिदं).

क्वार्थं स्यादिति. Actually the *Mbh.* reads : क्व तर्हीदानीमिदं स्यात्, followed by टित ईकारो भवतीति ? If, as an *apavāda*, every *ṭit* suffix is to precede the root, where is the scope for the utility of *ṭ* as indicating *ī* in the feminine, as there will be no nominal stem ending in a *ṭit* suffix ? — asks the *vipratiṣedha-vādin.*

य उभयवान् 'गापोष्टक्' इति is the reply. The *apavādavādin* says that the purpose of indicating *ī* in the feminine will not be futile even if P. 1. 1. 46 is regarded as an *apavāda* of P. 3. 1. 2. There is a scope for this purpose in a suffix which is furnished with both *ṭ* and *k* (य उभयवान्). The suffix *ṭak* taught after the roots *gai* and *pā* in P. 3. 2. 8 : गापोष्टक् is a case in point.

Here, by reason of one and the same rule P. 1. 1. 46 *ṭ* of *ṭak* demands that the suffix precedes while the *k* demands that it follows. In the tussle (a sort of *vipratiṣedha* called शब्दपरविप्रतिषेध) *k* which is mentioned later (as following) than *ṭ* in this rule (mentioned as preceding) supersedes so that the suffix *ṭak* follows the root. So from *sāmaga* and *surāpa* we have *sāmagī* and *surāpī* respectively in the feminine.

Ordinarily, a विप्रतिषेध is between two rules (sūtras). Sometimes it is admitted even between the earlier and later parts of one and the same rule, or between an earlier and a later word. Such a kind of विप्रतिषेध is called शब्दपरविप्रतिषेध. It is noteworthy that this term, though not occurring in the *Prad.*, is again mentioned by Nāg. Read : परत्वात् इति । शब्दपरविप्रतिषेधात् । आद्यन्ताविति सूत्रे च 'कित् अन्तः' इत्यस्य परत्वादित्यर्थः । (See the *Mbh.* under P. 1. 1. 57.)

The *Dīp.* तत्र टिदादिरित्यस्यावकाशः ... etc. illustrates this शब्दपरविप्रतिषेध.

Finally the *Dīp.* remarkes that in the case of चरेष्टः, the suffix *ṭa* will have to precede, undesiredly, the root (as there is no additional *k* unlike *ṭak*), resulting in the non-availability of the desired form. Hence the judgement : अपरिहारोऽयं 'परवचनात् सिद्धम्' इति.

[17]

सिद्धं तु षष्ठ्यधिकारे वचनात्. The *Mbh.* on this *Vār.* (3) reads : सिद्धमेतत् । कथम् ? षष्ठ्यधिकारे वचनात् । षष्ठ्यधिकारेऽयं योगः कर्तव्यः — 'आद्यन्तौ टकितौ षष्ठीनिर्दिष्टस्य' इति ।

Here it is suggested that it is not necessary to say प्रत्ययप्रतिषेधः as said in the *Vār.* 1. The goal is achieved by reading the present rule (P. 1. 1. 46) in the domain of P. 1. 1. 49 : षष्ठी स्थानेयोगा. The result then

will be that *ṭit* and *kit* will become initial and final parts respectively, only when there is a स्थानषष्ठी (Genitive indicative of place) in the rule, e. g. in सार्वधातुकस्येड् वलादेः', 'भियो हेतुभये षुक्' etc. And in rules like P. 3. 2. 16: चरेष्टः (where the suffix *ṭa* is taught after *car-*) there is no स्थानषष्ठी. (In fact there is no षष्ठी at all there.) It is पञ्चमी (Ablative), co ordinate with धातोः (P. 3. 1. 91). The same applies to the case endings etc. which come under the jurisdiction of P. 4. 1. 1: ङ्याप्-प्रातिपदिकात्. In other words P. 1. 1. 46 applies in the case of the 'augments' (*iṭ*, *ṣuk* etc.), while P. 3. 1. 2 applies to *pratyaya*-s (suffixes), where a स्थानषष्ठी is not already due.

प्रत्ययाधिकारे या षष्ठी ... etc. Even in the sections on *pratyaya* (P. 3. 1. 1ff.) we sometimes come across rules where a stem is mentioned in Genitive (instead of Ablative as expected), e. g. गापोष्टक् (P. 3. 2. 8). Bhar. tells us that these rules are not subject to P. 1. 1. 46. The Genitive used there is to be looked upon as used in the sense of Ablative and the *ṭit* suffix is to follow the root.

अन्तस्य प्रवृत्तिः in the *Dīp.* seems to have been used in the capacity of *upalakṣaṇa* i. e. standing for आद्यन्तयोः प्र°.

[18]

आद्यन्तयोर्वा षष्ठ्यर्थत्वादिति. This *pratīka* stands for the following *Mbh.* 'आद्यन्तयोर्वा षष्ठ्यर्थत्वात् तदभावेऽसंप्रत्ययः' (वा. ४)। आद्यन्तयोर्वा षष्ठ्यर्थत्वात् तदभावे = षष्ठ्या अभावे असंप्रत्ययः स्यात्। आदिरन्तो वा न भविष्यति।

The *Mbh.* says that a Genitive indicates a part i. e. an initial or a final part in the present case. In rules like चरेष्टः there is no Genitive. Therefore there will not be any understanding of *ṭa* taking an initial position in the root *car* by P. 3. 2. 8.

अर्थशब्दो नाभिधेयवचनः ... etc. Although for all practical purposes *artha* means 'meaning' Bhar. wants to make the technical position clear and so says that here *artha* means *prayojana* 'purpose, object' and, secondarily 'cause', which brings about the use of a word. आदि and अन्त are not strictly the *meanings* expressed by a Genitive. They are merely the 'purpose' behind the use of the Genitive. Similarly Kaiy. who says: षष्ठ्याः प्रयोजकावाद्यन्तौ, where प्रयोजक practically means 'a cause'. The *Dīp.* says that we shall surmise (प्रतिपद्यामहे) that the meanings *ādi* and *anta* must not have been intended here, otherwise there would have been a Genitive in rules like चरेष्टः, as required (प्रयोजन) by them.

इतरः षष्ठी यस्मान्नास्ति ... etc. This *Dīp.* introduces the following *Mbh.*: युक्तं पुनर्यच्छब्दनिमित्तको नामार्थः स्यात्, नार्थनिमित्तकेन नाम शब्देन भवितव्यम्?

This *Mbh.* contains an objection. It blames the *Vār.* for saying तदभावेऽसंप्रत्ययः. This statement is obviously equivalent to शब्दाभावेऽर्थाभावः. This seems to imply that word is the cause of meaning. That is obviously against the basic tenet of Grammar. So the *Mbh.* asks indignantly : युक्तं पुनर्यच्छब्दनिमित्तकः ... etc. Does not the opponent know that it is the meaning which is the cause of word (नार्थे ... शब्देन भवितव्यतम्)?

The *Dīp.* इतरः षष्ठी यस्मान्नास्ति ... etc., while introducing the above *Mbh.* says that the objector has not understood the *Vār.* correctly. He seems to understand the *Vār.* as accepting that *artha* (word-meaning) is preceded by word (शब्दपूर्वोऽर्थोऽभ्युपगतः). Hence the objector's outburst.

The *Dīp.* इतरः शब्दाभावोऽर्थाभावस्य ... etc. introduces the *Mbh.* : अर्थनिमित्तक एव शब्दः। तत् कथम्? आद्यन्तौ षष्ठ्यर्थौ। न चात्र षष्ठीं पश्यामः। ते मन्यामहे — आद्यन्तावेवात्र न स्तः। तयोरभावे षष्ठ्यपि न भवतीति। The *Dīp.* says that the *Vār.* does *not* mean that word precedes meaning (*artha*). Meaning is certainly already there before word (अर्थपूर्वक एव तु शब्दः). All that the *Vār.* and the *Mbh.* on it mean is that absence of word is a clue to the inference that meaning is not there (शब्दाभावोऽर्थाभावस्यानुमानम्). It should not be understood that शब्दपूर्वोऽर्थः is accepted. Cf. Kaiy. : अर्थ एव शब्दस्य प्रयोजकस्तत्प्रतिपादनाय शब्दप्रयोगः। अप्रयोगाच्चानुमीयते — नूनमर्थ एवात्र प्रयोजको नास्ति, शब्दप्रयोगं यः प्रयुञ्जीतेत्यर्थः।

In एतद्वर्जम्, एतद् = प्रत्यय. The rule आद्यन्तौ applies to *ṭit/kit* elements excepting the *pratyaya*-s (suffixes).

किं च षष्ठी प्रत्यक्षपक्षः ... etc. An additional observation of Bhar. There are two elements which are both responsible for the understanding of prefixion and suffixion of *ṭit* and *kit* word-elements respectively, viz. (i) a Genitive (of the word which is to take a *ṭit* or *kit* element), and (2) a *ṭit-kit*. Of these, the Genitive is self-evident, while the ascertainment of the place (initial or final) is a matter of inference — ' Because a *ṭit*, therefore an initial ' and so on. So in चरेष्टः etc. (where a suffix is involved), the mere absence of Genitive rules out the possibility of *ṭa* taking the initial position (which latter is only doubtfully suggested by the code-letter *ṭ*).

यत्र तु प्रत्ययविधौ ... etc. Bhar. advances some alternative suggestions for cases where a stem is mentioned in the Genitive even when a *pratyaya* is taught e. g. गापोष्टक् (P. 3. 2. 8). Here (1) such a Genitive should be supposed to have the meaning of the Ablative (पञ्चम्यर्थे षष्ठी). Or (2) the apparently Genitive ending should be understood as an Ablative ending itself on the strength of the *Mbh.* statement : सुपां सुपो भवन्ति (III. 256. 13). Or (3) let गापोः remain a Genitive. A word धातोः (in the Abl.) is understood (since the rule is in the jurisdiction of धातोः, P. 3. 1. 91). That will give occasion to P. 3. 1. 2 for application. Bhar. incidentally says that this device is useful in the case

of Taddhita suffixes also, e. g. in the case of P. 5. 1. 127 : कपिज्ञात्योर्ढक्. Here a word प्रातिपदिकात् should be made to continue from P. 4. 1. 1. It is the Ablative in धातोः and प्रातिपदिकात् which produces the *pratyaya*, not the Genitive.

Readings : (1) (*p* 10, *l*. 22) MS आद्यार्थे (for आद्यर्थः). — (2) (*p*. 10, *l*. 24) MS प्रयोज्यश्च; AL °ज्यस्य (for °ज्या). — (3) (*p*. 10, *l*. 25) AL ब्रुवन्. — (4) (*p*. 11, *l*. 4) MS षष्ठ्यस्तिमायि; AL षष्ठ्यः स्त्रियामिति (for षष्ठ्यस्ति सापि). — (5) (*p*. 11, *l*. 5) MS कपितात्यार्; AL क्रिपि तयोर् (for कपिज्ञात्योर्).

* * *

mid aco 'ntyāt paraḥ / P. 1. 1. 47

[1]

After the *ṭit* and *kit* elements Pāṇini now teaches the place of the *mit* ones. This rule says that a *mit* element comes after the last of the vowels of the element for which it is taught.

The *Mbh.* किमर्थमिदमुच्यते is by way of introduction to the *Vār*. 1 which gives the reply that P. 1. 1. 47 is to set aside, in advance, (1) P. 1. 1. 49 which says that a substitute, indicated by a स्थानषष्ठी, takes the place of the last phoneme (in combination with P. 1. 1. 52 : अलोऽन्त्यस्य) and (2) P. 3. 1. 2 which says that a suffix (प्रत्यय) follows the stem in connection with which it is taught. The *Mbh.* runs thus :

किमर्थमिदमुच्यते ? ' मिदचोऽन्त्यात् पर इति स्थानपरप्रत्ययापवादः ' (वा. १)। ' मिदचोऽन्त्यात् परः ' इत्युच्यते स्थानेयोगत्वस्य प्रत्ययपरत्वस्य चापवादः। स्थानेयोगत्वस्य तावत् — कुण्डानि, वनानि। पयांसि, यशांसि। प्रत्ययपरत्वस्य — भिनत्ति, छिनत्ति।

The *Dīp.* परस्य प्रत्ययस्य ... etc. explains the expression परप्रत्यय (occurring in the *Vār.*) which is apparently somewhat irregular. Three explanations are given. (1) परप्रत्ययस्य means परस्य प्रत्ययस्य. Though apparently meaning a धर्मिप्रतिषेध the expression results into धर्मप्रतिषेध. What is prohibited is the succeeding position of a प्रत्यय, not the प्रत्यय itself (धर्मप्रतिषेधो, न धर्मिप्रतिषेधः). By धर्म 'property' is meant परत्व (suggested by the word परस्य), by धर्मिन् the प्रत्यय 'suffix'. (2) Here प्रत्यय means the understanding, knowledge (संविज्ञानम्). The present rule sets aside the understanding that a suffix follows in the case of *mit* suffixes. (3) परप्रत्ययस्य = प्रत्ययपरत्वस्य. The word पर, though usually an adjective, is here to be understood as expressive of the quality (i. e. परत्व), even without the suffix (*-tva* etc.) which expresses a quality. This explanation is almost the same as the 1st, the only difference apparenly being that in the first explanation परत्व is only suggested, while in the third it is directly expressed.

Besides, in this third interpretation, the sequence परप्रत्यय is to be understood as meant for प्रत्ययपर by putting the word in the राजदन्तादि class (P. 2. 2. 31). (There is no such difficulty in the first interpretation.)

The *Dip.* भाष्यकारस्तु अक्षरार्थमनादृत्य ... etc. is a rebuke administered to Pat. for having failed to point out the grammatical difficulty involved in this expression and for not suggesting its solution.

Readings : (1) (*p.* 11, *l.* 9) MS धर्मप्रतिषेधः (for धर्मि°). — (2) (*p.* 11, *l.* 12) AL (reading the MS as अन्तरार्थम्) अनन्तरार्थम् (for अक्षरार्थम्).

[2]

The *Dip.* here raises a question as to why the Pari. (59) पुरस्तादपवादा अनन्तरान् विधीन् बाधन्ते नोत्तरान् is not put forth by Pat. (who has himself recognized the Pari. under P. 7. 2. 100 [III. 308. 20]) as a reply to the question : किमर्थमिदमुच्यते ? That would be useful in the case of the preceding rule (P. 1. 1. 46) also. For that *apavāda* rule supersedes only P. 1. 1. 49 : षष्ठी स्थानेयोगा (which is an अनन्तरविधि); it does not supersede P. 3. 1. 2 : परश्च (an उत्तरविधि), as a result of which the *ṭit* and *kit* suffixes (प्रत्ययाः) follow (and do not become the initial/final part of) the *prakṛti* as required by P. 1. 1. 46. It is true that it would be inconvenient in the present context as it would require even a *mit* suffix (like *śnam*) to follow the root, and not be an infix. But that is a different thing. If inconvenient, something should be done to counteract it. (Still one cannot help feeling that Bhar. lost the opportunity of bringing in this point under P. 1. 1. 46 : आद्यन्तौ टकितौ where it was most opportune. On the other hand it is embarrassing to raise it here under P. 1. 1. 47).

एवं मन्यते ... etc. gives the reply. It is based on the view which is called बाध्यविशेषचिन्ता. The Pari. पुरस्तादपवादाः ... contains three concepts viz. being beforehand (पुरस्तात्), following closely (अनन्तर), and following at a distance (उत्तर). Such concepts are possible only on the view that each general rule is a separate one (भेदेन च व्यपेक्षायाम्). (It is also implied that one takes one's stand on grammar alone : शास्त्रापेक्षायां प्रवृत्तौ, i. e. the correctness of a usage is to be decided by grammatical rules alone.) There it is possible to say only such-and-such rules (viz. *anantara*) are superseded and not such-and-such ones (viz. *uttara*). It is natural that when the *apavāda* proceeds it should be satisfied when it has superseded the first general rule that it comes across. Once satisfied, it does not take the trouble of exerting to supersede the distant general rules. But this is not possible on the बाध्यसामान्य view i. e. when all the general rules are looked upon as one whole. When there is one whole, you cannot say that one general rule is near or that another is away from the exception. (This is

also true when one decides the correctness of a form from the usage, and not on the basis of grammatical rules.)

पुरस्तादिति वा अनन्तर इति वा refers to the two Paribhāṣās, पुरस्तादपवादाः ... (Pari. 59) and अनन्तरस्य विधिर्वा प्रतिषेधो वा भवति (Pari. 61).

Since Pat. is here following the बाध्यसामान्य view, he has not referred to the पुरस्तात् Pari.

Readings : (1) (*p.* 11, *l.* 14) AL बाधितत्वं. — (2) (*p.* 11, *l.* 15) Ms आयो (for न्यायो). — (3) (*p.* 11, *l.* 18) AL वाऽऽनन्तर्यात्. — (4) (*p.* 11, *l.* 18) AL पूर्वस्मिन् (for अपूर्व°).

[3]

Here श्नमो मित्करणात् refers to the *Mbh.* अनवकाशं मित्करणं स्थानेयोगत्वं प्रत्ययपरत्वं च बाधते under the preceding rule P. 1. 1. 54. This *Dīp.* raises a question. If the Pari. पुरस्तादपवादाः ... is not applied here, i. e. in the context of the *ṭit*, *kit*, and *mit* suffixes, how does the *Mbh.* say : अनवकाशं मित्करणं ... etc.? And how does one know that in *śnam* the phoneme *m* is *it*?

The second question may perhaps appear somewhat absurd, because the final *m* of *śnam* is actually heard and gets the name of *it* by P. 1. 3. 3: हलन्त्यम्. The fact is, however, that a final consonant in the *upadeśa* does not necessarily become an *it* unless it has some purpose to serve. (For instance, *y* and *v* in P. 6. 1. 78: एचोऽयवायावः do not get the name *it*, cf. the *Sid-Kau.* on this rule : ... यवयोर्लोपो न। उच्चारणसामर्थ्यात्। एवं चेहेत्संज्ञापि न भवति।) If the Pari. पुरस्तादपवादाः ... is not applicable in the context of *ṭit*, *kit* and *mit* augments then no advantage accrues from the code-letter *m* at all. So it can't get the technical name *it* at all. Then how does Pat. say : अनवकाशं मित्करणं स्थानेयोगत्वं प्रत्ययपरत्वं च बाधते ?

The *Dīp.* प्रयोगात् — रुणद्धि, भिनत्तीति etc. answers the question श्नमो मित्त्वं कुतो निर्ज्ञातम्? This reference to the actual usage is one reply. The fact that in the usage the Vikaraṇa *śnam*, though a *pratyaya*, does not come after the root, but comes after the radical vowel is a clue to the inference that *na* here must be *mit*. For Pāṇini has designed his system so as to suit the actual usage (*vṛtta* or *prayoga*). Bhar. cites the *Mbh.* : वृत्तज्ञो ह्याचार्यो ... etc. which occurs under P. 1. 3. 9, *Vār.* 15 : वृत्ताद्वा which runs thus : वृत्ताद्वा पुनः सिद्धमेतत्। वृद्धिमन्तमाद्युदात्तं दृष्ट्वा ञिदिति व्यवसेयम्। अन्तोदात्तं दृष्ट्वा किदिति। युक्तं पुनर्यद् वृत्तनिमित्तको नामानुबन्धः स्यात्, नानुबन्धनिमित्तकेन नाम वृत्तेन भवितव्यम्? वृत्तनिमित्तक एवानुबन्धः। वृत्तज्ञो ह्याचार्योऽनुबन्धानासजति (I. 266. 17–21)।

ङित्यभस्याप्यनुबन्धकरणसामर्थ्यात् is a *Vār.* on P. 6. 4. 143 : टेः. The *Vār.* says that the mere fact that a suffix is *ḍit* is enough to bring about an elision of the *ṭi* portion of a stem even when the latter does not possess the name *bha* (although it is a requirement for the elision). For, otherwise the furnishing of the code-letter *ḍ* would be in vain. This accounts for the elision of *a* in *jan* when forms like *mandurajaḥ* are derived.

अथ वा शास्त्रं ... etc. gives an alternate reply. The grammar goes on attaching code-letters without any thought of its utility at the time. The code-letter is subsequently dropped also as required by P. 1. 3. 9. Now when a student with a critical mind becomes curious as to the utility of the code-letter, he thinks and comes to the conclusion that in the present case the succeeding position for *śnam*, which was due by P. 3. 1. 2, is now set aside and, instead, P. 1. 1. 47 is applied. Hence Pat.'s statement : यथा मिद्चोऽन्त्यात् परः ... etc.

Readings : (1) (*p.* 11, *l.* 20) MS AL चे(AL चे)दन्यायो (for चेदत्र न्यायो). — (2) (*p.* 11, *ll.* 20-21) AL मित्करणादिनिमित्तं. — (3) (*p.* 11, *l.* 22) AL ङित्वं तस्मादप्य° (for ङित्यभस्याप्य°). — (4) (*p.* 11, *l.* 23) MSAL °बहुसंज्ञं.

[4]

This *Dīp.* examines the *Mbh.* स्थानेयोगत्वस्य ... अपवादः. It first (तत्र यदि ... etc.) explains how the present rule is an *apavāda* of P. 1. 1. 49 : षष्ठी स्थानेयोगा, then raises an objection against it (अत्र विचार्यते), and finally (यदा त्वेतावद् ... etc.) justifies the *apavāda* view.

This is how the *sthāneyoga* position (i. e. substitution) first becomes due[1]: It is just as in the case of the rule P. 7. 3. 43 : रुहः पोऽन्यतरस्याम्. Let us forget for the moment the present rule (P. 1. 1. 47) and also the adhikāra अङ्गस्य. The rule रुहः पः means that *p* is (optionally) substituted in the place of the final phoneme (P. 1. 1. 52 : अलोऽन्त्यस्य), i. e. of *h* of *ruh* in the causative. Here actually *ruhaḥ* is a *sthānaṣaṣṭhī*, by the rule अलोऽन्त्यस्य it is the final *h* that comes to be replaced. Similarly, by the same logic, नपुंसकस्य झलचः would mean that *num* comes in the place of the final *jhal* (i. e. a consonant except semi-vowels and nasals) or of a similar *ac* (vowel) in the Nom. and Acc. pl. of a neuter stem. As this is not desired the present (P. 1. 1 47) overriding rule is framed.

This explanation is challenged in the *Dīp.* अत्र विचार्यते ... etc. There is only a single occurrence of the Genitive word viz *napuṁsakasya* (एकैवेयं षष्ठी ...). It can be taken either as an *avayavaṣaṣṭhī* going with *jhalac* (in the place

1. It is to be noted that Bhar. does not mention here तदन्तविधि.

of *jhal* and *ac*, when a part of a neuter stem) or as *sthānaṣaṣṭhī* ('*num* comes in the place of a neuter stem'). In the first interpretation, *napuṁsakasya* is not a *sthānaṣaṣṭhī*. In the second, there is no connection between *napuṁsakasya* and *jhalacaḥ*. A parallel of P. 7. 3. 82 : मिदेर्गुणः is given, where Guṇa is taught for the root *mid-*. There if the Genitive *mideḥ* is taken as *avayavaṣaṣṭhī* and so is made to qualify *ik* (which presents itself by the Pari. इको गुणवृद्धी), then there is no *sthānaṣaṣṭhī*. Similarly here. The objector means to say that since there is no possibility of स्थानेयोगत्व in this case, the present rule cannot be understood as its *apavāda*.

The *Dīp.* सत्यम्, एवमेतत् admits the force of the objection, but continues (यदा त्वेतावद् ...) to show how the original position of स्थानेयोगत्व is correct (to be further superseded by the present rule). An assumption, which was not stated expressly before, is now made clear. *Aṅgasya* is here valid by *adhikāra*. If it is ignored, i. e. if it is treated as if नपुंसकस्य had nothing to do with it, as is done in the prima facie view given above, there is no express mention of *sthāneyogatva* (न तदा स्थानेयोगत्वमस्ति शब्दोपादानम्). Still, it is indirectly suggested by the presence of *aṅgasya* as a result of which one understands the final vowel as the one to be replaced by *num*. (To avoid this undesired result P. 1. 1. 47 is framed.)

Observations : (1) This section is obscure. There are apparently many inconsistencies in it. We fail to perceive the exact problem as such. We are inclined to believe that the author is unnecessarily imagining a problem where it does not exist. The simple interpretation of the rule lies in making *halac* qualify *napuṁsakasya* which, by the consequent तदन्तविधि, results into the following explanation (given by Kaiy.) : 'नपुंसकस्य' इत्यत्र झलज्भ्यां नपुंसकस्य तदन्तविधिरित्यस्ति स्थानेयं गत्वस्य प्रसङ्गः। मित्त्वाच्चास्मिन्नुपस्थिते नपुंसकस्याङ्गस्येत्यवयवषष्ठी संपद्यते । Bhar. has deliberately ignored this simple position, apparently merely to make room for the objection — an cbjection for the sake of objection. The author is of course aware of this, as he has qualified the original position by *yadi* 'if' 'in case'. He thus keeps the original position deliberately weak to make room for the objection which refuses to accept that स्थानेयोगत्व has become due.

(2) Actually it does not matter whether you ignore *aṅgasya* or not. नपुंसकस्य can take care of it. It is not clear what is achieved by ignoring *aṅgasya* and then stating how स्नानेयोगत्व becomes due the way *Dīp.* has done it here.

(3) Either the text has become corrupt in transmission at some places or there may be an anomaly in the origin itself. Thus (i) in *l.* 4, झलचः is superfluous. The *Dīp.* is discussing the position of नपुंसकस्य only. Perhaps

झलच: was written by the scribe under the impression that the whole Sūtra was to be quoted. (ii) In *l.* 7, परो is wrong. स्थाने was expected, as *sthāneyogatva* is pleaded here. Further, अजन्तस्य also is strange here, since the तदन्तविधि (which would have given no occasion for the objection) was not resorted to when प्राप्ते स्थानेयोगत्वे was explained at the beginning. (iii) In *l.* 5, विशेषणे should have been विशेषणत्वे.

(4) Bhar. throughout speaks of *ac* only in this passage. Actually *jhal* is as much relevant as *ac*. So *ac* has to be understood, of necessity, as an *upalakṣaṇa* for *jhal* also.

(5) The illustration यथा मिद् इग्विशेषणे ... is ill placed. It does not support what precedes immediately (अथ स्थानेयोगत्वम् ...). It should have been after तत्र यदि ... नास्ति स्थानेयोगत्वम्, because then only there would be a common predicate, viz. नास्ति स्थानेयोगत्वम्.

(6) Kaiy. and Nāg. have taken no notice of this part of the *Dīp.*, either because they did not think that there was any stuff in the objection and the reply to it, or because they too did not know what to make of it.

Readings : (1) (*p.* 12, *l.* 3) AL इहेहंश्रेति । एवं (for °ह्रस्य इत्येवं). — (2) (*p.* 12, *l.* 4) MSAL विशेषणार्थषष्ठी. — (3) (*p.* 12, *l.* 7) AL उपात्तं तेन (for अपेक्षितं न). — (4) (*p.* 12, *l.* 8) AL एवम् (for अचम्).

[5]

The *pratika* भवेदिदं युक्तमुदाहरणं — कुण्डानीति stands for the following *Mbh.*: भवेदिदं युक्तमुदाहरणं — कुण्डानि, वनानि — यत्र नास्ति संभवो यदयमचोऽन्त्यात परश्च स्यात्, स्थाने चेति । इदं त्वयुक्तम् — पयांसि, यशांसीति । अस्ति हि संभवो यदयमचोऽन्त्यात् परश्च स्यात, स्थाने चेति ।

कुण्डानि etc. are Nom. or Act. pl. of the neuter stems *kuṇḍa* etc. which contain an infix *n* (नुम्) according to P. 7. 1. 72 : नपुंसकस्य झलचः ('झलन्तस्याजन्तस्य च क्लीबस्य नुमागमः स्यात् सर्वनामस्थाने परे' सि. कौ.). This *Mbh.* takes objection to the examples पयांसि, यशांसि. This is the argument : In the *a*-stems *kuṇḍa* etc. it is impossible to make *num* a substitute of *a* (as required by P. 1. 1. 49 : षष्ठी स्थानेयोगा) and at the same time to put it after the final vowel — i. e. *a* itself (as required by the present rule). Therefore let this rule (P. 1. 1. 47) supersede P. 1. 1. 49. But the case of पयांसि is different. There *num* can come after the last *a* and can also come in the place of the final consonant *s*. Thus there is no conflict there. The *num* does not remain without a scope. So it cannot be an *apavāda*. So पयांसि, यशांसि are not proper examples of अनवकाशत्वाद् बाधकत्वम् — that is the objection.

In the *Dīp.*, अचि निवर्तिते means 'when the vowel is replaced (by *num*)'. Similarly निवर्त्यं सकारम्.

Readings: (1) (*p.* 12, *l.* 9) AL त्वचि (for ह्यचि).—(2) (*p.* 12, *l.* 10) MSAL सकारस्य (MS °रस्यसं) (for सकारम्).

[6]

The *pratīka* नैवेश्वरआज्ञापयति stands for the following *Mbh.* : नैवेश्वर आज्ञापयति, नापि धर्मसूत्रकाराः पठन्ति — अपवादैरुत्सर्गा बाध्यन्तामिति। किं तर्हि ? लौकिकोऽयं दृष्टान्तः। लोके हि सत्यपि संभवे बाधनं भवति। तद्यथा — 'दधि ब्राह्मणेभ्यो दीयताम्, तक्रं कौण्डिन्याय' इति। सत्यपि संभवे दधिदानस्य तक्रदानं निवर्तकं भवति। एवमिहापि सत्यपि संभवे अचामन्त्यात् परत्वं षष्ठीस्थानियोगत्वं बाधिष्यते।

This *Mbh.* answers the above objection. In order to explain it the *Dīp.* starts by saying that some supersessions are taught in grammar, e. g. P. 1. 4. 2 : विप्रतिषेधे ..., while some others are not so taught. For example, the supersession of what is not obligatory by an obligatory operation is not taught therein. Similarly the optional supersession of an external operation by an internal one. The present Pari. also, viz. पुरस्तादपवादाः ... is not laid down. The *Dīp.* thinks that this may be so because Pāṇini may have thought that it can be known from the worldly rule. But, the *Dīp.* adds, there is no such express rule in the world also.

Here Bhar. expressly says that an *antaraṅga* operation is only optionally more powerful than a *bahiraṅga* one. This is not consistent with the general statement: परनित्यान्तरङ्गापवादानामुत्तरोत्तरं बलीयः, which does not make any reference to the optional character of this dictum. Perhaps Bhar. may have meant that this Pari. is rather uncertain, or that it has many exceptions, or that there is some controversy about it. But the exact reason in his mind remains uncertain. Anyway the statement is remarkable.

नैवेश्वर आज्ञापयति .... The *Mbh.* means to say that supersession does not necessarily take place when two injunctions are incompatible (असंभवे). An *apavāda* may supersede an *utsarga* rule even when the two are compatible. The *Dīp.* points out the distinct domains of a king's order and an injunction of the Dharmaśāstra.

Nāg. understands *īśvara* in the sense of Veda. He also notes that some MSS of the *Mbh.* do not read असंभवे (between पठन्ति and अपवादैः) and adds that that expression has to be understood there.

Readings : (1) (*p.* 12, *l.* 12) Ed. आज्ञापयति (for चाज्ञा°). — (2) (*p.* 12, *l.* 14) MS केपा(?)रब्धा; AL ल्वेवारब्धा (for लोके ह्या°). — (3) (*p.* 12, *l.* 15) AL च नारब्धा (for त्वना°). — (4) (*p.* 12, *l.* 15) AL तत्र ईश्वर (for नैवेश्वर).

[7]

The *pratīka* किं तर्हि ? लौकिकोऽयं दृष्टान्तः stands for the following *Mbh.*: किं तर्हि ? लौकिकोऽयं दृष्टान्तः। लोके हि सत्यपि संभवे बाधनं भवति। तद् यथा — दधि ब्राह्मणेभ्यो दीयताम्, तक्रं कौण्डिन्याय' इति, सत्यपि संभवे दधिदानस्य तक्रदानं निवर्तकं भवति। एवमिहापि सत्यपि संभवे अचामन्त्र्यात्परत्वं षष्ठीस्थानेयोगत्वं बाधिष्यते।

The word *dṛṣṭānta* is taken in the sense of *pradarśana* or *darśana* by Bhar. Literally meaning 'this is what is seen in the world', it practically means that the argument (संभवेऽपि अपवादैः उत्सर्गाः बाध्यन्ते) has a support in the worldly practice. Kaiy. paraphrases *dṛṣṭānta* by *niścaya*. It seems however that Pat. has used that word in its usual sense of 'a parellel', which meaning also seems to be given alternatively by Bhar. when he says : अथ वा, यद् वक्ष्यमाणं तस्य प्रतिनिर्देशः. Bhar. concludes by saying that the view संभवेऽपि बाधनम् requires no elaborate argumentation to prove it. It is as patent as the hotness of fire.

Kaiy. concludes thus : तत्र वृद्धव्यवहारादीदृश एव वाक्यार्थे व्युत्पत्तिर्यत् सामान्यविहितो विशेषविहितेन बाध्यते, न समुच्चीयते नापि विकल्प्यते।

Reading : (1) (*p.* 12, *l.* 20) AL अर्थं प्रकरणं चान्त°.

[8]

In spite of the categorical statement : नात्रोपपत्तिर्वक्तव्या (which, Bhar. evidently thought, was Pat.'s view) Bhar. now proceeds to furnish a logical defense on his own of the view : संभवेऽपि बाधनम्. He discusses it in the context of the well known sentence : दधि ब्राह्मणेभ्यो दीयताम्, तक्रं कौण्डिन्याय. Although there is no specific prohibition of giving curds to Kauṇḍinya, in actual practice Kauṇḍinya never gets curds. How does it happen ? Bhar. first gives three explanations.

(1) Here, in the first argument, the whole thing hinges on the intention of the speaker. True, that Kauṇḍinya is a Brāhmaṇa and so has a claim to receive curds because of the word *brāhmaṇebhyaḥ* in the sentence. But, by this word, did the speaker intend to include *Kauṇḍinya* also among the recipients of curds, or did he intend to exclude him from curds and he wanted to give him only buttermilk, as seems more likely from the specific mention of Kauṇḍinya in connection with buttermilk ? The use of the word Kauṇḍinya is absolutely unambiguous : it definitely refers to the person called Kauṇḍinya. On the other hand, on the latter alternative the use of the word *brāhmaṇa*, applying to Kauṇḍinya also, would be only incidental, secondary, or unintended (*nāntarīyaka*). The incidental or unintended mention cannot stand on the same level as that which is specifically mentioned with that specific intention (*tātparya*).

So, Bhar. concludes, the poor fellow does not get the curds — neither in place of buttermilk (*vikalpa*), nor in addition to it (*samudāya*).

(2) In the previous explanation the conflict was between two words, *brāhmaṇa* and *kauṇḍinya*. While applying to the person named Kauṇḍinya, one (*brāhmaṇa*) was *nāntarīyaka* and the other (*kauṇḍinya*) *tatpara*. In this 2nd explanation the conflict is between two referents of the word *brāhmaṇa*. That word can denote any person belonging to the Brāhmaṇa caste : the person named Kauṇḍinya, and also any other person belonging to that caste, different from Kauṇḍinya. So the referent of the word *brāhmaṇa* (in ब्राह्मणेभ्यो दधि दीयताम्) becomes doubtful. Since it is not known which *brāhmaṇa* word — the one which applies to Kauṇḍinya or the one which does not apply to him — is used, one is not sure that Kauṇḍinya also has to be supplied with curds.

(3) Our understanding of the person named Kauṇḍinya from the word K° is direct (*pratyakṣa*) while our understanding of him from the word *brāhmaṇa* is indirect (*ānumānika*), through his possession of the characteristic (*rūpa*) of Brāhmaṇahood. The person named K° is the word-meaning (*padārtha*) of the word K°, but not of the word *brāhmaṇa*. And a meaning which is direct and the one which is only inferential cannot be put on the same level.

So, whichever explanation you prefer, the result is that K° gets only buttermilk; he does not get curds either in addition (*samudāya*) to or in lieu (*vikalpa*) of it. In the first explanation there is a conflict between *nāntarīyaka* vs. *tatpara*, in the second between *saṁdigdha* vs. *asaṁdigdha*, and in the third between *pratyakṣa* vs. *ānumānika*.

Observations : (1) Bhar. has discussed the present *Mbh*. passage : दधि ... कौण्डिन्याय in the Āhnika III also (*p*. 5, *l*. 6 — *p*. 6, *l*. 4). He does not mention our first argument there. On the other hand, the argument दधिदानं च विनापि कौण्डिन्येन संभवति, न तु तक्रदानम् which appears there is not mentioned here.

(2) Kaiy. and Nāg. do not feel it necessary to give this *upapatti*. Kaiy. simply says : तत्र वृद्धव्यवहारादीदृश ... etc. which is given above (page 147).

[8. 1]

The expression अत्रैवोच्यते practically means ' Here an objection is raised ' although in later works अत्रोच्यते or उच्यते usually means : ' Here is the reply ' (referring to an objection already raised by the opponent). The objection runs up to कथं न प्रतिपद्यते ? इति. The objector pinpoints the fact that curds is to be given to the Brāhmaṇas and that K° *is* a Brāhmaṇa. Do not give the curds to K° as K°, but why not to the brāhmaṇa in him ? (And even though K° is

not specifically mentioned in connection with curds, the same applies to the other Brāhmaṇas also !)

By way of reply, the *Dīp.* अतोऽप्राप्त्यनुमानं बाधा etc. advances some other explanations for denying curds to K°. (4) This is the first argument : we follow here the Naiyāyika (=Mīmāṁsaka) definition of sublation (*bādhā*) viz. अप्राप्त्यनुमानम्. This is done by actually furnishing a prohibition (अप्राप्तिः=प्रतिषेधप्राप्तिः) in the original sentence. The first statement is enlarged thus : दधि ब्राह्मणेभ्यो दीयताम्, कौण्डिन्याय न दातव्यम्। Then तक्रं ... etc. In अप्राप्तौ विधिरनुमीयते the word विधि means प्रतिषेध. The passage means : अप्राप्तिविषये प्रतिषेधश्रुतिरनुमीयते.

[8. 2]

This inferred prohibition explains why curds is not given to K° in spite of his being a Brāhmaṇa. If curds is given to him, that would be directly violating the prohibition. Even if it is given optionally, that is if it is given sometimes and not given at others, there is a partial violation of the prohibition. And a combination of the two — to give and also not to give—is out of question because of the contradiction involved. So the ultimate result is that curds is not given to K°.

But what is the authority for inferring a prohibition ? — one may well ask. The *Dīp.* यद्यपि द्वावपि विधी ... etc. discusses the question.

[8. 3]

(5) Bhar. finds it difficult to accept the above explanation from the standpoint of an advocate of *ākṛti* An *ākṛti* is believed to be complete in even a single member of that *ākṛti* just as in the whole class or group. Since Brāhmaṇahood is complete even in K°, how can curds be denied to him ?

So Bhar. now adduces a worldly maxim viz. ब्राह्मणा भोज्यन्ताम्, माठरकौण्डिन्यौ परिवेविष्टाम् ' Let the Brāhmaṇas be fed and let Māṭhara and Kauṇḍinya (here again !) serve '. Here also though M° and K° are Brāhmaṇas still they have only to serve, they do not get the food. They are specifically mentioned with reference to serving, while only generally mentioned with reference to eating. So serving supersedes eating. Similarly here also buttermilk supersedes curds.

The maxim of ब्राह्मणा भोज्यन्ताम् ... परिवेविष्टाम् occurs in the *Mbh.* on the Sū. '*hayavaraṭ*'. Read : द्विर्वचनेऽपि। नेमौ रहौ कार्यिणौ द्विर्वचनस्य। किं तर्हि ? निमित्तमिमौ द्विर्वचनस्य। तद्यथा — ब्राह्मणा भोज्यन्ताम्, माठरकौण्डिन्यौ परिवेविष्टामिति। नेदानीं तौ भुञ्जाते (I. 28. 13–15). On this the *Dīp.* : ' नेमौ रहौ ... द्विर्वचनस्य ' इति। अस्मिन्हि वाक्ये ' अचो रहाभ्याम् ... (पा. ८. ४. ४६) ' इत्यत्र रेफहकारौ निमित्तत्वेनाश्रितौ नोत्सहेते अस्मात् वाक्यात् कार्यित्वं प्रतिपत्तुम्। कुतः? अस्मिन् वाक्ये ' यर ' इति

निर्देशे रेफहकारयोरनुमीयमानत्वात्। 'रहाभ्याम्' इति निमित्तत्वेन साक्षात् चोदितत्वात्। तद्यथा ब्राह्मणा भोज्यन्ताम्, माठरकौण्डिन्यौ परिवेविष्टामिति। अस्मिन् प्रकरणे वाक्ये भुजिक्रिया तयोरनुमीयमाना साक्षात् चोदितया परिवेषणक्रियया बाध्यते इत्येतस्मात् वाक्यात् न तौ भुजिं प्रति कर्तृत्वमनुभवत इति (*Āhn*. II, *p*. 28, *ll*. 13-20). The logical argument (प्रत्यक्ष *vs.* आनुमानिक) is the same as in (1) above.

[8.4]

(6) So far the discussion was carried on on the view that there are two activities of giving involved (correspondingly, one more *dīyatām* to be understood after *kauṇḍinyāya*). This last explanation, which is now advanced, is given on the view that there is a single activity of giving, differing only in the objects given and in the recipients. (एक एव ददातिर्भिन्नकर्मको भिन्नसंप्रदानकश्च). The speaker gives a single instruction and it is also executed simultaneously, the Brāhmaṇas getting the curds and K° getting the buttermilk at one and the same time. Once K° gets the buttermilk, there is no opportunity for him to get the curds. This indicates, according to Bhar., that the speaker intended from the beginning to exclude K° from the curds.

Incidentally, the word विष्यते (*l*. 24) is rather obscure. The root *viṣ-* is mostly a Vedic verb (although not so said expressly in the Dhātupāṭha). It has a variety of meanings but none of them seems to fit particularly in the context. Unless it is a scribal error, it is difficult to see what made Bhar. use that root. We have tentatively assigned the meaning 'be connected with'. If a scribal error, one could think of विध्यते, विश्यते, or some such expression as being the original one.

Readings : (1) (*p*. 12, *l*. 23) MS उपपत्तिमपि; AL °त्तिरपि (for °त्तिमदपि). — (2) (*p*. 12, *l*. 25) AL उपमर्दयति. — (3) (*p*. 12, *l*. 26) MS नयो:; AL तयो: (for न तयो:). — (4) (*p*. 12, *l*. 28) AL अस्ति अनुपग्राहो (for अन्यस्याप्युप°). — (5) (*p*. 12, *l*. 28) AL युक्त (for प्रयुक्त). — (6) (*p*. 13, *l*. 1) AL संदिह्यासंदिह्ययोश्च.—(7) (*p*. 13, *ll*. 1-2) MS तपवर्थ: (for न पदार्थ: as happily reconstructed by AL). — (8) (*p*. 13, *l*. 4) MSAL क्रम: (for ब्रूम:). — (9) (*p*. 13, *l*. 5) MS प्रत्युक्तम्. — (10) (*p*. 13, *ll*. 5-6) MS तात्पर्यणांसंहतदेनशब्दार्थयोच; AL तात्पर्योपसंहतत्वेन शब्दार्थयोश्च. — (11) (*p*. 13, *l*. 8) AL बाधेति। एवं च ल°. — (12) (*p*. 13, *l*. 9) MSAL अप्राप्तो. — (13) (*p*. 13, *l*. 10) MSAL -विशेषाभावेन. — (14) (*p*. 13, *l*. 16) MS -विशेषाभावो. — (15) (*p*. 13, *l*. 16) MS अप्राप्ति: प्रतिपत्तिपद्यते. — (16) (*p*. 13, *l*. 20) MSAL तक्रकर्मक: (for our emendation °कर्मकेदाने). — (17) (*p*. 13, *l*. 24) MS दध्याविष्यते. — (18) (*p*. 13, *ll*. 25-26) AL -र्थं एक एव। अयमर्थस्यैको विद्यमानो दे°.

[9]

अन्त्यात् पूर्वो मस्जे:. The full text of this *Vār*. along with the *Mbh*. on it runs as follows :

'अन्त्यात् पूर्वो मस्जेर्मिदनुषङ्गसंयोगादिलोपार्थम्' (वा. २)। अन्त्यात् पूर्वो मस्जेर्मिद् वक्तव्यः। किं प्रयोजनम्? अनुषङ्गसंयोगादिलोपार्थम्। अनुषङ्गलोपार्थं संयोगादिलोपार्थं च। अनुषङ्गलोपार्थं तावत् — मग्नः, मग्नवान्। संयोगादिलोपार्थम् — मङ्क्ता, मङ्क्तुम्, मङ्क्तव्यम्।

magnaḥ is formed from *masj*+(*k*)*ta* (*ta*>*na* P. 8. 2. 45 : ओदितश्च) wlth an infix *n*(*um*) by P. 7. 1. 60 : मस्जिनशोर्झलि. Now, if *n* is inserted after the final vowel (i. e. as *mansj-*), then since *n* is not penultimate it cannot be deleted by P. 6. 4. 24 : अनिदितां हल ... and we cannot arrive at the desired form. So Kāt. here suggests that as far as the root *masj* is concerned the rule should be modified and the *mit* augment (i. e. *num*) be taught as coming before the final consonant (i. e. as *masnj-*). The *n* can then be dropped and after a further dropping of *s* (P. 8. 2. 29 : स्कोः संयोगाद्योः ....) and *g*-substitution for *j* (P. 8. 2. 30 : चोः कुः) we get the correct from *magna*.

Similarly, in *maṅktā* (from *masj*+*tā*), if *n* is inserted after *a* as required by the Pāṇinian rule (*mansj*+*tā*), then the whole cluster *-nsj-* will be called a *saṁyoga* (P. 1. 1. 7 : हलोऽनन्तराः ...). In this position *s* cannot be regarded as the initial of a *saṁyoga* and consequently it cannot be deleted by P. 8. 2. 29 : स्कोः संयोगाद्योः ... As a result we arrive at a wrong form. Here also, if the *Vār.* is followed, then in *masnj-* *s* can be dropped (now it being the initial) and with other relevant changes we get the correct form *maṅktā*.

The *Dīp.* बहूनां च संयोगसंज्ञा इत्यस्मिन् पक्षे इदमुच्यते makes it clear that in *maṅktā* the difficulty about the elision of *s* crops up only if the view बहूनां संयोगसंज्ञा (i. e., in our case, the name *saṁyoga* applies to the whole cluster *-snj-*) is followed. However, If the other view, viz. द्वयोर्द्वयोः संज्ञा is followed, then there is no difficulty for we have here two *saṁyoga*-s viz. *-ns* and *-sj-*. Here *s* is an initial of a conjunct, and can be deleted by P. 8. 2. 29 without any difficulty. (For *magnaḥ*, however, the *Vār.* is necessary. One can delete here also *s* by adopting the view द्वयोर्द्वयोः संयोगसंज्ञा all right. But here the elision of *s* is *asiddha*. The *s* being there *n* cannot be regarded as penultimate, and so cannot be dropped undesiredly. So the *Vār.* is necessary for *anuṣaṅga-lopa*, though not for *saṁyogādilopa*.)

The *Dīp.* किमर्थमिदम् ... वा raises a question whether both the sets of illustrations given in the *Mbh.* are necessary. Cannot मग्नः मग्नवान् alone suffice? The idea is that *magnaḥ* e g. afords an illustration of both kinds of elisions mentioned in the *Vār.* and it should have sufficed. Is not the addition *maṅktā* etc. superfluous? The *Dīp.* यद्यप्यनुषङ्गलोपे यत्नः etc. gives the reply. It says that it is possible to provide for the *anuṣaṅgalopa* in *magnaḥ* even without the present *Vār.* by framing a special rule saying that P. 6. 4. 24 : अनिदिताम् ... applies to *masj* even when it is not penultimate. But the problem of the

संयोगादिलोप still remains in *maṅktā* (where the problem is not about the अनुषङ्गलोप). Hence the additional examples *maṅktā* etc.

Kaiy. is silent on this *Mbh.*

Readings : (1) (*p.* 14, *l.* 1) MS मस्जो (for मस्जेः). — (2) (*p.* 14, *l.* 3) MS मन् (?) (for मग्न as in AL). — (3) (*p.* 14, *l.* 3) AL च (for वा). — (4) (*p.* 14, *l.* 4) MS मंडेति (for मङ्क्तेति).

[10]

This *Vār.* (भर्जिमर्च्योश्च) makes a similar plea for the roots *bhṛj* (I. 191) and *marc* (X. 107). The *mit* augments concerned are *ūm* and *īm* (supposed to be taught in the Uṇādi) respectively. The *Mbh.* gives the resultant forms as *bharūjāḥ* and *marīcayaḥ*.

Kaiy. gives the process thus : 'भ्रजी भर्जने' इत्यस्यौणादिकेऽचि कृते गुणे रपरत्वे च जकारात् पूर्वं ऊमागमः। 'मर्च शब्दार्थे' इत्यस्य चौरादिकस्य णिचि 'अच इः' इति इप्रत्यये णिलोपे चकारात् पूर्वं ईमागमः ।

The *Mbh.*, however, holds a different opinion. It thinks that, since the words *bharūja* and *marīci* have been read in the *aṅgulyādi* and the *bāhvādi* gaṇas respectively, no further authority is necessary to vouch their correctness. The *Vār.* is superfluous. Read : स तर्हि वक्तव्यः? न वक्तव्यः। निपातनात् सिद्धम्। किं निपातनम्? भरुजाशब्दोऽङ्गुल्यादिषु पठ्यते। मरीचिशब्दो बाह्वादिषु।

The *Dīp.* अवश्यमयं पठितव्यः etc. supports the *Mbh.* since the inclusion in the Gaṇapāṭha of the words concerned is necessary to explain derivatives from them. There is some confusion in the *Dīp.* here which we do not know whether it is some scribal error or whether Bhar. himself is nodding. The *Dīp* says that word *bharuj* ais included, apart from the *aṅgulyādi* class[1] (P. 5. 3. 108), in the *bāhvādi* class (P. 4. 1. 96) also. The *Dīp.* also cites the form *bhāruji*, formed (with *iñ*) apparently according to P. 4. 1. 96. But this is wrong. According to our present records *bharuja* is read in *bahvādi* class (P. 4. 1. 45 : बह्वादिभ्यश्च) and not in the *bāhvādi* one. The words in this class optionally take the suffix *ṅīṣ* in feminine. So the correct derivation should be *bharujī*. That Bhar. really meant *bahvādi* (and not *bāhvādi*) is clear from his citation भरुज चन्द्रभागा नद्याम् (correctly : भरुज ध्वज चन्द्रभागा न [v. l. °गान्न] द्याम्) which is found in the Gaṇapāṭha on P. 4. 1. 45. So *bhārujiḥ* of the *Dīp.* has to be emended to *bharujī*.

We think the corruption took place in two stages : (1) Some scribe wrote *bāhvādiṣu* instead of *ba°* out of carelessness but retained the original

1. Which gives us भारुजिकः.

bharujī. (2) A further scribe, in a succeeding stage of transmission, thought that *bharujī* was incompatible with the *bāhvādi* class, and so changed it to *bhārujir*, little caring to take into consideration the Gaṇapāṭha actually cited in the text.

Readings : (1) (*p.* 14, *l.* 5) MSAL ऊमीमिति । ऊम् ई(MS इ)म् इति। — (2) (*p.* 14, *l.* 6) MS मारीचेर्. — (3) (*p.* 14, *l.* 7) MS बाह्वादि°. — (4) (*p.* 14, *l.* 7) MSAL भारुजिरिति (though AL emend बाह्वादि° to बह्वादि°).

[11]

The *Mbh.* is now discussing the question whether (1) a *mit* element is to be regarded as an integral part of what precedes (*pūrvānta*), or (2) as the initial part of what follows, or (3) as an independent one, unconnected (*abhakta*) with what precedes or follows. (A similar discussicn occurs later on regarding the element *r* taught in P. 1. 1. 51 : उरण् रपरः.) The *Mbh.* runs thus : किं पुनरयं पूर्वान्तः, आहोस्वित् परादिः, आहोस्विदभक्तः? कथं वायं पूर्वान्तः स्यात्, कथं परादिः, कथं वाभक्तः? यद्यन्त इति वर्तते, ततः पूर्वान्तः। अथादिरिति वर्तते, ततः परादिः। अथोभयं निवृत्तम्, ततोऽभक्तः।

In the *Dīp.* the subject of उपपादयति is of course भाष्यकारः. By the *anuvṛtti* of the words *anta* and *ādi* are mentioned these two words occurring above in P. 1. 1. 46 : आद्यन्तौ टकितौ.

If *antaḥ* is continued, then Bhar. says that the full form (उपस्क्रियते) of the rule will be (मित्) अचाम् अन्त्यात् परः (भवति), अन्तश्च. So a *mit* will have to be regarded as पूर्वान्त.

परः सन्नन्तः ... etc. The *Dīp.* raises a question here. On the *pūrvānta* view, a *mit* has to be the final part (*anta*) of what precedes (*pūrva*). But what is the *pūrva* here? Is it the immediately preceding phoneme (*avayava*), or is it the whole group (*samudāya*)? The *Dīp.* यथान्तिमे निगमयिष्यति ... etc. cites the *Mbh.* occurring at the end of this section and deduces from the words संघातभक्तोऽसौ that here by *pūrvānta* is meant *samudāyānta*.

अथादिरिति वर्तते ... etc. This *Dīp.* answers an anticipated objection. Why should *ādi* mean *parādi* only? Why not *pūrvādi*? Where is the Sū. authority for this supposition? 'Common sense' replies the *Dīp.* Surely no sane man would expect an element to follow the last vowel of a word and, at the same time, to be its initial part (न हि संभवोऽस्ति ...).

[11. 1]

The *Vār.* (4) अभक्ते ... etc. runs as follows : अभक्ते दीर्घनलोपस्वरणत्वानुस्वारशीभावाः. Here Kāt. points out that six operations, substitution of a long

vowel etc., cannot be done if the view that a *mit* is neither connected with **what** precedes nor with what follows (i. e. the *abhakta* view) is accepted.

(1) *dīrgha* : The *Mbh.* illustrates the difficulty about the long substitute thus : यद्यभक्तो दीर्घत्वं न प्राप्नोति। कुण्डानि, वनानि। 'नोपधायाः' 'सर्वनामस्थाने चासंबुद्धौ' इति दीर्घत्वं न प्राप्नोति। In कुण्डानि (fr. कुण्ड + न् + इ) the stem-final *a* is lengthened by P. 6. 4. 7-8. But now it cannot be so done because if *num* is not a part of the preceding, the *aṅga* is no longer *nānta* - it cannot be said to end in *n*. (The *aṅgādhikāra* requires that the *aṅga* should end in *n*.)

ननु च 'तदादिग्रहणं स्यादिनुमर्थम्' इत्युक्तम्। This is an objection. Pāṇini defines *aṅga* as यस्मात् प्रत्ययविधिस्तदादि प्रत्ययेऽङ्गम् (1. 4. 13). In *Vār.* 1 on this Kāt. says : अङ्गसंज्ञायां तदादिग्रहणं स्यादिनुमर्थम्, i e. the inclusion of *tadādi* in the definition is for (the vikaranas *sya* etc. and) the augment *num*. So how can now this be pointed out as a blemish of the *abhakta* view ? The *Dīp.* अस्मिंश्च पक्षे ... etc. gives the reply. True. Kāt. has pointed out this provision made by Pāṇini for the *abhakta* view. But the student has to remember it (तत् स्मर्तव्यम्). This leads to the defect of गौरव (i. e. प्रतिपत्तिगौरव). That is the only defect as far as the *dīrgha* objection is concerned. The *Dīp.* further points out that there is no difficulty on the *pūrvānta* view and that on the *parādi* view also P. 7. 3. 101-102 take care of the lengthening. Incidentally, the *Dīp.* further points out that lengthening in *asthīni* cannot be explained on the *parādi* view because P. 7. 3. 101-102 apply only to a stem in *a*.

(2) *Nalopa.* The *Dīp.* refers to this defect by the *pratīka* अग्ने त्रीति. The *Mbh.* reads : नलोपश्च न सिध्यति। 'अग्ने त्री ते वाजिना त्री षधस्था ता ता पिण्डानाम्'। 'नलोपः प्रातिपदिकान्तस्य' इति नलोपो न प्राप्नोति। In त्री (fr. त्रि + न् + इ) and ता (fr. तद् + नुम् + इ), both Nom. or Acc. pl. neut. of त्रि and तद् respectively, the augment *n*(*um*) is deleted by P. 8. 2. 7 : नलोपः प्राति° (with the deleting of the case ending (*ś*)*i* by P. 6. 1. 70 : शेश्छन्दसि बहुलम्). On the *abhakta* view, the nominal stems (*tri* and *tad*) cannot be said to end in *n*. So P. 8. 2. 7 cannot apply and the desired from is not obtained.

छान्दसः पुंवद्भावो ... etc. The *Dīp.* seeks to obviate the difficulty by suggesting a few alternative solutions, but the author is not evidently himself much interested in them. He suggests, for example, that words like *vājinā* could be regarded as Vedic masculines, thus nipping in the bud the necessity of *num* itself after *tri* etc. But then, the *Dīp.* points out, *śi* cannot be had as a substitute for *jas* or *śas* (and so, instead of *trī* the form *trayaḥ* will result). The dropping of *n*, on another suggestion, can be looked on as a simple Vedic *varṇalopa* (not by P. 8. 2. 7). But then after the dropping of *n* (and the elision cannot be said to be *asiddha*, not being taught in the *asiddhakāṇḍa*), *i* of *tri* ceases to be penultimate and consequently cannot be lengthened by P. 6. 4. 7-8. A third

suggestion is to regard *n* as a part of the nominal stem on the maxim तन्मध्यपतितस्तद्ग्रहणेन गृह्यते. But Bhar. ultimately rejects this alternative also on the ground that this is taxing too much the student's memory (अतिबहु स्मर्तव्यम्). Incidentally, Kaiy. and Nāg. take no note of these suggestions.

(3) *Svara.* The *pratīka* सर्वाणि ज्योतींषि refers to the following *Mbh.* : स्वरश्च न सिध्यति । 'सर्वाणि ज्योतींषि'। 'सर्वस्य सुपि' इत्याद्युदात्तत्वं न सिध्यति। The word *sarva-* is desired to be accented initially when a case-ending follows (P. 6. 1. 191 : सर्वस्य सुपि). In forms like सर्वाणि, on the *abhakta* view, what follows *sarva-* is *n*, and not any case-ending. So the desired accent is not available. The *Dīp.* points out that on the *pūrvānta* view *sarva* includes *n* also (as its final part). And, on the *parādi* view also there is no difficulty because now the case-ending *-ni* immediately follows.

(4) *Ṇatva* (cerebralization of *n*). The *Mbh.* on this point (referred to by क्रियते न्यास एव in the *Dīp.*) runs as follows : णत्वं च न सिध्यति । माषवापाणि व्रीहिवापाणि । पूर्वान्ते प्रातिपदिकान्तनकारस्येति सिद्धम्, परादौ विभक्तिनकारस्येति। अभक्ते नुमो ग्रहणं कर्तव्यम् । न कर्तव्यम् । क्रियत एतन् न्यास एव — 'प्रातिपदिकान्तनुम्विभक्तिषु च' इति ।

The *Mbh.* first points out that on the *abhakta* view, *n* (in *māṣavāpa* + *n* + *i*) is neither a part of the stem nor of the case-ending. So *num* has to be read additionally in P. 8. 4. 11 : प्रातिपदिकान्तनुम्विभक्तिषु च in order to secure the *ṇ*-substitution. It is then pointed out that nothing new will have to be done, for *num* is already included in his rule 8. 4. 11 by Pāṇini himself.

As elsewhere, Bhar. interpretes क्रियत एतन् न्यास एव as meaning अवश्यं कर्तव्यं नुम्-ग्रहणम् (Kaiy. also in the same words). That means that whatever view you may adopt, inclusion of *num* in the rule cannot be dispensed with (एवं च सर्वपक्षेष्वपीदमावश्यकमिति भावः as Nāg. says). Bhar. illustrates this necessity by citing the example of *prāhiṇvat*, Imperf. 3 sing. of √*hinv*). Here *n* is neither a part of a *prātipadika* (*hinv* is a verbal root), nor of an ending. So the reading of *num*, which is necessary for *prāhiṇvat* etc., will also be useful for *māṣavāpāṇi* etc.

(5) *Anusvāra.* The *Dīp.* quotes as a *pratīka* the example *dviṣaṁtapaḥ* from the *Mbh.* which runs thus : अनुस्वारश्च न सिध्यति । द्विषंतपः, परंतपः । 'मोऽनुस्वारो' 'हलि' इत्यनुस्वारो न प्राप्नोति ।

Pat. gives two examples, *dviṣaṁtapa* and *paraṁtapa*, to show that the *anusvāra* seen in them cannot be accounted for on the *abhakta* view. In the stage *dviṣat* + *tāpi* + (*kh*)*a*(*c*) the following changes take place in *dviṣat* :

dviṣat > *dviṣamt* (P. 3. 2. 39) > *dviṣam* (P. 8. 2. 23) > *dviṣaṁ* (P. 8. 3. 23). The last Sū. requires that *m*, to be replaced by an *anusvāra*, should be a *pada*-final. Bhar. argues that even on the *abhakta* view *m* can be regarded as a part of *dviṣat* (which is a *pada*) on the strength of the maxim (quoted above) तन्मध्यपतितस् ... etc. As no difficulty comes in the case of *dviṣaṁtapa* even on the *abhakta* view, Bhar. says that Pat. probably did not mean it as an example. He meant *paraṁtapa* only and *dviṣaṁtapa* came in only incidentally, on account of its association with *paraṁtapa* which is taught in the same Sū. (P. 3. 2. 39). Hence the *Dīp.* : प्रसङ्गेनोदाहृतमित्येवं वर्णयन्ति. (Similarly Kaiy. : द्विषंतप इति। प्रसङ्गोच्चारितमेतत्। अत्र हि तन्मध्यपतितस्तद्ग्रहणेन गृह्यते इति नुमो द्विषद्ग्रहणेन ग्रहणमस्ति।)

Paraṁtapa, however, is a fitting example, for *m*(*um*) can in no way be regarded as a part of what precedes on the *abhakta* view.

The *Dīp.* takes some more pains to show how *dviṣaṁtapa* is not an example here. Perhaps it will be held that the *saṁyogāntalopa* (*dviṣamt* > *dviṣam*) being taught in the *asiddhakāṇḍa* (P. 8. 2. 23) is *asidha* with reference to the substitution of *ṁ* in the place of *m*. But the latter rule is also in the *asiddhakāṇḍa*; still as it (P. 8. 3. 23) follows, the *saṁyogāntalopa* is *siddha* with reference to it. So no difficulty in the operation of P. 8. 3. 23.

(6) *Śībhāva*. The *Mbh.* comments : शीभावश्च न सिध्यति। त्रपुणी, जतुनी, तुम्बुरुणी। नपुंसकादुत्तरस्यौङः शीभावो भवतीति शीभावो न भवति।

In the stage *jatu* + *au* (dual) two operations become due : (1) A substitute (*ś*)*ī* for *au* (P. 7. 1. 19 : नपुंसकाच्च), and (2) the infix *n*(*um*) (P. 7. 1. 74 : इकोऽचि विभक्तौ). Of these two, the *n*(*um*)- infixion has to be done first, both because it is a succeeding operation and also because it is an obligatory one. But once *n* comes in between then the ending *au* no longer follows the neuter stem *jatu* immediately, for *n*(*um*) is an intervener on the *abhakta* view, So the desired form cannot be arrived at.

[11. 2]

(1) Guṇa. After pointing out the defect of the *abhakta* view Kāt. now takes up the *parādi* view in the *Vār.* (5) : परादौ गुणवृद्ध्यौत्वदीर्घनलोपानुस्वार-शीभावे नकारप्रतिषेधाः and points out its defects (दोषस्थानानि as Nāg. says). Pat. introduces the *Vār.* by एवं तर्हि परादिः करिष्यते. The *Mbh.* on this *Vār.* begins thus : यदि परादिर्गुणः प्रतिषेध्यः — त्रपुणे, जतुने, तुम्बुरुणे। 'घेर्ङिति' इति गुणः प्राप्नोति।

In *trapu* + *n*(*um*) + (*ṅ*)*e* (Dative sing.), the case-ending is *ne*(*ṅ*) on the *parādi* view. So P. 7. 3. 111 : घेर्ङिति applies, threatening a *guṇa*-substi-

tution for the stem-final *o*. As it is not desired, the Guṇa will have to be prohibited if one adopts the *parādi* view.

Bhar. does not explain the difficulty, obviously because there is little to explain. In the *Dīp.* ङ् इद् यस्य ... etc. he only makes one clarification. He says that the difficulty pointed out in the *Vār.* is real only if the word *ṅit* (occurring in P. 7. 3. 111) is interpreted as ङ् इत् यस्य i. e. as a Bahuvrīhi. If, however, it is interpreted as a Karmadhāraya (ङ् एव इत्), then there is no difficulty. For, in that case a *ṅit* ending will mean an ending beginning with *ṅ*. For an ending consisting of the mere code-letter *ṅ* is impossible; and so *ṅit* will have to be taken in the sense of *ṅidādi* 'beginning with the code-letter *ṅ*' according to the maxim वर्णे यत् स्यात् तच्च विद्यात् तदादौ (based on the *Vār.* (29) यस्मिन् विधिस्तदादावल्ग्रहणे on P. 1. 1. 72: येन विधिस्तदन्तस्य).

In our example, the ending *ne*(*ṅ*) is not *ṅidādi*. So there is no threat of Guṇa on the Karmadhāraya interpretation of *ṅit*. There will be Guṇa only in cases like *bandhave, sādhave* etc. where the case-ending is *ṅe*, i. e. a *ṅidādi* one.

(2) *Anusvāra*. The *pratīka* अनुस्वारश्च न सिध्यति stands for the following *Mbh.* on this topic: अनुस्वारश्च न सिध्यति — द्विषंतपः, परंतपः । 'मोऽनुस्वारो' 'हलि' इत्यनुस्वारो न प्राप्नोति ।

If *m*(*um*) is regarded as *parādi* in *paraṁtapa*, obviously it cannot be a *padānta* (final element of the preceding *pada*) and so it cannot be replaced by an *anusvāra*. (See Notes, 11. 1 (5) above.)

According to Bhar., here also (as in 11. 1 (5) above), *dviṣaṁtapa* is not a proper example. For, he says, on the *parādi* view *m* becomes a part of the following *t*, and since *t* is a *pada*-final, its part *m* also can be looked upon as a *pada*-final and accordingly there is no difficulty in getting an *anusvāra* out of *m*.

Kaiy. first mentions the view held by Bhar. and then gives the opposite view also (without mentioning any names). Read: परादिपक्षे तकारस्य मकारो भक्तस्तकारश्च पदान्त इति मकारोऽपि तद्भक्तत्वात् पदान्त इति सिद्धोऽनुस्वार इत्याहुः । अन्ये तु तद्भक्तत्वात् तकारग्रहणेनास्य ग्रहणं भवतु न तु पदान्तत्वम्, न हि द्वयोर्मकारतकारयोः पदान्तत्वमुपपद्यत इत्याहुः ।

(3) *Śībhāve nakārapratiṣedhaḥ*. The full text of the *Mbh.* is as follows: शीभावे नकारप्रतिषेधः । शीभावे नकारप्रतिषेधो वक्तव्यः । त्रपुणी, जतुनी, तुम्बुरुणी । सनुम्कस्य शीभावः प्राप्नोति । नैष दोषः । 'निर्दिश्यमानस्यादेशा भवन्ति' इत्येवं न भविष्यति । यस्तर्हि निर्दिश्यते तस्य न प्राप्नोति । कस्मात्? नुमा व्यवहितत्वात् ।

We have already come across the examples involved here (त्रपुणी etc.) in 11. 1 (6) above. In *jatunī* (fr. *jatu*+*n*(*um*)+*au*) etc., if *n* is accepted as *parādi* (*jatu*+*nau*), then the whole *-nau* (and not merely *-au*) will have to be replaced by (*ś*)*ī*, which results into a wrong form. So a prohibition (of *parāditva* of *num*) in such cases will have to be laid down.

The expression नकारप्रतिषेधः is vague. It certainly does not mean 'prohibition of *n*', since *n* is actually desired to be present in the final form. What is not desired is its replacement (along with *au*) by (*ś*)*ī* So Bhar. says नकारस्य ... या निवृत्तिः 'replacement' तस्याः प्रतिषेधः । Kaiy. supplies स्थानित्व 'status of the original (to be replaced ' : ... नकारस्य स्थानित्वप्रतिषेधो वक्तव्य इत्यर्थः. This ultimately gives the same meaning.

निर्दिश्यमानस्यादेशा ... etc. Here the *Mbh.* is arguing against including शीभावे नकारप्रतिषेधः in the *Vār.* The Pari. (12) निर्दिश्यमानस्य ... says that when a substitute is taught, it takes the place of the word-element which is actually read in the rule for being replaced. The substitute does not replace a whole compound, for instance, which ends in that element. To illustrate : *pad* replaces *pād* only by P. 6. 4. 130, and not a whole compound like *vyāghrapād*. Similarly here also only *au* will be replaced by (*ś*)*ī*, and not the whole element *-nau*, even on the *parādi* view.

यस्तर्हि निर्दिश्यते...etc. The *Mbh.* accepts the argument (निर्दिश्यमानस्य...), but points out that still there is a difficulty. It is true that *au* is here *uccāryamāṇa*. But it does not follow immediately the neuter stem (*napuṁsakāt*, P. 7. 1. 19). The two are intervened by *num*. The substitution rule does not apply as condition of immediacy (P. 1. 1. 67 : तस्मादित्युत्तरस्य) is not fulfilled. Hence the *Vār*.

तत्रायं वाक्यार्थो ... etc. Here Bhar. assigns a different meaning to नकारप्रतिषेध. नकारप्रतिषेधः नकारनिमित्तकः प्रतिषेधः '(undesired) prohibition (of the substitution of (*ś*)*ī* in the place of *au*) on account of (the intervening) *n*'. However, as far as the *Mbh.* is concerned, it is here only describing the result, not interpreting the expression appearing in the *Vār*. Its own interpretation adds the predicate वक्तव्यः as we have seen in the *Mbh.*

[11. 3]

The *Mbh.* now takes up the third and the last alternative, viz. *pūrvānta* (एवं तर्हि पूर्वान्तः करिष्यते), thus leading to the *Vār*. (6) : पूर्वान्ते नपुंसकोपसर्जनह्रस्वत्वं द्विगुस्वरश्च which enumerates defects in that view. The *Mbh.* comments : यदि पूर्वान्तः क्रियते, नपुंसकोपसर्जनह्रस्वत्वं द्विगुस्वरश्च न प्राप्नोति। नपुंसकोपसजनह्रस्वत्वम् — आराशस्त्रिणी, धानाशष्कुलिनी । निष्कौशाम्बिनी, निर्वाराणसिनी । द्विगुस्वरः — पञ्चारत्निनी, दशारत्निनी। नुमि कृतेऽनन्त्यत्वादेते विधयो न प्राप्नुवन्ति ।

All the examples cited here are Neu. Nom. or Acc. dual. आराशस्त्रिणी (fr. आरा + शस्त्री + नुम् + ई) and धानाशष्कुलिनी are *samāhāra* Dvandva compounds. निष्कौशाम्बिनी and निर्वाराणसिनी are *prādi* Tatpuruṣas. पञ्चारत्निनी and दशारत्निनी are Dvigus. In आराशस्त्रिणी (आरा च शस्त्री च, ते) and धानाशष्कुलिनी the final long vowel *ī* is shortened by P. 1. 2. 47 : ह्रस्वो नपुंसके प्रातिपदिकस्य. In निष्कौशाम्बिनी (निर्गते कौशाम्ब्याः) and निर्वाराणसिनी the final *ī* is similarly shortened by P. 1. 2. 48 : गोस्त्रियोरुपसर्जनस्य. (In निष्कौशाम्बिनी the constituent कौशाम्बी is named *upasarjana* by P. 1. 2. 44 : एकविभक्ति चापूर्वनिपाते.) In पञ्चारत्निनी and दशार° the first constituents *pañcan* and *daśan* retain their accent by P. 6. 2. 29 : इगन्तकालकपाल ... द्विगौ ('इगन्त उत्तरपदे कालवाचिनि कपाल ... इत्येतेषु च द्विगौ समासे पूर्वपदं प्रकृतिस्वरं भवति' काशिका). All these three features, the नपुंसकह्रस्व, उपसर्जनह्रस्व, and the द्विगुस्वर will not be achieved if the *pūrvānta* view is adopted, says the *Vār.* The simple reason is that after *num* (by P. 7. 1. 73 : इकोऽचि विभक्तौ) is inserted the stem ends in *n*; it is no more an *ajanta* ('ending in a vowel') stem (अचः = अजन्तस्य प्रातिपदिकस्य). So no scope for the shortening (...उपसर्जनस्याजन्तता इगन्तता च विहता).

Bhar. starts here by raising an objection against the mentioning of the two kinds of shortenings : नपुंसकह्रस्व and उपसर्जनह्रस्व. The नपुंसकह्रस्व alone would have sufficed. After all it is the *num* in all these examples which tends to obstruct the process of shortening and the *num* which is there in the *upasarjana* cases is in the neuter stems only. So the *Dīp.* says: नपुंसके नुमः संभवादेतावद् वक्तव्यम् - नपुंसकह्रस्वत्वमिति. The addition of उपसर्जनह्रस्व is superfluous, this is what is meant.

The *Dīp.* अयं त्वभिप्रायः answers the above objection. Here it is pointed out that in the cases like *niṣkauśāmbinī* both kinds of shortenings become due : Here as the second constituent is an *upasarjana* the *upasarjana-hrasva* is due while the *napuṁsaka-hrasva* is due because the whole compound is neuter. Ultimately the *upasarjana-hrasva* prevails, because it is subsequent. Hence the mention of *upasarjana-hrasva*. When the stem no longer ends in a vowel (अजन्तता विहता), there cannot be a shortening; and when it no longer ends in *i*, *u*, *ṛ* or *ḷ* the (desired) accent is not available.

[11. 3. 1]

न वा बहिरङ्गलक्षणत्वात् is the final *Vār.* which refutes the objection taken in the previous *Vār.* on the *pūrvānta* view. The *Mbh.* comments : न वैष दोषः। किं कारणम्? बहिरङ्गलक्षणत्वात्। बहिरङ्गो नुम्, अन्तरङ्गा एते विधयः। असिद्धं बहिरङ्गमन्तरङ्गे। The *Dīp.* explains that shortening does not depend on the following case-ending while *num* does. And the case-ending further is based on the relation with external things. So shortening is an internal while *num* an external operation. So the Pari. (50) असिद्धं बहिरङ्गमन्तरङ्गे decides (and an *antaraṅga*

operation is stronger than *para* and even *nitya*). So shortening takes place first, and *num* only afterwards.

Perhaps it will be argued that the two kinds of shortening could be looked upon as *antaraṅga* in this way. But what about the accent ? It depends on the second constituent of the compound. How could it then be *antaraṅga* ? The *Dīp.* स्वरे चोक्तम् ... etc. gives a reply to such an objection. Citing P. 4. 3. 140, *Vār.* 4 : पदग्रहणं परिमाणार्थम्, it says that the mention in the locative of a word in a rule teaching the accent is just for indicating the boundary. It does not mean that the word ending in the Locative is the cause of that accent. So the accent also, not depending on any external factor for its cause, is *antaraṅga*.

संघातभक्तोऽसाविति. This *pratīka* stands for the following *Mbh.* : द्विगुस्वरे भूयान् परिहारः। संघातभक्तोऽसौ नोत्सहतेऽवयवस्येगन्ततां विहन्तुमिति कृत्वा द्विगुस्वरो भविष्यति। Here the *Mbh.* gives an additional reason (भूयान् परिहारः) to show that there is no difficulty about the accent in a Dvigu. In a Dvigu like *pañcāratnin* the whole compound may be regarded as ending in *n* because the *num* is taught for the whole compound as such. But that does not affect the structure of the *uttarapada* as such. It still remains as *aratni*. And since the *uttarapada* remains *iganta* (ending in an *ik* phoneme, viz. *i*) the rule P. 6. 2. 29 : इगन्त ... operates, giving the desired initial accent.

Readings : (1) (*p.* 14, *l.* 10) MSAL उपक्रियते. — (2) (*p.* 14, *l.* 11) MS [अ]न्तमे; AL [अ]न्ते. — (3) (*p.* 14, *l.* 11) MS संघभक्तो. — (4) (*p.* 14, *l.* 24) AL पूर्वान्ते. — (5) (*p.* 14, *l.* 24) MS सुद्ग्रहणेस्यानंतर्यं; AL परादौ सुग्रहणे स्यादा°. — (6) (*p.* 14, *l.* 25) MS सुद्ग्रहणं. — (7) (*p.* 14, *l.* 26) AL वै भक्तस्. — (8) (*p.* 14, *l.* 26) AL प्राहिणोद्. — (9) (*p.* 15, *l.* 1) MSAL उदाहृत. — (10) (*p.* 15, *l.* 5) MS शीभावश्चेति (for °स्येति). — (11) (*p.* 15, *l.* 7) MSAL यदा इ एव इत् ङित्त्वे इति. — (12) (*p.* 15, *l.* 10) MSAL तु (for सुम्). — (13) (*p.* 15, *l.* 11) MS निर्वृत्तिस्. — (14) (*p.* 15, *ll.* 18–19) AL नुमोऽसंभवाद्. — (15) (p. 15, *l.* 20) AL वोपसर्जन° (for the first उप°). — (16) (*p.* 15 , *l.* 21) AL [अ]धिगता (for विहता). — (17) (*p.* 15, *ll.* 22–23) AL °क्षमेचोक्तं (for क्षम्। स्वरे चोक्तम्). — (18) (*p.* 15, *l.* 23) MSAL पदग्रहण. — (19) (*p.* 15, *l.* 26) AL लभते (for न ल°).

* * *

eca ig ghrasvādeśe / **P. 1. 1. 48**

[1. 1]

किमर्थमिदमुच्यते is a frequent question with which Pat. opens the discussion of a Sū. Bhar. here incidentally mentions three circumstances which occa-

sion such a question. With the *Dip.* इह त्वानर्थक्यात् प्रश्नः, cf. Kaiy. : विनापि सूत्रेणेष्टसिद्धिरिति प्रश्नः (Nāg. adds : वक्ष्यमाणसूत्रप्रत्याख्यानप्रकारेण...).

[1. 2]

The present rule is connected with such rules as ह्रस्वो नपुंसके प्रातिपदिकस्य (P. 1. 2. 47). One of the ways of showing this connection is to combine the two rules (the present Pari. and rules like P. 1. 2. 47) into a single grammatical sentence (नानावाक्यानामेकवाक्यता).

The *Dīp.* here also mentions two different technical ways in which *ec* is to be ultimately reduced to *ik*. One is simply to make *a*, the initial element of these diphthongs, retire (भूतैकदेशनिवृत्तिः). The other is to resort to the *ekaśeṣa* (as in reduplication), by which only *i/u* survive. The *Dīp.* promises to deal with all these aspects in the course of its observations on the following *Mbh.* where these points are raised.

[1. 3]

सवर्णाकारनिवृत्त्यर्थम् ... etc. This *pratīka* stands for the following *Vār.* and the Bhāṣya thereon : 'एच इग्वचनं सवर्णाकारनिवृत्त्यर्थम्' (वा. १)। एच इग् भवतीत्युच्यते, सवर्णनिवृत्त्यर्थमकारनिवृत्त्यर्थं च। सवर्णनिवृत्त्यर्थं तावत् — एङो ह्रस्वादेशशासनेषु अर्ध एकारोऽर्ध ओकारो वा मा भूदिति। The *Mbh.* says that the present rule (P. 1. 1. 48) is necessary to prevent $\breve{e}/\breve{o}$ (i. e. half *e* and *o*) as substitutes for *eṅ* (i. e. *e* and *o*), when a short substitute is due for them. P. 1. 1. 48 prevents $\breve{e}$ / $\breve{o}$ and specifically sanctions *ik* (i. e. here *i/u*) when shortening is due. $\breve{e}$ / $\breve{o}$ present themselves on the basis of *sāvarṇya*. But, actually *i/u* are desired, not $\breve{e}$ / $\breve{o}$. Hence this specific provision (P. 1. 1. 48).

The *Dīp.* प्रश्लिष्टावर्णत्वात् सवर्णा...etc. explains why $\breve{e}$ / $\breve{o}$ threaten to replace *e/o* only, and not *ai/au* also. The vowel *a* is completely merged in the following part of the diphthong in *e/o* only; not in *ai/au*.

नियतविषयाश्च वर्णाः ... etc. Here the *Dīp.* observes that all the phonemes are not used with an equal frequency in the different recensions of the Veda. Their uses are fixed. So $\breve{e}$ and $\breve{o}$ may not be met frequently elsewhere. Here, however, they can force themselves because they can satisfy, at least *prima facie*, necessary grammatical requirements.

Observation : As an example of a rare phoneme the *Dīp.* MS mentions *ū* (ऊ). But surely *ū* cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be regarded as *niyataviṣaya*. We do not know which letter Bhar. originally wrote, which in course of time came to be corrupted into ऊ. We tentatively read $\breve{o}$ (ओ॑).

[1. 4]

इमावैचौ समाहारवर्णाविति. The *Mbh.* represented by this *pratīka* reads : अकारनिवृत्त्यर्थं च। इमावैचौ समाहारवर्णौ, मात्रावर्णस्य मात्रेवर्णोवर्णयोः। तयोर्ह्रस्वशासनेषु कदाचिदवर्णः स्यात्, कदाचिदिवर्णोवर्णौ। मा कदाचिदवर्णो भूदित्येवमर्थमिदमुच्यते। The purpose in teaching *ik* as the substitute of *aic* is to prevent *a*, which would also otherwise come as a substitute because of its short length. The *Mbh.* gives the structure of *ai* and *au*. It says that both *a* (the first part) and *i* / *u* (the second part) have a length of one mora each, i. e. both are short equally. P. 1. 1. 48 prohibits here *a* by confirming *i/u* alone as the short substitute.

Bhar. does not explain the argument, evidently thinking it too simple to require an explanation. Instead he thinks it necessary to explain the *Mbh.* expressions समाहारवर्णौ and मात्रावर्णस्य. (Incidentally, the present *Mbh.* occurs under the Śiva-Sūras *eoṅ/aiauc* also. But Bhar. did not then think it necessary to explain these expressions.) He says that समाहारवर्णौ should rather have been समाहारवर्णावयवौ 'having for their parts the phonemes which combine together ($a+i=ai$; $a+u=au$)'. That is why *ai* and *au* are called समाहारवर्णौ (consequently we should emend the MS व्यपदेशात् into व्यपदेशः.) Kaiy. also says the same thing : समाह्रियमाणावयवत्वात् (But, like Bhar., he too is silent under *eoṅ/aiauc.*)

We have explained मात्रावर्णस्य in a simple way above, according to which out of the two moras of *aic*, one mora (मात्रा) is formed by *a*, and one by *i/u*. We think this is the simplest and the most natural explanation of the *Mbh.* Bhar., however, explains it in a very curious way. He says : योऽसावष्टादशधा भिन्नः, तस्य या मात्रा एकदेशः, सोऽवयवोऽस्य. This seems to mean that one (मात्रा, एकदेशः) out of the eighteen varieties of *a* is a part of *aic*. We do not know what is achieved by this and why the simple interpretation is discarded. Kaiy. also takes मात्रा in the sense of अवयव and refers to eighteenfold *a* (अष्टादशभेदभिन्नस्यावर्णस्य मात्रा=अवयव इति भेदसद्भावात् षष्ठ्या निर्देशः).

Here is one good point about Kaiy. He has at least made his difficulty clear, which led him to the roundabout interpretation which he has given. He also takes मात्रा in the sense of a part (अवयवः). Now *a* itself is the part (of *aic*). When अवर्ण and मात्रा refer to one and the same object, how does Pat. use Genitive in अवर्णस्य? For, the Genitive is used only when there are two distinct things (we can say वृक्षस्य शाखा, etc, but not वृक्षस्य वृक्षः). So Kaiy. has to find out some means to somehow defend Pat. So what he does is to understand the eighteenfold *a* as a whole, any single variety of it as a part, and thus somehow to justify the Genitive. Bhar. also, whom Kaiy. follows, had probably the same difficulty, but he is silent about it.

One cannot help saying that while trying to defend Pat. against an alleged grammatical irregularity, Bhar. (and followiug him Kaiy.) has misinterpreted Pat. as regards the real meaning of his words.

(*p.* 16, *l.* 17) एतदाचष्टे, निवर्तकमिदं ... etc. Here the *Dīp.* remarks that when he says तयोर्ह्रस्वशासनेषु ... etc., Pat. makes it clear that Kāt.'s *Vār.* सवर्णाकारनिवृत्त्यर्थम् is based on the view that P. 1. 1. 48 is only *nivartaka*. That is, it is not teaching any new addition. When P. 1. 2. 47 : ह्रस्वो नपुंसके, for example, lays down a short substitute for the final of a neuter stem, all that P. 1. 1. 48 says is that if that final vowel is *ec*, its substitute will be a short *ik* only, no other short vowel. (The rule is the *nivartaka* of the initial *a*. Or, to borrow a term from Nāg., P. 1. 1. 48 serves the purpose of a *niyama* 'restriction' : only short *i/u*, no *ă*.) P. 1. 1. 48 is thus a sort of *paribhāṣā*. So like any other Paribhāṣā there will be an *ekavākyatā* — it will form one sentence with the rules like P. 1. 2. 47 which teach short substitutes.

The *Dīp.* adds (अन्यस्य तु विधायकम्) that the opponent's view is that P. 1. 1. 48 is not a paribhāṣā. It is an independent injunctive rule (विधायकम्) that will supersede P. 1. 2. 47 etc. This other view is demonstrated in 2. 1 below.

ननु विवृततरत्वादैचः ... etc. The *Dīp.* raises three objections against the *Mbh.* कदाचिद्वर्णं स्यात् ... etc. on the *akāranivṛtti* view. (1) Both *a* and *i/u* are *vivṛtatara* (more open) in *ai/au* according to the *Mbh.* on *eoṅ/aiauc* which says : 'संध्यक्षरेषु विवृतत्वात्' (वा. १०)। यदत्रावर्णं विवृततरं तदन्यस्मात् अवर्णात्। ये अपीवर्णोवर्णे विवृततरे ते अन्याभ्याम्। The phoneme *a* is *saṁvṛta* (closed) in practice. It cannot come as a substitute for the more open *a* of the diphthongs *ai/au* on account of difference in the effort. The *Mbh.* statement कदाचिद्वर्णं स्यात् is not therefore proper. (2) After the withdrawal of *a*, the more open *i* and *u* will remain. But they are not desired. The normally open *i* and *u* are desired. (3) In the matter of substitution, the place of articulation occupies an important position. By retaining *i/u* alone as the substitutes and rejecting *a* altogether the place (velum) of the first constituent of the diphthongs is altogether thrown to the wind. That does not seem fair.

The *Dīp.* तत्र स्थानग्रहणात् ... etc. replies objections 1 and 3. The 2nd objection is replied in 2. 6 below. Firstly, it is just because of the importance of the place of articulation in the matter of substitution that it is feared that *a* will try to come in as substitute of *ai/au* inasmuch as it has at least a partial similarity with *ai/au* in this matter. It is wholly velar while *ai/au* also have partly that place of articulation. Secondly *a* may be *saṁvṛta* in the actual practice; but in Grammar it can be *vivṛtatara*. When it comes to using it, it can

be reverted to its *saṁvṛta* status. Hence the *prima facie* possibility of *a* forcing itself as a substitute of *ai/au*.

[2. 1]

दीर्घास्त्विकः प्राप्नुवन्ति. The *Mbh.* represented by this *pratīka* runs as follows : अस्ति प्रयोजनमेतत् । किं तर्हीति ? दीर्घप्रसङ्गस्तु । दीर्घास्त्विकः प्राप्नुवन्ति । किं कारणम् ? स्थानेऽन्तरतमो भवतीति ।

This *Mbh.* points out a difficulty that will arise. A substitute is subject to the principle of *āntaratamya* (P. 1. 1. 50). When an *ik* replaces an *ec* by this rule, the *ik* will have to be necessarily long (of which it is capable) as being nearmost to the original *ec* which is to be replaced. So the object of the rule will be defeated.

In [1. 4] the *Dīp.* referred to the two views about the exact nature of P. 1. 1. 48. According to one view (implied in the *Vār.*) this is not an independent rule, but a metalinguistic rule which becomes a part of the injunctive rules which teach a short substitute, e. g. P. 1. 2. 47 : ह्रस्वो नपुंसके प्रातिपदिकस्य. (This is the *nivartaka* view.) Since the two rules combine into a single sentence, the substituted *ik* has to be short and so there is no difficulty. (एचो ह्रस्वप्रसङ्गे इगेव ह्रस्वः as Kaiy. says.) The objection दीर्घप्रसङ्गस्तु is now taken on the other view viz. that P. 1. 1. 48 is an independent injunctive rule. Since on this view P. 1. 1. 48 merly teaches an *ik* substitute, superseding a short vowel, there is no restriction of shortness on the substitute and so long *ik* vowels become due undesiredly as substitutes because of *āntaratamya*.

The *Dīp.* ह्रस्वश्रुत्यैकवाक्यतावमगच्छदिकः is partly corrupt. As it is, it does not make a sense (our translation is provisional). It seems that the first part of the sentence refers to the *nivartaka* view which presupposes the *ekavākyatā*, while the latter part (इकः केवलमपूर्वान् विदधाति) states the *vidhāyaka* (or the *nirvartaka*) view and shows how long vowels are inevitable in *atiri* etc. (where the undesired forms **atirī* etc. would result).

(*p.* 17, *l.* 1) The *Dīp.* कथं पुनर्भाव्यमानेन सवर्णानां ग्रहणम् ? objects to the above argument. An *aṇ* phoneme which already exists can comprehend its homogeneous phoneme, but not the one which is brought into existence, say by way of substitution. (Cf. the Pari. 19 : भाव्यमानेन सवर्णानां ग्रहणं न.) How can then the *ik* which is being taught here as a substitute include in it a long *ik* also ? The *Dīp.* यत्र ग्रहणं संभवति ... replies this objection. It's true. But there is an exception. The phoneme *u* can comprehend *ū* even when it is itself *bhāvyamāna*. Cf. the dictum : भाव्यमानोऽप्युकारः सवर्णान् गृह्णाति (Pari. 20). So, the threat of a long substitute may be only imaginary in the case of *i* etc., but

it is real in the case of *u*. Cf. Kaiy : भाव्यमानस्यापि सवर्णग्रहणं दृश्यतेऽमूभ्यामित्यादाविति दोषोपन्यासः ।

(*p*. 17, *l*. 3) ननु च ह्रस्वादेश इत्युच्यते, तेन दीर्घा न भविष्यन्ति. An objection against the above *dīrghaprasaṅga* objection. *Ik*-substitution is taught when a short substitute is due. Naturally only a short *ik* is valid. If, in spite of this, a long *ik* came in, then, as the *Dīp* says, the word *hrasva* in the rule would be meaningless (ह्रस्वादेशश्रुतिरनर्थिका स्यात्). So P. 1. 1. 48 is to be interpreted as एच इक् ह्रस्व आदेशो भवति 'a short *ik* is the substitute for *ec*'. Similarly Kaiy : अयं हि वाक्यार्थः – एचो ह्रस्वप्रसङ्गे इगेव ह्रस्व इति.

(*p*. 17, *l*. 5) इतरो यद्यस्य प्रयोजनान्तरं न स्यात् ... etc. This *Dīp*. introduces the *Mbh*. : विषयार्थमेतत् स्यात् – एचो ह्रस्वप्रसङ्गे इग् भवतीति. This refutes the above objection based on the meaninglessness. Even if the *ik* substitute were long, the word *hrasva* in the Sū. does not become meaningless. It still serves a purpose, viz., that *ik* replaces *ec* only where a short substitute is taught; it does not replace *ec* where some operation other than the shortening is taught. P. 8. 2. 86 : गुरोरनृतो ... etc. teaches a *pluta* substitute for a metrically heavy vowel under certain circumstances (e. g. 'O Dèvadatta !'). Being *guru*, the *ec* vowels (*e*, *o*, *ai*, *au*) become *pluta*. If Pāṇini had not read *hrasva* in his rule 1. 1. 48, then, in the case of P. 8. 2. 86 also there would be an *ik* substitute for *ec* instead of a *pluta* vowel. One could say that *hrasva* in 1. 1. 48 is meant for avoiding such an undesired result. The word *hrasva* will not become meaningless even if a long *ik* forced itself as a substitute for *ec*.

(*p*. 17, *l*. 8) तस्मात् ह्रस्वशासनविषये ... etc. This *Dīp*. works out the effect of the *viṣayārtham* view. P. 1. 2. 47 teaches a short substitute for the final of a neuter stem. Therefore, by the present rule, the words एच इग् (भवति) enter into that rule. At this time we get two statements (*vākyabheda*): (1) प्रातिपदिकस्य ह्रस्वो भवति '(a final vowel of a neuter) nominal stem is replaced by a short vowel' and (2) एच इग् भवति 'under the same circumstance (the final) *ec* is replaced by *ik*'. The effect of this twofold statement is that there is no connection between *hrasva* and *ik* (अनभिसंबन्ध). The final result is that a short substitute comes in when the original vowel is other than *ec*, while if it is *ec* it will be replaced by *ik*. This *ik* will necessarily be a long *ik* on account of *āntaratamya*. The desired short *ik* will not be available. Hence the *Mbh*. : दीर्घास्त्विकः प्राप्नुवन्ति. Similarly Kaiy. : यत्र ह्रस्वो विधीयते तत्रैवास्योपस्थानं यथा स्यात्, देवदत्तेति प्लुतादिविधावुपस्थानं मा भूत्। अस्मिश्चोपस्थिते वाक्यभेदेनैव इको विधीयमाना अन्तरतमा दीर्घा एव प्राप्नुवन्ति ।

The *Dīp*. एतत्तु यथा ... etc. anticipates an objection against the above argument and answers it. This is the objection anticipated : Let the एच इक् part of the combined rule cause long *ik* as the substitute. After it has operated,

the other part, say ह्रस्वो नपुंसके, will operate, thus bringing a short *ik* in the place of a long one. The object is achieved. How does then the opponent say : दीर्घास्त्विकः प्राप्नुवन्ति ?

The reply is given on the understanding that एच इक् is an *apavāda* of ह्रस्व. And once an *apavāda* has operated and set aside the general the latter cannot be revived. A parallel is cited. According to P. 7. 4. 9 : दयतेर्दिगि लिटि, the root *dī* (iv. 26) is replaced by *digi* in the perfect (the forms are *digye, digyāte* etc.). Here one could well ask : Let the root *dī* be replaced by *digi*. It's all right. But why does *digi* (which is only a *dhātvādeśa*) not undergo reduplication ? Because the substitution of *digi* is an *apavāda* of reduplication, is the reply. At the stage *di* + *l*(*iṭ*) two operations become due : reduplication, and substitution (of *digi*). As an *apavāda* the substitution takes place and bars the reduplication permanently.

Kaiy. briefly says : ह्रस्वस्य बाधितत्वाद्दीर्घेषु कृतेषु पुनर्ह्रस्वाभावः.

In the MS some letters are lost after अन्यथा तु पुनरपि. We have supplied ह्रस्वः स्यात्. But some more letters must have been lost as is indicated by the following पनयोर्न नानावाक्यत्वम्.

[2. 2]

परमनयोर्न नानावाक्यत्वम्. As remarked above some portion of the *Dīp.* is lost here. We have reconstructed प[रम]नयोर् from पनयोर् by supplying रम after प. अनयोर् refers to (1) the rules like P. 1. 2. 47 where a short substitute is taught, and (2) the present rule P. 1. 1 48.

In making this small reconstruction we have taken it for granted that the *Dīp.* after completing its comments on दीर्घास्त्विकः प्राप्नुवन्ति has already passed on to the consideration of the next *Vār.*, viz. दीर्घप्रसङ्गस्तु निवर्तकत्वात्. This *Vār.* may have been there in the original *Dīp.* and then lost along with some other portion, As it is, the single sentence परमनयोर्न नानावाक्यत्वम् (which refutes what is said before) looks rather strange. It is immediately followed by ननु चैकवाक्यभावे ... etc. which contains a critique of the view expressed therein and it does seem that the *Dīp.* is alreadyheading to the *Vār.* दीर्घप्रसङ्गस्तु... (whether cited previously or not).

(*p.* 17, *l.* 13) ननु चैकवाक्यभावेऽनुवादः ... etc. In this one sentence the *Dīp.* points out a defect in the *ekavākya* view (put forward emphatically in the first sentence). In this procedure P. 1. 1. 48 is reduced to a secondary position. It has nothing to teach newly, but just to repeat (*anuvāda*) what rules like P. 1. 2. 47 say. On the other hand, on the *nānāvākya* view P. 1. 1. 48 attains the status of an injunctive rule (*vidhi*). And in such situations they

usually prefer to look upon a rule as *vidhi* rather than as *anuvāda* or *niyama*. (Nāg. : नियमत्वेऽनुवादादिदोषाद् विधित्वमेव न्याय्यमित्यभिमानः.)

The *Dīp.* सत्यम्, एवमेतत् partly admits the above charge but still justifies the *ekavākya* view for other reasons. Firstly, there is a natural connection between P. 1. 1. 48 and the rules like P. 1. 2. 47 which teach a short substitute. They have mutual expectancy. To obliterate this natural relationship artificially is not proper. Secondly, to bring in many actions where one suffices leads to the fault of *gaurava* (unnecessary prolixity). It is better to avoid it where possible. Thirdly, if the *nānāvākya* view is followed, P. 1. 1. 48 does not supersede P. 1. 2. 47 as there is no connection between the two sentences.

The last sentence किं च नानावाक्यत्वे कल्प्यमाने 'एच इग्' इत्यत्र 'ह्रस्वो नपुंसके' इत्यबाधितं भवति, असंस्पर्शादस्येति requires some explanation. The objector (who favours नानावाक्यता) says here that if the एकवाक्यता view is accepted (in order to prevent the undesired long substitutes), that will lead to yet another undesired result. For, an एकवाक्यता of the following kind also could result: नपुंसकस्य प्रातिपदिकस्य यः अन्त्य एच् तस्य ह्रस्व इग् भवति. With this एकवाक्यता, only *ec* will get subtitutes while other long vowels (ī ... etc.) will remain without a short substitute. On the other hand, the opponent argues, if नानावाक्यता is followed, P. 1. 1. 48 cannot influence the other rules like P. 1. 2. 47 (असंस्पर्शादस्य) and so ī etc. can get a short substitute.

The difficulty pointed out here by the *nānāvākyavādin* is removed by the *ekavākyavādin* in the next *Dīp.* ननु चैकवाक्यत्वे कल्प्यमाने ... etc.

ननु चैकवाक्यत्वे कल्प्यमाने ... etc. The use of ननु here is confusing. It creates the impression that another objection against the *ekavākya* view follows. (Cf. the beginning of the previous paragraph : ननु चैकवाक्यमात्रे which points out defects in the *ekavākya* view.) But far from it. Actually this section is a justification of it. It points out how everything desired can be achieved even on that view.

This is the process : एच इक् ह्रस्वो नपुंसके प्रातिपदिकस्य is the single combined sentence. Here the teaching of the short substitute by the predicate *hrasva* presupposes *acaḥ* 'in the place of an *ac*' (i. e. a vowel)', i. e. an *ac* is the original phoneme which is to be replaced by a short vowel (P. 1. 2. 28 : अचश्च. 'ह्रस्वदीर्घप्लुतशब्दैर्यत्राज् विधीयते तत्र 'अचः' इति षष्ठ्यन्तं पदमुपतिष्ठते' सि. कौ..) Now, *ec* is included in *ac*. So a short substitute is available for *ec*. We then combine this with एच इक्, which means एचः इक् ह्रस्वो भवति 'the substitute of *ec* is a short *ik*'.

Although the passage is not very clear, it seems that it has to be explained on some such lines. The *Dīp.* points out that in this way we give a

free scope to the short substitute in the case of vowels other than *ec*. The difficulty pointed out in the preceding paragraph by the *nānāvākyavādin* is only apparent, not real.

For the objection and its reply, cf. Kaiy.: यदि तर्ह्येकवाक्यता, एजव्यतिरेकेणान्यस्य ह्रस्वो न प्राप्नोति। नैष दोषः। पूर्वे ह्रस्वश्रुत्याच उपस्थानाद् ह्रस्वत्वं क्रियते। तत्रैचोऽप्यन्तर्भावाद् ह्रस्वे क्रियमाणे 'एच इक्' इत्यस्योपस्थानम्।

[2. 3]

अन्ये पुनरप्येवं वर्णयन्ति etc. This *Dīp.* is the explanation of the following *Mbh.*: 'दीर्घाप्रसङ्गस्तु निवर्तकत्वात्' (वा. 2)। दीर्घाणां त्विकामप्रसङ्गः। किं कारणम्? निवर्तकत्वात्। नानेनेको निर्वर्त्यन्ते। किं तर्हि? अनिको निवर्त्यन्ते। सिद्धा ह्यत्र ह्रस्वा इकश्चानिकश्च। तत्र अनेनानिको निवर्त्यन्ते।

The *Mbh.* says that when this Sū. teaches an *ik* as a substitute for *ec* whenever a short substitute is taught for it (*ec*), it is not meant that an *ik*, coming anew, replaces the whole *ec*. No. There is no such *sthānyādeśa* relationship intended here (नैवैचाम् इकां च स्थान्यादेशभावं वर्णयन्ति as the *Dīp.* says). All that is done is that out of the two short vowels forming an *ec*, viz. *a* and *i/u*, the second part (*i/u*) is allowed to remain and the first part made to go (सिद्धा ह्यत्र ... अनिको [अकाराः] निवर्त्यन्ते). The *i* and *u* forming the second part are short. When retained, they alone are the substitutes. It is like the *ekaśeṣa* where only something goes; nothing comes in. As there is no *sthānyādeśa* relationship there is no possibility of long *i/u* coming in by P. 1. 1. 50.

Observation: The first sentence, अन्ये पुनरप्येवं वर्णयन्ति is somewhat confusing. On the face of it, it seems to mean that some people repeat (once more) this interpretation. We fail to see the significance of *punar api*, as this explanation appears for the first time in the *Mbh.* here. If Bhar. has anticipated it and given it in the lost portion of the *Dīp.* (see above [2. 2], we do not know. Or *punar api* may just mean: Here, again, is another interpretation advanced by some.

Still, it is a mystery why the *Dīp.* attributes this explanation to 'some others' (*anye*), when that is the authentic explanation, and the only explanation at that, given by Pat.

[2. 4]

In this section the *Dīp.* raises four objections against the *nivartaka* i. e. *ekaśeṣa* view held in the Vār.

(1) According to the *Mbh.* statement: यदत्रावर्णं विवृततरं तदन्यस्मादवर्णात्, ये अपीवर्णोवर्णे विवृततरे ते अन्याभ्यामिवर्णोवर्णाभ्याम् (under the *Śiv. Sūtras*: एओङ्। ऐऔच्।) the *i/u* portion of these diphthongs is more than ordinarily open (*vivṛta-*

tara). If it is to remain as it is, as the *nivartaka* view presupposes, we do not get the desired, normally open, *i/u* but extra-open *i/u*.

(2) In the Acc. pl. *atirīn* etc., the *ī* is no longer available (and so also the following *-n*). In the position अतिरि + अस् the final *i* is expected to become *ī* by P. 6. 1. 102: प्रथमयोः पूर्वसवर्णः. But this cannot happen in our case, since that rule teaches the lengthening of *ak*, while *i* in *atiri* cannot be called *ak* because it is not represented by *i* (in the Akṣarasamāmnāya) because of the difference in the efforts — *i* in the Akṣarasamāmnāya is *vivṛta* while the one in *atiri* will be *vivṛtatara*. And when there is no lengthening, the substitution of *n* in the place of *a* of the termination *as* taught by P. 6. 1. 103: तस्माच्छसो नः पुंसि also cannot take place.

(3) If one adopts the *uttarabhūyastva* view (to be mentioned below) (which says: अर्धमात्रा अवर्णस्य, अध्यर्धमात्रेवर्णोवर्णयोः) in the case of *ai* and *au*, the substitute *i/u* will be also of 1½ moras, thus abnormal in length.

(4) In the case of *e* and *o*, where the first part *a* has completely merged in *e/o*, it is not possible to say which part goes and which remains.

[2. 5]

This section answers the objections raised above.

(1) It is held here that the extra *vivṛta* nature of *i/u* is due to an external reason, viz. the extra *vivṛta* nature of the first component *a*. It is not inherent in the *i/u* part of diphthongs. The moment *a* is removed, *i/u* assumes its pure *vivṛta* nature, like a crystal shedding aside the colour of the nearby object, the moment the latter is removed.

(But this *Dīp.* is not faithful to the *Mbh.* As we have seen above in [2. 4 (1)], the *Mbh.* says that *i/u* in the diphthongs are equally *vivṛtatara* as *a*. The *Mbh.* does not say that only *a* is *vivṛtatara* really. We do not know what is Bhar.'s authority for this statement.)

(2) This answers the second objection also. Since we have the normally *vivṛta i/u*, there is no difficulty about the *savarṇadīrgha*.

(3) There is no problem on the *uttarabhūyastva* view, because on that view the rule P. 1. 1. 48 itself is unnecessary. Read the *Mbh.* (on this Sū. itself): 'ऐचोश्चोत्तरभूयस्त्वात्' (वा. ४)। ऐचोश्चोत्तरभूयस्त्वादवर्णो न भविष्यति। भूयसी मात्रा (= सार्धमात्रा) इवर्णोवर्णयोः, अल्पीयसी (= अर्धमात्रा) अवर्णस्य। भूयस एव ग्रहणानि भविष्यन्ति। तद्यथा 'ब्राह्मणग्राम आनीयताम्' इत्युच्यते। तत्र चावरतः पञ्चकारुकी भवति।

(4) Even in the case of *e/o* where the components are not clearly separable, the teacher explains the division.

[2. 6]

ऐचोश्चोत्तरभूयस्त्वादिति. This *Vār*. denies, on the strength of उत्तरभूयस्त्व, the necessity of P. 1. 1. 48 for ruling out *a* as a short substitute of *ai* and *au*. The second components of these diphthongs, viz *i*/*u* are more dominant than the first one, viz. *a*. So *ai* and *au* are practically regarded as palatal and labial respectively. So their short substitutes also will be automatically the palatal *i* and the labial *u* respectively. No further rule like the present one is necessary to keep out *a* from coming in as substitute. The Bhāṣya on this *Vār*. is already cited above [2. 5 (3)].

(*p*. 18, *l*. 11) समुदायस्य च नास्ति ... etc. There is no short vowel which has a composite place of articulation (उभयस्थानः). Hence the problem : which of the short vowels — *a* or *i*/*u* — is to be a substitute of *ai*/*au* ? The reply is given on the basis of भूयस्त्व — the larger or longer component decides . *i* in *ai*, and *u* in *au* are longer parts. On that basis *ai* is called (*vyapadeśa*) palatal, and *au* labial. So *ai* is replaced by the palatal *i*, and *au* by the labial *u*.

(*l*. 12) व्यपदेशे निमित्तम् , cause of designation, here designation based on the place of articulation, such as *kaṇṭhya* ' velar ' etc. (*l*. 16) इवर्णोवर्णमात्रा च भूयसी. Scil.: अध्यर्धमात्रत्वात् .

(*p*. 18, *l*. 18) एवं ब्राह्मणानां भूयस्त्वात् ते व्यपदेशहेतवो, नान्येऽवयवाः । This *Dīp*. explains the *Mbh*. : भूयस एव ग्रहणानि। तद्यथा ' ब्राह्मणग्राम आनीयताम् ' इत्युच्यते। तत्र चावरतः पञ्चकारुकी भवति।

The *Mbh*. is illustrating the usual practice of naming after the majority (प्राधान्येन व्यपदेशा भवन्ति as the dictum is usually worded). The word *brāhmaṇagrāma*, for example, does not mean a village where all the inhabitants are Brābamaṇas. It just means a village which is mostly inhabited by the Brāhmaṇas. A few other people, like a carpenter, an ironsmith etc. who are bound to be there, are neglected when the place is called *brāhmaṇagrāma*. Similarly in our case, where *e* is called a palatal on account of the prominent portion of *i* therein.

Bhar. makes an interesting observation when he says : मनुष्येषु च ग्रामशब्दो वर्तत इति दृष्टान्तः. This means that in the sentence ब्राह्मणग्राम आनीयताम् *grāma* does not mean the village, the place as such, but rather the people (*manuṣyeṣu*)[1] who live there, the villagers. In the context of *ānayana* ' bringing '

1. Cf. the *Mbh*. on P. 1. 1. 7 : ग्रामशब्दोऽयं बह्वर्थः। अस्त्येव शालासमुदाये वर्तते। तद्यथा — ग्रामो दग्ध इति। अस्ति वाटपरिक्षेपे वर्तते। तद्यथा – ग्रामं प्रविष्ट इति। अस्ति मनुष्येषु वर्तते। तद्यथा — ग्रामो गतो ग्राम आगत इति। अस्ति सारण्यके ससीमके सस्थण्डिलके वर्तते।··· (1. 59 20-22).

there is the application of the dictum प्राधान्येन ... etc. But, Bhar. points out, in some other context this may not be so. When it is intended to convey that a village is donated to Brāhmaṇas (for practising Dharma), then in that case the expression *brāhmaṇagrāma* (or *brāhmaṇānāṁ grāmaḥ*) will mean a village belonging to the Brāhmaṇas only (of which they are owners). The dictum प्राधान्येन व्यपदेशा भवन्ति will not apply there (सारण्यके हि ग्रामशब्दवाच्ये स्वामित्वेन व्यपदिश्येरन् ... etc.)

Kaiy. echoes the idea briefly : ब्राह्मणानां वास्तव्यत्व उदाहरणम्, न तु स्वामित्वे।

It appears that Pat. has deliberately chosen the context of 'bringing' (*ānīyatām*), since, evidently, only the villagers can be brought, not the village.

Readings : (1) (*p.* 16, *l.* 4) The MS reads from किमर्थम् upto एकशेष twice. — (2) (*p.* 16, *l.* 5) MS (first time) आनर्थक्यात्. — (3) (*p.* 16, *l.* 6) MS (both times) संस्थानत्वात्. — (4) (*p.* 16, *l.* 8) MS (both times) नानावाक्यता(first time °वाक्यना)विकवाक्यता. — (5) (*p.* 16, *l.* 9) MS (first time) एकदेशे (for °शेष-). — (6) (*p.* 16, *l.* 10) MS ह्रस्वस्वात् ॥ नैप्विति. — (7) (*p.* 16, *l.* 12) AL ओव्यापारः. — (8) (*p.* 16, *l.* 13) AL अर्धेकारौकाराव्. — (9) (*p.* 16, *l.* 15) MS व्यपदेशाद्विमात्राव्; AL °शात्। द्वि°. — (10) (*p.* 16, *l.* 15) MS मात्रावयवत्वान्यअवर्णस्येति; AL °त्राऽवयवत्वात् अव°. — (11) (*p.* 16, *l.* 15) AL सोऽस्याव् (for योऽस्याव्). — (12) (*p.* 16, *l.* 16) MS अभियोज्यम्. — (13) (*p.* 16, *l.* 16) MSAL विवृताव् (for our emendation विवृततराव्). — (14) (*p.* 16, *l.* 21) MS करणे तालुस्थानेतैव; AL करणता तालुस्थानेनैव. — (15) (*p.* 16, *l.* 24) MSAL ·श्रुत्येकवाक्यतावम(AL °मव)गछत्. — (16) (*p.* 17, *l.* 1) MS यण; AL यत्र (for येन). – (17) (*p.* 17, *l.* 4) MSAL भवत्येव इको (for °ति 'एच इक्).–(18) (*p.* 17, *l.* 9) MS इत्यतोन्येतो; AL इति। अतोऽन्यो न. — (19) (*p.* 17, *ll.* 11-13) MSAL पुनरपि प(AL अ)नयोर्. — (20) (*p.* 17, *l.* 14) MSAL नावा(AL न वा)क्यविधिः (for our emendation नानावाक्यभावे). — (21) (*p.* 17, *l.* 14) MS किंवा; AL किञ्च (for किं तु). — (22) (*p.* 17, *l.* 15) MS अन्ये कैव; AL अन्या एकैव (for एकैव). — (23) (*p.* 17, *l.* 18) MS [अ]विस्थानिवत्त्वेन; AL [अ]पि स्थानिवत्त्वेन. — (24) (*p.* 17, *l.* 18) MSAL अंतर्भूत-. — (25) (*p.* 17, *l.* 18) MS पुरध्यावाप्येते (for पुनरध्यारोप्यते as in AL). — (26) (*p.* 17, *l.* 19) MSAL भवत्येव (for °त्येच). — (27) (*p.* 17, *l.* 19) MS भवत्येवस्त्विक्; AL °त्येव। अस्तु इक्. — (28) (*p.* 17, *l.* 24) AL निवर्तते। अनिक इग्. — (29) (*p.* 18, *l.* 1) MS वीद्यते. — (30) (*p.* 18, *l.* 1) MSAL विवृततरत्वादिनैव(AL °नै चा)पायो. — (31) (*p.* 18, *l.* 2) ML अरा (for अतितु). — (32) (*p.* 18, *l.* 3) MS चाध्यमात्रस्य; AL सार्धमात्रस्य. — (33) (*p.* 18, *l.* 6) AL उद्रूपस्य अपगतो°. — (34) (*p.* 18, *ll.* 6-7) MS वविवृत°; AL यच्च विवृत°. — (35) (*p.* 18, *l.* 8) MS अत्वाताचार्यो; AL सत्वात् आ°. — (36) (*p.* 18, *l.* 13) MS स च तुस्थानिप्रकृष्टाव् (?); AL स चेत् स्थाने प्रकृष्ट (for स च स्थानित्वेन प्रकृतः स्यात्). — (37) (*p.* 18, *l.* 14) AL व्यपदेशे नि°. — (38) (*p.* 18, *l.* 15) MS तस्याथा(or प्या)धिक्यात्; AL तस्याप्या° (for तस्यार्धा°). — (39)

(*p.* 18, *l.* 15) MSAL तस्यावर्णस्य. — (40) (*p.* 18, *l.* 16) MS ताल-, AL तालव्य- (for our emendation तालव्योष्ठ्य-). — (41) (*p.* 18, *l.* 17) MSAL स्थानी न व्यपदेशं लभेत. — (42) (*p.* 18, *ll.* 17-18) AL सालवनम् and सालाश्र. — (43) (*p.* 18, *l.* 20; MS ब्राह्मणानामयं धर्म; AL ब्राह्मणानामयं ग्राम.

* * *

ṣaṣṭhī sthāneyogā / **P. 1. 1. 49**

[1]

किमिदं स्थानेयोगा. The apparently curious form of the word स्थानेयोगा prompts this question : Is it a compound or just a phrase ? If a compound, how is the case-ending (*i*) retained in the first constituent ? Alternatively, if a phrase, how is the peculiar feminine form *yogā* (possible only in the compound) to be accounted for ? And surely an expression cannot at one and the same time be both a compound and a phrase (समासासमासयोर्युगपदसंभवात्).

The elision of the original case-endings of the constituents of a compound is taught in P. 2. 4. 71 : सुपो धातुप्रातिपदिकयोः. A feminine abstract noun (when not in a compound) from √*yuj* would be *yukti* by P. 3. 3. 94 : स्त्रियां क्तिन् (which bars *ghañ* due by P. 3. 3. 16, 18, 19). The feminine of the Bahu. compound स्थानेयोग, however, is formed with *ā* (i. e. *ṭāp* by P. 4. 1. 4 : अजाद्यतष्टाप्).

(*p.* 19, *l.* 1) समासेऽर्थप्रतिपत्तिः ... etc. It was shown above that both the *samāsa* and the *asamāsa* views about स्थानेयोगा have one factor each in their favour. Now Pat. decides in favour of the compound, the Bahu. compound, to be specific (स्थाने योगोऽस्याः). What is the deciding factor ? Meaningfulness, replies Bhar. On the *asamāsa* view, the phrase स्थाने योगा makes no sense. Not only the grammatical form does not admit of any meaning; even inference fails here. The *samāsa* interpretation, on the other hand, gives a meaning, and so is to be preferred. As regards the inconvenient form योगे-, the *Mbh.* justifies it by सप्तम्यलोपो निपातनात्. A *nipātana* is the actual use of a finished grammatical form (सिद्धप्रक्रियस्य निर्देशः) by a competent authority like Pāṇini, which is taken as a sufficient proof for the correctness and usability (cf. the *Dīp.* प्रयोक्तव्योऽयं शब्दः) of that form in the absence of a regular grammatical statement or a formal analysis of it.

(*p.* 19, *l.* 3) तत्र स्थानेयोगा° etc. The meaning of the Genitive is relationship (संबन्धः). The syntactically related word is related with the word in Genitive through some connection. The Sū. P. 1. 1. 49 says that in Grammar the connection of a word in Genitive with the syntactically connected word is through place. To put it technically, the Genitive ending is connected with

i. e. expressess particular relation, viz. the one characterized by place. षष्ठी is स्थाननिरूपितसंबन्धार्थिका.

(*p.* 19, *l.* 5) ' आच्छे ' इति यः शेभावः ... etc. Bhar. takes the *Mbh.* तृतीयाया वा एत्वम् as meaning that according to this alternative interpretation *sthāne* is to be regarded as *sthāna* + *śe*, the ending *śe* being a substitute of *ṭā* (Instr. sing.) according to P. 7. 1. 39. Bhar., however, points out that *śe* is taught only for the Vedic language (since *chandasi* is continued into P. 7. 1. 39 from 38 : क्त्वापि च्छन्दसि) and so it will be difficult to account for its presence here. Perhaps the *Mbh.* would reply by saying (cf. *Mbh.* I. 37. 4 ; 313. 5) : छन्दोवत् सूत्राणि भवन्ति.

There is some difference of opinion among the commentators here. Both Bhar. and Kaiy. understand the *Mbh.* तृतीयाया वा एत्वम् literally taking *e* as a substitute for the Instrumental sing. ending (i. e. *ṭā*). But while Bhar. understands *śe* by this *e*, Kaiy. understands a simple *e* (different from *śe*), justifying it on the authority of *nipātana* itself, mentioned in the *Mbh.* just before for *saptamyalopa*. Nāg., on the other hand, thinks that *e* replaces the final *a* of the stem *sthāna*, after the case-ending *ṭā* is dropped in the normal course by P. 2. 4. 71 : सुपो धातु... . He thinks that if the *Mbh.* is interpreted literally it would result into an awkward form (*स्थानेनेयोगा ?). Read : तृतीयान्तस्य समासे तृतीयाया लुक्यस्यैत्वमित्यर्थः । तृतीयायाः स्थाने एतद्विधाने तु अन्तरङ्गबाधे मानाभावादिनादेशेऽन्त्यस्य स्यात् । लुग्बाधे मानाभावाच्च .... ।

[1. 1]

(*p.* 19, *l.* 7) दर्शनद्वयं च षष्ठीनिर्देशेषु etc. As an introduction to this rule P. 1. 1. 49, the *Dīp.* here describes two views (दर्शनद्वयं) on the way the Genitive, one of whose main functions is to indicate the place a substitute is to take, functions in Pāṇini's grammar. This is done by taking the example of the substitution of $\sqrt{}$*bhū* in the place of $\sqrt{}$*as* in the context of the *ārdhadhātuka* suffixes taught in P. 2. 4. 52 : अस्तेर्भूः. The basic meaning of the Genitive case is ' relationship, connection, ' and so one may understand that $\sqrt{}$*as* and $\sqrt{}$*bhū* are related in some way ; but the exact relationship is not known. Some words, says the *Dīp.*, like *bhū* here or *Yajñadatta* in *Devadattasya Yajñadattaḥ* ' Y. of D. ' are unable to declare their exact relationship with the word in Genitive. (The *Dīp.* says that they do not bring about any modification or additional quality (व्यतिरेकः) in Devadatta etc.) In देवदत्तस्य यज्ञदत्तः etc., you have to add a word like पुत्रः ' son ', दासः ' servant ' etc. to state the exact nature of the relationship between the two. Similarly here we have to supply the word *sthāna* ' place ' to make the relationship of $\sqrt{}$*as* and $\sqrt{}$*bhū* specific. This is what is done by the present rule. The relationship of $\sqrt{}$*as* and $\sqrt{}$*bhū* is *sthānadvāraka*

'through place' (an expression not actually used by Bhar.) just as it is ***putra-tvādidvāraka*** in *Devadattasya Yajñadattaḥ*.

It is suggested that √*as* and √*bhū* are not directly connected with one another. The Genitive in *asteḥ* is grammatically connected with ***sthāna*** and it is with this *sthāna* that √*bhū* is connected as occupant (*ādheya*). So **अस्तेर्भूः** means अस्तेः स्थाने भूर्भवति '√*bhū* takes the place of √*as*'. As the other class of words, which modify the words in the Genitive by themselves, i. e. which themselves declare their exact relationship, are mentioned *dāsaḥ*, *putraḥ* etc. (i. e. the 'relative' words, so to say).

In एवं हि कल्प्यमाने ... etc. (*l.* 11), the *Dīp.* says that if words like *Yajña-datta* were to modify *Devadattasya* etc. directly, then the only modification possible will be that of conjunction : **देवदत्तस्य यज्ञदत्तः = देवदत्तो यज्ञदत्तश्च !**

(*p.* 19, *l.* 15) अन्ये मन्यन्ते ... etc. This *Dīp.* presents the other view. According to this view, अस्तेः and भूः are connected directly with one another. No medium is necessary to connect the two. The properties like nearness, or location, are inherent in *bhū*, with which it modifies *as*. Technically the *aparasambandhin* of *as* is *bhū* itself (not ***sthāna*** as in the previous view).

Of course, even on this view the Sū. is still necessary in order to bring out the specific kind of relationship, which otherwise, though there, will remain dormant.

[1.2]

स्थानं वार्थः. Here *sthāna* is taken in the sense of 'meaning'. The suffix *lyuṭ* (=*ana*) in *sthāna* is taken in the sense of 'location' (**अधिकरण**; cf. P. 3. 3. 115, 117 : करणाधिकरणयोश्च), on the understanding that a word is there (stays, or resides) i. e. (ultimately) 'conveys' meaning. So अस्तेर्भूः=**अस्तेरर्थे** भूर्भवति. When √*bhū* steps in to convey the meaning of √***as***, the latter retires (on the maxim : उक्तार्थानामप्रयोगः).

[1. 2. 1]

(*p.* 19, *l.* 19) अथ वर्णादेशेषु ... etc. An objection against this स्थानम्=**अर्थः** view. This view, says the objector, is all right in the case of full, i. e. meaningful words (like √*as* etc.). But how will this apply in the case of mere phonetic substitutions (e. g. the oft-quoted replacement of *ik* by *yaṇ*), since mere phonemes have no meaning ? What meaning do you assign there to ***sthāna*** (कः स्थानार्थः) ?

The *Dīp.* तत्रापि 'सर्वे सर्वपदादेशाः' answers the objection, the answer being based on the maxim सर्वे सर्वपदादेशाः. This maxim asserts that all substitutions, including the so-called purely phonetic ones, are really to be looked upon as substitution of one meaningful unit in the place of another meaningful unit.

Thus, though P. 6. 1. 77 : इको यणचि teaches substitution of *y* in the place of *i* belonging to *dadhi* (for instance), actually it is to be looked upon as teaching the substitution of *dadhy* in the place of *dadhi*. The same applies to P. 7. 3. 43 : रुहः पोऽन्यतरस्याम् which while apparently teaching an optional substitution of *p* in the place of *h* of √*ruh* (in the causative), actually teaches the substitution of the whole *rup* in the place of *ruh*.

[1. 2. 2]

The *Dīp.* अथ वा कालः ... etc. offers another solution to the question : अथ वर्णादेशेषु कः स्थानार्थः ? The equation स्थान = अर्थ is given up for the time being and a new one is suggested now : स्थान = काल. (Probably to be explained as तिष्ठन्ति वर्णा अस्मिन्.) Substitution of a phoneme means that the time which was meant to be occupied by, say *ik*, is now occupied by *yaṇ*.

[1. 2. 3]

The *Dīp.* (यथा 'वा अस्तेः' ... etc.) falls back again on the previous interpretation, viz. स्थान = अर्थ, though this time *artha* is to be understood in a different sense, viz. 'the form' of a word. This is not so strange, as it may perhaps appear at first sight. Every sound sequence, before a meaning is assigned to it by convention, shows its own form only. That is what the sound sequence primarily means. And even after it comes to have a conventional meaning, it continues to denote only its form in some contexts, e. g. in grammar. Cf. प्राक् संज्ञिनाभिसंबन्धात् संज्ञा रूपपदार्थिका (*Vākyap.* 1. 66; also 1. 59-60).

The passage यथा वा 'अस्तेर्' ... is somewhat corrupt, but after some emendations (see *Readings* below!) it can be made to give a tolerably good idea of the intended meaning. The *Dīp.* seems to say : Let us not make a fetish of the word *artha* with which the word *sthāna* is paraphrased above. After all, even in the aknowledged case of *as* > *bhū*, the meaning of *as* in P. 2. 4. 52 is *not* the popular or conventional one. It does not mean 'to be' there. There also the meaning consists of 'form' only. For, actually, *as* in that rule stands for all the forms of *as* which occur in the actual parlance. The sound sequence *as* there is as such an *anukaraṇa*, an imitative name, as e. g. *ik* in P. 6. 1. 77 : *iko yaṇ aci* is that of *i* in *dadhi* etc.

In both the examples the sound sequences to be replaced have only their form as their meaning. Why the objection then against purely phonetic substitute only on the plea that it has no meaning?

(*p.* 19, *l.* 24) यथा वा. One rather expected here अथ वा as leading another alternative. So we may take वा here as equivalent to अथ वा, and connect यथा with एवम् which is to follow. — अर्थप्रयुक्तानाम् अस्तिरूपाणाम् refers to

the meaningful forms of √*as* to be used in communication. The masc. ते is rather surprising, referring as it does to °रूपाणि. It is perhaps to be accepted on the model of शैत्यं हि यत् सा प्रकृतिर्जलस्य (*Raghu*. 5. 54). These actual forms of √*as* occurring in communication are meaningful, and their meaning is expressed by the substitutes, i. e. the forms of √*bhū*. But their imitative names, *as* and *bhū* in P. 2. 4. 52, have no such real meaning, they denote only the forms *a-s* and *b-h-ū* of the actual language. We supply a word अनुकरणम् after इत्यत्रापि इको (*l*. 25) to make the sense complete.

Readings : (1) (*p*. 18, *l*. 24) MS योगेपि (for योगेति as emended in AL). — (2) (*p*. 19, *l*. 1) MS स्थानयोगो (for the *Mbh*. ed. स्थाने योगो). — (3) (*p*. 19, *l*. 2) AL अर्थ- (for अन्यार्थ-). — (4) (*p*. 19, *l*. 2) *Mbh*. ed. सप्तम्यलोपो निपातनात्. — (5) (*p*. 19, *l*. 3) MS स्थानेयोगेविषयः; AL स्थाने योगो विषये. — (6) (*p*. 19, *l*. 3) MS नाश्व(or श्व)विषय; AL नास्ति अविषये (for our emendation नान्यविषय). — (7) (*p*. 19, *l*. 5) AL सन्येत. — (8) (*p*. 19, *l*. 10) MS नयनदत्तो. — (9) (*p*. 19, *l*. 12) MS यज्ञदत्तस्येति (for °त्तश्चेति as emended by AL). — (10) (*p*. 19, *l*. 13) AL व्यतिरेके. — (11) (*p*. 19, *l*. 17) MSAL चार्थः (for वार्थः). — (12) (*p*. 19, *l*. 17) MS दृष्ट (!) (for शब्द as emended by AL). — (13) (*p*. 19, *l*, 18) MS भवतिभाविनिवृत्तिश्; AL भवति भाविनी वृत्तिश् (for our emendation भवतिर्भवति । नि°). — (14) (*p*. 19, *l*. 18) AL भवति (for भवतिस्). — (15) (*p*. 19, *l*. 22) MS एकः कालं; AL इकः काले. — (16) (*p*. 19, *l*. 24) MS -प्रत्युक्तानामवि° (for प्रयुक्तानामसि° as emended by AL). — (17) (*p*. 19, *l*. 25) MSAL विधीयते (for our emendation [ऽ]भिधी°). — (18) (*p*. 19, *l*. 26) MS येन कृता दध्यादिस्या; AL यणि कृते दध्य् आदिः स्यात् (for our emendation येऽनुकृता दध्यादिस्था).

[2]

किमर्थं पुनरिदमुच्यते. The form of the question implies that the Sū. is superfluous. It is to suggest that the purpose of the Sū. can be served otherwise. Bhar. points out that the other means, which the questioner has in mind but which he does not mention expressly, is the commentarial explanation (व्याख्यान), cf. Pari. 1.

But there is more in it than this. Bhar. points out that whereas the *vyākhyāna* can be a substitute for P. 1. 1. 49, it becomes a must if P. 1. 1. 49 is framed. For, once this rule is there, it cancels all other relations intended to be conveyed by Genitive. Everywhere the *sthānaṣaṣṭhī* becomes the rule. The other relations like *avayavaṣaṣṭhī* cannot be conveyed. So the *vyākayāna* becomes inevitable.

No example is here given in the *Dīp*. But the example of P. 6. 4. 89 : ऊदुपधाया गोहः occurs later on [2. 2], which we may consider just now as well.

That rule lays down a substitute *ū* for the penultimate vowel (*upadhā*) of √*guh* when a strong suffix follows. (That is, in this environment we have *gūh-* instead of *goh-*.) Here *gohaḥ* is an *avayavaṣaṣṭhī*; it refers to *upadhā* which is a part of it. So the rule means : *ū* is substituted in the place of the penultimate, a part belonging to the root *guh*, when the latter is expecting to be *goh*. Now with P. 1. 1. 49 (if framed) *gohaḥ* also (along with *upadhāyāḥ*) will have to be looked upon as a *sthānaṣaṣṭhī*. So the rule will mean : (1) (with the coming in of P. 1. 1. 52 : अलोऽन्त्यस्य) the final of *goh* is replaced by *ū*; also (2) penultimate of other roots (like *pac*) is replaced by *ū*. The rule will thus result into two injunctions, both giving undesired forms while the desired form remains unachieved.

To prevent this a *vyākhyāna* will be necessary. It will have to say which of the two Genitives (which are subordinate to and qualify the substitute *ūt*) is the qualifier and which is the qualified : एकस्मिंश्च विशेष्ये संनिपतितविशेषणानामुपकारार्थम्. It will have to say that *gohaḥ* is *avayavaṣaṣṭhī*, not *sthānaṣaṣṭhī*, in spite of the rule and that *upadhāyāḥ* alone is here *sthānaṣaṣṭhī*. — उपकारार्थं ultimately means ' for deciding '. अयमर्थः, i. e. where स्थानषष्ठी and where अवयवषष्ठी.

If the *vyākhyāna* has to be relied on after all, why not rely it in the initial stage itself, and dispense with P. 1. 1. 49 — that is the question raised.

Observations : (1) The MS is somewhat corrupt here : Following emendations have been made : षष्ठ्यादी[नां]; प्रक्लृप्तिः; एकस्मिन् (for नेक°);[1] संनिपतित- (for °तिते); श्रयणीयम् or some such word to be supplied after व्याख्यानाद्या; finally, after this, words like तस्माच्च व्याख्यानाद्.

(2) Here Kaiy.'s remark : विनापि सूत्रेणेष्टं सिध्यति is all right, but the other remark : आरब्धे चातिप्रसङ्गः is premature if that is all he wants to say. Besides, he completely misses the point about the *Vyākhyāna*. Nāg., on the other hand, picks up the thread although it is missing in Kaiy. Read : तत्रातिप्रसङ्गवारणाय ' व्याख्यानतः ' इत्येतदाश्रयणे तयैव सिद्धौ परिभाषेयं व्यर्थेति भावः ।

[2. 1]

षष्ठ्याः स्थानेयोगवचनं नियमार्थम् (वा. १). The *Mbh.* on the *Vār.* runs as follows : नियमार्थोऽयमारम्भः । एकशतं षष्ठ्यर्थाः, यावन्तो वा । ते सर्वे षष्ठ्यामुच्चारितायां प्राप्नुवन्ति । इष्यते च, व्याकरणे या षष्ठी सा स्थानेयोगैव स्यादिति । तच्चान्तरेण यत्नं न

1. Perhaps प्रक्लृप्तिनेकस्मिन् of the MS was originally प्रक्लृप्तिरेकस्मिन् (with Saṁdhi even between two sentences).

सिध्यतीति षष्ठ्याः स्थानेयोगवचनं नियमार्थम्। एवमर्थमिदमुच्यते। The Genitive in Sanskrit has a lot of meanings (i. e. different kinds of connection or relation). All of them would present themselves simultaneously, if Pāṇini used the Genitive without defining it. Pāṇini wants to restrict (नियमार्थम्) the use of the Genitive, to make it an indication of the place of a substitute only. Hence the rule.

(*p.* 20, *l.* 4) एकशतं षष्ठ्यर्थाः ... etc. Pat. makes two statements on meanings of Genitive : (1) A Genitive has one hundred and one meanings. (2) As many meanings as one comes across in the world (लोके). Bhar. remarks that the first statement is based on some 'text' (पाठम्), while the second on the actual usage.

Kaiy. names the text as षष्ठीदण्डकपाठः. 'षष्ठीदण्डकपाठाश्रयेणैतदुक्तम्', says he. Nothing is known about this text. Nāg. simply paraphrases षष्ठीदण्डकपाठः by पाठविशेषः. — In अथ वा etc. (*l.* 6) Bhar. gives another interpretation in which he makes the *Mbh.* express only one meaning : 'whether there are a hundred and one meanings or whether the number is determined by the applicability of the dictionary meanings in the context of the word, when those meanings present themselves (सत्यप्यनेकार्थसंभवे पाठाद्, ये संभवन्ति)...'.

(*p.* 20, *l.* 8) तत्र केचिदेवं प्रतिपन्नाः ... etc. The *Dīp.* mentions two views about the way the *niyama* 'restriction' is effected by this rule. According to one view the rule is meant for that student whose mind is so much carried off by the general meaning of the Genitive that he cannot see the specific meaning although it is there. The Sū. so to say says to the student : "Hey! Look here! This Genitive has a specific meaning viz. *sthāneyoga*. Keep this well in mind when you come across a Genitive another time." (Incidentally the expression सामान्यापहृतबुद्धेः reminds one of the *Bhagavadgītā* expressions like माययापहृतज्ञानाः (7. 15) and कामैस्तैस्तैर्हृतज्ञानाः (7. 20).)

Others on the other hand think that a Genitive (like *asteḥ*) is incapable of taking on a specific form of relationship. What Pāṇini does here is to inform that after a Genitive the word *sthāne* 'in the place of' comes in to make the meaning complete. (So, according to the first interpretation *asteḥ* means, by itself, *asteḥ sthāne*, while according to the other *asteḥ* means *asteḥ* only and so *sthāne* has to be added to it to enable it to convey the intended sense.)

[2. 1. 1]

अवयवषष्ठ्यादयस्तु न सिध्यन्ति. This is the *Mbh.* on the *Vār.* 2 : अवयवषष्ठ्यादिष्वतिप्रसङ्गः शास्तो गोह इति. The full text of the *Mbh.* runs thus : अवयवषष्ठ्यादयस्तु न सिध्यन्ति। तत्र को दोषः? 'शास इदङ्हलोः' इति शासेश्चान्त्यस्य स्यादुपधामात्रस्य च। 'ऊदुपधाया गोहः' इति गोहेश्चान्त्यस्य स्यादुपधामात्रस्य च।

An objection is raised here against the framing of P. 1. 1. 49. If such a rule is framed, then *gohaḥ* for instance in P. 6. 4. 89 will mean गोहः स्थाने and also *ū* will have to be undesiredly substituted in the place of the root-final *h*. Also, since *upadhāyāḥ* now loses its support in *gohaḥ*, any root could now be understood. Any other root, say *pac* (cf. Kaiy. : शासिना संबन्धाभावात्[1] पचादिसंबन्धिनोऽपि) will have its penultimate replaced, equally undesiredly, by *ū*. Hence the *Mbh.* : अवयवषष्ठ्यादयस्तु न सिध्यन्ति. (For details, see above. Anticipating this defect the *vyākhyāna* was proposed there instead of this rule.)

(*p.* 20, *l.* 13) अविशेषस्य विवक्षितत्वात् ... etc. The expression अविशेषस्य विवक्षितत्वात् (which occurs twice) is rather uncertain. In view of the context I take अविशेष in the sense of अभेद, absence of any distinction (in the meaning of Genitives), since with P. 1. 1. 49 there, all occurrences of the Genitive are going to mean स्थानेयोग. The steam roller of षष्ठी स्थानेयोगा liquidates all other relations otherwise expressed by Genitive. नियमेन संबन्धान्तराणां निवर्तितत्वात्, says Kaiy.

अविशेषस्य ... वाक्यान्तरोपप्लवः. This refers to the making of two rules out of the one rule : ऊदुपधाया गोहः carried out in the *Mbh.* quoted above. That rule actually is supposed to teach a single operation : substitution of *ū* in the place of the penultimate vowel of √*guh*. Here उपधायाः is स्थानषष्ठी while गोहः is अवयवषष्ठी. But if everywhere a Genitive is to mean स्थानषष्ठी then the rule is treated as *two* statements (the *upaplava*), teaching two operations : (i) substitution of *ū* for (the final of : P. 1. 1. 52) *guh* and (ii) substitution of *ū* for the penultimate of every other root.

The *Dīp.* यत्र विकृतः; ङिङ्त्सु न स्यात् supplies some additional information. It says that this substitution (*goh* > **goū*) will take place when a suffix which causes a Guṇa (or Vṛddhi) follows; it will not be there before a *kit* or *ṅit* suffix (before which Guṇa and Vṛddhi are prohibited : P. 1. 1. 5). The point is that the significance of the particular modified reference (विकृत-[निर्देश] :) of the √*guh* in the Guṇa form *goh* is intact even on the objector's side.

[2. 1. 1. 1]

अवयवषष्ठ्यादीनां चाप्राप्तिः ... etc. The wording of the *Vār.* is deceptive. Supply a word like विषये after अवयवषष्ठ्यादीनाम्. Also नियमस्य (i. e. of P. 1. 1. 49) is to be supplied before अप्राप्तिः. (Nāg. has partly a different construction : अवयवषष्ठ्यादीनामिष्टानां निवृत्तये नियमाप्राप्तिरिति वार्त्तिकार्थः ।) This is made clear in the *Dīp.* अप्राप्तिरिति न षष्ठ्याः ... etc.

1. Cf. Nāg. तस्य (= शासेः) स्थानषष्ठीसंबन्धत्वेनोपधाविशेषणे सामर्थ्याभावादिति भावः ।

This *Vār.* is a reply to the objection raised in the previous (2nd) *Vār.* The *Mbh.* comments on it thus : अवयवषष्ठ्यादीनां च नियमस्याप्राप्तिः। किं कारणम्? 'योगस्यासंदिग्धत्वात्'। संदेहे नियमः। न चावयवषष्ठ्यादिषु संदेहः। The *Mbh.* argues that restriction comes in only where there is uncertainty. And in the case of rules like ऊदुपधाया गोहः etc. there is no uncertainty. The word *upadhā* means a particular part (अवयव) of a word, viz. the penultimate. Naturally it expects a whole (अवयवी). Thus there is no other alternative but to take *gohaḥ* as an अवयवषष्ठी. Since there is no doubt, there is no room for P. 1. 1. 49 to come in here. The opponent's apprehension is uncalled for.

The gist of the *Dīp.* from यत्रानेकार्थः संभवति (*l.* 19) up to इत्येतत् प्रदर्शयति (*l.* 25) is this : P. 1. 1. 49 does not cancel other meanings of the Genitive (like अवयवषष्ठी) and impose स्थानषष्ठी meaning on every Genitive used in grammar. In fact grammar does not impose any meaning on any word. All that the present rule does is to declare that *where no other meaning is already fixed*, and so where consequently many meanings are possible, the Genitive shall mean a Genitive of place. If a meaning like अवयवषष्ठी is already indicated, it is not dislodged by this rule.

Observation : This part of *Dīp.* is corrupt in a number of places and had to be emended accordingly.

(*p.* 20, *l.* 26) लौकिकोऽयं दृष्टान्त इति. This *pratīka* represents the following *Mbh.* :

किं वक्तव्यमेतत्? न हि। कथमनुच्यमानं गंस्यते? लौकिकोऽयं दृष्टान्तः। तद्यथा लोके—कश्चित् कंचित् पृच्छति। ग्रामान्तरं गमिष्यामि पन्थानं मे भवानुपदिशत्विति। स तस्मा आचष्टे। अमुष्मिन्नवकाशे हस्तदक्षिणो ग्रहीतव्यः, अमुष्मिन्नवकाशे हस्तवाम इति। यस्तत्र तिर्यक्पथो भवति न तस्मिन् संदेह इति कृत्वा नासावुपदिश्यते। एवमिहापि संदेहे नियमो, न चावयवषष्ठ्यादिषु संदेहः।

This parallel is given in support of the reply न हि to the question किं वक्तव्यमेतत् (एतद्=यत्र संदेहस्तत्रैव नियमः)? The *Mbh.* says that this can be understood even without an express statement to that effect. It is like a knowledgeable person guiding a traveller as to the way he is to take to reach his destination. He does not mention each and every way the traveller is likely to come across on his way. If the traveller is to pursue, say the north-south way, the guiding person will not instruct him to avoid an east-west way which cuts across his way, because he knows that the traveller will automatically avoid it. He will restrict his instruction only to where the traveller is likely to be in doubt. When, for instance, the way branches off into two, one of which is left-inclined and the other right-inclined, but both more or less going in the same direction, the traveller is likely to be confused, and so the guide will say : 'Take, at-such-and

such a point, the way to the right' 'at such-and-such a point, the one to the left'.

Moral : the grammar also instructs expressly on something which is vague, not on what is obvious.

(*p.* 20, *l.* 26) एकदिक्कौ, the two ways going more or less in the same direction after branching off. — (*l.* 27) हस्तद्क्षिणो हस्तवाम:. After these expressions a word like पन्था: is understood. हस्तद्क्षिण: and हस्तवाम: are Bahu. compounds, qualifying the noun पन्था: (or मार्ग: etc.), so they mean 'the right-hand path' and 'the left-hand path' respectively. Cf. हस्तो दक्षिणो यस्येति बहुव्रीहि:, Kaiy. Nāg. supplies संनिहित: to specify the relation between the hand and the path. There is some difficulty about the formation of the compounds हस्तद्क्षिण: and हस्तवाम:. Normally it is the words दक्षिण and वाम which should have led the compound on account of the rule सप्तमीविशेषणे च बहुव्रीहौ (P. 2. 2. 35), since वाम and दक्षिण qualify हस्त.

The *Dīp.* गुणतोऽसमाख्याने ... (*p.* 21, *l.* 1) etc. gives two alternative explanations to somehow justify the second place of *dakṣiṇa* and *vāma* in these compounds. (1) It is denied that the two words are of the nature of *guṇa* (i. e. *viśeṣaṇa* 'a qualifier'). They are equally *dravya* 'principal' as *hasta*. Since they do not have a status of *viśeṣaṇa*, P. 2. 2. 35 does not apply although they are *Bahu.* compounds. (But how, in that case, *vāma* and *dakṣiṇa* still continue to qualify the road in the sense of 'left' and 'right' is not made clear.)— This may somehow certify *hastavāma* as valid. But there is another objection in the case of *hastadakṣiṇa*. *Dakṣiṇa* is technically called a *sarvanāman* (P. 1. 1. 34 : पूर्वपरावर ...) and so again it should lead the compound according to बहुव्रीहौ सर्वनामसंख्ययोरुपसंख्यानम् (P. 2. 2. 35, *Vār.* 1). The *Dīp.* दाशतेर्दक्षतेर्वा... meets this objection. Here one can take the word *dakṣiṇa* as derived from <*dāś* (I. 931, or V. 33) or *dakṣ* (I. 639, 807). It is not to be taken as a *sarvanāman* (P. 1. 1. 34) which character it has when a *vyavasthā* (स्वाभिधेयापेक्षावधिनियम:, *Kāś*) is intended; in other words the word *dakṣiṇa* is not intended here as a *sarvanāman*. (2) The compound is not *Bahu.*, but Tatp. formed according to P. 2. 1. 30 : तृतीया तत्कृतार्थेन गुणवचनेन. Here the quality of 'rightness' is believed to be produced in the path on account of its contact with the right hand of the traveller. Hence the तृतीयातत्पुरुष comp. (This explanation applies to हस्तवाम also.)

(*p.* 21, *l.* 4) तिर्यक्पथं तु नैवोपदिशन्ति. There is some doubt as to what exactly *tiryak* means. We have made it clear above that we take it in the sense of a crossroad that cuts more or less perpendicularly the road that one is pursuing. Bhar. and Kaiy. are silent on this point. Nāg. first says : तिर्यक्पथ: । अनृजुमार्ग इत्यर्थ: which apparently means a curving road. He implies

that since in this case there is no possibility of any doubt in the mind of the traveller, the guide is silent about this. But this does not seem to be correct. Since there is absolutely no option for the traveller when a road is curving, we do not think this is meant by Pat. We think that initially there should be *some* scope for a little doubt which the traveller can remove on a little deliberation. This is possible on a crossroad where the traveller may at first be in a little doubt but immediately his decision is made since the crossroad goes in a quite different direction than the one he is to pursue. After अनृजुमार्गः (mentioned above) Nāg. continues: पूर्वपश्चिमान्यतरदिशि गच्छतो दक्षिणोत्तरमार्गे इति यावत्। This obviously is the same interpretation as the one we have suggested. His words इति यावत् are, however, confusing, since this is *not* the same thing as अनृजुमार्गः. One rather expected इति वा.

Incidentally, the word हस्तदक्षिणः cccurs again in the *Mbh.* under P. 2. 1. 1. (I. 363. 12) in the phrase : कूपे हस्तदक्षिणः पन्थाः 'the path on the right hand side (to be taken) at the well.'

[2. 1. 1. 2]

अथ वा, स्थानेऽयोगेति. The construction is : अयोगा=अव्यक्तयोगा (=अविशिष्ट-योगा, अनिर्णीतयोगा इत्यर्थः) या षष्ठी सा स्थानेयोगा वेदितव्या. In the case of गोह:, that Genitive is not अयोगा (in the sense underlined here). It is अवयवयोगा. So no problem. Kaiy. points out that Genitive is impossible unless *some* connection (योग) is there. So, in order to be meaningful, अयोगा has to be taken in the sense अव्यक्तयोगा (or some such thing): योगमन्तरेण षष्ठ्या एवाभावाद् विशिष्टो योगो (=निर्णयविशिष्टः Nāg.) यस्या नास्तीति सामर्थ्यात् प्रतीयते.

(*p.* 21, *l.* 8) यद्यपि नञोऽस्त्यर्थानाम् ... etc. This *Dīp.* anticipates an objection (against the formation of the compound *ayogā*) and answers it. अयोगा means literally अविद्यमानयोगा (cf. the *Vār.* 15 : नञोऽस्त्यर्थानां on P. 2. 2. 24 : अनेकमन्यपदार्थे). Now every Genitive must have some *yoga*, otherwise it simply cannot be there. How do you call it अयोगा? Reply: अयोगा=अविद्यमान-विशिष्टयोगा.

[2. 1. 1. 3]

अथ वा, योगवती योगा. The *Mbh.* continues: किं पुनर्योगवती? यस्या बहवो योगाः। कुत एतत्? भूम्नि हि मतुब्भवति।

Here योगा is analysed as योग+अ+आ (टाप्). The suffix अ is possessive (मत्वर्थीय). Every *ṣaṣṭhī*, as said above, must have some *yoga*. So when it is said specifically : 'Genitive is used to indicate the place when it is possessed of *yoga*', it means 'Genitive is used (to indicate the place) when it has abundance of connections', i. e. when there is a possibility of many

meanings (kinds of connection or relationship) for the Genitive. The implication is that when some meaning is already fixed (such as *avayava*; या तु निर्ज्ञातयोगा ...), the Genitive is neither *ayogā* nor *yogavatī*. So there this Sū. cannot interfere.

[2. 2]

विशिष्टा वा षष्ठी स्थानेयोगा (वा. ४). An alternative device, now proposed by Kāt. to prevent this rule from encroaching on other uses of Genitive, is to use a different intonation (like the *kala* or *dhmāta*[1] etc.). This will be used when the *sthānaṣaṣṭhī* is meant, not elsewhere.

(*p.* 21, *l.* 15) लिङ्गामङ्गाच्च पौरुषेयत्वं ... etc. A rather obscure sentence. By पौरुषेयत्व Bhar. perhaps means that the utterance with *kala* or some such intonation does not come from Pāṇini. It is left for execution to the teacher etc. We therefore propose to emend लिङ्गामङ्गाच्च to लिङ्गासङ्गस्य च. But this emendation (as also, that of प्रक्ष्य to वक्ष्य i. e, दक्ष्ये, originally proposed by AL) is purely tentative. Other possibilities are not ruled out. Incidentally, in *l.* 15 we read the MS याश्रित्य as चाश्रित्य (and not as वाश्रित्य as AL do), since *both* कल (or ध्मात) and स्वरित are necessary : कल (or ध्मात) to indicate स्थानषष्ठी and स्वरित for the continuation of शासः in P. 6. 4. 36.

(*p.* 21, *l.* 17) इतरोऽसंप्रत्ययादयं ... etc. This introduces the following *Mbh.* : यद्येवम्, 'शास इदङ्हलोः', 'शा हौ'। शासिग्रहणं कर्तव्यम् — स्थानेयोगार्थं लिङ्गमासङ्क्ष्यामीति।

A difficulty is pointed out in this *Mbh.* in the way of carrying out the suggestion made above. The actual case cited is that of the two rules : शास इदङ्हलोः and शा हौ (P. 6. 4. 34, 35). In the first rule उपधायाः is understood, the relation of शासः with it being अवयवषष्ठी (शास उपधायाः इत् स्यात् ... etc.). The word शासः is continued in P. 6. 4. 35 also, where its relation with शा is स्थानषष्ठी (शासः स्थाने शा स्यात्, हौ परतः). We cannot, however, use this शासः (continued from the previous rule) because it has already a status of the अवयवषष्ठी. It is not a clean slate. So शासः will have to be read once more (शासिग्रहणं कर्तव्यम्) which, by means of the *kala* or some such intonation, can indicate that this is a स्थानषष्ठी.

In the *Dīp.* अयं = 'शा हौ' इत्यत्र अनुवृत्तः शासिः. उपधाविशेषणत्वेन प्रवृत्तः = उपधामपेक्ष्य अवयवषष्ठीत्वेन प्र°. अनासक्तलिङ्गः = अनासक्त-कलादि-स्थानषष्ठीलिङ्गः. तद्रूपोपपन्नः = अवयवषष्ठ्यन्तः.

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1. For a complete enumeration of such artificial intonations, and for Kāt.'s proposal to use them as a distinctive mark in a different context, see *Mbh.* on the *Vār.* 18 up to the end of the Paspaśā.

(*p.* 21, *l.* 20) यदेवादः पुरस्तात् ... etc. The full text of this *Mbh.* is as follows : न कर्तव्यम्। यदेवादः पुरस्तादवयवषष्ठ्यर्थं प्रकृतम्, एतदुत्तरत्रानुवृत्तं सत् स्थानेयोगार्थं भविष्यति।

It is maintained here that it is not necessary to read *śāsaḥ* once more in P. 6. 4. 35. The one which continues from the previous rule can be used for this purpose, although originally it is without such a mark, and has the meaning of अवयवषष्ठी.— पुरस्तात् = 'शास इत्...' इत्यत्र. The point is that शासः can be understood as having two different forms and thus serving two different purposes : in P. 6. 4. 34 it is without an intonational mark and so has the meaning of an अवयवषष्ठी, while, continued in 35 it can be taken as having the mark *kala* etc. and so having the meaning of a स्थानषष्ठी.

(*p.* 21, *l.* 20) कथम्? अधिकारो नाम ... etc. This *pratīka* represents the following *Mbh.* : कथम्? अधिकारो नाम त्रिप्रकारः। कश्चिदेकदेशस्थः सर्वं शास्त्रमभिज्वलयति, यथा प्रदीपः सुप्रज्वलितः सर्वं वेश्माभिज्वलयति। अपरोऽधिकारो यथा रज्ज्वायसा वा बद्धं काष्ठमनुकृष्यते, तद्वदनुकृष्यते चकारेण। अपरोऽधिकारः प्रतियोगं तस्यानिर्देशार्थ इति योगे योगे उपतिष्ठते। तद्यदैव पक्षः — अधिकारः प्रतियोगं तस्यानिर्देशार्थ इति, तदा हि यदेवादः पुरस्तादवयवषष्ठ्यर्थम्, एतदुत्तरत्रानुवृत्तं सत् स्थानेयोगार्थं भविष्यति।

The *Mbh.* says that an अधिकार (a word used in the widest sense here) is *firstly* of two kinds : (1) It can stand at one fixed place. It does not require any formal device for connecting it with the particular rule where it is to be useful. A Paribhāṣā (e. g. तस्मिन्निति निर्दिष्टे पूर्वस्य, P. 1. 1. 66) belongs to this kind of *adhikāra*. (It is like a bright lamp placed in a central place which can illumine the whole hall without being required to be moved from place to place.) (2) There are other *adhikāra*-s which require a technical device in order to be useful in the injunctive rules. This device, again, may be of two kinds : (a) A conjunctive particle *ca* is tagged on to the rule in which the expression concerned is carried forward from a previous rule. (This *ca* is like a string with which something is tied and then dragged by means of that string.) (b) The use of this *ca* is dispensed with and instead a device like the Svarita intonation is used to indicate that the expression thus marked continues into the following rules although not uttered everytime (प्रतियोगं तस्यानिर्देशार्थः=अधिक्रियमाणस्यानुच्चारणार्थः as Nāg. says). Although not so said expressly, the reference is obviously to P. 1. 3. 11 : स्वरितेनाधिकारः. (We are not told here how to know the terminus of this *adhikāra* ; also no wordly parallel is mentioned.)

The *Mbh.* तद्यदैव पक्षः ... etc. explains the relevance of this classification in the present case. The *adhikāra* in P. 6 4. 35 (शास इत् ...) is to be regarded as belonging to the last type mentioned above : viz. where Svarita is utilised and where the expression concerned is not required to be uttered (*anirdeśārtha*) every time. Pat. here evidently suggests that *śāsaḥ* can therefore have

this double character: it can be without *kala* in P. 6. 4. 34 and with *kala* in 35. There is no conflict.

(*p.* 21, *l.* 21) एतद्राचष्टे । यद्येवं मन्येथाः ... etc. explains the above *Mbh.* and brings out the idea expressly which is only hinted broadly in the *Mbh.*

In P. 6. 3. 79-81, the expression सहस्य सः from P. 6. 3. 78 is carried forward into every rule, by *ca.* Here that expression is regarded as actually uttered. Also, every time it is in one and the same form (अस्यानुवृत्तिरभेदेन). (Bhar. adds that one can say the same thing about a Paribhāṣā also. The word *ikaḥ* e. g., a part of the Pari. इको गुणवृद्धी (P. 1. 1. 3) can be said to combine itself, by the device of *tantra*, with all the rules which contain the *liṅga* of this Pari., viz. the word Guṇa or Vṛddhi.)

In यस्त्वेवमासक्तलिङ्गः (*p.* 22, *l.* 1) ... etc. Bhar. contrasts the position of the *adhikāra* which functions on the strength of a Svarita accent. Its presence in the rules concerned is only inferred (अवसीयते = अनुमीयते. तद्वन्तः = स्वरितेन अधिक्रियमाणशब्दवन्तः.) The form of such an expression, carried forward from rule to rule, need not be the same. It can be modified, obviously according to the need. Of course the modification of the form is only mental (बुद्ध्या). So in our present case also, *śāsaḥ* occurring in 6. 4. 34 is one word, which is without an intonational mark, and the one in 35, which has that intonational mark, is quite another. Of course this discrimination is only mental (बुद्ध्या व्यवस्यति).

Observation : The word *adhikāra* is used here in the *Mbh.*, as remarked above, in the widest sense. It means any word or group of words read in a grammatical rule, which is 'authorised' (*adhikṛ-*) to be present in and be a part of injunctive rules, either by the natural continuation (*anuvṛtti*), or as a part of a rule of interpretation (Paribhāṣā), or through the technical device of Svarita.

On अधिकारो नाम etc. Kaiyaṭa observes : पारार्थ्यसाम्यात् परिभाषाप्यधिकार इत्युच्यते । कश्चिदिति । परिभाषारूपः ।

(*p.* 22, *l.* 5) संप्रत्ययमात्रमेतत् स्यात्. After शासः इति, supply 'शास इत् ...' इति सूत्रे. In लिङ्गासङ्गात्, लिङ्ग here means Svarita (and not *kala* etc.). In the word लिङ्गवान् (*l.* 7), however, लिङ्ग means *kala* etc. With एतत् प्रतिपादयति ... etc, cf. Kaiy. : स्वरितत्वप्रतिज्ञानादुत्तरेषु योगेषु तस्य शब्दस्यानुमानं भवतु, लिङ्गासङ्गस्त्वनुच्चारितस्य कथं स्यादित्यर्थः। So the elaborate argument based on अधिकारो नाम त्रिप्रकारः also fails to convince the opponent. Hence the next proposal.

[2. 2. 1]

(*p.* 22, *l.* 8) एवं तर्ह्यादेशे तल्लिङ्गं करिष्यते [तत् प्रकृतिमास्कन्त्स्यति ।]. The *liṅgāsaṅgavādin* now makes a novel suggestion. If the Genitive *śās* can-

not be furnished with a *kala*, well, let us furnish the substitute *śā* with it. For, it *is* at least uttered. Even though it is not a Genitive by itself, it will point to *śāsaḥ* as the intended recipient of *kala*. प्रकृति=स्थानिन्. Cf. the *Uddy.* : आदेशे लिङ्गासङ्गात् तस्य च षष्ठ्यभावात् तत्संबन्धिनः स्थानिनो लिङ्गकार्यं फलिष्यतीत्यर्थः।

स्वरितत्वं संप्रत्ययमात्रार्थम्. This is how we reconstruct the MS स्वरितंत्वसंप्रत्ययात्रामानं. The Svarita is only for inferring the presence of *śāsaḥ* in P. 6. 4. 35. The mark is furnished to the substitute *śā*. — विशिष्ट means qualified, i. e. qualified by the Geni. *śāsaḥ*.

Readings : (1) (*p.* 20, *l.* 2) MS प्रक्लृप्तिनेक°, prob. from प्रक्लृप्तिरेक° (for प्रक्लृप्तिः। एक°). — (2) (*p.* 20, *l.* 3) AL व्याख्यानाच्चा° (for °नाद्य ...). See Notes for other additions and omissions. — (3) (*p.* 20, *l.* 7) MSAL प्रसङ्ग-. — (4) (*p.* 20, *l.* 14) MS विवक्षितत्वात्र; AL° त्वान्न (for °त्वा[द्]त्र). — (5) (*p.* 20, *l.* 15) MSAL कृत्सु (for क्ङित्सु). — (6) (*p.* 20, *l.* 20) MS वनन्निवृत्ति; AL वचननिवृत्तिः (for च तन्निवृत्ति). — (7) (*p.* 20, *l.* 21) MSAL यदिति मया या (AL यथा). — (8) (*p.* 20, *l.* 21) MS प्रतिपद्यसे; AL °पद्यस्व (for °पद्यसे). — (9) (*p.* 20, *l.* 22) MS -संभवेतिति; AL °वे इति (for °वे). — (10) (*p.* 20, *l.* 22) MSAL निवृत्य. — (11) (*p.* 20, *l.* 22) MS यत्र (for तत्र). — (12) (*p.* 20, *l.* 23) MS भिधीयंते; AL निधी° (for विधी°). — (13) (*p.* 20, *l.* 23) AL गोहः (for गोहेर्). — (14) (*p.* 20, *l.* 25) MS निबन्विं; AL निवर्तित- (for नैवं-). — (15) (*p.* 20, *l.* 26) AL om. च. — (16) (*p.* 21, *l.* 1) MS भमाख्याने; AL ऽन्वाख्याने (for ऽसमा°). — (17) (*p.* 21, *l.* 1) MS दासतेर्. — (18) (*p.* 21, *ll.* 4-5) AL संदिह्यते इत्येवम्। अथवाऽऽचार्यायैव षष्ठी संदिह्यमाना। — (19) (*p.* 21, *l.* 6) MS °दिशंतीति (with आचार्या for आचार्यो in *l.* 5). — (20) (*p.* 21, *l.* 9) MS व्यर्थानाम्; AL ऽर्था° (for ऽन्यर्था°). — (21) (*p.* 21, *l.* 13) MS सा नु नायोगा नामपि योगयंती; AL सा तु न। योगानामपि योगवती. — (22) (*p.* 21, *l.* 14) AL कलं ध्मातं. — (23) (*p.* 21, *l.* 15) MS याश्रित्य; AL वाऽऽश्रित्य (for चाश्रित्य). — (24) (*p.* 21, *l.* 15) MS वक्ष्यमितिगंसंगाच्च; AL वक्ष्यामीति। लिङ्गासङ्गाच्च. — (25) (*p.* 21, *l.* 22) MS वायुक्ता; AL वा युक्ता (for च युक्ता). — (26) (*p.* 22, *l.* 1) MS योगसुपतिष्ठते; AL योग उप° (for योगे समुप°). — (27) (*p.* 22, *l.* 2) MS शब्दैस्तास्; AL शब्दैरेतांस् (for °ब्दैस्तांस्). — (28) (*p.* 22, *l.* 3) MS नुद्ध्या (for बुद्ध्या, as emended in AL). — (29) (*p.* 22, *l.* 3) MS तव तत्र; AL तत्र तत्र (for त[थै]व तत्र). — (30) (*p.* 22, *l.* 4) MSAL लिङ्गवदेव. — (31) (*p.* 22, *l.* 5) MS उच्चारणात्र; AL °रणात् (for °रणा[द्]त्र). — (32) (*p* 22, *l.* 6) MS समतु; AL स तु (for our suggested emendation समं तु). — (33) (*p.* 22, *l.* 7) AL शक्यं.

[3]

यत्रैका षष्ठी ... etc.

Observations : (1) The whole passage (up to वाक्यगम्या विशेषा इति) is considerably obscure. (2) The reasons are : (a) At places Bhar.'s thought

itself is obscure. (b) At many places the MS is corrupt. The letters make no sense whatever. This required emendation. But since that in its turn depends upon a correct insight into the thought of the author, our emendations could prove to be just our subjective ideas. (c) In one or two places it is very probable that there is a gap in the MS. — For these reasons the emendations or reconstructions suggested here should be taken to be purely provisional.

Let us first list the emendations that we propose: (1) (*p.* 22, *l.* 14) ब्रूम: (for क्रम: of the MS). — (2) (*p.* 22, *l.* 14) (with AL) पक्षो (for पक्षे). — (3) (*p.* 22, *l.* 15) (with AL) योगवतो (for एवंयोगवती). — (4) (*p.* 22, *l.* 16) एतच्च (MS uncertain; AL एतत्). — (5) (*p.* 22, *l.* 16) (with AL) आनर्थक्याद् (for °र्थवया°). — (6) (*p.* 22, *l.* 17) °लम्भस्तूत्तरैर्योगैः (for the MS °लम्भस्तुत्तरित्योगैः; AL °लम्भो योगैः). — (7) (*p.* 22, *l.* 18) दुपाण still remains a mystery. We tentatively follow AL, only we read उपात्त instead of their तदुपात्त. — (8) (*p.* 22, *l.* 19) (with AL) व्यापृतौ (for व्यातृतो). — (9) (*p.* 22, *l.* 20) We suggest tentatively पक्षयोः (for प्रत्यक्षयोः). — (10) (*p.* 22, *l.* 21) (with AL) त्वाश्रितार्थः (for त्याश्रि°). — (11) (*p.* 22, *ll.* 21–22) विशेषापनयनयनादु[भ]यत्रापि योगेनोत्सहते (for विशेषोपनयत्वाद्यत्रवियोगे नोत्स° which AL read as °षोपनयत्वादत्रापि योगे नोत्स°). — (12) (*p.* 22, *l.* 22) संप्रसारणेन (for संस्मरणेन). — (13) (*p.* 22, *l.* 24) AL read कल्पना संभवति (for the MS कल्पनासंभविनी). We follow the MS, only, we understand it as कल्पना+असं°. — (14) (*p.* 22, *l.* 25) विशेषार्थस्य व्यञ्ज° (for the MS विशेषेश्चाय(or °प)व्यंज° which AL read as: °पैश्चोपव्यञ्ज°). — (15) (*p.* 22, *l.* 25) इहापि। अङ्ग° (for the MS इहाप्यंग°, retained by AL). — (16) (*p.* 22, *l.* 26) we insert (most reluctantly) [तु न] after विशेषाभिधानपक्षे.

In the light of these emendations we now briefly explain the text.

The *pratīka* यत्रैका षष्ठी, अनेकं च विशेष्यम् represents the following *Mbh.*: यदि नियमः क्रियते, यत्रैका षष्ठ्यनेकं विशेष्यं तत्र न सिध्यति। अङ्गस्य, हलः, अणः संप्रसारणस्येति। हलपि विशेष्यो, ऽणपि विशेष्यः, संप्रसारणमपि विशेष्यम्। असति पुनर्नियमे कामचार एकया षष्ठ्यानेकं विशेषयितुम्। तद्यथा — देवदत्तस्य पुत्रः, पाणिः, कम्बल इति। तस्मान्नार्थो नियमेन। The reference here is to P. 6. 4. 2: हलः, where अङ्गस्य is continued from P. 6. 4. 1, दीर्घोऽणः from P. 6. 3. 111 and संप्रसारणस्य from P. 6. 3. 139. The Sū. says that an *aṇ* vowel, when it has the designation Samprasāraṇa (i. e. the vowels *i* and *u*), is lengthened when it follows a consonant which is a part of *aṅga*.

Here it is to be noted, from the point of view of our problem, that both the Samprasāraṇa and the *hal* (consonant) have to be parts of *aṅga* if the lengthening is to take place. So *aṅgasya* has to be an *avayava-ṣaṣṭhī* with reference to them (and, of course, to *aṇaḥ* which is co-referential with संप्रसारणस्य). But

अङ्गस्य has also to be a स्थानषष्ठी since the long substitute is to come in its place — i. e. in the place of its final phoneme by P. 1. 1. 52 : अलोऽन्त्यस्य.[1] And once the present restrictive rule (P. 1. 1. 49) is made, अङ्गस्य cannot have an अवयवषष्ठी value. The desired form (e. g. *hūta* 'invited') cannot be had. If, however, this rule is not made, then there is no difficulty and a single Genitive can be connected with different syntactically connected words, with each in its particular aspect, i. e. देवदत्तस्य (=देवदत्तजन्यः) पुत्रः, (=देवदत्तावयवः) पाणिः, (=देवदत्तस्वामिकः) कम्बलः etc. With P. 1. 1. 49 there, P. 6. 4. 2 cannot operate satisfactorily, because the Genitive अङ्गस्य, restricted to स्थानषष्ठी, cannot be connected with हलः etc. in the part-whole capacity (अवयवषष्ठी).

(*p*. 22, *l*. 12) केचिद् वर्णयन्ति ... etc. The *Dīp*. begins its exposition with quoting a view of 'some' according to which the objection raised in the *Mbh*. refers to *only* the device of using *kala* etc. (the device which is the subject in the immediately preceding section in the *Vār*. : विशिष्टा वा षष्ठी स्थानेयोगा) to indicate a स्थानषष्ठी. (In the *Dīp*., इति, appearing after प्रतिपद्यस (= °द्यसे) is unintelligible.) Bhar. apparently differs from this view (वयं तु ब्रूमः) and suggests the objection as valid in spite of the *Vār*. : अवयवषष्ठ्यादीनां चाप्रासिर्योगस्यासंदिग्धत्वात्. There will equally be a difficulty even on संदेहे नियमः view. This is sufficiently clear from the *Dīp*. : यदि संदेहे नियम इति पक्षो, अस्ति संदेहः. The uncertainty is there in our present example, viz. अङ्गस्य and so the objection now raised in the *Mbh*. is equally valid in spite of the justification संदेहे नियमः.

The *Dīp*. रसामाद्यो(or °द्यौ)न लिख्यति remains a mystery. लिख्यति may be सिध्यति as AL suggest. But what is रसामाद्यौ(°द्यौ)? Surely not रसगन्धौ as AL read !

(*p*. 22, *l*. 15) अथाव्यक्तयोगा अयोगा ... etc. From here upto च वैयधिकरण्यमिति (*p*. 22, *l*. 23), Bhar. takes up the two solutions suggested by Pat. above — viz. (1) reading the Sū. as षष्ठी स्थानेऽयोगा (where अयोगा=अव्यक्तयोगा) and (2) reading it as षष्ठी स्थाने योगा (योगा=योगवती=बहुयोगवती) and shows that with this twofold interpretation, there will be no problem with अङ्गस्य. (But it is not known who held the opposite view, which is apparently being challenged [चोद्यते] in the *Dīp*. here. The *Dīp*. is not explicit on this point.) You can take it in both senses, स्थानषष्ठी and अवयवषष्ठी as required by each case. He does it on all the three alternatives about *anuvṛtti* : (i) mere शब्दानुवृत्ति (i. e. the *anuvṛtti* of merely the word अङ्गस्य in the present case), (2) अर्थानुवृत्ति (continuation of merely the meaning of the expression अङ्गस्य) and (3) उभयानुवृत्ति (continuation of both).

1. Cf. Nāg. : तत्रालोऽन्त्यस्येत्येकवाक्यतयाङ्गावयवाद्धलः परं यदङ्गान्त्यावयवाण्रूपसंप्रसारणं तस्य दीर्घ इत्यर्थः.

(1) यदि तावद् 'अङ्गस्य' ... संबन्धे सतीति. This is the शब्दानुवृत्ति (rather शब्दमात्रानुवृत्ति) view. Here the Genitive in अङ्गस्य has no meaning at all in P. 6. 4. 1, much less the स्थानेयोग meaning. Unburdened with any meaning, the word अङ्गस्य comes down in the subsequent rules (like P. 6. 4. 2 : हलः), where it acquires relevant meanings (अर्थप्रतिलम्भः). (There is neither an अव्यक्तयोगा nor a बहुयोगवती Genitive in P. 6. 4. 1 and so the स्थानयोग meaning is not predetermined there.)

(2) अथाप्यर्थमात्रम् ... न तु संज्ञासंबन्धिकाले. This is अर्थमात्रानुवृत्ति. The word-aspect of अङ्गस्य is ignored in P. 6. 4. 1 and the meaning-aspect alone is made to continue in the subsequent Sūtras. Since there is no Genitive, no स्थानषष्ठी character is predetermined. Subsequently the word-form is supplied in P. 6. 4. 2 etc. and relevant meanings are assigned to the Genitive. So no problem.

In यथा विभाषाप्रदेशेषु प्रतिषेधविकल्पौ ... etc. the *Dīp.* furnishes a parallel for the अर्थानुवृत्ति. P. 1. 1. 44 : न वेति विभाषा teaches the term विभाषा. Here, on the strength of *iti*, न वा is not understood as the words *na vā*, but their meanings, viz. prohibition-cum-option. (Cf. the *Kāśikā* : नेति प्रतिषेधः, वेति विकल्पः, तयोः प्रतिषेधविकल्पयोर्विभाषेति संज्ञा भवति । इतिकरणोऽर्थनिर्देशार्थः ।) It is further held that although the Sū. which defines the *vibhāṣā* mentions *na vā* in the definition, still in the injunctive rules which lay down *vibhāṣā*, as e. g. P. 3. 3. 143 : विभाषा कथमि लिङ् च, it is their meanings, *pratiṣedha + vikalpa*, that are carried down. The meanings operate only in the injunctive rules, not in the term-defining rule. Similarly, the meanings of Genitive are not operative in P. 6. 4. 1 where अङ्गस्य is mentioned; they become operative only in injunctive rules like हलः (P. 6. 4. 2).

अनयोः पक्षयोः (*l.* 20) = 'अङ्गस्य' इत्यत्र शब्दमात्रानुवृत्ति-अर्थमात्रानुवृत्तिपक्षयोः.— अर्थमात्रानुवृत्तिपक्षे is understood after यद्यस्ति योगः, and शब्दमात्रानुवृत्तिपक्षे after यदि नास्ति.

(3) यदि त्वाश्रितार्थः शब्द ... वैयधिकरण्यमिति. This is शब्दार्थानुवृत्ति view. Here by अर्थः or अर्थात्मा, the general meaning of the Genitive viz. संबन्धसामान्य is intended. This is supported by विशेषापनयनात् which follows. The *Dīp.* says that the word अङ्गस्य follows in the later rules in its general sense (संबन्धसामान्य), with all particular meanings of that Genitive removed. The result is that अङ्गस्य can be syntactically connected with दीर्घः as स्थानषष्ठी and with संप्रसारणस्य, अणः, as अवयवषष्ठी. — उभयत्रापि योगेन='दीर्घः' इत्यत्र स्थानयोगेन; संप्रसारणस्य, अणः इत्यत्र च अवयवयोगेन.

On this view संप्रसारणस्य, अणः, is taken as co-referential (समानाधिकरण) with अङ्गस्य. So there is तदन्तविधि also : अण्रूपसंप्रसारणान्तस्य अङ्गस्य स्थाने दीर्घः भवति.

The *Dīp.* gives an alternative construction also, which is marked by वैयधिकरण्य. अङ्गस्य is related to संप्रसारणस्य (and अणः) by a part-and-whole relation. The latter alone have a स्थानषष्ठी. So अङ्गस्य यः अवयवः, अणूरूपसंप्रसारणम्, तस्य स्थाने दीर्घो भवति।

Incidentally, Nāg. follows this second alternative only. He does not give the first alternative (marked by सामानाधिकरण्य). Kaiy. is entirely silent on this point.

(*p.* 22, *l.* 24) एवं तु मन्यते ... etc. Following the *Mbh.*, Bhar. now presents the other side. The subject of *manyate* is Bhāṣyakāra. In the *pūrvapakṣa* stated in detail above, it is taken for granted that *aṅgasya* can continue in the subsequent rules as having a general meaning; it is further assumed that once *aṅgasya* comes into contact with the syntanctically connected words in the subsequent rules, the particular meaning of the Genitive materialises. These connected words in the subsequent rules are sort of manifestors (उपव्यञ्जनानि) which help bring out the specific sense of the Genitive (अङ्गस्य) in different contexts. The *Mbh.* gives a parallel from the day-to-day Sanskrit (देवदत्तस्य पुत्रः, पाणिः, कम्बलः) where the Genitive in देवदत्तस्य, first having a general meaning — संबन्धसामान्य 'connection in general' — developes into special meanings when it comes into contact with पुत्रः etc. Thus देवदत्तस्य पुत्रः means देवदत्तस्य जन्यत्वेन संबद्धः, दे° पाणिः, means अवयवत्वेन संबद्धः, and दे° कम्बलः means स्वत्वेन संबद्धः.

It seems the *Mbh.* passage giving this parallel, viz. असति पुनर्नियमे ... पाणिः, कम्बल इति was quoted (or at least referred to) in the *Dīp.* after °पार्थस्य व्यञ्जनानि इति but has been somehow now lost. The following words एवमिहापि, which constitute the *nigamana*, seem definitely to point to the one-time mention of this parallel in the *Dīp.*

The suggestion of the subsequent particularisation of the initial general meaning is refuted here, says the *Dīp.* (इयमपि कल्पनासंभविनी). Once the Sū. षष्ठी स्थानेयोगा is accepted (आश्रीयमाणे सूत्रे), the Genitive अङ्गस्य expresses definitely a particular meaning (अङ्गस्येति विशेषाभिधानपक्षे); then it can no longer be pleaded that there will be different phrases with specific Genitive meanings (वाक्यविशेषान्तराणामुपजनः) wherein the initial general meaning will yield particular meanings which are known from the context of a particular phrase (संबन्धसामान्योपादाने वाक्यगम्या विशेषा इति).

As remarked at the beginning of this section, our reconstructions and interpretation of the whole passage are tentative and open to correction.

(*p.* 23, *l.* 1) ननु चोक्तम्, एकशतं षष्ठ्यर्था इति. The *Mbh.* represented by this *pratīka* runs as: ननु चोक्तम्, एकशतं षष्ठ्यर्थाः, यावन्तो वा सन्ति, ते सर्वे षष्ठ्यामुच्चारितायां प्राप्नुवन्ति.

The preceding *Mbh.* had thus concluded : तस्मान्नार्थो नियमेन 'Therefore, no purpose is served by the restriction (i. e. P. 1. 1. 49)'. This rejection of the Sū. was based on two reasons : (1) The Sū. bars other meanings of the Genitive which are also intended. (2) The Sū is not necessary at all, as there is a freedom (कामचारः) to assign to the Genitive whatever meaning is suitable in a particular context, if no restriction is imposed like the present one. The present *Mbh.* objects to this rejection of the Sū. by drawing the attention to a previous *Mbh.* statement [2. 1] which had maintained that a hundred and one meanings of the Genitive will present themselves where only स्थानषष्ठी is intended, if the present restrictive rule is not made.

(*p.* 23, *l.* 1) नैष दोषः। The *Mbh.* represented by this *pratīka* runs as : नैष दोषः। यद्यपि लोके बहवोऽभिसंबन्धाः — आर्था यौना मौखा स्रौवाश्चेति, शब्दस्य तु शब्देन कोऽन्योऽभिसंबन्धो भवितुमर्हति, अन्यदतः स्थानात्? This refutes the objection raised in the preceding *Mbh.*

The *Dīp.* अयमभिप्रायः ... etc. explains this *Mbh.* The point stressed by the *Dīp.* here is that although a word may have a capacity to express a number of relations, in practice only a few of them materialize.

The *Dīp.* illustratest his point by contrasting two sentences which outwardly look very similar. In देवदत्तस्य दासभार्या, the word *Devadattasya* is syntactically connected only with *dāsa*; it has nothing to do with *bhāryā* (which indicates that Devadatta is in no way related to his servant's wife). On the other hand in एतानि देवदत्तस्य दासीगृहाणि the word *Devadattasya* is connected with *gṛhāṇi*, not with *dāsī*. The emphasis is on Devadatta's ownership of the maid-servant's quarters. In the former example, the subordinate constituent (उपसर्जन) is qualified by देवदत्तस्य; in the latter, the principal one. That is how the usage becomes current (*rūḍha*).

The passage is very loosely worded and is, indeed, corrupt. In उपसर्जनविशेषणद्वयम् (*l.* 4), द्वय is apparently an intruder, the intended idea being, देवदत्तस्येति षष्ठ्यन्तमुपसर्जनस्य (दासपदस्य) विशेषणत्वेनैव रूढम्. Also रूढानि (nuter pl.) is strange. Further, could द्वय belong to this example ? If so, it could mean that the *Dīp.* here says that देवदत्तस्य qualifies both दासी and गृहाणि (i.e. Devadatta's connection with both, the maid servants and quarters, is intended to be conveyed). Finally, after किं तर्हि, a sentence like देवदत्तस्य यो दासः, तस्य भार्येति (or some such words) seems to have been lost, judging from the usual style of the *Dīp.*

(*p.* 23, *l.* 8) इतरो योऽयं शब्द ... etc. This *Dīp.* introduces the *Mbh.* शब्दस्यापि शब्देन etc. the full text of which is as follows : शब्दस्यापि शब्देनानन्तरादयोऽपि संबन्धाः। अस्तेर्भूर्भवतीति संदेहः — स्थाने, ऽनन्तरे, समीपे वा। This is in reply to the rhetorical question asked above : शब्दस्य ... कोऽन्योऽभिसंबन्धो ... अन्यदतः स्थानात् ?

So there *are* other connections, possible in the case of word. P. 1. 1. 49 is necessary because of the uncertainty (संदेहः) involved. — In l. 8, **षष्ठ्यर्थम् = षष्ठी** (Nom. sing.) **अर्थम्**.

(*p*. 23, *l*. 10) **संदेहमात्रमेतद् भवति** ... etc. The reply of the opponent who opposes the framing of P. 1. 1. 49. The *Mbh*. runs thus : **संदेहमात्रमेतद् भवति। सर्वसंदेहेषु चेदमुपतिष्ठते — 'व्याख्यानतो विशेषप्रतिपत्तिर्न हि संदेहादलक्षणम्' इति। स्थाने इति व्याख्यास्यामः।**

In the *Līp*. **एतदुक्तं भवति** etc. Bhar. points out that the *vyākhyāna* is as much indespensable (for saying the unsaid thing) when there is no Sūtra, as when there is one (in order to clarify it). The point is that in spite of the plurality of the meanings of the Genitive, the connection-through-place will be decided on the basis of *vyākhyāna*, which is always an indispensable authority.

(*p*. 23, *l*. 11) **अथ वा, न संदेहाद्** ... etc. Here Bhar. adds his own remarks which offer two logical explanations why the *sthāna* meaning is preferred to others. He starts by saying that uncertainty does not mean absence. Every visual object (*rūpam*) has a particular colour, although that may not be quite visible in insufficient light. You have to find out means to make it visible. Similarly in the case of word-meaning also.

As to the exact means with which to decide the issue on hand, Bhar. says that the *antaraṅga-bahiraṅga* consideration can solve the problem. The form (i. e. the phonetic form, the sound sequence) of a word is always inseparable from it; it is its first meaning, so to say. Naturally, when a word B is brought in relationship with A used in Genitive, it will be understood that the sound sequence B replaces the sound sequence A. To put it plainly, B replaces A. The replacement has thus an upper hand over a simultaneous use of the two side by side. Secondly, Bhar. adds, such a simultaneous use side by side will be illogical because of the redundance involved in it. And if $\sqrt{as}$ is already there, $\sqrt{bh\bar{u}}$ can only be taken as replacing it.

शब्दार्थ in **शब्दार्थानुपाती** (*l*. 15) is apparently the same as **स्वरूपार्थ** (*l*. 16). It is apparently not a Dvandva.

[4]

षष्ठ्यन्तं स्थानेन यथा युज्येत ... etc. The following is the full text of the *Mbh*. : **न तर्हीदानीमयं योगो वक्तव्यः॥ वक्तव्यश्च। किं प्रयोजनम्? षष्ठ्यन्तं स्थानेन यथा युज्येत, यतः षष्ठ्युच्चारिता। किं कृतं भवति? 'निर्दिश्यमानस्यादेशा भवन्ति' इत्येषा परिभाषा न कर्तव्या भवति।**

It was maintained in the the preceding *Mbh*. that in the case of doubt or uncertainty where many meanings present themselves for the Genitive, the

vyākhyāna can decide the issue. So the question is now raised: Is this Sūtra itself to be dispensed with then? The reply is here given in the negative. The Sūtra (P. 1. 1. 49) may remain, because it serves one purpose. It is sometimes necessary to restrict the application of P. 1. 1. 72 : येन विधिस्तदन्तस्य. It is sometimes desired, against P. 1. 1. 72, that a substitute should replace only the specific word-element mentioned in the Genitive in the relevant rule, and not what ends in that word-element (technically called *tadanta*) also. The job of bringing about this restriction is usually carried out by the Pari. निर्दिश्यमानस्यादेशा भवन्ति. That job can be now done by P. 1. 1. 49 also. This rule, which says that the Genitive indicates connection-with-place, declares in other words that what is acually mentioned in the Genitive is (alone) replaced by a substitute. The Pari. निर्दिश्यमानस्य can be dispensed with (... न कर्तव्या भवति).

यत् तत् षष्ठ्यन्तं ... etc. The *Dīp.* makes a distinction between what is actually read (श्रुत्यनुपाति) and what is to be understood from or meant by (प्रतीयमानं) it. स्थानेन युज्यते ultimately means ' is replaced '. This is what the *Dīp.* means : The rule पादः पत् (P. 6. 4. 130) mentions the stem *pād*, the Genitive indicating that *pād* is to be replaced by *pad* in the circumstances mentioned in that rule (viz. when it is technically named *bha*). अङ्गस्य is here understood since it is an *adhikāra* (P. 6. 4. 1). Now the rule येन विधिस्तदन्तस्य comes in so that पादस्य has to qualify अङ्गस्य. So the Sū. P. 6. 4. 130 means पादन्तस्य अङ्गस्य भस्य पद् इत्ययमादेशो भवति. An example of a पादन्त अङ्ग is, e. g., व्याघ्रपाद्. At this stage a difficulty comes in. When a suffix *yañ* is applied after *vyāghrapād* in the sense ' descendant of Vyāghrapād ' the whole stem *vyāghrapād* is threatened to be replaced by *pad*, which is not desired. Here, it is claimed, P. 1. 1. 49 comes in handy. Otherwise redundant, it can now suggest that a word in Genitive (षष्ठी interpreted in the sense of षष्ठ्यन्त in the *Mbh.*) alone undergoes replacement. That alone participates in the operation (यतः षष्ठ्युच्चारिता तस्य कार्ययोगित्वम्) — this is the gain from the framing of the rule (एषोऽर्थः सूत्रारम्भात् लभ्यते). Similarly Kaiy. : षष्ठीति षष्ठ्यन्तं गृह्यते । तेन षष्ठ्यन्तमेव निर्दिश्यमानं स्थानेन युज्यते, न तु प्रतीयमानमित्यर्थः ।

So the final meaning assigned to P. 1. 1. 49 is : षष्ठ्यन्तं (आदेशविधौ यत् सूत्रोच्चारितम्, तदेव) स्थानेन युज्यते (न तु षष्ठ्यन्तान्तम्)!

(*p.* 23, *l.* 22) ननु च 'पादः' इत्येतत् ... etc. A doubt is expressed here. P. 1. 1. 72 is entitled to operate here and so on the strength of the *tadanta-vidhi* taught therein the substitute *pad* is bound to replace the whole stem *vyāghrapād*. How can P. 1. 1. 49 prevent it?

Bhar. first refutes (एतच्चासत्) the view (held by ' some ') that the तदन्तपरिभाषा is set aside here. Whereas such a policy will not come in the way of substitution of *pad* in the place of *pād* which is derived, by a zero suffix, from the

stem *pādi* (√*pad*+*ṇic*), it will hinder the ultimate appearance of *vyāghrapad* in the place of *vyāghrapād*. The substitution may be there in the place of single word *pād* 'foot', but not of compound words ending in it. So the whole purpose is defeated.

The truth is that the *tadantavidhi* is partly useful and partly troublesome. It is useful in that it makes way for the desired substitute *pad* in the case of *vyāghrapad* etc. But it is troublesome in that it imposes the substitute on the whole stem *vyāghrapād*, and not for its final part *-pād*. So a way has to be found out. A delimitation or specification (व्यवच्छेदः) is to be resorted to. This is done by utilising the rule षष्ठी स्थानेयोगा in such a way as to make पादः पत् mean : 'पादः' इति पादन्तस्य (व्याघ्रपाद् इत्यादेः) यः पाच्छब्दस्तस्य पद्भावो भवति (न तु समस्तस्य व्याघ्रपाच्छब्दस्य). (And, of course, this does not rule out the substitution of *pad* for a single, uncompounded *pād*.)

The subject in इह हि न स्यात् (*l.* 25) is पद्भावः. Incidentally, the sentence इह हि दोषः स्यात् etc. is loosely constructed. It creates a misunderstanding that the substitution will not be possible in पाद् which comes from √पद्+णिच्+क्विप्. But that is not so. There is no difficulty there. The difficulty is in the case of व्याघ्रपाद् mentioned in the next sentence. So पादयतेरप्रत्ययान्तस्य पद्भावः स्यात् has to be taken as a parenthetical sentence, both इह words referring to व्याघ्रपाद्. — In यथैव शास्त्रात् etc. (*l.* 26) Bhar. says that here the Śāstra is nowhere violated. Both the understanding of तदन्तविधि and the subsequent restriction of the substitution to the final part of व्याघ्रपाद् are equally regular. (Between यथैव and शास्त्रात्, 'येन विधिस्तदन्तस्य' is to be understood. अस्माच्छास्त्रात् refers to षष्ठी स्थानेयोगा.)

(*p.* 23, *l.* 28) अथ वा, समुदाया ... etc. An alternative solution. Here the substitute becomes due for the whole, व्याघ्रपाद् (not for the part पाद् unlike in the previous interpretation), theoretically; in practice, the substitution is realised through the part only.

(*p.* 24, *l.* 3) कथं 'यीवर्णयोर्दीधीवेव्योः ... etc. Kāt. and Pat. have considered the possibility of a conflict of the present rule with the अवयवषष्ठी. But there are a couple of other uses of Genitive specifically taught in grammar which they have not considered, e. g. P. 1. 1. 52 : अलोऽन्त्यस्य and P. 1. 1. 54 : आदेः परस्य. The commentators take up this question. Bhar. takes up the question of P. 1. 1. 52 : अलोऽन्त्यस्य when he refers to यीवर्णयोः etc. (P. 7. 4. 53) in connection with the problem of how to prevent the elision of the whole stem दीधीवेवी- against the Pari. निर्दिश्यमानस्या ....

The solution given is that because of the mention of *dīdhīvevī-* in the Genitive the Sū. अलोऽन्त्यस्य (P. 1. 1. 52) also finds a scope here. So, on the force of this Pari. the final vowel *ī* alone will be elided.

Here, there is no qualifying word (*viśeṣaṇa*) for *aṅgasya*. So no *tadantavidhi*. Since the substitute (viz. *lopa*, continued from P. 7. 4. 50) is taught by mentioning the original in the *Genitive*, अलोऽन्त्यस्य presents itself. But there is no conflict. The two can be co-ordinated thus : दीधीवेव्योः अङ्गस्य (co-ordinate Genitives) अन्त्यस्य (i. e. ईकारस्य) लोपः .... So अलोऽन्त्यस्य actually helps in avoiding the elision of the whole stems (दीधी- and वेवी-) which would otherwise result from the operation of the Pari. निर्दिश्यमानस्य ... .

But although there is no difference among commentators about the result — viz. the absence of the operation of the Pari. निर्दिश्यमानस्य ... in this case, there is no unanimity as to the exact technical procedure by which the Pari. is set aside. Kaiy. says अलोन्त्यस्य ... इत्येतत्तु वचनसामर्थ्यात् [निर्दिश्यमानपरिभाषया] न बाध्यते. Raghunāthaśāstrī says : व्यवस्थितविभाषात्वादित्यर्थः. As we have seen, Bhar. refers to the उपसंहार ' co-ordination which avoids conflict '. Nāg. expresses the same idea by the expression व्यवस्थापकत्व : न बाध्यते इति । किं तु व्यवस्थापकत्वेनाश्रीयते ।

Readings : (1) (*p*. 22, *l*. 7) The MS reads from चार्यं शब्दम् up to रेव सा तु (*p*. 22, *l*. 10) twice. — (2) (*p*. 22, *l*. 9) MS (first time) कल्याध्मातो; (second time) कालाध्मातो. — (3) (*p*. 22, *l*. 10) MS स्वरितंत्वसंप्रत्ययात्रामानं; AL °तत्वसंप्रत्ययाच्च (for our emendation °तत्त्वं संप्रत्ययमात्रार्थं). — (4) (*p*. 22, *ll*. 14–15) MSAL अ(MS व)यं तु क्रमः. — (5) (*p*. 22, *l*. 14) MS रसामाद्यौ(or °द्यौ) न लिध्यति(!) ; AL रसगन्धौ । न सिध्यति. — (6) (*p*. 22, *l*. 16) MS एतप्रस्व°; AL एतत् स्व°. — (7) (*p*. 22, *l*. 16) MS आनर्थक्यायोग (for °र्थक्याद्योग as in AL). — (8) (*p*. 22, *l*. 17) MS °लंभस्तूत्तरित्योगैः; AL °लम्भो योगैः. — (9) (*p*. 22, *l*. 18) MS सतीत्यथा°. — (10) (*p*. 22, *l*. 18) MS दुपाण-; AL तदुपात्त- (for तूपात्त-). — (11) (*p*. 22, *l*. 20) MSAL प्रत्यक्षयोर् (for our emendation पक्षयोर्). — (12) (*p*. 22, *l*. 21) MS त्याश्रितार्थः . — (13) (*p*. 22, *ll*. 21–22) MS विशेषोपनयवाद यत्रवियोगेन; AL °षोपनयत्वादत्रापि योगे (for our emendation °षापनयनादु[भ]यत्रापि योगेन. — (14) (*p*. 22, *l*. 22) MSAL संस्मरणेन (for our emendation संप्रसारणेन). — (15) (*p*. 22, *l*. 24) AL °ना संभवति (for °नासंभविनी). — (16) (*p*. 22, *ll*. 24–25) AL अङ्गस्येति । अत्रापि. — (17) (*p*. 22, *l*. 25) MS विशेषेश्चाप-; AL °वैश्चोप-. — (18) (*p*. 22, *l*. 26) AL उपव्यञ्जनः सम्बन्धः. — (19) (*p*. 23, *l*. 6) MS न चान्योर्थोस्तिस्य; AL °न्यार्थोस्तिः । तस्य (for our suggested °न्योऽर्थोऽस्ति तस्य योग्यः). — (20) (*p*. 23, *l*. 9) *Mbh*. ed. अनन्तरादयः. — (21) (*p*. 23, *l*. 12) MS मसंधकारे (for समन्ध° as emended by AL). — (22) (*p*. 23, *l*. 12) MSAL वास्ति (for चास्ति). — (23) (*p*. 23, *l*. 18) AL युज्यते. — (24) (*p*. 23, *l*. 19) AL तत्तत् (for तन्न). — (25) (*p*. 23, *l*. 23) MSAL संभूतं (for our suggested संश्रुतं). — (26) (*p*. 23, *l*. 25) MS इह हि तस्या इह हि तस्याद्म(or °त्र)व्याघ्रपाद; AL इह हि तत्स्यान्न व्याघ्रपाद इति. — (27) (*p*. 23, *l*. 26) MS प्रातस्थ; AL पादस्य (for our emendation प्राप्तस्य). — (28) (*p*. 23, *l*. 27) MSAL एवमयं वाछा(AL° शा)स्राद् (for our emendation एवमेव चा[स्मा])च्छास्राद्.

— (29) (*p.* 23, *l.* 28) MS यमुया (for समुदाया as emended by AL). — (30) (*p.* 24, *l.* 1) MS याछाखाद्; AL पाच्छा° (for our emendation ऽस्माच्छा°).

* * *

sthāne 'ntaratamaḥ / P. 1. 1. 50

[1. 1]

किमुदाहरणम्? The questioner is of the view that the present rule is redundant. Whatever cases the protagonist of this rule may advance to justify the framing of the rule, the questioner hopes to show that they can be accounted for by the other rule, viz. P. 1. 3. 10 : 'यथासंख्यमनुदेशः समानाम्' (प्रश्नस्तु लक्षणान्तरेणापि सिद्धत्वादनर्थकमेतदिति as the *Dīp.* says). Similarly Kaiy. : क्वचिल्लक्षणान्तरेणेष्टं सिद्धमिति प्रश्नः), thus rendering the present rule superfluous.

(*p.* 24, *l.* 7) 'इको यणचि'। दध्यत्र, मध्वत्र. The protagonist of this rule quotes a rule (इको यणचि) and its examples (दध्यत्र, मध्वत्र) to justify the framing of P. 1. 1. 50. You asked for illustration? Well! here is an illustration.

(*p.* 24, *l.* 8) उभयोपादानमुदाह्रियते. उभयम् = (i) the Sū. (P. 6. 1. 77) and (ii) the actual example(s). After यस्मिन्, scil. सूत्रे. अस्य = 'स्थानेऽन्तरतमः' इति सूत्रस्य. — लक्षणान्तरेण = 'यथासंख्यम्...' (P. 1. 3. 10) इति सूत्रेण.

वैषम्यमात्रम्, mere disparity, i. e. disparity between the *sthānin*-s and the *ādeśa*-s mentioned in P. 6. 1. 77 : इको यणचि. The *Dīp.* makes it clear that the opponent is aware of the rule P. 1. 3. 10 : यथासंख्यमनुदेशः समानाम्, but he thinks that that rule cannot work here since there is no parity between the originals and the substitutes.

(*p.* 24, *l.* 10) एवं मन्यते। इकः इति बहवः —. This *Dīp.* illustrates the *vaiṣamya* referred to above. The abbreviation *ik* stands for *i*, *u*, *ṛ*, and *ḷ*. In all they (originals) make up 66 sounds while the *yaṇ*-s i. e. *y*, *v*, *r*, and *l* (the substitutes) number only 7. These numbers are calculated thus :

From the point of view of length, *i*/*u* are of three kinds : short, long, and protracted (3). Each of these, again, from the point of view of pitch, may be of three kinds : Udātta, Anudātta, and Svarita ($3 \times 3 = 9$). Finally, all these nine may be either nasal, or non-nasal. That makes ($9 \times 2 =$) 18. So 18 kinds of *i* + 18 kinds of *u* make 36 (इकारोकारौ प्रत्येकमष्टादशधाभेदात् षट्त्रिंशत्।).

The case of *ṛ* is the same as of *i*/*u*. It has also 18 varieties. But there is no long *ḷ* (**ḹ*). So there are only 12 varieties. Thus *ṛ* and *ḷ* together make 30 varieties, bringing the whole total to 66. (Incidentlly, the *Dīp.* should have linked *ṛ* with *i*/*u* — having an equal number of varieties — than with *ḷ* having a smaller number of varieties.)

As regards the *yaṇ-s*, the 3, *y*, *v*, and *l* can be both nasal and non-nasal. So they make up 6. *r* is non-nasal only. So together, *yaṇ-s* come to 7 (यणोऽपि सप्तेति ।).

For these varieties of Sanskrit phonemes, read the *Sidkau.* : तदित्थम् अ इ उ ऋ एषां वर्णानां प्रत्येकमष्टादश भेदाः । ऌवर्णस्य द्वादश । तस्य दीर्घाभावात् । एचामपि द्वादश । तेषां ह्रस्वाभावात् । (under P. 1. 1. 8 : मुखनासिका°)

The *Dīp.* अथ वा ऌकारस्य ... (*l.* 12) points out another *vaiṣamya*. Perhaps it may be said that this disparity (66 versus 7) is there only on the individualistic (*vyakti*) point of view. There is no disparity on the generic (*jāti*) point of view : There are four *ik-* originals and also four *yaṇ* substitutes. Where is the disparity ? The *Dīp.* now says that actually there are only three originals (as against four substitutes). For, there is no *sthānitva* for *ḷ* (ऌकारस्य स्थानित्वं नास्ति). Its *sthānitva* is simply impossible (असंभवात्). (See the *Uddy.* for Nāg.'s criticism of this calculation.)

The *Dīp.* does not say what sort of impossibility lies here. But it is obviously referring to the fact that in Sanskrit *ḷ* is seen only in the root *kḷp* but actually the root is read as *kṛp* with a rule that *ṛ* of this root is replaced by *ḷ* (P. 8. 2. 18 : कृपो रो लः). This rule is in the *asiddhakāṇḍa* with the result that for all practical purposes we have only *ṛ*. The phoneme *ḷ* has no chance of occupying the position of a *sthānin*. Cf. the discussion in the *Mbh.* under the Śiva-Sū. *ṛ-ḷ-k* about the necessity of reading *ḷ* in the alphabet. The discussion begins : अथ ऌकारोपदेशः किमर्थः? किं विशेषेण ऌकारोपदेशश्चोद्यते ? ... अयमस्ति विशेषः — अस्य हि ऌकारस्याल्पीयांश्चैव प्रयोगविषयः । यश्चापि प्रयोगविषयः सोऽपि क्लृपिस्थ एव । क्लृपेश्च लत्वमसिद्धम् । तस्यासिद्धत्वात् ऋकारस्यैवाच्कार्याणि भविष्यन्ति । नार्थ ऌकारोपदेशेन । (I. 19. 10–15).

(*p.* 24, *l.* 14) संख्यातानुदेशेनापि ... etc. This *Mbh.* argues, against the protagonist of P. 1. 1. 50, that *dadhy atra* etc. can be derived with the help of P. 1. 3. 10 : यथासंख्यम्.... The disparity (*vaiṣamya*) pointed out by the opponent is no disparity at all. He is mistaken when he takes the *vyakti* view. It is the *jāti* view that is to be adopted. On this view there are four vocalic classes contained in *ik*, viz. *i*, *u*, *ṛ* and *ḷ*, and four in *yaṇ* — *y*, *v*, *r*, and *l*. So no disparity. — यद्प्युक्तम् ... etc. (*l.* 16) clears the objection about *ḷ*. The phoneme *ḷ* may not occur in the actual usage as a *sthānin*, but it can do so in the rule (P. 6. 1. 77 : इको यणचि) where you cannot deny the parity.

(*p* 24, *l.* 18) अयमभिप्रायो — यदा स्वरितेन ... etc. This *Dīp.* brings out the special feature of the example now quoted (तस्थस्थमिपां ...), in support of the framing of P. 1. 1. 50, a feature which was lacking in the earlier example (इको यणचि). The *pratīka* [तस्थस्थमिपां तां]तंतामः represents the following *Mbh.* :

इदं तर्हि । 'तस्थस्थमिपां तांतंतामः' इति । एकार्थस्यैकार्थः, द्व्यर्थस्य द्व्यर्थः, बह्वर्थस्य बह्वर्थो यथा स्यादिति ।

The *Dīp.* here brings in a technical point, viz. necessity or otherwise of the use of Svarita for the working of **P. 1. 3. 10** : यथासंख्यम् .... Even if it is decided that the use of Svarita is necessary for ensuring *yathāsaṁkhya* by **P. 1. 3. 10**, it makes no difference for **P. 6. 1. 77** : इको यणचि (and so you could dispense with **P. 1. 1. 50** as far as **P. 6. 1. 77** is concerned). But with **P. 3. 4. 101** : तस्थ° it is a different thing. If insisted upon here, then the Svarita loses its capacity to indicate the *yathāsaṁkhya*. As **P. 1. 3. 10** is rendered impotent, **P. 1. 1. 50** becomes indispensable.

To explain : There is a long discussion in the *Mbh.* on **P. 1. 3. 10** on the means of avoiding *yathāsaṁkhya* in those cases where it results undesiredly on account of the equal number of the *uddeśin*-s and the *anudeśin*-s. An expedient finally suggested by Pat. is to drag *svaritena* from the following rule (**P. 1. 3. 11**) into the preceding rule and to read the latter as : यथासंख्यमनुदेशः स्वरितेन. (The word स्वरितेन will of course be continued into **P. 1. 3. 11** which will not suffer any loss on this account.) Read : अथ वैवं वक्ष्यामि । यथासंख्यमनुदेशः समानां 'स्वरितेन' इति । ततो 'ऽधिकारः' । (*Mbh.* I. 271. 12, 13). The result will be that P. 1. 3. 10 will operate only in the case of those rules which are supposed to be read with a Svarita; it will not operate in the case of those rules which are not supposed to be read with a Svarita. So now there is no difficulty. Where *yathāsaṁkhya* is desired, we look upon the rule concerned as read with a Svarita; where it is not desired, we look upon that rule as not read with a Svarita. (And this is not difficult. After all, प्रतिज्ञास्वरिताः पाणिनीयाः !) There is, however, one difficulty with this use of the Svarita. Unless there is some definite clue, it remains uncertain whether the Svarita has been employed for some technical purpose (as here, to indicate *yathāsaṁkhya*, or for the *anuvṛtti* of the word concerned in the following rules) or it is meant to indicate the Svarita as the actual accent of the real linguistic form.

To come to our rival rules **P. 1. 3. 10** and **P. 1. 1. 50**. The protagonist of P. 1. 1. 50 says that it is true that P. 1. 3. 10, supported by the Svarita, can indicate *yathāsaṁkhya* in the case of इको यणचि. There is no difficulty. The Svarita there can have the only object viz. of indicating *yathāsaṁkhya*. For, *ik* is not going to be used in the actual language. It will be only its named, viz. *i*, *u*, *ṛ*, *ḷ*, that will be so used. Similarly *yaṇ* is unconcerned about the Svarita since that is a quality of a vowel only. So as far as इको यणचि is concerned, P. 1. 3. 10 can work effectively with the *svarita* without any doubt of its intended purpose (यदा स्वरितेन ... यथासंख्यं प्रतिपद्यते ।). (And so **P. 1. 1. 50** : स्थानेऽन्तरतमः is not necessary for इको यणचि.)

But with तस्थस्थमिपां ... it is a different thing. The substitutes *tām*, *tam* etc. are to be actually used in the language. For aught one knows, the utterance of *tām*, *tam* etc. with a Svarita could mean that Pāṇini wanted to teach thereby that the accent of these verbal endings is Svarita in the actual language. Since, with this other purpose which would be equally possible, one cannot definitely say that the Svarita is for indicating *yathāsaṁkhya*, the other rule, P. 1. 1. 50 is necessary for the तस्थस्थमिपां .... (तामादीनां तु ... न यथासंख्यं प्रतिपद्यते ।)

In *l*. 20, अज्गुणः 'quality of a vowel' qualifies स्वरितः (understood). श्रुत्यर्थम् (*l*. 22) means स्वरितस्य श्रुत्यर्थम्. — न यथासंख्यं प्रतिपद्यते, scil. 'यथासंख्यमनुदेशः ...' इत्यनेन । Hence the need of P. 1. 1. 50.

Observations : (1) The whole discussion is on the assumption : यदा स्वरितेन चिह्नेन यथासंख्यं प्रतिपद्यते (*l*. 19). If this assumption is not accepted, then P. 1. 3. 10 can equally be well even for तस्थस्थमिपां as well, thus making P. 1· 1. 50 superfluous even in this case.

(2) Even on the view : यदा स्वरितेन चिह्नेन यथासंख्यं प्रतिपद्यते, there would not be much difficulty. P. 1. 3. 10 could still deliver goods. After all there is only the point of doubtfulness of Pāṇini's purpose in employing the Svarita. But, as is well known, this is not a serious difficulty in view of the celebrated dictum : व्याख्यानतो विशेषप्रतिपत्तिर्न हि संदेहादलक्षणम्. In fact Pat. himself has raised this point in the above-mentioned discussion on P. 1. 3. 10 and given the solution. Read : एवमपि स्वरितं दृष्ट्वा संदेहः स्यात् । न ज्ञायते किमयं समसंख्यार्थ आहोस्विदधिकारार्थ इति । संदेहमात्रमेतद् भवति, सर्वसंदेहेषु चेदमुपतिष्ठते, 'व्याख्यानतो...' इति । समसंख्यार्थ इति व्याख्यास्यामः ।

If, in spite of this declaration Pat. and Bhar. raise the point of doubtfulness and build an argument on it, it must be, as commentators usually observe on such occasions, शिष्यबुद्धिवैशद्याय. Bhar. leaves this reply based on the *vyākhyāna* for the other man to point out. It will duly follow. The student has to be trained in arguments and counter-arguments step by step.

(*p*. 24, *l*. 22) एकार्थस्यैकार्थ इति. (The original *Mbh*., represented by this *pratīka*, has been already quoted above.) Some of the endings mentioned in P. 3. 4. 101 for replacement are of dual (*-tas*, *-thas*), one is of the plural (*-tha*), and one of singular (*-mip*). There are similarly an equal number of substitutes indicating the three numbers. The *Mbh* points out that it is necessary that a singular substitute replace a singular original (एकार्थस्य [स्थानिनः] एकार्थ [आदेशः] यथा स्यात्) and so on. Since, in spite of the equal number of the *uddeśin*-s and *anudeśin*-s the *yathāsaṁkhya* cannot work for the reason mentioned above, the present rule (P. 1. 1. 50) is necessary so that the desired pairing off takes place (यथा स्यात्).

In the *Dīp.* प्रदर्शनमात्रमेतत् ... etc., Bhar. points out one more kind of wrong substitution which is averted by the present rule. The job of a finite ending after a verb is to denote two features : number and person. Pat. refers to number only (एकार्थस्यैकार्थः...). Bhar. here supplies the point about the person. Although *tām* among the substitutes is dual, it does not replace *thas* which is dual; it replaces *-tas* which, apart from being dual, is also 3rd person like itself.

Observation : Although the main point made here by Bhar. is clear, the text of the *Dīp.* is very corrupt. It actually reads (*l*. 23) : एवंप्रएवं प्रत्यन्तापरभावः चेतन्योपाधिरित्येह्य(or त्य)र्थाः. We of course drop one एवं प्र as being a scribal error. एवं प्रत्यन्ता° is emended by AL into एवमत्यन्ता, but we doubt its utility. We reconstruct : एवं प्रत्यक्त्वा°. Here प्रत्यक्त्व is the 'I' consciousness and thus denotes the idea of the (Western) 'first person' (*uttama-puruṣa* of the ancient Skt. grammarians). The clue comes from Kaiy. who has used this term in his comm. on this *Mbh.* Read : एकार्थस्येति । सादृश्यहेतुधर्मोपलक्षणमेतत् । तेन प्रत्यक्त्वादयोपि धर्मा गृह्यन्ते. Nāg. further expands on it. He defines प्रत्यक्त्व as अहंकारास्पदचेतनधर्मः. He mentions पराक्त्व (= अहंकारानास्पदचेतनधर्मः) as the mark of 'second person' (*madhyama-puruṣa*) and *aniyata* 'absence of definiteness' as the mark of the 'third person' (*prathama-puruṣa*).

The plural in एते ह्यर्थाः is also puzzling. We do not know how to account for it, since the other items (पराक्त्वम and अनियतत्वम्) are not specifically mentioned. Nor is there *ādi* (in plural). Our translation is tentative.

(*p*. 25, *l*. 1) ननु चैतदपि ... etc. A justification of P. 1. 3. 10. The *Dīp.* says that the *vyākhyāna* can make it clear that the use of Svarita is for indicating *yathāsaṁkhya*, and not for indicating any actual Svarita in these forms in the language. — अनयोः स्वरितकरणम् : अनयोः means in the two rules (इको यणचि and तस्थस्थमिपां etc.).

[1. 2]

(*p*. 25, *l*. 4) यत्रानेकमान्तर्यम् ... etc. This *pratīka* represents the following *Mbh.* : अथ स्थान इति वर्तमाने पुनः स्थानग्रहणं किमर्थम्? यत्रानेकमान्तर्यं तत्र स्थानत आन्तर्यं बलीयो यथा स्यात्। किं पुनस्तत् ? चेता, स्तोता। प्रमाणतोऽकारो गुणः प्राप्नोति, स्थानत एकारौकारौ। पुनः स्थानग्रहणादेकारौकारौ भवतः।

This *Mbh.* examines the need of reading the word *sthāne* in this Sūtra. There is already one word *sthāne* (a part of *sthāneyogā*) in the previous rule (P. 1. 1. 49). It should be made to continue in our rule also. (Nāg. furnishes the means : एकदेशे स्वरितत्वप्रतिज्ञानात्.) Where is then the need to read that word again here (पुनः स्थानग्रहणं किमर्थम्)? The *Mbh*. यत्रानेकमान्तर्यं ... etc. gives the reply.

According to the reply given, it is suggested that a single word *sthāne* will not do. Two *sthāne* words (or two occurrences of this word) are necessary, one *sthāna* meaning 'place of articulation' and another 'contingency of a conflict between factors that determine *āntarya*'. If *sthāne* is not read in this rule and only it is made to continue from the previous rule the Sū. [स्थाने]ऽन्तरतमः will mean : '(The substitute) nearmost by reason of the place of articulation (*sthāne* = *sthānena*) (comes in)'. This statement will have one defect. In such a case where the question of *sthāna* does not come in and consequently where the substitute is to be selected on the basis of other factors like meaning, length (of a vowel) etc. the substitution cannot be effected. For, it will have no sanction of the Sū. (which speaks only of the authoritative nature of *sthāna*). So we practically want two statements : (1) A substitute has to be nearmost (in one or other respect), and (2) in the case of conflict between the factors which decide the *āntarya*, the *sthāna* is given preference. The first statement gives the other factors (like meaning, length) their due place, while the second ensures preference to *sthāna* over others. That is why we want two *sthāne* words and so in spite of the *anuvṛtti*, we have to read *sthāne* again in this rule.

As an axample, the *Mbh.* cites the Guṇa substitute in the case of roots like *ci-*. Out of the three phonemes named Guṇa (P. 1. 1. 2), *a* becomes due as a substitute because of its short length (one mora) which is common with the original (*i*). The Guṇa vowel *e* also presents itself because, although not wholly related to *i* in the matter of place of articulation — *i* has *tālu* while *e* has *kaṇṭhatālu* — it has at least a partial resemblance. (The third contestant, *o*, however, has neither the length nor even a partial place in common with *i* and is ruled out altogether.) By the present rule *e* finally is substituted, giving *cetā*.

(*p.* 25, *l.* 4) अत्र स्वरितकरणात् ... etc. In the *Aṣṭ.* the use of the Svarita indicates the continuance of such a word (marked with the Svarita) in the following rules. Bhar. takes it for granted that *sthāne* in P. 1. 1. 49 is read with the Svarita. (He equally takes it for granted that we know it. Further, instead of mentioning *sthāne* specifically, he refers to it by *śabdāntaram* [incidentally, what is the significance of *-antara* ?], as though he were making a general statement !) He further says that the expression *antaratamaḥ* is practically to be repeated, once in connection with *sthāne* continued (*anvīyamānam*) from the previous rule and again also in connection with *sthāne* read in the present rule. As regards the meaning, *sthāna* in the previous rule means 'place of articulation' and evidently it continues to have that meaning here also. The *sthāna* in our rules means *prasaṅga*. So we get two statements : (1) स्थाने (= प्रसङ्गे सति) अन्तरतमः (सदृशतमः) भवति. (2) यत्रानेकमान्तर्यं तत्र स्थाने (=स्थानेन ताल्वादिना) यः अन्तरतमः स भवति. — The expression स चानेकार्थः (*l.* 7) is vague. It seems to be equivalent to तच्चानेकत्वम् (scil. अन्तरतमानाम्).

(p. 25, *l*. 8) इतरथा ह्येकक्रियासंनिपाते ... etc. Here इतरथा = स्थानेग्रहणमनुवर्त्यापि यदि वाक्यभेदो नाश्रीयेत. Here Bhar. explains why mere स्थाने स्थानेऽन्तरतमः will not suffice. The वाक्यभेद (with अन्तरतमः read with two *sthāne* words independently) is necessary. — एकक्रियासंनिपात practically means एकवाक्य 'a single sentence' (cf. one of the definitions of sentence : एकतिङ् (P. 2. 1. 1, *Vār*. 10). A single statement स्थाने स्थानेऽन्तरतमः will deprive other factors like the meaning of their share in deciding the *āntarya* (... अर्थगुणप्रमाणान्तरतम्यं निवर्तितमेव स्यात्).

(*p*. 25, *l*. 9) अथाप्येतावति व्याप्रियते ... etc. The expression एतावति refers to स्थाने भवति. It implies स्थानेग्रहणे अननुवृत्ते. Bhar. says that if स्थाने is not made to continue, mere स्थानेऽन्तरतमः will do no good (अकिंचित्करं भवति). (Incidentally, अन्तरतमः is to be understood as the subject of व्याप्रियते; and तत् or सूत्रम् as that of भवति.) For, the statement स्थानेऽन्तरतमः will merely mean that in the contingency of many claiming a place, the nearmost one will come in. Where is the sanction for the preference to be given to the place of articulation?

At this stage an argument like what follows is probably to be understood as advanced by the opponent. The latter may say: it does not matter if the deciding factor of the place of articulation is not mentioned. Let that one come in, which has the maximum number of factors in its favour. Then the Sū. will not be *akiṁcitkara*. The *Dīp*. यो बहुभिः स्यात् स कथम् replies this argument. What guarantee or sanction is there to say that the one with many (or maximum number of) qualifications will come in automatically?

यथा लोके (*l*. 11) looks like the reply of the opponent. The parallel is taken from the Dharmaśāstra. A particular situation where brothers alone are the surviving heirs of the deceased brother seems to be in Bhar.'s mind. When a *piṇḍa* is to be offered to the deceased or when his inheritor is to be decided, among the brothers that one who is both एकपितृक and एकमातृक is preferred. A similar principle of the possession of the maximum number of qualifications will be followed in grammar also, says the opponent. — यदि च लौकिकीमवस्थां (*l*. 12) ... etc. is the reply of the Siddhāntin. He points out that the reading of the superlative suffix *-tama* (in *antaratama*) in the Sū. opposes the adoption of the popular custom here in the grammar. The idea that in the case of competition between many rivals, the one who has maximum qualifications (i. e. points of affinity) be chosen is already known from the practice of the world. If Pāṇini had depended on it, he would not have used the superlative suffix *-tama* here. Indeed, remarks Bhar., the whole sūtra in that case becomes redundant (लौकिक्यां प्रतिपत्तौ सूत्रमेव प्रत्याख्यायते.)

Readings : (1) (*p*. 24, *l*. 8) AL °योरुपादानम्. — (2) (*p*. 24, *l*. 8) MSAL यस्मिन्नसं- (for our emendation यस्मिन्न[स्य] सं°. — (3) (*p*. 24, *l*. 11)

AL °दशभेदात्. — (4) (*p.* 24, *l.* 11) MSAL ऋकारो. — (5) (*p.* 24, *l.* 14) MS drops सिद्धम्. — (6) (*p.* 24, *l.* 14) MS पूर्योयं वों; AL पूर्णो (for our emendation ऽपूर्वो). — (7) (*p.* 24, *l.* 18) MS om. तस्थस्थमिपां तां·. AL अनुदेशविषयं 'तांतंतामः' इति. — (8) (*p.* 24, *l.* 20) MSAL [अ]नुगुणो (for अज्गुणो). — (9) (*p.* 24, *l.* 23) AL अत्यन्तापर°. — (10) (*p.* 24, *l.* 23) MS इत्ये ह्य(or स्य)र्थाः; AL इति एतेऽर्थाः. — (11) (*p.* 24, *l.* 24) MS यत्सु; AL तेषु (for सत्सु). — (12) (*p.* 25, *l.* 2) MS ह्रित- (for स्वरित- as emended in AL). — (13) (*p.* 25, *ll.* 2-3) AL om. ह्यनयोः (MS ह्यजयौ) ... श्रवणार्थम्. — (14) (*p.* 25, *l.* 4) *Mbh.* ed. (Kielhorn) AL अनेकविधमान्तर्यम्. Nirṇ. ed. reads अनेकमान्तर्यम् as in the *Dīp.* — (15) (*p.* 25, *l.* 4) MSAL अस्वरित (for our emendation अ[त्र] स्व°). — (16) (*p.* 25, *l.* 4) MS शब्दांतरसूत्रांतरे. — (17) (*p.* 25, *l.* 6) AL स्थानेन (for °ने च).

[2]

किमर्थं पुनरिदमुच्यते. This *Mbh.* is meant to introduce the *Vār.* 1 : स्थानिन एकत्वनिर्देशाद् ... etc. In a way the question sounds strange because in a part of the preceding *Mbh.* it has been stated that this rule P. 1. 1. 50 is necessary for P. 6. 1. 101 : अकः सवर्णे दीर्घः where P. 1. 3. 10 does not help. Hence the protest in the *Dīp.*: ननु च प्रयोजनमुक्तम्, 'अकः सवर्णे दीर्घः' इति। This part of the *Mbh.* which was unfortunately skipped over by Bhar. runs as follows : इदं तर्हि — 'अकः सवर्णे दीर्घः' इति, दण्डाग्रम्, क्षुपाग्रम्, दधीन्द्रः, मधूष्ट्रः। कण्ठस्थानयोः कण्ठस्थानस्तालुस्थानयोस्तालुस्थान ओष्ठस्थानयोरोष्ठस्थानो यथा स्यात्.

(*p.* 25, *l.* 15) उच्यते। एतदयं पृच्छति etc. The *Dīp.* justifies the question by saying that the *Mbh.* here wants to know the exact difficulty that will crop up in the working of P. 6. 1. 101 if the present rule is not framed (यदीदं नोच्येत किमनिष्टं स्यादिति).

(*p.* 25, *l.* 16) स्थानिन एकत्वनिर्देशात्. The full text of this *Vār.* and the *Mbh.* thereon runs as follows :

'स्थानिन एकत्वनिर्देशादनेकादेशनिर्देशाच्च सर्वप्रसङ्गस्तस्मात् स्थानेन्तरवचनं नियमार्थम्' (वा. १)। स्थान्येकत्वेन निर्दिश्यते, 'अकः' इति। अनेकश्च पुनरादेशः प्रतिनिर्दिश्यते, 'दीर्घः' इति। स्थानिन एकत्वनिर्देशादनेकादेशनिर्देशाच्च सर्वप्रसङ्गः। सर्वे सर्वत्र प्राप्नुवन्ति। इष्यते चान्तरतमा एव स्युरिति। तच्चान्तरेण यत्नं न सिध्यति। तस्मात् स्थानेऽन्तरतमवचनं नियमार्थम्। एवमर्थमिदमुच्यते।

This is the idea : When homogeneous vowels come together, a long substitute results ($\breve{\bar{a}}+\breve{\bar{a}}=\bar{a}$; $\breve{\bar{i}}+\breve{\bar{i}}=\bar{i}$ etc.). P. 6. 1. 101, which accounts for this phenomenon, mentions only a long substitute in general as the result. Such being the case, all the four long vowels (*ā*, *ī*, *ū*, and *ṝ*) become due as substitute in the first instance, irrespective of the nature of the two vowels concerned,

P. 1. 1. 50 rules that only that substitute which is nearmost in the matter of place of articulation materializes. This restriction is the purpose of P. 1. 1. 50 which provides for the smooth function of P. 6. 1. 101.

(*p.* 25, *l.* 16) कथं स्थानी एकत्वेन निर्दिश्यते ... etc. Bhar. first examines the expressions *eka* 'one' and *aneka* 'many' which qualify *sthānin* and *ādeśa* respectively in the *Vār.* The starting point of the *Vār.* is that the originals (*akaḥ*) are mentioned in the singular while the substitutes are mentioned in the plural (*dīrghaḥ*). But how can one say so? If it is held that as a name (*saṁjñayā*) *akaḥ* — the original — is in the singular, *dīrghaḥ* — the substitute — is also equally in the singular as a name. And, if there is a plurality of the actual substitutes, the named, — then there is equally a plurality of the actual originals also in the capacity of the named (संज्ञिभेदादनेकत्वम्). On what ground, then, do you discriminate between the two and say that the original is one but the substitutes are many?

(*p.* 25, *l.* 18) तत्र भूतत्वात् स्थानी एकत्वेन निर्दिश्यते ... etc. This *Dīp.* furnishes the reply. *In any concrete case*, the original (i. e. the two original *ak* vowels) is already there (*bhūta*). Its singularity is self-evident. The substitute, on the other hand, is yet to come (*bhāvyamāna*). It has a potentiality to be in plural. (There are four, as we saw.) The case-ending *ṅas* (Gen. sing.) in *akaḥ* is a *bhūtavibhakti*, i. e. coming after a stem which denotes what is already there, and as such has to be understood as indicating a singular object. In the expression *dīrghaḥ*, the case-ending *su* (Nom. sing.) is a *bhāvyamānavibhakti* and so it can denote many objects. Both *akaḥ* and *dīrghaḥ* are names, but, for reasons just given, in the first case the name has only one named, while in the second there can be many.

Observations : (1) The statement 'the original is one' implies a single given context, a concrete example. This is not made sufficiently clear by Bhar. But read Kaiy. : यद्यपि 'अकः' इत्यनेन स्थानिनो बहव उपात्तास्तथापि प्रयोगे एकैकः स्थानी, तस्य पर्यायेण बहवो दीर्घा आदेशाः प्राप्नुवन्तीत्यर्थः.

(2) We are all along speaking of 'a single original'. But actually there are *two* ($\breve{a} + \breve{a}$, or $\check{i} + \check{i}$ etc.). Pāṇini also speaks of the the two in एकः पूर्वपरयोः (6. 1. 84) which applies to the *savarṇa-dīrgha* Saṁdhi also which is under discussion. How does Kāt. speak of oneness of the original? Neither Bhar. nor Kaiy. raises this point, but Nāg. does. 'The two sounds undergoing this Saṁdhi form a single combined *sthānin*' is his solution. Read : यद्यपि पूर्वपरयोरित्युक्तेरेकः स्थानीत्ययुक्तम्, तथापि तत्समुदायाभिप्रायेणेदम्.

यथा लोके ... etc. (*l.* 21) gives a parallel. The ball of clay, which corresponds to the *sthānin*, is patently one but has the potentiality of giving rise to many products which correspond to the *ādeśa*.

The sentence ज्ञातश्च ... यत्र प्रतिपद्यते त्रिकारं करोमीति is not clear.

अपरे वर्णयन्ति. This has reference to the following section of the *Mbh.* :

'यथासंख्यमनुदेशः समानाम्' (पा. १. ३. १०)। ... किमर्थमिदमुच्यते ? 'संज्ञासमासनिर्देशात् सर्वप्रसङ्गोऽनुदेशस्य, यथासंख्यवचनं नियमार्थम्' (वा. १)। संज्ञया समासैश्च निर्देशाः क्रियन्ते। संज्ञया तावत् — 'परस्मैपदानां णलतुसुस्थलतुसणल्वमाः' इति। समासैः — 'तूदीशलातुरवर्मतीकूचवाराड्ढक्छण्ढञ्यकः' इति। संज्ञासमासनिर्देशादेतस्मात् कारणात् सर्वप्रसङ्गः = सर्वस्योद्देशस्य सर्वोऽनुदेशः प्राप्नोति। इष्यते च समसंख्यं यथा स्यादिति। तच्चान्तरेण यत्नं न सिध्यतीति तत्र यथासंख्यवचनं नियमार्थम्। एवमर्थमिदमुच्यते।

किं पुनः कारणं संज्ञया च समासैश्च निर्देशाः क्रियन्ते ? 'संज्ञासमासनिर्देशः पृथग्विभक्तिसंज्ञ्यनुच्चारणार्थः' (वा. २)। संज्ञया च समासैश्च निर्देशाः क्रियन्ते पृथग्विभक्तीः संज्ञिनश्च मोच्चीचरमिति (I. 267. 14–24)).

The others (*apare*), who give a different explanation of स्थानिन एकत्वनिर्देशात् (and whose view Bhar. is now quoting) had obviously the above *Mbh.* passage in view. Here the necessity of framing P. 1. 3. 10 is discussed. Ordinarily, when there is an equal number of *uddeśin*-s and *anudeśin*-s (e. g. originals and substitutes, or stems and suffixes) it is the natural thing that the first *anudeśin* should be paired off with the first *uddeśin*, the second with the second, and so on. (A popular example quoted by Nāg. is शत्रुं मित्रं विपत्तिं च जय रञ्जय भञ्जय, where जय is connected automatically with शत्रुं, and so on.) In grammar, however, sometimes this natural process cannot take place because of some technical difficulties. When, for instance, instead of being enumerated the items are mentioned by their common technical name, the condition of equal number on both sides is no longer there. Thus e. g. in P. 3. 4. 82 : परस्मैपदानाम् ... etc. where the originals तिप्तस् ... मस् are not mentioned individually but by their common name *parasmaipada*, thus resulting into a lack of nine items corresponding to the nine endings णलतुस् .... The same difficulty occurs when the items are mentioned in the form of a (Dvandva) compound (e. g. P. 4. 3. 94 : तूदीशलातुर ... etc. where both *uddeśin*-s and *anudeśin*-s are mentioned by a Dvandva). According to the grammatical theory a Dvandva denotes *cārtha* (= *samuccaya* here) which is one. So, here again a natural *yathāsaṁkhya* becomes impossible. Hence the provision of P. 1. 3. 10.

The *apare* now point out that in P. 6. 1. 101 also the *sthānin* 'akaḥ' is by way of a technical name. So all the long substitutes will threaten to replace every *ak* vowel. The *Vār.* says that to prevent it P. 1. 1. 50 is framed.

Whereas the contrast in the previous interpretation is between *bhūta* and *bhāvyamāna*, in this interpretation it is between संज्ञासमासनिर्देश and संज्ञासमासेतरनिर्देश.

In *l.* 25, मिथोनिर्देशः = अस्य अयम् आदेशः, अस्य अयम् इत्यादिः। (*l.* 27) सवै-स्योकालस्य = °स्य + ऊकालस्य (i. e. द्विमात्रिकस्य). For लघ्वर्थम्, see the *Mbh.* on P. 1. 3. 10, *Vār.* 2, quoted above.

Readings : (1) (*p.* 25, *l.* 15) MS यदिदं. — (2) (*p.* 25, *l.* 15) MS नाऽये (or °ठये) त — (3) (*p.* 25, *l.* 17) MS संज्ञाया. — (4) (*p.* 25, *l.* 19) MS अक्सिवर्णे; AL अपि सवर्णो (for अचि सवर्णे). — (5) (*p.* 25, *l.* 19) MS निर्दिष्टमानो. — (6) (*p.* 25, *l.* 22) MS एकत्वेनातश्; AL °त्वेन। अतश्. — (7) (*p.* 25, *l.* 24) AL सवर्णाः पर्यायेण सवर्णे. — (8) (*p.* 25, *l.* 25) MSAL मिथोनि-र्देशो. — (9) (*p.* 25, *l.* 27 — *p.* 26, *l.* 1) MS शक्यौष्याकः (for ऽशक्योऽस्याकः as in AL).

[3]

यथा पुनरियमन्तरतमनिर्वृत्तिः. The following *Mbh.* (which follows immediately the *Mbh.* quoted above : *p.* 203, *ll.* 28-32) is represented by this *pratīka* : अस्ति प्रयोजनमेतत्। किं तर्हीति। यथा पुनरियमन्तरतमनिर्वृत्तिः, सा किं प्रकृतितो भवति — स्थानिन्य-न्तरतमे षष्ठीति? आहोस्विदादेशतः — स्थाने प्राप्यमाणानामन्तरतम आदेशो भवतीति? कुतः पुनरियं विचारणा? उभयथा हि तुल्या संहिता ' स्थानेऽन्तरतम उरण् रपरः ' इति।

The opponent in the *Mbh.* admits half-heartedly (अस्ति प्रयोजनमेतत्) the above utility of P. 1. 1. 50 but now raises another question. He wants to know whether अन्तरतम is to be interpreted as अन्तरतमे (Loc. sing.) or as अन्तरतमः (Nom. sing.). The question is justified *prima facie* because the Saṁhitā text अन्तरतम could be analysed equally well both ways. (You can't take the established text अन्तरतमः for granted, that is the idea.) And whichever way it is analysed, it has its own difficulty. यथा = येन प्रकारेण = संहितापाठं प्रामाणिकत्वे-नाङ्गीकृत्य. In *p.* 26, *l.* 4 MS संहितयाठे च विशेवता संहिताप्यस्वि is obscure. तत्रानेन ये संहितया ... etc. : it is not clear what the reciters of the Saṁhitā text of the *Aṣṭ.* are to be asked. Are they to be asked : ' What is the *pada* text of *antaratama* which you follow ? '

पदप्रकृतिः संहिता (*Nir.* 1. 17) is a fundamental doctrine. Taking the word पदप्रकृति as a Tatpuruṣa compound, it is usually explained as meaning that a continuous text (*saṁhitā*) is the original or basic one, from which individual words (*pada*-s) are abstracted. It is believed that the reality belongs to the Saṁhitā-text, not to the Pada-text. The *Vākyapa.* 2. 57-59, mentions the other view (पदानि प्रकृतिः यासाम्) also and refutes it. Read :

अभेदपूर्वका भेदाः कल्पिता वाक्यवादिभिः।
भेदपूर्वानभेदांस्तु मन्यन्ते पददर्शिनः॥ (57)
पदप्रकृतिभावश्च वृत्तिभेदेन वर्ण्यते।
पदानां संहिता योनिः संहिता वा पदाश्रया॥ (58)

पदाम्नायश्च यद्यन्यः संहिताया निदर्शकः ।
नित्यस्तत्र कथं कार्यं पदं लक्षणदर्शनात् ॥ (59)

So now the question is : what do you extract from the Saṁhitā text of the *Aṣṭ*. : अन्तरतमे or °तमः (किंभूतं पदमपोद्धर्तव्यमित्येतदत्र पृच्छति ।) ?

(*p*. 26, *l*. 9) 'स्थानेऽन्तरतमः' इत्यत्र ··· etc. Bhar. now shows how the Sū. is to be interpreted differently on the two views.

(1) If you choose अन्तरतमे, then the Sū. becomes स्थानेऽन्तरतमे. Here अन्तरतम qualifies स्थानिन् (or प्रकृति) understood. Also, षष्ठी is to be made to continue (fr. P. 1. 1. 49) in our Sū. So the full form of the Sū. is स्थाने अन्तरतमे (स्थानिनि) षष्ठी. Now षष्ठी indicates an item to be replaced (P. 1. 1. 49). So the Sū. means : When many similar criginals are due, the one which is nearmost should be regarded as mentioned in the Genitive (hence to be replaced by the substitute which is taught). This type of interpretation thus ultimately results into the restriction of the original (प्रकृतिनियमः). So the *Dīp*. (*ll*. 9–11) says : 'स्थानेन्तरतम' इत्यत्र 'षष्ठी' इति वर्तते । तेनात्रादेशस्य या प्रकृतिरन्तरतमा सैव षष्ठ्या निर्दिष्टा, नान्या ··· इति प्रकृतिनियमोऽयं विज्ञायते. Similarly Kaiy. : तत्र सप्तम्यन्तपक्षे षष्ठीति वर्तते, अन्तरतमो य आदेशस्य स्थानी तत्रैव षष्ठी, यत्रैव षष्ठी तत्रादेश इति प्रकृतिर्नियम्यते ।

(2) If you choose अन्तरतमः, then it is the *ādeśa* which has to be nearmost. The original remains unrestrained, as the षष्ठी goes with the whole *sthānin*. Hence the *Dīp*. : आदेशान्तरतम्ये तु (i. e. 'स्थानेऽन्तरतमः' इति पठ्यमाने तु) प्रकृतेरनियमात् सर्वत्र षष्ठी, आदेशस्तु नियम्यते ··· .

कुतः ? अर्थस्याविच्छेदात् (*l*. 7) etc. states the indivisibility of a sentence from the semantic point of view. Since meaning is indivisible, word also must be indivisible. That is why the Saṁhitā is more authoritative, says the *Dīp*.

The sentence एवं च कृत्वा एकपदेनासंहिता is obscure. If it is meant to convey that euphony is obligatory within a word, it is difficult to see what purpose it serves here.

(*p*. 26, *l*. 13) इको यणचीति Having asked the question : अन्तरतमनिर्वृत्तिः, सा किं प्रकृतितो ··· आहोस्विदादेशतः ? The *Mbh*. continues : किं चातः ? यदि प्रकृतितः, 'इको यणचि' इति यणां येऽन्तरतमा इकस्तत्र षष्ठी, यत्र षष्ठी तत्रादेशा भवन्तीतीहैव स्यात् — दध्यत्र, मध्वत्र । कुमार्यर्थं ब्रह्मबन्ध्वर्थमित्यत्र न स्यात् । आदेशतः पुनरन्तरतमनिर्वृत्तौ सत्यां सर्वत्र षष्ठी, यत्र षष्ठी तत्रादेशा भवन्तीति सर्वत्र सिद्धं भवति ।

The *Mbh*. now examines the two views : (1) सप्तम्यन्तपक्षः, i. e. प्रकृतिनियमः or प्रकृतितोऽन्तरतमनिर्वृत्तिः, and (2) प्रथमान्तपक्षः, i. e. आदेशनियमः, or आदेशतोऽन्तरतमनिर्वृत्तिः. It first takes the rule इको यणचि (P. 6. 1. 77) to examine the working of the metarule P. 1. 1. 50 on both the alternative interpretations.

In केचिदिको ... the *Dīp.* distinguishes between two kinds of *ik* vowels according to their length, viz. (1) मात्रिक 'short' and (2) द्विमात्र 'long'. Now all *yaṇ*-s, as consonants, have half a mora each for their length. So, from this point of view, a short *i*, for example, is nearer (*antaratama*) to *y* than a long *ī*. So, when P. 6. 1. 77 is applied, only short vowels will be replaced by semivowels (*dadhy atra* etc. as illustrated in the *Mbh.*), not long ones (in *kumāryartham*). This is a defect of the प्रकृतिनियम.

In the *Dīp*, केचिदिक: and द्विमात्रा: are in apposition. Scil. यण्भ्य: after अर्धमात्रिकेभ्यो. Although even short (*mātrika*) *ik*-s are not exactly similar to *yaṇ*-s, still they are at least somewhat near (*īṣatsaṁnikṛṣṭāḥ*), not far removed (*dūraviprakṛṣṭāḥ*) like the long ones. Thus being *antaratama*, the short *ik*-s alone get the *ṣaṣṭhī*. In other words, the Sū. now practically becomes ह्रस्वस्येको यणचि (thus depriving the long vowels of a *yaṇ* substitute (ह्रस्वैरेव षष्ठी लब्धा, न दीर्घैरिति).

(*p.* 26, *l.* 15) ननु चानुदाहरणमेतद् ... etc. An objection against bringing in P. 6. 1. 77, since it is already decided in the *Mbh.* that it is not necessarily an example of the rule under discussion, since P. 1. 3. 10 suffices for that case (संख्यातानुदेशेनाप्येतत् सिद्धम् as the *Mbh.* says there). — सत्यम्। एवमेतत् ... etc. is the reply. It is an *anudāharaṇa* only on the *ādeśāntarya* view. When one is thinking of the other, i. e. *prakṛtyāntarya* view, P. 6. 1. 77 does claim consideration. For, the long *ik*-s now do not get *ṣaṣṭhī*.

In यच्च तदुक्तं स्थानान्तर्यम् (*l.* 17) ... etc., the *Dīp.* draws attention to a curious position which obtains here. It was said above that in the event of conflict between similarity on different grounds, that based on the place of articulation was to be the decisive one. But even that test fails here since a short *i*, e. g., is equally similar to *y*, and is also (relatively) more similar to it in the matter of length. — In *l.* 18, अयं = ह्रस्व: (इक्).

So a long *ik* has to remain without a substitute on the *prakṛtyāntarya* view. There will be, of course, no such difficulty on the *ādeśāntarya* view.

एवम् 'इको गुणवृद्धी' इति. The *Mbh.* represented by this *pratīka* runs as follows: तथा इको गुणवृद्धी। गुणवृद्ध्योर्येऽन्तरतमा इकस्तत्र षष्ठी, यत्र षष्ठी तत्र आदेशा भवन्तीतीहैव स्यात् — नेता, लविता, नायको, लावकः। चेता, स्तोता, चायकः, स्तावकः इत्यत्र न स्यात्। आदेशतः पुनरन्तरतमनिर्वृत्तौ सत्यां सर्वत्र षष्ठी। यत्र षष्ठी तत्रादेशा भवन्तीति सर्वत्र सिद्धं भवति।

An exactly opposite kind of difficulty arises with P. 1. 1. 3: इको गुणवृद्धी. When *e* and *o* are to come as Guṇa substitutes, only long *ī* and *ū* could be so replaced (as in *netā*, *lavitā*), because they alone are *antaratama* with the

substitutes. Guṇa in *cetā*, *stotā* will not be available. Similarly in the case of the Vṛddhi substitutes *ai* and *au*.

Here also there is no difficulty on the *ādeśāntarya* view.

ननु नायको लावकः (*l.* 22) etc. raises an objection. The *vṛddhi* in *nāyaka, lāvaka* does not come under the jurisdiction of P. 1. 1. 3. (It is not *ig-lakṣaṇā* as the *Dīp.* says). It is effected by P. 7. 2. 115 : अचोऽञ्णिति. How does then Pat. mention those cases here? Does not matter, says Bhar. All that we have to do is to add a separate statement for Vṛddhi : 'only the nearmost (i. e. long) vowel (*ac*) will be replaced by Vṛddhi'. The additional *Mbh*. passages will be something like this : *तथा 'अचोऽञ्णिति' इति। वृद्धेर्योऽन्तरतमोऽच् तत्र षष्ठी। यत्र षष्ठी तत्रादेशा भवन्तीतीहैव स्यात् — नायको, लावक इति। चायकः, स्तावकः इत्यत्र न स्यात्।

(*p.* 26, *l.* 24) तथा ऋवर्णस्य गुणवृद्धिप्रसङ्गे इति. This *pratīka* refers to the following text of the *Mbh.* : तथा ऋवर्णस्य गुणवृद्धिप्रसङ्गे गुणवृद्ध्योर्यदन्तरतमम्रवर्णं तत्र षष्ठी। यत्र षष्ठी तत्रादेशा भवन्तीतीहैव स्यात् — कर्ता, हर्ता, आस्तारकः, निपारक इति। आस्तरिता, निपरिता, कारकः, हारक इत्यत्र न स्यात्। आदेशतः पुनरन्तरमनिर्वृत्तौ सत्यां सर्वत्र षष्ठी। यत्र षष्ठी तत्रादेशा भवन्तीति सर्वत्र सिद्धं भवति।

Another defect of the *prakṛtyāntarya* view. This concerns *ṛ* whose Guṇa substitute is *a* (based on the common one-mora length only), which is further suffixed by *r* (P. 1. 1. 51 : उरण् रपरः), i. e. *ar*. The Vṛddhi, similarly is *ār* finally (*ā*-r). Here the defect is that since the substitute *a*(*r*) is a short vowel, only short *ṛ* will have a Guṇa substitute (*kartā* fr. *kṛ*- etc.); Guṇa forms from a long *ṛ* will not be available (like *āstaritā* fr. *stṝ*-). On the other hand, in the case of Vṛddhi, only long *ṝ* will have a Vṛddhi substitute, (*āstārakaḥ* fr. *stṝ*); Vṛddhi form from a short *ṛ* will not be available (like *kārakaḥ* fr. *kṛ*-).

The *Dīp.* किमर्थं पुनः points out an alleged tautology in mentioning the case of *ṛ* separately, when *ik* as a whole is already discussed in the immediately preceding *Mbh.* Is not *ṛ* included in *ik*? So, the objector says, an objection as regards *ṛ* is already as good as taken. एष विशेषः (*l.* 25) ... etc. justifies the separate treatment of *ṛ*, which is based on the different behaviour of other *ik*-s (viz. *i* and *u*) in this case. While in the case of *ṛ* Guṇa is possible for *ṛ* only, and Vṛddhi for *ṝ* only, in the case of *i*/*u*, both are possible from long *ī*/*ū* only.

The examination of the *prakṛtyāntarya* view in the *Mbh.* ends here. Nāg. here comments : एवं च सप्तम्यन्तच्छेदो (i. e. अन्तरतमे) लक्ष्यासिद्ध्या दुष्ट इति भावः.

वान्तो यि प्रत्यये. Having pointed out the defects of the *prakṛtyāntarya* view, Pat. now takes up the *ādeśāntarya* view. The *Mbh.* reads : अथादेशतोऽन्तरतमनिर्वृत्तौ सत्यामयं दोषः — 'वान्तो यि प्रत्यये'। स्थानिनिर्देशः कर्तव्यः। ओकारौकारयोरिति वक्तव्यम्। एकारैकारयोर्मा भूदिति। प्रकृतितः पुनरन्तरतमनिर्वृत्तौ सत्यां वान्तादेशस्यैच्षु यान्तरतमा प्रकृतिस्तत्र षष्ठी। यत्र षष्ठी तत्रादेशा भवन्तीत्यन्तरेण स्थानिनिर्देशं सिद्धं भवति।

P. 6. 1. 78 : एचोऽयवायावः teaches substitution of *ay*, *āy*, *av* and *āv* in the place of *e*, *ai*, *o*, and *au* respectively when a vowel follows. The next Sū. (79) teaches the substitutes *av* and *āv* in another environment also, viz when a suffix beginning with *y* follows. Pat. says that here *o* and *au* require a specific mention as the *sthānin*, for otherwise *av/āv* will replace all the *ec* vowels (*e*, *ai*, *o*, and *au*), being continued from the previous rule. This defect does not arise if the *prakṛtyāntarya* view is accepted. For, in that case, only *o* and *au*, which are similarmost to *av/āv*, will be restricted to the status of the *sthānin*. — In the *Mbh.*, supply ओकारौकारौ after अन्तरतमा प्रकृतिः.

This is made clear in the *Dīp.* : सर्वस्यैचो ... निर्देशेन (*p.* 27, *ll.* 2–3).

(*p.* 27, *l.* 3) अत्र वृत्तिसूत्रे ... etc. The expression *vṛttisūtra* is a problem. The word occurs once in the *Mbh.* under *Vār.* 18 : तथा चोत्तरस्य वचनार्थः on P. 2. 2. 24 where its meaning is by no means clear. (Some take it as a rule (sūtra) teaching a compound-formation (viz. 2. 2. 25) : cf. 'संख्ययाव्यये'-त्यादिरूपे वृत्तिविधायके = समासविधायके सूत्रे (Raghunātha Shastrī's foot-note 9; Nirṇaysāgara ed. 1935, P. 451). This word occurs once more in the *Mbh.* under *Vār.* (23) : लुप्ताख्यातेषु च on P. 2. 1. 1. : समर्थः पदविधिः. Here Nāg. explains *Vṛttisūtra* as a sūtra accompanied by a *Vṛtti* (viz. Pāṇini's Sūtras), as against another kind of Sūtras, viz. the Vārttikas, which have no *vṛtti*. He, however, also notes a *v. l.* : वृत्तिः सूत्रवचनप्रामाण्यात्. Incidentally, the *Vṛttisūtra* of Jayāditya, referred to by Itsing, has to be obviously taken as standing for *sūtravṛtti*, i. e. the *Kāśikā*.

The meaning of this word used here in the *Dīp.* remains problematic.

The *Dīp.* भूतापेक्षायां प्रवर्तितव्यम् is vague. Perhaps *bhūta* means the *sthānin* which is already there.

तर्हि 'एचः' इत्येतदनुवर्तते ... etc. Pat. has pointed out the defect, caused by not accepting the *prakṛtyāntarya* view, in the words : स्थानिनिर्देशः कर्तव्यः. In other words, an addition of ओकारौकारयोः to the existing rule वान्तो यि प्रत्यये becomes necessary. Before Pat. gives his own solution, Bhar. here tries his own solution or, what looks better, the one given in the Vṛttisūtra. According to this solution (by means of which ओकारौकारयोः can be had without actually reading

it), the expression *aci* also[1] is to be brought down from P. 6. 1. 78 into 79, along with *ecaḥ*. So P. 6. 1. 79 now means: The substitute ending in *v*, which was seen before a vowel, that (now) takes place before *y*-suffix also (किं तु यो ... प्रत्यय इति). What is now needed or is to be supplied (एतावदपेक्ष्यते) is the original which was seen to be replaced by a substitute ending in *v*. Bhar. supplies it by saying: ओकारौकारयोः.

Kaiy., who also gives this solution (without naming the source) is more explicit. Read: यदा त्वेवं व्याख्यायते — यादृशो वान्त आदेशः पूर्वं (= अचि) दृष्टस्तादृशो यि प्रत्यये भवति, ओकारस्थानिकोऽवादेशो दृष्ट औकारस्थानिकश्चावादेश इति, तदा न दोषः। On this Nāg. comments thus: अचीत्यनुवर्त्याचि परतो यस्य यो वान्तो दृष्टस्तस्य यि प्रत्यये स इति व्याख्येयमित्यर्थः। He, however, expresses his dissent thus: अन्ये तु वाच्यवृत्त्येदृशार्थस्यालाभात्, यि प्रत्यये इति दृष्ट्वाऽचीत्यस्यासंबन्धाच्च, भाष्योक्तं वचनमेव ज्याय इत्याहुः।

(*p.* 27, *l.* 7) तयोस्तर्हि शक्यार्थादन्यत्रेति. This *pratīka* refers to the *Mbh.* which is now defending the *ādeśāntarya* view in its own way. Read: आदेशतोऽप्यन्तरतमनिर्वृत्तौ सत्यां न दोषः। कथम्? वान्तग्रहणं न करिष्यते। 'यि प्रत्यये'। एचोऽयादयो भवन्तीत्येव। यदि न क्रियते, चेयं, जेयमित्यत्रापि प्राप्नोति। 'क्षय्यजय्यौ शक्यार्थे' इत्येतन्नियमार्थं भविष्यति, क्षिज्योरेवैच इति। तयोस्तर्हि शक्यार्थादन्यत्रापि प्राप्नोति, क्षेयं पापम्, जेयो वृषलः। उभयतो नियमो विज्ञास्यते — क्षिज्योरेवैचः, तयोश्च शक्यार्थ एवेति।

The *Mbh.* says that there is no harm here in accepting the *ādeśāntarya* view. We drop वान्तो and simply read P. 6. 1. 79 as यि प्रत्यये. — But will not the *ay* substitute force itself in $\sqrt{ci}+ya$ and $\sqrt{ji}+ya$ (resulting into the wrong forms **cayya* etc.? — No. P. 6. 1. 81: क्षय्यजय्यौ [2]शक्यार्थे will then have a restrictive purpose: 'If stems in *i* (in *e* after Guṇa) are to have an *ay* substitute when a *y*-suffix follows, it will be only in the case of $\sqrt{kṣi}$ and $\sqrt{ji}$'. So *ceya* etc. are legitimate.

At this stage the *Mbh.* raises an objection: तयोस्तर्हि शक्यार्थादन्यत्र ... etc. which is quoted in the *Dīp.* If all stems in *i* (in *e* after Guṇa) are to have a substitute in *ay* then it will be there undesirably for $\sqrt{kṣi}$ and $\sqrt{ji}$ even if the meaning is something other than 'possibility'. (*Jayya* e. g. means 'what is possible to subjugate'. But it will undesiredly also mean 'what aught to be subjugated'.)

1. Bhar. actually mentions *ecaḥ* only. He does not expressly mention *aci*, but his exposition implies it. — Further we have to understand what is called *arthādhikāra* here.

2. Actually, on the *yogavibhāga* (read below!), क्षय्यजय्यौ alone is the rule now.

(*p.* 27, *l.* 7) एवं मन्यते ... etc. The *Dīp.* is bringing out the idea in Pat.'s mind (मन्यते). In the *Mbh.*: तयोस्तर्हि शक्यार्थादन्यत्रापि प्राप्नोति क्षेयं पापं, जेयो वृषलः.

तयोः=क्षिज्योर्धात्वोः. शक्यार्थादन्यत्र=योग्यादिष्वर्थेषु. The subject of प्राप्नोति is अयादेशः. क्षेयं (and जेयं) is an illustration where the meaning is other than *śakyārtha*. जेयं means जेतुं योग्यम्. But here also *ay* will force itself, making the forms *kṣeya* and *jeya* impossible even when शक्यार्थ is not meant. (In the *Dīp.*, शक्यार्थ इत्यस्य परित्यागे corresponds to शक्यार्थादन्यत्रापि of the *Mbh.*)

Observation: Although not said so expressly, here a suggestion is implied, viz. that क्षय्यजय्यौ शक्यार्थे is to be read as two rules:

क्षय्यजय्यौ।

शक्यार्थे। (Here क्षय्यजय्यौ is continued.)

(*p.* 27, *l.* 8) उभयतो नियम इति. This *pratīka* stands for the following *Mbh.*: उभयतो नियमो विज्ञास्यते — क्षिज्योरेवैचः, तयोश्च शक्यार्थ एवेति. The *Dīp.* is explaining the twofold purpose served by the *yogavibhāga* (which latter is necessary for the उभयतो नियम.) The क्षय्यजय्यौ part allows for the formations *ceya*, *neya* etc. while the शक्यार्थे part sees to it that *kṣayya* and *jayya* are formed only in the sense of 'possible to reduce' and 'possible to subjugate' respectively (*kṣeya* and *jeya*, on the other hand, are formed in the sense other than possibility, 'fit to reduce', etc.).

The following extract from the *Śabdakaustubha* is worth reading in this connection: तदेवं सप्तम्यन्तपक्षस्य दुष्टत्वात् प्रथमान्तपक्ष एव युक्त इति स्थितम्। स्यादेतत्। एवं सत्येज्मात्रस्य वान्तादेशः स्यादिति चेत् — अत्राहुः। पूर्वसूत्रे तावद् यथासंख्यं प्रवृत्तम्। अन्तरतमपरिभाषा वा। अर्थाधिकारश्चेहाश्रीयते। यादृशो वान्तादेशः पूर्वं दृष्टः — ओकारस्थानिकोऽव् औकारस्थानिकश्चाव् — तादृशो यि प्रत्यये भवतीति सूत्रार्थः। यद्वा। वान्त इति न करिष्यते। न चैवं चेयं नेयमित्यादावतिप्रसङ्गः। क्षय्यजय्याविति योगो विभज्य कण्ठतालव्यस्य चेद् भवति क्षिज्योरेवेति नियमपरतया व्याख्यानात्। क्षिज्योः शक्यार्थ एवेति द्वितीयसूत्रार्थः। तेनाद्यार्थे तयोरपि नेति बोध्यम्।

(*p.* 27, *l.* 11) इहापि तर्हि नियमान् ... etc. This *pratīka* represents the following *Mbh.*: इहापि तर्हि नियमान्न प्राप्नोति — लव्यं, पव्यम्। अवश्यलाव्यम्, अवश्यपाव्यम्. *Lavya* is formed from *lū* 'pluck' by P. 3. 1. 97: अचो यत्, (*avaśya*)-*lāvya* by P. 3. 1. 125: ओरावश्यके (ण्यत्). If the *niyama* is to be understood in a universal way or in its brodest capacity (*sāmānyaviṣayam*) then of all the roots (having an *ec* form before the suffix *ya*), only *kṣi*- and *ji*- can get the substitute *ay* etc. Roots like *lū* cannot get that substitute (*av* in the case of *lū*). — सर्वत्र निवृत्तिः=क्षिजिभ्यामन्यत्र सर्वत्र अयादिनिवृत्तिः. This is what the *Dīp.* means when it says: यदि सामान्यविषयमनुमानं सर्वत्र निवृत्तिः. सामान्यविषयम् means applying to *ec* (i. e. *e*, *ai*, *o* and *au*) in general.

The *Dīp.* अथ विशेषो राविपादास्यतेति (reconstructed by AL as लाऽयपाऽयस्य नेति) is corrupt. Its meaning depends on how that clause is to be interpreted: Whether this clause beginning with *atha* maintains that there will be no difficulty on the विशेषानुमान view, or whether it wants to suggest that there will be some difficulty even on this view. If the first alternative is preferred, the original text may have been something like *अथ विशेषो न विवादास्पदतेति. But if, going by the usual style of the *Dīp.*, the second alternative is preferred, then the original text may have been something like *अथ विशेषो रायिपर्युदास्यतेति. This will mean that on the विशेषविषयमनुमानम् view, *rai* falls outside the *niyama*, resulting into an *āy* substitute. We are inclined to the second alternative in view of the difficulty about *rai* going to be pointed out presently in the *Mbh.* Still we have kept the options open.

(*p*. 27, *l*. 12) तुल्यजातीयस्य नियमः. After this the *Mbh.* reads : कश्च तुल्यजातीयः? यथाजातीयकः क्षिज्योरेच्। कथंजातीयकः क्षिज्योरेच् ? एकारः। So the restriction applies only to *ec* which is similar to that in *kṣi*- and *ji*- (>*kṣe*- and *je*-) viz. *e*. The *o* of *lū* is spared thus and so the substitute *av* is not difficult to have. So no difficulty about *lavya* and *lāvya*.

(*p*. 27, *l*. 14) एवमपि ... रैयतीति represents the following *Mbh.*: एवमपि ... रायमिच्छति रैयतीत्यत्र प्राप्नोति. Since *e* is specifically mentioned as subject to the *niyama*, *ai* is not covered by it. So, like *lavya* etc. in the above case, (which was desired there) it will get, undesiredly, the substitute *āy* in रै+क्यच्+ति. Cf. एकारस्यैव नियमेन व्यावृत्तिः कृता, न त्वैकारस्य ... (Kaiy.). रायिश्छान्दसः replies the objection. It says that the denominative *raiya*- (*rai*+*kyac*) is a Vedic formation. Since no such form is found in the *bhāṣā*, we need not bother about it. As an authority which does not sanction *kyac* after *rai*, *Vār*. 2 : गोसमानाक्षर ... etc. (on P. 3. 1. 8) is quoted in the *Dīp.* (which actually teaches that *kya* comes after the word *go*, nouns in simple vowels [समान=*ak* of Pāṇini], and the nouns ending in -*an*).

Observations : (1) रायिश्छान्दसो is the reading of Kielhorn, Abhyankar (Mar. ed.), some Nirṇayasagara eds., and the Jhajjar ed. The *Dīp.* also reads रायिः छा°. But there are serious doubts about its grammatical correctness. It is obviously a technical name formed with *i* (इक्श्तिपौ धातुनिर्देशे, *Vār*. 2 on P. 3. 3. 108). But what is the named ? It cannot be the noun *rai* 'riches' because *ik* is thus usually affixed to a *dhātu*, not to a noun derived from it. It cannot be the secondary root *raiya*- (i. e. *rai*+*kyac*) because in that case the form will have to be **raiyi*. The name cannot also refer to $\sqrt{}$*rai* (P. Dh. 1. 958) because it has a different meaning and, further, it is not stated to be a *chāndasa* root. Nāg. therefore reads रा यि छान्दसः (च्छान्दसः acc. to Kielhorn) where *rā* (<*rāḥ*) is Nom. sing. of *rai* and means the *word* '*rai*'. *yi* means, of course, 'when a

suffix beginning with *y* follows'. So the whole sentence means क्यजन्तस्य रैशब्दस्य (Bhar. simply यकारपरस्य) भाषायां प्रयोगो नास्ति. Read Nāg. : राः रैशब्दः, यि यकारादि-प्रत्यये इति भाष्यार्थ इति भावः। भाष्ये विसर्गरहित एव पाठः। When, however, he makes this last statement, we do not know whether he had manuscript support for it or whether he is relying only on his conviction that Pat. could not write an ungrammatical form.

We may also note that रायिश्छान्दसः recurs again in the *Mbh.* under P. 6. 1. 79 : वान्तो ... Kaiy. also here *uses* the alleged incorrect form 'अथ वा क्यच्पर एव रायिश्छान्दस इति व्याख्यायते.

The two readings रायिश्छान्दसः and रा यि च्छान्दसः are so close to one another that in the transmission one could easily pass into the other and we do not know what Pat. himself wrote. Still the possibility of 'Homer nodding' here cannot be altogether ruled out.

(2) There is either a misunderstanding, or a wilful twisting, on the part of all commentators (including Bhar.) about the *Mbh.* expression *tulyajātīya*. Pat. specifically paraphrases it by एकारः. (कथंजातीयकः क्षिज्योरेच्? एकारः।) This agrees well with the following *Mbh.* (एवमपि ... रैयतीत्यत्र प्रप्नोति) which naturally raises the objection that if *e* alone is released from the *niyama*, the substitute *āy* for *ai* (in *rai*) becomes inevitable undesiredly. Bhar., however, understands *e* of the *Mbh.* as indicative of both *e* and *ai* since he says (on तुल्यजातीयस्य नियमः) कण्ठतालव्यताविशेष उपादीयते इति भावः and similarly Kaiy. who says तुल्यजातीयस्येति। कण्ठतालव्यस्येत्यर्थः। Nāg. also says : भाष्ये एकारग्रहणमुपलक्षणमिति भावः।

We frankly do not agree with the commentators. If Pat. had really meant to use एकारः as an *upalakṣaṇa* what could prevent him from saying expressly एकारैकारौ ? There the matter would have ended. But we think that Pat. still wanted to keep the discussion open because he intended to raise up the question of *ai*.

Secondly, if *e* represents *ai* also, what is the justification for the objection एवमपि ... रैयतीत्यत्र प्राप्नोति ? Nāg. ingeniously says : (भाष्ये एकारग्रहण-मुपलक्षणम्।) एतदनभिज्ञः शङ्कते भाष्ये— रायमिच्छति... etc. Similarly already Bhar.: प्रश्लिष्टावर्णविषयमेतदिति प्रतिपद्याह. This is clever, but not convincing. Commentators' solution may be theoretically ideal but it is well known that Pat. arrives at the final solution step by step. We feel that the commentators are imposing their view upon Pat. Similarly Nāg. explains the Prad. एकारस्यैव नियमेन व्यावृत्तिः कृता by एकारस्य तालव्यत्वमेवेति भाष्याशयः. Both these arguments are unconvincing.

(3) The whole *Mbh.* passage from वान्तो यि प्रत्यये up to रायिश्छान्दसो, दृष्टानुविधिश्छन्दसि भवति recurs, with slight changes, under P. 6. 1. 79. There

वान्तादेशे स्थानिनिर्देशः (corresponding to the *Mbh.* स्थानिनिर्देशः कर्तव्यः here) is *Vār.* 1.

[3. 1]

(*p.* 27, *l.* 17) ऊदुपधाया गोहः. This *pratīka* represents the following *Mbh.*: ऊदुपधाया गोहः। आदेशतोऽन्तरतमनिर्वृत्तौ सत्यामुपधाग्रहणं कर्तव्यम्। प्रकृतितः पुनरन्तरतमनिर्वृत्तौ सत्यामूकारस्य गोहो[1] यान्तरतमा प्रकृतिस्तत्र षष्ठी, यत्र षष्ठी तत्रादेशा भवन्तीत्यन्तरेणोपधाग्रहणं सिद्धं भवति। It is argued here that if the *prakṛtyāntarya* view is adopted, the reading of *upadhāyāḥ* in this Sū. can be dispensed with. For, only that part of *goh* which is similarmost to the substitute *ū*, viz. *o*, gets the *ṣaṣṭhī*, and consequently that alone is replaced by *ū*. The specific mention of *upadhāyāḥ* can be thus spared.

(*p.* 27, *l.* 18) अत्र चोद्यते ... etc. An objection against the above argument. It says that with *ऊद् गोहः as the rule and the *prakṛtyāntarya* view, you cannot get at the desired form. For, here the whole *gohaḥ* is mentioned in Genitive. So by P. 1. 1. 52 : अलोऽन्त्यस्य the final phoneme (i. e. *h*) will have to be replaced. No other phoneme (*o.* for instance) has the possibility of becoming the (अन्यस्य संभवो नास्ति). How do youthen argue as above (तत्र कथं त्विदमुच्यते) ?

अयमभिप्रायः ... etc. is the defence against the above objection. The *prakṛtyāntarya-vādin* says that his suggestion is conditional. It is made on the understanding that *gohaḥ* is not looked upon as a *sthānaṣaṣṭhī*, but as an ordinary Genitive, a *viśeṣaṇa-ṣaṣṭhī*, thus capable of qualifying any words connected with it. (Since there is no sign[2] like *svarita*, there is no compulsion to look upon *gohaḥ* as a *sthānaṣaṣṭhī*, that is his view.) If that is accepted (*yadi... pratipadyase*), then the present rule with the *prakṛtyāntarya* interpretation can lay down the proper connecting of Genitive (i. e. with *o* which is similarmost to the substitute *ū*).

The *Dīp.* योऽन्तरतमो न संभवति ... संबध्यते इति merely expands on the *anusaṁhāra*, only in a negative way, according to the *prakṛtyāntarya* view. The *Dīp.* says that even in the absence of the word *upadhāyāḥ* you can get *o* as the original, just as in रुहः पः (P. 7. 3. 43) you can understand *p* as the substitute of *h* even in the absence of *antyasya* in that rule, because of the metarule P. 1. 1. 52 (यथालोन्त्य... संप्रत्ययेन भवितव्यम्).

(*p.* 27, *l.* 24) क्रियते न्यास एव... etc. The *Mbh.* merely says that there is no harm in this respect even on the *ādeśāntarya* view (आदेशतोऽप्यन्तरतमनिर्वृत्तौ सत्यां न दोषः), for ' this is done in the Sū. as it is '. (See below for our observations on it).

1. भाष्ये गोहः संबन्धिन ऊकारस्य यान्तरतमा प्रकृतिरित्यन्वयः। (उद्द्योत).
2. For this sign (*liṅga*) of *sthānaṣaṣṭhī*, see *p.* 21, *ll.* 14ff.

The *Dīp.* explains this by saying that the opponent also is equally obliged to read *upadhāyāḥ*. It is not peculiar (*apūrva*) to the *ādeśāntarya* view. Even with his *prakṛtyāntarya* view he cannot escape it. His view is neither faultless, nor even less faulty. It is improper for him, therefore, to point this out as a defect.

Bhar. here does not expressly mention the reason why *upadhāyaḥ* has to be read by the protagonist of the *prakṛtyāntarya* view also. Kaiy. provides it. Read : अन्यथा परत्वाद् अलोऽन्त्यस्येत्यनेन गोह इति षष्ठ्यन्त्येऽल्युपसंह्रियेतेति भावः. (The construction is : अन्त्ये अलि षष्ठी उपसंह्रियेत.) This was hinted above in the *Dīp.* (*p.* 27, *l.* 18) : समुदाय एवात्र षष्ठीनिर्दिष्टः ... etc. Nāg. concludes : एवं च पक्षद्वयेऽप्यावश्यकं तदिति भावः ।

(*p.* 27, *l.* 26) तकारग्रहणं कर्तव्यम्. The *Mbh.* represented by this *pratīka* runs as follows : 'रदाभ्यां निष्ठातो नः पूर्वस्य च दः'। आदेशतोऽन्तरतमनिर्वृत्तौ सत्यां तकारग्रहणं कर्तव्यम् । प्रकृतितः पुनरन्तरतमनिर्वृत्तौ सत्यां नकारस्य निष्ठायां यान्तरतमा प्रकृतिस्तत्र षष्ठी, यत्र षष्ठी तत्रादेशा भवन्तीत्यन्तरेणापि तकारग्रहणं सिद्धं भवति । A similar argument. In P. 8. 2. 42 : रदाभ्यां निष्ठातो नः, पूर्वस्य च दः, the inculsion of *t* could be similarly avoided according to the protagonist of the *prakṛtyāntarya* view.

Here also in कथमसति तकारग्रहणे ... etc. (*l.* 26) an initial objection is raised against the above argument (although there is no word like *codyate* as in the preceding case). The objection is about the formation of *carita* (ppl. of √*car*). It is pointed out that with the *रदाभ्यां निष्ठायाः, पूर्वस्य ... etc., *n*-substitution results undesirably because the *niṣṭhā* (*-ita*) immediately follows *r*, and *t* being similarmost, must be replaced by *n* according to the *prakṛtyāntarya* view.

Another, an alternative, result is pointed out in the *Dīp.* (*l.* 27) : किं च, 'आदेः परस्य' ... etc. It is now pointed out that the rule आदेः परस्य (P. 1. 1. 54) will find an equal scope here with the result that *i*, which is the initial vowel of the *niṣṭhā* (*-ita*) which follows immediately *r* (mentioned in the ablative in P. 8. 2. 42), will have to be replaced by *n* according to P. 1. 1. 54. Whichever alternative you may choose, a wrong form results.

(*p.* 28, *l.* 1) अस्यायमभिप्रायः ... etc. is a reply to the objection. Actually, the first objection, which stresses that with *prakṛtyāntarya* view, substitution of *n* in the place of *t* in *carita* results undesiredly, is not replied in the *Dīp.* It gives a reply to only the second objection in निष्ठायाः इत्यस्यानेन ... etc. It apparently accepts the role of P. 1. 1. 54 : आदेः परस्य in our context, but says that it does not suffice. The first phoneme of the following element, which has to undergo a replacement according to P. 1. 1. 54, has also to be, as the *prakṛtyāntaryavādin* holds, similarmost to the substitute. And *i* here, though first, is not similarmost to the substitute *n*. — अनेन (*l.* 1) = 'स्थानेन्तरतमः' इति सूत्रेण.

We have dropped the MS निष्ठाया इत्यत्र च (after प्रकृतौ उपसंहारात्) as the dropping makes the passage smooth.

Observations : (1) As said above, the *Dīp.* replies only to the second objection (about *i* becoming the *sthānin.* It does not say anything in reply to the first objection (about the replacement of *t* by *n*).

(2) Kaiy. replies to the first objection only. He justifies the absence of *n*-substitution on the ground that in *carita*, *t* does not immediately follow *r*; there is intervention (*vyavadhāna*) by *i*. Actually, the wording of the rule according to the *prakṛtyāntaryavādin*, viz. *रदाभ्यां निष्ठाया नः पूर्वस्य etc. requires a close contact of *r*/*d* and *niṣṭhā* (here *ita*) only. And it is there. So, being similarmost, *t* has to be replaced by *n*, which cannot be prevented. Kaiy.'s reason *vyavadhānāt* is not convincing because he does not say why *vyavadhāna* between *r* and *t* is to be taken into consideration, and not the one between *r* and *ita* which seems natural. He merely says : चरितमित्यादौ व्यवधानान्न भवति। 'निष्ठायाः' इति षष्ठ्यास्तकार एवोपसंहारात्तस्यैवानन्तर्येण विवक्षितत्वात्। The explanation is furnished by Nāg. for which see below.

It is surprising that Kaiy. fails to bring in आदेः परस्य, which was already noticed in this connection by Bhar.

(3) Nāg. first explains Kaiy. thus : ननु तद्ग्रहणाभावे चरितमित्यादावपि रेफानन्तरा निष्ठेति नत्वं स्यादत आह — चरितमिति। रदाभ्यामित्यस्य प्रधानविशेषणताया न्याय्यतया परिभाषासंस्कृते लक्ष्यसंस्कारके वाक्ये रेफदकाराभ्यां परस्य निष्ठासंबन्धिनोऽन्तरतमस्य नकारादेश इत्यर्थ इति भावः। He, however, differs from Kaiy. and states his own view, which is that here *n* cannot replace *i* because the latter is not similarmost and it cannot replace *t* because the latter, though similarmost is not initial (required by आदेः परस्य). Read : 'आदेः परस्य', 'स्थानेऽन्तरतमः' इत्याभ्याम् 'आदेरन्तरतमस्य नः' इत्यर्थे इकारस्यान्तरतमत्वाभावेन तकारस्य चादित्वाभावेनाप्राप्तिरिति परे।

(*p.* 28, *l.* 2) क्रियत न्यास एव. From here onwards, Bhar. shows that whatever view one takes of the relative strength of the two *anusaṁhāra*-s[1] — one according to the Sū. under discussion (with the *prakṛtyāntarya* view) and the other according to P. 1. 1. 52 : अलोऽन्त्यस्य etc. — there is bound to be a difficulty, somewhere or other, if there is no specific mention of the *sthānin.* So the conclusion is यथान्यासमेव ज्यायः i. e. to retain the words like *upadhāyāḥ*, *taḥ* etc. and not to care too much for economy.

1. It is not easy to see how there is a free option about the *bādhyabādhaka* relationship The rules which govern it are fixed. Bhar. says nothing about it. Kaiy. merely says that P. 1. 1. 52 : अलोऽन्त्यस्य will supersede the present rule. But he, too, does not elaborate on it, by showing how both these find scope in examples where the other does not interfere and how the two come to clash in the case of ऊदुपधाया गोहः.

The following two cases are examined on the alternative that the present *anusaṁhāra* supersedes अलोऽन्त्यस्य :

(1) P. 7. 3. 43 : रुहः पः. In the original, i. e. *ruh*, the radical vowel *u* is similarmost to the substitute *p*, because both are labial. So, if this rule (with the *prakṛtyāntarya* view) supersedes अलोऽन्त्यस्य, *u* instead of *h* will have the *sthāna-ṣaṣṭhī* and so it will have to be replaced by *p*.

(2) P. 5. 2. 43 : द्वित्रिभ्यामयज् वा (42 : संख्याया अवयवे तयप्). This Sū. teaches that instead of *-taya(p)*, there comes optionally *-aya(c)* after *dvi-* and *tri-* in the sense 'having two/three constituents'. So we have *dvaya* and *traya*. Here the whole of *taya* (taught by P. 5. 2. 42) is replaced by *aya* (P. 1. 1. 55 : अनेकाल्शित् सर्वस्य). But if *prakṛtyāntarya* view supersedes that *anusaṁhāra*, then the part *y* of the original *taya* alone will have to be replaced on the ground of similarmostness (*l*. 5 : त्रयमिति — अत्र यकारस्य स्यात्).

The following case is examined on the alternative that the *anusaṁhāra* as taught by अलोऽन्त्यस्य supersedes the present one : P. 6. 4. 89 : ऊदुपधाया गोहः. In the absence of the word *upadhāyāḥ*, it is *h* that will be replaced by *ū*. (This is already discussed above [*p*. 27, *ll*. 17-23], where, however, the *Dīp.* says that the difficulty can be tided over by taking *gohaḥ* as *viśeṣaṇaṣaṣṭhī*.)

(*p*. 28, *l*. 7) असति तकारे ... etc. The *Dīp*. here is confusing. One at first thinks that what follows is also one more example of स्थानेऽन्तरतमे being superseded by अलोऽन्त्यस्य etc. (इदं ... बाध्यते as the *Dīp*. has said above). But it is not. On the contrary it appears that Bhar. is pointing out a defect in the *prakṛtyāntarya* view if *-taḥ* is not read in P. 8. 2. 42 : रदाभ्यां निष्ठातो (now *निष्ठायाः) नः पूर्वस्य ... etc. In the form *bhinnavadbhyām* (Instr. etc. dual of *bhinnavat* which has the designation *niṣṭhā* by P. 1. 1. 26), *d* will have to be replaced by *n*. This is so because the rule (now *रदाभ्यां निष्ठाया नः पूर्वस्य...etc.) will mean : रदाभ्यां पराया निष्ठायाः संबन्धिनी या नकारादेशस्य अन्तरतमा प्रकृतिः, तस्याः (दकारस्येति यावत्) षष्ठी ... etc.'

जश्त्वस्य सिद्धत्वात् (*l*. 7). The dental *t* (in *bhinnvat*) becomes *d*—undergoes *jaś*-substitution — by P. 8. 2. 39 : झलां जशोऽन्ते, a rule in the *asiddhakāṇḍa*. The rule which requires the replacement of *d* by *n* is P. 8. 2. 42 : रदाभ्यां ... also a rule in the *asiddhakāṇḍa*. Still P. 8. 2. 39 being earlier is *siddha* from the point of view of P. 8. 2. 42 (as P. 8. 2. 1 : पूर्वत्रासिद्धं says) and can operate on *d* produced by it.

Observations : (1) The sentence असति तकारे ... नकारस्य is grammatically incomplete. A predicate इति दकारस्य नत्वं प्रसज्येत (or some such thing)

is to be supplied after नकारस्य. (2) The drawback of the *prakṛtyāntarya* view has not been stated fully, as far as the present illustration is concerned, by Bhar. (nor by Kaiy.). Resulting of *n*-substitution for *d* is just one side of it. The other side is that the desired *n*-substitution will not be available for *t* (in *bhid-tavad+bhyām*), since *d* alone is similarmost to *n* (cf. the *Mbh.* cited by Bhar.).

The reading of *-ta* in P. 8. 2. 42 is necessary for the *ādeśāntaryavādin* to prevent *n*-substitution of *i* in *carita*. (*If* here the *n*-substitution becomes due for *t* also, it can be prevented on the ground of *vyavadhāna.*) It is necessary for the *prakṛtyāntaryavādin* to present *n*-substitution of *d* in *bhinnavad-bhyām* (if, however, *n*-substitution does not become due, it is not necessary), and to secure that substitution for *t* (the initial of *tavat*) which is otherwise not available on account of absence of similarmostness.

(*p.* 28, *l.* 9) अथ मन्यसे ... etc. The opponent will perhaps say: The rule lays down *n*-substitution for that *d* which *precedes* the ppl. suffix *ta* (पूर्वस्य =निष्ठातकारपूर्वस्य), not that which follows (as in भिन्नवद्भ्याम्). To this the reply given is that the *prakṛtyāntarya* view of P. 1. 1. 50 may be for this purpose: to make *n*-substitution available as it is not otherwise available (of course on the understanding that it is desired).

Kaiy. follows Bhar. Read: अन्यथा हि भिन्नवद्भ्याम् इत्यत्र दकारस्य नत्वं स्यात्। स हि नकारस्य सुसदृशः 'यथा तृतीयास्तथा पञ्चमाः' इत्युक्तत्वात्। On this Nāg. comments: पक्षान्तरेऽपि तुल्यत्वान्न गौरवमित्याह — अन्यथेति. But here he is only explaining Kaiy. His own thought is different (as in *caritam* above). He says: वस्तुतस्त्वादेः परस्येत्यनेनान्त्यस्याप्राप्तिः।

Observations: Apart from those already made on this part of the *Dīp.* above, the following observations on the *Mbh.* sentence क्रियत [एतत्] न्यास एव (which occurs twice) are to be made;

The commentators usually take this statement to mean ultimately that the defect pointed out by the opponent is equally there in his viewpoint also. According to their interpretation, the *Mbh.* is here pointing out that in the present case the reading of the words *upadhāyāḥ* and *taḥ* is as much necessary for *prakṛtyāntarya* view also. What is a must for both parties cannot be pointed out as a blemish in one or the other view, involving *gaurava* 'unnecessary prolixity'. (Cf. Nāg.: एवं च पक्षद्वयेऽप्यावश्यकं तद् and पक्षान्तरेऽपि तुल्यत्वान्न गौरवम् concerning the two cases discussed in the *Mbh.*) Already even Bhar. also seems to express a similar idea: यदि च प्रकृतिपक्षो निर्दोषोऽल्पदोषो वा स्यात् युज्यते वक्तुमिति. Kaiy. does not use words like *āvaśyaka* or *gaurava* but the idea is ultimately the same.

Such an interpretation, though traditionally current, is open to doubt for two reasons :

(1) It does not seem, after all, that the reading of *upadhāyāḥ* and *taḥ* are absolutely necessary for the *prakṛtyāntarya-vādin* in order to avoid wrong forms. Bhar. himself has shown in the *Dīp.* (*p.* 27, *l.* 19; यदि लिङ्गाभावात्… etc.) how even a *prakṛtyāntaryavādin* can interpret P. 6. 4. 89 in such a way as to arrive at the proper form, without giving rise to any wrong form. Similarly in the case of P. 8. 2. 24 Nāg. has shown that because of the Pari. आदेः परस्य no wrong *n*-substitution results in *carita* and *bhinnavadbhyām*.

Even when Bhar. says (*p.* 27, *l.* 24) यदि च प्रकृतिपक्षो निर्दोषोऽल्पदोषो वा स्यात् … etc., he may not necessarily be referring to the present two cases. He may be referring to the earlier cases like ' इको यणचि ', ' इको गुणवृद्धी ' etc.

(2) Secondly, the straightforward interpretation of the *Mbh.* : क्रियते एतन् न्यास एव can only be : ' This *is* done in the sūtra as it is '. This admits of two possibilities : (i) The opponent (objector) does not have the words *upadhāyāḥ* and *-taḥ* in his version of the the *Aṣṭ.*, but they are there in the respondent's *Aṣṭ*. So the latter says : You are not suggesting anything new. The words *upadhāyāḥ* and *-taḥ* are already read by Pāṇini in his rules. (ii) The words concerned are there in the versions of *Aṣṭ.* of both the parties. So the advocate of the *prakṛtyāntarya* view says that while he can drop these words and effect economy on account of his *prakṛtyāntarya* view, the other party (advocate of the *ādeśāntarya* view) must needs read them. To this the other one says : well, I am not doing anything new; Pāṇini has done it already.

Bhar.'s use of the word *apūrva* ' unprecedented, new ' (यद्यपूर्वं क्रियते ततो दोषः …) seems to support this latter interpretation, unless one takes *apūrva* in the sense of ' not common with the other view, unique '.

Readings : (1) (*p.* 26, *l.* 4) AL कश्च (for यश्च). — (2) (*p.* 26, *l.* 4) MS संहितयाठे च विशेवता; AL संहितापाठे च विशेषतः. — (3) (*p.* 26, *l.* 7) MS कुर्यार्थास्या° (for कुतः? अर्थेस्या° as in AL). — (4) (*p.* 26, *l.* 8) AL एकपदे न असंहिता. — (5) (*p.* 26, *ll.* 9–10) MS वर्तते तेनत्रा°; AL वर्तत इति। तत्रा°. — (6) (*p.* 26, *l.* 10) MS अनंतरतमा. — (7) (*p.* 26, *l.* 10) MSAL यैव (for सैव). — (8) (*p.* 26, *l.* 10) MSAL नान्या. — (9) (*p.* 26, *l.* 12) MS अयं न वत्ययं भवतीति; AL अयं भवत्ययं भ°. — (10) (*p.* 26, *l.* 14) AL ह्रस्वे चैव षष्ठो, अलब्धा. — (11) (*p.* 26, *l.* 14) MSAL do not read न. — (12) (*p.* 26, *ll.* 15-16) AL तदाद्येन. — (13) (*p.* 26, *l.* 17) AL यच्चैतद्. — (14) (*p.* 26, *ll.* 18–19) MS यणस्थाने; AL यण् स्था°. — (15) (*p.* 26, *l.* 19) AL वाऽन्तर. — (16) (*p.* 26, *l.* 20) *Mbh.* ed. तथा (for एवम्). — (17) (*p.* 26, *l.* 22) MS वा(or चा)- यको. — (18) (*p.* 26, *l.* 23) AL वाऽन्तरतमा. — (19) (*p.* 26, *l.* 25) MS वीदितं;

AL वि॰ (for चो॰). — (20) (*p.* 26, *l.* 26) MSAL वृद्धिमात्रे (AL ॰र्मात्रिके) (for our emendation द्विमात्रे). — (21) (*p.* 27, *l.* 2) AL संश्लिष्यते. — (22) (*p.* 27, *l.* 3) MS स्य निर्देशेन; AL स्यात् निर्दे॰. — (23) (*p.* 27, *ll.* 4-5) MS वांतोचीत्यत्र. — (24) (*p.* 27, *l.* 5) MS स्यत्र; AL ऽस्तत्र (for ऽत्यत्र). — (25) (*p.* 27, *l.* 5) MS संभवति. — (26) (*p.* 27, *l.* 6) MS वामौ; AL वान्तौ (for वासौ). — (27) (*p.* 27, *l.* 6) AL दृष्टौ वि. — (28) (*p.* 27, *l.* 8) MS AL चेयादयः (MS ॰य) शवयन्ते निवर्त. — (29) (*p.* 27, *l.* 9) MSAL चेयादयो निवर्तिताः. — (30) (*p.* 27, *l.* 12) MS राविपादास्यतेति; AL लाव्यपाव्यस्य नेति. — (31) (*p.* 27, *l.* 13) MSAL ॰पद्यामहे (for our emendation ॰पद्याह). — (32) (*p.* 27, *l.* 19) AL त्विदम्. — (33) (*p.* 27, *l.* 20) MSAL अनुसंहरति (for our emendation ॰रेति). — (34) (*p.* 27, *l.* 21) MS स्वथ्यां; AL श्रुत्यां (for षष्ठ्यां). — (35) (*p.* 27, *l.* 24) *Mbh.* ed.: क्रियत एतन् न्या॰. — (36) (*p.* 27, *l.* 26) MSAL अपि स- (for असति). — (37) (*p.* 28, *l.* 2) After उपसंहारान्, MS reads: निष्ठायाः इत्यत्र च. — (38) (*p.* 28, *l.* 2) *Mbh.* ed. क्रियत एतन् न्या॰. — (39) (*p.* 28, *l.* 5) MS ऽऽश्पावाद्; AL उरूपत्वाद् (for ओष्ठ्यत्वाद्). — (40) (*p.* 28, *l.* 7) MS दकारच; AL ॰रस्य च (for ॰रश्च). — (41) (*p.* 28, *l.* 10) AL -प्राप्त्यर्थम् (for -प्रापणार्थम्). — (42) (*p.* 28, *l.* 10) MS यथान्यायम्.

[4]

किं पुनरिदं निर्वर्तकम् ... etc. This *pratīka* stands for the following *Mbh.* which leads to the next *Vārttika* and comments on it:

किं पुनरिदं निर्वर्तकम् — अन्तरतमा अनेन निर्वर्त्यन्ते, आहोस्वित् प्रतिपादकम् — अन्येन निर्वृत्तानामनेन प्रतिपत्तिः? कश्चात्र विशेषः? 'स्थानेऽन्तरतमे निर्वर्तके स्थानिनिवृत्तिः' (वा. 2)। स्थानेऽन्तरतमे निर्वर्तके सर्वस्थानिनां निवृत्तिः प्राप्नोति। अस्यापि प्राप्नोति — दधि, मधु।

This *Vār.* raises an unusual question: Is the present rule an injunctive (*nirvartaka*) rule, i. e. an independent rule which lays down substitution (for each and every lingulstic element, say words like *dadhi* etc.) or does it merely grant correctness (*pratipatti*) on the basis of similarity, to substitutes which are effected by other rules like *iko yaṇ aci*? Even though no substitute is mentioned specifically in this rule, that is no bar to its *nirvartaka* character, for, on the ground of similarmostness, a word can be its own substitute.

(*p.* 28, *l.* 12) एतद् भाष्यकारो ... etc. Bhar. draws altention to the slightly differing view of the Vārttikakāra. According to him the rule is neither *nirvartaka* nor *pratipādaka*, it is so to say *niyāmaka* (restrictive).

The *Dīp.* यथा तु षष्ठी ... etc. says that all the necessary features being there, P. 1. 1. 50 can be looked upon as a *nirvartaka* rule, teaching the original element itself as its substitute, since सर्वथान्तरतमश्च विद्यते शब्दः.

(*p.* 28, *l.* 16) स तु किं समुदायस्यैव भवति ... etc. A further point about this substitution is raised here. It is just mentioned here as a point worthy of discussion. And it will figure prominently in the discussion which follows. The point is about the usual part-whole relationship : Is the whole substituted for the whole or are the parts substituted for the parts ? (Incidentally, we have emended the MS reading स तु किं समुदायस्य न भवति नावयवानां समुदायस्य वा युग° to स तु किं समुदायस्यैव भवति, उतावयवानाम्? समुदायस्य अवयवस्य च युग° which, we think, will bring out the intended idea clearly.)

The *Dīp.* येऽप्येत आदेशाः (*l.* 18) ... etc. raises another question, which is about the specific substitutes taught in the *Aṣṭ* (like *as*>*bhū*). Do they supersede the self-substitution taught by the present rule (i. e. on the *nirvartaka* view), or do both of them become optional ? (The *Dīp.* seems to be inclined to the latter view though, curiously, we do not get any definite reply in the *Dīp.* which follows, in spite of एतच्च परीक्ष्यम्.)

[4. 1]

स्थानेऽन्तरतमनिर्वर्तके स्थानिनिवृत्तिः. The *Mbh.* (quoted above) points out that on this *nirvartaka* view — rather an extreme and a fantastic view from the commonsense point of view — no word will remain in its place. Every word will have to be replaced (by some word). As a random illustration, the words *dadhi* and *madhu* are quoted.

Although it is usual to first explain and justify the text which is commented upon and only afterwards to criticise it, here however the *Dīp.* straightway engages into a vigorous defence againt the attack on the *nirvartaka* view. The defence centres around the following three points :

(1) What does the opponent mean by सर्वशब्दानां निवृत्तिः ? Does he mean that there will be an absolute void? If so, that is wrong. For that will lead to an end of all linguistic activity (*p.* 28, *ll.* 24–25). Certainly the advocate of the *nirvartaka* view cannot have such an idea in his mind. (2) If a substitute has a different (phonetic) form, it cannot convey the intended meaning. So such a substitute also cannot be meant by the advocate of the *nirvartaka* view (*p.* 28, *ll.* 25–26). (3) So the only alternative which remains is that the same word is substituted. The clinching evidence in its favour is that it is both phonetically similar and also semantically synonymous. When such a substitute comes in by virtue of this rule, the original is as good as present there. This part of the *Dīp.* is an elucidation of the following *Mbh.* which is not cited in the *Dīp.* : अस्तु। न कश्चिदन्य आदेशः (i. e. *śūnya* or *bhinnarūpa*, *Dīp.*) प्रतिनिर्दिश्यते। तत्रान्तर्यतो दधिशब्दस्य दधिशब्द एव, मधुशब्दस्य मधुशब्द एवादेशो भविष्यति।

What is this hue and cry — *vācoyuktiḥ* is the word in *Dīp.* — about no *sthānin* remaining there? When you have an identical word — identical in form, meaning and accent (तुल्यरूपे सस्वरे च), pray, what sort of a *nivṛttiḥ* is this (*p.* 28, *ll.* 23–24)?

It must be said that the *Dīp.* has not presented the relevant points in a proper order (which we have tried to do above). Further the passage also requires some emendations. (We read दधिशब्दे for दध्य, and तुल्यरूपे सस्वरे च for तुल्यरूपेभ्यः स्वरे च of the MS. – अयमभिप्रायः (*l.* 22) etc. seeks to make explicit what is implicit in दधिशब्दो निर्वर्तते. — अस्यां कल्पनायामानर्थक्यं makes sense only if taken as referring to स्थानेऽन्तरतमे निर्वर्तके स्थानिनिवृत्तिः.

(*p.* 29, *l.* 1) याद चैवम्, क्वचिद् द्वै(*Mbh.* ed. वै°)रूप्यम्. This stands for the following *Mbh.* : यदि चैवम्, क्वचिद् वैरूप्यम्। तत्र दोषः स्यात् — बिसं मुसलमिति। इण्कोरादेशप्रत्यययोरिति षत्वं प्राप्नोति।

The opponent of the *nirvartaka* view resumes his attack. He admits that the defence given above will suffice in many cases.[1] But a small number of cases still remain where wrong forms will result. After substitution (of, say, *bisa* by the identical form) the phoneme *s* now is threatened with cerebralization by P. 8. 3. 59 : आदेशप्रत्यययोः, since *s* has now the status of a substitute (*ādeśa*), as required for cerebralization by that rule. And when a dissimilar form (viz. the substitute *biṣa* as compared with the original *bisa*) thus results, it will fail to convey the desired meaning. Thus this dissimilarity of form (*vairūpyam*) — further resulting into the lack of understanding of meaning — is the defect in this view.

When pointing out the possibility of *vairūpyam*, 'dissimilarity of form' (Bhar. himself reads '*dvairūpyam*', but, about this, later), the *Mbh.* has used an expression *kvacit.* It literally means sporadically, in a few cases, etc. But Bhar. (and, following him, Kaiy.) takes it in a rather technical sense. According to him, क्वचित्=क्वचित् पक्षे, i. e. depending on a particular alternative, that is an alternative about the phenomenon of substitution.[2] To explain : As mentioned above, there are two views about substitution viz. (1) whether it affects the whole (*samudāyādeśa*), or (2) whether it affects a part only (*avayavādeśa*). If you take the first view, the whole, e. g., *bisa* (the substituted form) alone gets the name *ādeśa*. The constituent phonemes do not get it individually. If, on the other hand, you take the latter view, all individual phonemes get the name *ādeśa* individually, and, as such, *s* also is now called

1. यदि चैवम् = यद्यपि तत्रैवं निर्वाहस्तथापि (छाया).
2. एवमर्थं च 'क्वचिद्' इत्याह। कस्मिंश्चित् पक्षे वैरूप्यं द्वैरूप्यं वा। (दीपिका).

ādeśa. The difference which these two alternative views make is now clear in our context. In the *samudāyādeśa* view there is no danger of *s* being replaced by *ṣ* by P. 8. 3. 59 since it does not have the designation *ādeśa*. But in the *avayavādeśa* view *s* does have such a designation and so has to be cerebralized. (यदा त्विदं दर्शनम्, अवयवा अपि ... वैरूप्यं समर्थ्यंते *Dīp. p.* 29, *ll*. 3–5).

We have mentioned above that Bhar. himself reads the *Mbh.* as *dvairūpyam* (for *vairūpyam*). This means that *after* substitution two forms result. One we have seen already, viz. *biṣa* But, the *Dīp.* says, if we accept the *samudāyādeśa* view the phoneme *s* will remain unaltered and ***bisa*** also will be correct. Thus on these two different views we get two forms optionally (पक्षे वैरूप्यं द्वैरूप्यं वा) and the reading *dvairūpyam* also can be thus justified (यदा तु समुदायः ... ग्रन्थः समर्थितो भवति, द्वैरूप्यमिति. *Dīp. p.* 29, *ll*. 5–7).

The wording of the *Dīp.* is here somewhat clumsy. Further some words seem to have been either omitted by the author for economy or dropped by the copyist through negligence. The sentence **यदा तु समुदायः** ... gives the intended sense only if it is read in the following form : यदा तु [षत्वं] मा भूत् इति समुदायः कार्यभाक् [इति पक्षः आश्रीयते], तदा आदेश .... Only when rewritten like this it becomes clear that the *Dīp.* here wants to say that resorting to the *samudāyādeśa* view is the means of avoiding cerebralization.

In the *Dīp* आदेशग्रहणमपि समर्थ्यते (*p.* 29, *l.* 6) Bhar. informs us that incidentally another purpose also is served by resorting to the *samudāyādeśa* view : It provides *raison d'etre* for the word *ādeśa* in P. 8. 3. 59. This is the idea : This rule आदेशप्रत्यययोः teaches, *inter alia*, cerebralization (**अपदान्तस्य मूर्धन्यः** 55) of such *s* (सः 56) as is a substitute (*ādeśa*) and as follows a vowel other than *ă*, or a velar or a semivowel or *h* (इण्कोः 57). We thus arrive at the form, say, *niṣiñcati* (*ni* + *ṣic*>*sic*>*siñc* + (*ś*)*a* + *ti*) because, firstly, it is a substitute of *ṣ* (P. 6 1. 64 : धात्वादेः ...) and, secondly, it follows *i*. Because of the specific mention of *ādeśa*, no *s* which is not a substitute is to be cerebralized. That is why there is no cerebralization in e. g. **अपि सिकतासु**. So the reading of *ādeśa* in P. 8. 3. 59 has a utility, a significance.

Now Bhar. says that this reading of *ādeśa* in P. 8. 3. 59 will become meaningless if one resorted exclusively to *avayavādeśa* view. For in that case each and every *s* will be a substitute (because of the *nirvartaka* view). There will be no *s* which will not be a substitute. Then what kind of *s* will be debarred from becoming *ṣ* ? What purpose will be served by reading the word *ādeśa* in that rule ? It will be meaningless. Pāṇini could simply read his rule as *प्रत्ययस्य. Here the *samudāyādeśa* view comes handy. For, on this view, the part *s* (of *bis* etc.) is *not* an *ādeśa* at all; it is the whole *bis* that gets the name *ādeśa*. So some *s*-s do survive, even after the operation of P. 1. 1. 50

(on the *nirvartake* view). Since such *s* will not be cerebralized by P. 8. 3. 59, the reading of *ādeśa* in that rule becomes purposive. (So आदेशग्रहणमपि [i. e. in P. 8. 3. 59] समर्थ्यते.)

अयमपि ग्रन्थः समर्थितो भवति, द्वैरूप्यमिति concludes this argument. To sum up, this is what the whole passage says :

(1) If cerebralization is to be prevented in *bisa* etc., the *samudāyādeśa* view is to be adopted.

(2) This will also give meaningfulness to the reading of *ādeśa* in P. 8. 3. 59.

(3) The adoption of *avayavādeśa* alone will result in the cerebralization **biṣa*.

(4) If both the views are adopted optionally, then one gets two forms *bisa* and *biṣa*. So the reading *dvairūpyam* can be justified.

In *l.* 2, पर्यनुयोक्तव्याः = वक्तव्याः. यद्येवम् = यद्यप्येवं तथापि. The parallel of 'एकाचो द्वे ...' is वैधर्म्येण.

Observations : (1) This passage also seems to be considerably corrupt. We have already shown above how the sentence यदा तु समुदायः ... etc. is to be rewritten if it is to make any sense. Further, we suggest an emendation of तदा वा into तदैव (*p.* 29, *l.* 5) to improve the sense.

(2) The whole idea is really simple if we see how Kaiy. has put it : यदि बिसशब्दस्य बिसशब्द आदेशस्तदा षत्वं नास्ति, न हि तदा सकार आदेशः। यदा तु सकारस्य सकार आदेशस्तदा षत्वप्रसङ्ग इति वैरूप्यप्राप्तिः। One does feel that Bhar. has made the whole thing unnecessarily complicated. Further, neither Kaiy. nor Nāg. knows of any v. l. द्वैरूप्यम्. Nor does Kielhorn report it.

(3) One thing, however, must be said to Bhar.'s credit. His idea about the *samudāyādeśa* view giving meaningfulness to the reading of *ādeśa* in P. 8. 3. 59 in the context of the *nirvartaka* view of P. 1. 1. 50 is really brilliant. It is unfortunate that later commentators like Kaiy. should have ignored it.

(*p.* 29, *l.* 8) एवमस्तेर्भूः ... etc. Bhar. now takes up the case of substitutes like *aster bhūḥ* (P. 2. 4. 52). Although he had promised to discuss whether such substitutes supersede the identical substitutes or are optional along with the latter, here he simply appears to look upon them as optional. The *Dīp.* says that there is *dvairūpya* on the *avayavādeśa* view. The two forms are : (1) the cerebralized form (with *ṣ* for *s* of *as*), and (2) *bhū*. — क्वचित् पक्षे=समुदायादेश-

पक्षे ('Optionally with अवयवादेशपक्षे' — that is to be understood). The *trairūpyam* is (1) *as* with *s*, (2) with *ṣ*, and (3) *bhū*.

(*p*. 29, *l*. 10) अपि चेष्टा व्यवस्था ... etc. Having pointed out the defect of *kvacid vairūpyam*, the opponent now points out a defect in the case of even similar substitutes (सदृशादेशविषयेऽपि दोषमाह — Nāg.). An endless cycle of identical originals and identical substitutes will result on the *nirvartaka* view because there will be no purpose after the accomplishment of which the cycle will come to a stop. The *Mbh*. runs : अपि चेष्टा व्यवस्था न प्रकल्पेत । तद्यथा — तप्ते भ्राष्ट्रे तिलाः प्रक्षिप्ता मुहूर्तमपि नावतिष्ठन्ते, एवमिमे वर्णा मुहूर्तमपि नावतिष्ठेरन् ।

In इत्यादयमभिप्रायः etc. the *Dīp*. anticipates a position likely to be taken by the advocate of the *nirvartaka* view. He will perhaps say that where there is a tussle between a whole and its parts, he will prefer the whole for undergoing the operation (here substitution) on the basis of समुदाये कार्यसमाप्तिः — after all it is the meaningful wholes which matter. Since he will subscribe to the *samudāyādeśa* view only, there is no room for *vairūpya*, he may say. But he is now told that that alone is not the point. The whole system — which decides on the correct and incorrect words — is at stake. For even if we accepted that only similar forms resulted, they will not be stable for a single moment, the same form appearing now as the substitute and now again as the original to be again replaced, *ad infinitum* (पुनः पुनरन्येनान्तरतमेन निवर्तकेन प्रवर्तितव्यम्). निवर्तक=a substitute.

(*p*. 29, *l*. 12) ननु च सकृत् प्रवृत्तौ ... etc. The adherent of the *nirvartake* view puts in an objection. Why does the opponent presuppose that there will be an endless cycle ? He suggests that the process will stop after the very first substitution — obviously because the rule has had scope. It is satisfied (ननु च सकृत् प्रवृत्तावेवास्य निवृत्तिः स्यात्).

In the *Dīp*. एतदेव वयं पृच्छामः ... (*p*. 29, *l*. 13), the opponent controverts this argument. He says that ordinarily a rule stops once it has been applied, because its object is achieved. But in the present case nothing new is to be produced. Why will it then stop after one application (सकृत् प्रवृत्तिः किमर्था) ? In the absence of a definite purpose, it may just go on mechanically. And when it thus goes on operating, who is going to check it and prevent it from applying further (पुनः प्रवृत्तः केन निवर्त्यते) ?

Further, adds the *Dīp*., every word that comes in this way heads towards disappearance the next moment (...सर्वो निवृत्त्यभिमुखः). This consciousness of the utter unsteadiness of every word will make the use of any word impossible (... प्रयोग एवोपरुध्येत).

(*p.* 29, *l.* 15) यथैवादेशा ... लावस्थस्य. Here the *Dīp.* gives an illustration, from Grammar, of an element which (though taught in Grammar) does not find an actual place because one knows that it is going to be replaced by a substitute. It is the suffix *l* (*laṭ*, *liṭ* etc.), the prototype of finite verbal endings (P. 3. 4. 69 : लः कर्मणि च ...), which, having enjoyed a momentary theoretical existence, is immediately replaced by the concrete *tip* ending (P. 3. 4. 77–78 : लस्य । तिप्तस्झि ...). Every substitute generated again and again by this rule is as *ādeśābhimukha* and *asādhu* 'unfit for actual use' as the finite ending which is still in the form of *l*.

This passage also is corrupt at places. We have dropped मा of मासकृत्. Perhaps the scribe was wavering between पृच्छामः and पृच्छाम (with असकृत् as the following word). We have added प्रवृत्तः after पुनः; this is necessary because the one which is already there refers to the first operation (and is equivalent to *pravartate*), while the one which we have added refers to subsequent operation(s) (and is adjectival). Other additions are स (after उपजायते) and स्थ after लाव. Also, एवमस्य is expected naturally. As to emendations, we emend the corrupt [अ]चःस्थानिवत्यर (*l.* 13) to [अ]स्य निवृत्तिः. वृद्धावयं is obviously a scribal error for बुद्धावयं (cf. बुद्धिं जनयन्ति below). The last emendation is अनवस्थाने (*l.* 17) for अनेवस्थाव of the MS. (cf. below : तप्ते भ्राष्ट्रे तिलाः ... अनवस्थिताः).

(*p.* 29, *l.* 17) तथा दधि अत्रेति ... etc. An example of an operation becoming impossible because of the unsteadiness or momentariness of verbal elements. Here both (1) *i* which is to undergo the operation of replacement (*nimittin*) and (2) *a* which is the cause of that operation (*nimitta*) are *ādesābhimukha*, heading towards replacement themselves. Therefore the understanding that here *ik* is to be replaced by *yaṇ* does not result. (एतस्य = इकारस्य । अस्मिन् = अकारे परतः सति । अनेन कार्येण = यणादेशेन.)

The *Mbh.* compares the non-stop cycle of original and substitute to sesame grains thrown on a hot frying pan (उत्पातनिपातयोरविच्छेदात्). The result is that the phonemes will not create the impression of correctness — or rather of the fitness for use. So the moral (*bhāvaḥ*) : पक्षोऽयं न संभवति.

Readings : (1) (*p.* 28, *l.* 13) AL उपक्रमते. — (2) (*p.* 28, *l.* 13) MS[1] निवर्तक-. — (3) (*p.* 28, *l.* 14) MS यथानुषष्ठीमनयेतस्प°; AL यथा तु षष्ठीनयेन स्वः. —(4) (*p.* 28, *l.* 15) MS निवर्तयंति. — (5) (*p.* 28, *ll.* 16–17) MSAL स तु किं समुदायस्य न भवति नावयवानां समुदायस्य वा (for our suggested emendation °यस्यैव

1. Almost everywhere the MS writes निवर्तक- where निर्वर्तक- is required. The MS reads निवर्तकं in the *Mbh.* here also.

भवति, उतावयवानाम्? समुदायस्य अवयवस्य च).—(6) (*p.* 28, *l.* 18) MS आदेशास्ते (for °शा अस्तेर्).—(7) (*p.* 28, *l.* 19) MS च सब्द; AL च शब्द:.—(8) (*p.* 28, *l.* 20) MS विकल्पते.—(9) (*p.* 28, *l.* 20) MSAL परीक्ष्य.—(10) (*p.* 28, *l.* 21) Nirṇ. ed. ऽन्तरतमे.—(11) (*p.* 28, *l.* 21) MS निवर्तक and (12) Nirṇ. eds. सर्वे-स्थानिनिवृत्ति:.—(13) (*p.* 28, *l.* 22) MS स्थानिनो.—(14) (*p.* 28, *l.* 22) MS शब्दा निवर्तते; AL °शब्दो निवर्तते (for शब्दो निर्वर्तेत).—(15) (*p.* 28, *l.* 23) MS वध्य; AL दध्य् (for our suggested emendation दधि-शब्द).—(16) (*p.* 28, *ll.* 23–24) MSAL °रूपेभ्य: स्वरे (for our suggested emendation °रूपे सस्वरे.—(17) (*p.* 29, *l.* 1) AL transpose द्वैरूप्यम् and वैरूप्यम्.—(18) (*p.* 29, *l.* 2) MS विशम् and शकारत्वात्.—(19) (*p.* 29, *l.* 5) MSAL तदा वा (for our suggested emendation तदैव).—(20) (*p.* 29, *l.* 5) MSAL समर्थयते.—(21) (*p.* 29, *l.* 6) MS सदा (for तदा).—(22) (*p.* 29, *l.* 9) MS स्त्रियैरूप्यम्; AL वैरूप्यम् (for ऽस्ति त्रै°).—(23) (*p.* 29, *l.* 10) MS प्रकल्पते.—(24) (*p.* 29, *l.* 10) AL अस्य (for स्याद्).—(25) (*p.* 29, *l.* 12) AL निर्वर्तकेन.—(26) (*p.* 29, *l.* 13) MSAL [अ]च: स्थानिवत्य(AL °त्प)र[:] (for अस्य निवृत्ति:).—(27) (*p* 29, *l.* 13) MSAL पृच्छाम: मासकृत्.—(28) (*p.* 29, *l.* 15) MS -मुख्य (for -मुख).—(29) (*p.* 29, *ll.* 15–16) MS आदेशोभिमुख्यस्य.—(30) (*p.* 29, *l.* 16) MS लावास्य; AL वाऽस्य (for our emendation लात्रस्थस्य.—(31) (*p.* 29, *l.* 17) MSAL वृद्धावयं.—(32) (*p.* 29, *l.* 18) MS यादेशाभिमुख्याव्.—(33) (*p.* 29, *l.* 18) MS -तिष्ठति.—(34) (*p.* 29, *l.* 19) MS °नेत्येस्या°; AL °न इत्यस्या° (for °नेत्येतस्या°).—(35) (*p.* 29, *l.* 20) MS अवछे° (for अविच्छे°).

[4.2]

अस्तु तर्हि प्रतिपादकम्. Kāt. now takes up the other view for discussion. On this view all possible substitutes are produced by other injunctive rules while this rule grants correctness to that one among them which is similar-most. The *Mbh.* अन्येन निर्वृत्तानामनेन प्रतिपत्ति: is explained thus by Nāg: अन्येन निर्वृत्तानां मध्येऽनेनान्तरतमस्यैव साधुत्वप्रतिपत्तिरिति भाष्यार्थ:. Bhar. illustrates this by citing the case of P. 6. 1. 101 : अक: सवर्णे दीर्घ:. This rule produces, at one stroke, all the four long vowels. They proceed and retire (प्रवृत्ता: निवृत्ताश्च), except, of course, one which is similar, and so recommended by P. 1. 1. 50.

This 'call many, choose one' method is illustrated in the *Dīp.* by the example of goats, where many are brought but ultimately only one is retained. Bhar. stresses that there is no futility (*ānarthakyam*) in producing many substitutes all of which, except one, are rejected.

[4. 2. 1]

निर्वृत्तप्रतिपत्तौ निर्वृत्ति: (वा. ३). This *Vār.* is thus explained in the *Mbh.*: निर्वृत्तप्रतिपत्तौ निर्वृत्तिः न सिध्यति। सर्वे सर्वत्र प्राप्नुवन्ति। The *Vār.* points out a drawback of the *nivṛttapratipatti* view. It says that production (*nirvṛttiḥ*)

of substitutes is not achieved here. The *Dīp.* here promptly points out that by निर्वृत्तिः, Kāt. means इष्टशब्दनिर्वृत्तिः. The *Mbh.* commenting on this *Vār.* says that production is not achieved, because all substitutes become due everywhere (सर्वे सर्वत्र प्राप्नुवन्ति).

At this the opponent (advocate of the *nirvṛttapratipatti* view) jumps to his feet to point out what he thinks to be a contradiction between the statement of Kāt. and that of Pat. He says : किं तर्ह्युच्यते निर्वृत्तिर्न सिध्यतीति ? न साधीयो निर्वृत्तिः सिद्धा भवति ? When it is admitted that all substitutes are produced, what does Kāt. mean by saying : निर्वृत्तिः (न सिध्यति) ? The *Dīp.* points out that this question is based on a lack of correct understanding of what Kāt. means. While (as pointed out by the *Dīp.* already) Kāt. used निर्वृत्तिः in a specific sense, viz. इष्टनिर्वृत्तिः, the opponent wrongly understands it in a general sense. Hence the question (इतरस्तु निर्वृत्तिसामान्यमुपादाय पर्यनुयुङ्क्ते). The *Mbh.* (explaining the objection) continues :

न ब्रूमो निर्वृत्तिर्न सिध्यतीति। किं तर्हि? इष्टा व्यवस्था न प्रकल्पेत। न सर्वे सर्वत्रेष्यन्ते। It is true, says the *Mbh.*, that forms, i. e. correct forms, *are* produced. But the difficulty is that along with them the wrong or undesired forms also are produced. How are they to be rejected ?

(*p.* 30, *l.* 6) इदमिदानीं किमर्थं स्यात्. This *Mbh.* gives the reply to the above question. What is then the present rule for ? Is it not meant exactly for the purpose of keeping away the wrong forms produced by the injunctive rules ? Hence the *Dīp.* : यदि सर्वे सर्वत्र ... मापद्यते। ... न भविष्यति.

[4. 2. 2]

(*p.* 30, *l.* 8) अनर्थकं च (*Vār.* 4). The *Vār.* says that in any case this rule is going to be futile. For, with all pious intentions it will not be able to annul the wrong forms, once they are produced by the other (i. e. injunctive) rules. — यो हि भुक्तवन्तं ब्रूयात् 'मा भुक्थाः' इति, किं तेन कृतं स्यात्? asks the *Mbh.* dramatically. The *Dīp.* explains the above argument of the *Mbh.*, and the conclusion arrived at, including even the parallel of 'trying to prevent from eating one who has already eaten' (यथा भुक्तस्य ... एवमेषां निर्वृत्तानामशक्या निवृत्तिरिति).

This argument may be thus illustrated with regard to the two rules, P. 6. 1. 77 : इको यणचि and P. 6. 1. 101 : अकः सवर्णे दीर्घः. If we apply the first rule alone (i. e. without modifying it at the same time by स्थानेऽन्तरतमः) to the case *dadhi* (+*atra*), we get four forms : *dadhy*, °*hv*, °*hr* and °*hl*. The four forms are *fait accompli* and are correct (*sādhu*) as far as P. 6. 1. 77

is concerned. If we subsequently try to restrict the correctness to the form *dadhy* only and thus to rule out the other three forms, that is not possible. So the *Dīp.* says : संप्रति तु निर्वृत्तेषु तेषु तदिदं प्रवर्तमानं न शक्नोति प्रतिपादयितुम् — य एते साधवः (i. e. *dadhv* etc.), ते संप्रत्यसाधवः. Similarly, in the case of अकः सवर्णे दीर्घः, in the case of *viṣṇu*+*udaya*, along with the correct form *viṣṇūdaya* wrong forms also will result, viz. **viṣṇādaya*, °*ṇī*°, and °*ṇṝ*° which cannot be now ruled out by P. 1. 1. 50. To deny reality to those forms will be like denying the bringing of goats when they are actually brought.

The reason for saying अन्यो हि वक्ष्यति — 'त एव साधवः ...' (*ll.* 12-13) is that both rules, viz. P. 6. 1. 77 and P. 1. 1. 50 (or P. 6. 1. 101 and P. 1. 1. 50) will be equally authoritative and it will be a matter of subjective choice, which to follow. Cf. Nāg. : ननु शास्त्रप्रामाण्यादुभयोरपि साधुत्वे ... etc.

(*p.* 30, *l.* 15) तस्माच्छब्दप्रसङ्गमप्रक्रम्य ... etc. This final passage is rather obscure. Apart from the somewhat obscurity of the thought itself, the text also is corrupt in some places, adding to the difficulties of understanding this part of the *Dīp.* Our translation and explanations are only tentative.

शब्दप्रसङ्ग seems to mean the actual resulting of the substitute-word while बुद्धौ प्रसक्त 'what has become due in mind' i. e. what is theoretically possible. प्र+√क्रम् (in अप्रक्रम्य) which usually means 'to begin, to initiate', here probably means 'to present' (we follow AL in reading MS °मप्यक्तम्य as °मप्रक्रम्य). — We further follow AL in reading the MS पदौवैक (*l.* 16) as यदैवैक-. We have, however, retained -प्रक्रमो (*l.* 16), reading an *akārapraśleṣa* after it. This is what the *Dīp.* means here : The rule इको यणचि operates only when the original, which is logically due, is still in the mind. Once you give expression to any word-substitute (*ekaśabdaprakramaḥ*), the Sū. can function no more. The next sentence (प्रकृते कस्मिंश्चिदादेशे ...) brings out the significance of this sentence. In the context *dadhi* + *atra*, once you have actually effected any one of the possible substitutes (say *v* or *y* ... etc.), you cannot be sure that that will be the similarmost and so the desired one (नेदमस्त्यन्तरतमः प्राक् भवतीति). And if that happpens to be a wrong one, you are without the correct one, for the Sū (viz. P. 6. 1. 77) (*aysa*) is not available for a second time. (The *Dīp.* [*a*]*bhāvād* in *l.* 17 is to be obviously emended to [*a*]*bhāvaḥ*. As it is, the Ablative cannot furnish a reason for the preceding statement.)

अथ प्रवृत्तिरूपं नाश्रीयते (*l.* 17) ... etc. pleads for the *buddhiprasakti* view. *pravṛttirūpa*° is probably the same as the *śabdaprasaṅga*, and *prasaṅgarūpa* the same as the *buddhau prasakta*. The words सदृशतम आदेशो भवति are to be supplied after *prasaktānām*. The *Dīp.* here shows how the two rules (इको यणचि and स्थानेऽन्तरतमः) are to be combined so as to make them yield the

desired meaning : इको यणां प्रसक्तानाम् अन्तरतम आदेशो भवति. (Why the *Dīp.* does not read the latter part is a mystery.)

A corollary of this is that the *pratipādaka* alternative (viz. अन्येन निर्वृत्ताना-मनेन प्रतिपत्तिः) is gone with this synthesis of इको यणचि and स्थानेऽन्तरतमः. Cf. the *Dīp.* पक्ष एवायं नास्ति ... etc.

In *l.* 19, उपकल्पना is probably to be read as उक्तकल्पना, 'the proposition under discussion' (i. e. the *pratipādaka* view).

(*p.* 30, *l.* 20) इतरस्त्वाह ... etc. is an introduction of the next *Vār.* उक्तं वा.

Readings: (1) (*p.* 29, *l.* 25) MS निवृत्तानाम्. — (2) (*p.* 30, *l.* 3) MS निवृत्तिः. — (3) (*p.* 30, *l.* 3) MSAL निष्ठा- (for our emendation इष्ट-). — (4) (*p.* 30, *l.* 3) MS निवृत्तिर्. — (5) (*p.* 30, *l.* 4) MS निवृत्तिला°. — (6) (*p.* 30, *l.* 5) MS निवृत्तिर्. — (7) (*p.* 30, *l.* 6) MS सुतदेवं ; AL स्यात् । तदेवं. — (8) (*p.* 30, *l.* 9) MS भवंतीकोपवाचीति (for भवति । 'इको यणचि' इति (as in AL). — (9) (*p.* 30, *l.* 9) MS साधुअंयणीहि (for साधुत्वे [AL °त्वं] यणो हि as in AL). — (10) (*p.* 30, *l.* 11) MS नरिदं; AL पुनरिदं (for तदिदं). — (11) (*p.* 30, *l.* 14) MS निवृत्तानां. — (12) (*p.* 30, *l.* 14) MS निवृत्तिविति; AL निर्वृत्तिरिति. — (13) (*p.* 30, *l.* 15) MS अप्रयक्तस्य (for अप्रक्रमस्य as in AL). — (14) (*p.* 30, *l.* 16) MS पदौवैक- (for थर्दै° as in AL). — (15) (*p.* 30, *l.* 16) AL -प्रक्रमे. — (16) (*p.* 30, *l.* 16) AL प्रवृत्तिर् (for ऽप्रवृ°). — (17) (*p.* 30, *ll.* 16-17) MS °स्मित्वा-देनदम् (for °स्मिन् वा नेदम् as in AL). — (18) (*p.* 30, *l.* 17) AL अन्तरतमस्य. — (19) (*p.* 30, *l.* 19) MSAL °पादकमिति । द(AL इद)मिति.

Observation : Here the *Dīp.* abruptly closes the discussion of P. I. 1. 50 and passes on to P. 1. 1. 51 : उरण् रपरः. As it cannot be reasonably supposed that Bhar. has deliberately skipped over such an extensive part of the *Mbh.*, the only possibility is that the *Dīp.* on this part of the *Mbh.* is lost. Whether the copyist of our MS ignored some folios of the original either accidentally or through negligence, or whether they were already lost in the original which he was copying is difficult to say. Calculating the portion of the *Mbh.* on P. 1. 1. 50 for which the *Dīp.* is available and the remaining one for which there is no *Dīp.* we find that 74 lines of *Mbh.* in Kielhorn's ed. (120. 1 — 122. 18) have the *Dīp.* while the remaining 72 lines (122. 19 — 125. 15) do not have it — nearly 50 : 50. The available *Dīp.* runs into 5 folios (i. e. 10 sides) : 205 B1 — 210 A10. Considering the size, lines on every page, and the letters in each line, we can say that 5 folios have been lost.

* * *

ur aṇ raparaḥ / P. 1. 1. 51

[1]

किमिदमुरणरपरवचनमन्यनिवृत्त्यर्थम् ? This *pratīka* stands for the following *Mbh.* : किमिदमुरणरपरवचनमन्यनिवृत्त्यर्थम् — उः स्थानेऽणेव भवति, रपरश्चेति। आहोस्विद् रपरत्वमात्रमनेन विधीयते — उः स्थानेऽण् चानण् च। अण् तु रपर इति ?

As usual this *Mbh.* is meant to introduce the *Vār*-s which examine the two views mentioned here. According to the first view, this rule makes two statements : (1) *ṛ* is replaced by *aṇ* (i. e. *a*, *i*, *u*). This is an injunction and the substitnte *aṇ* which comes accordingly supersedes any other possible substitute. This is the main statement. (2) A secondary statement, an incidental part of this main statement, is that the resulting *aṇ* is always followed by the phoneme *r* (i. e. *ar*, *ir*, *ur*). The other view is that this rule does not lay down any new substitute for *ṛ*. Out of the *aṇ* and the non-*aṇ* substitutes which may result *by other rules*, the *aṇ* substitute has to be always followed by *r* (रपरत्वमात्रमनेन विधीयते). That is all.

(*p.* 30, *l.* 22) इकोगुणवृद्धिसूत्रे ... etc. The *Dīp.* here first removes a possible misunderstanding. It says that the first view does not seek to make the present rule absolutely injunctive. It does not say that our rule wants *each and every ṛ* to be replaced by *aṇ*. Nothing like that. The *Mbh.* on P. 1. 1. 3, the *Dīp.* says, has made it already clear that P. 1. 1. 51 is not an independently injunctive rule (अस्य सूत्रस्य विज्ञातं पारतन्त्र्यम्). Still in those rules which mention *ṛ* in Genitive, P. 1. 1. 49 will come in and then, according to the first (i. e. the *nirvartake*) view *aṇ* will have to be substituted in the place of *ṛ* as far as such rules are concerned.

The *Mbh.* on P. 1. 1. 3 referred to here in the *Dīp.*, which emphasizes the subordinate position of P. 1. 1. 51, reads thus : 'उरण्रपरे च'। उरण्रपरे च सर्वर्काराणां निवृत्तिः प्राप्नोति।...कर्तृ हर्तृ। 'सिद्धं तु षष्ठ्यधिकारे वचनात्'। सिद्धमेतत्। कथम्? षष्ठ्यधिकार इमे योगाः कर्तव्याः। एकस्तावत् क्रियते। तत्रैव इमावपि योगौ षष्ठ्यधिकारमनुवर्तिष्येते। अथ वा, षष्ठ्यधिकार इमौ योगावपेक्षिष्यामहे। Here the *Dīp.* remarks : षष्ठ्यधिकारे सति स्वनिमित्तप्रयुक्ताः स्थानषष्ठीमपेक्षमाणा 'अङ्गस्य' 'वन्यादीनाम्' 'ऋत इद्धातोः' इति, स्वकार्यं निष्पादयन्ति, न षष्ठीमन्तरेणेति।

The *Dīp.* यत्र षष्ठी तत्र ... etc. pinpoints the exact scope of this rule (यत्र षष्ठी तत्र), and says that this *aṇ* substitute supersedes other claimants (आदेशान्तराणां बाधकम्). — The rule is further analysed and shown to be consisting of two statements : (1) उः स्थाने अण् भवति, and (2) स च रपरः as the *Mbh.* says. It is necessary to resort to this *vākyabheda*, एकत्र विधेयद्वयासंभवात् (*Chāyā*).

(*p*. 30, *l*. 25) तत्रोदात्तानुदात्त ... etc. An incidental reflection of the *Dīp*. on the *nirvartaka* view (Actually, it could come better under the *Vār*. 1. उरण्रपर ... उदात्तादिषु दोषः where Kāt. has specifically discussed the difficulty which will arise on the *nirvartaka* view where accent substitution is taught. Why Bhar. anticipates this subject here prematurely is not easy to see.) This discussion is based on the view that the expression *acaḥ* (P. 1. 2. 28) is continued in उच्चैरुदात्तः (29) etc. This makes an *udātta* etc. a substitute in the place of (*sthāne*) an *ac* 'vowel'. Read (*Mbh*. I. 206. 13–14) : 'उच्चैरुदात्तः' । 'नीचैरनुदात्तः' । किं षष्ठीनिर्दिष्टस्याज्ग्रहणमनुवर्तते, उताहो न ? On this Kaiy. : षष्ठीनिर्दिष्टमिति । उच्चैर्नीचैरित्येते अव्यये अधिकरणशक्तिप्रधाने । तत्र 'अचः' इत्यनुवृत्तौ सत्यामयमर्थो भवति — उच्चैः स्थान उपलभ्यमान उदात्तसंज्ञः, स चाचः स्थान इति । (It is obvious that if this *anuvṛtti* view is finally abandoned — cf. the *Mbh*. एवं तर्हि निवृत्तम् later on — the present discussion under P. 1. 1. 51 loses all significance.)

What exactly the *Dīp*. wants to say here is somewhat obscured because ऋवर्णस्यापूर्वमचियोगोनंतरसमान् is corrupt. Still it smain point seems to be this : When a word like *kṛti* is formed, the radical vowel has to be *Udātta* (P. 6. 1. 197 : ञ्नित्यादिर्नित्यम्). Further, the radical vowel itself will have to be an *aṇ* according to the present rule. P. 1. 1. 50 : स्थानेऽन्तरतमः cannot step in and say that the substitute must be the similarmost one, i. e. *ṛ* itself, for that rule, which finds scope elsewhere (e. g. in P. 6. 1. 101), will be superseded by our P. 1. 1. 51, evidently helped by P. 1. 4. 2 : विप्रतिषेधे परं कार्यम् . This defect in the *nirvartaka* view the *Dīp*. obviously wants to point out here, though, as we have said above, the proper place of this discussion is below under *Vār*. 1 where, indeed, Bhar. discusses another aspect of this subject.

In *l*. 1 we have emended ऽनंतरसमान् to ऽनन्तरतमान्. It states the scope of P. 1. 1. 50. When a preceding rule has found an exclusive scope somewhere, only then a conflicting succeeding rule can supersede it (P. 1. 4. 2).

(*p*. 31, *l*. 2) आहोस्विद् रपरत्वमात्रम् ... etc. The *Dīp*. गुणासङ्गमात्र ... व्यापारः is the paraphrase of the *Mbh*. रपरत्वमात्रमनेन विधीयते (the alternative view), where रपरत्वम् is referred to by गुण 'property'. The *Dīp*. makes the difference in this alternative clear by saying that the *aṇ* (which is to be *rapara*) is already there (*bhūto*) being brought in by some other rule (*anyena lakṣaṇena*).

(*p*. 31, *l*. 6) उदात्तादिषु दोषः. There seems to be a lacuna here. The *Dīp*. which follows is obviously a commentary on the *Vār*. and the *Mbh*. which follows it. But this text is not found in the MS. The *Mbh*. reads :

कश्चात्र विशेषः? 'उरणृपरवचनमन्यनिवृत्त्यर्थं चेदुदात्तादिषु दोषः' (वा. १)। उरणृपरवचन-मन्यनिवृत्त्यर्थं चेदुदात्तादिषु दोषो भवति। के पुनरुदात्तादयः? उदात्तानुदात्तस्वरितानुनासिकाः। कृतिः, हृतिः। कृतं, हृतम्।... The defect (*doṣaḥ*) which results from following the *nirvartaka* alternative is, of course, the substitution of *aṇ* as the radical vowel instead of *ṛ* itself in forms like *kṛti*, and *r* suffixion (see above, *Dīp*., p. 31, *l*. 7). (It is rather strange that the defect is not mentioned specifically in the *Vār*. and also in the *Mbh*. It is not clear even in the *Dīp*., but perhaps that may be a part of the lost portion of the *Dīp*. It is Kaiy. who offers us useful help. He says: अन्तरतमस्य (scil. ऋकारस्य) बाधकोऽण् प्रसज्यत इति भावः। But it is Nāg. who furnishes all the required information. Read: 'उच्चैरुदात्तः' इत्यादिषु षष्ठ्यन्तम् 'अचः' इत्यनुवर्तत इति पक्षे 'ञ्नित्यादिर्...' इत्यादावच इत्युपस्थितेः षष्ठीसद्भावाद् 'उरण्...' इत्यस्योपस्थानमिति द्रष्टव्यम्).

The uncertainty of the *Udātta* accent of the *aṇ* substitutes is due to difference of opinion regarding the point whether P. 1. 1. 51 can set aside the *Udātta* taught by P. 6. 1. 197 : ञ्नित्यादिर्नित्यम्. One view is that it can (यत्र ['उरण् रपरः' इत्यस्य] उपस्थितिस्तद्विधेयस्य (अपि) बाधः इत्यभिमानः, Nāg.) and so *Udātta* is not available. According to the other view it cannot, and so *Udātta* is unaffected (तथा च विधिविधेयोदात्तत्वमस्त्येवेति भावः, *Chāyā*).

This is the position: If P. 1. 1. 50 prevails, there is *ṛ* and it is *Udātta* : if P. 1. 1. 51 prevails, the radical vowel could be *Udātta*, but it is *aṇ* (not *ṛ*).

(*p*. 31, *l*. 6) ते तु किमुदात्तादि... etc. The *Dīp*. here observes that whether the (undesirable) *aṇ* substitutes — instead of the desired *ṛ* — themselves are Udātta or not does not matter, since any way the wrong form is going to result. (For we do not want merely any Udātta vowel as the radical vowel. It has to be *ṛ* alone.)

Here the following *Dīp*.: धिकृतदोषो कृतदोषो ... वक्तव्यमेव is corrupt. We do not know what धिकृतदोषो ... रूपः स्यात् means. It may be inferred from एवमपि 'even so' of the next sentence that it furnishes some sort of a defence. Accepting it (*evam api*) the next sentence reiterates the defect : ऋकारस्याण् रपरः प्राप्नोति The following sentence : तृत्व इत्येतत्तु ... etc. is yet another riddle. We plead our inability to solve it.

(*p*. 31, *l*. 8) प्रतिपदादेषु तु ... etc. The *Dīp*. here mentions one more aspect of this rule, viz. that in connection with rules which lay down specific substitutes of *ṛ* in specific contexts. These substitutes, being taught specifically, naturally set aside the *aṇ* substitute which is taught in a general way. For, if here too the *aṇ* substitutes were to take place, the specific substitutes will become meaningless. Their teaching will suffer (उदिति श्रुतिरुपरुध्यते). Still one

defect remains. When P. 1. 1. 51 does not operate in their case, *r*-suffixion also will not be available for them — certainly an undesired contingency — since *r*-suffixion is a subordinate part of *aṇ* taught by P. 1. 1. 51. No *aṇ*, no *r*-suffixion.

In *l*. 10, the MS तदिति is read by us as उदिति (cf. our reading य उः [twice], for यतः above). We take this उद् as referring to *ut* of P. 7. 1. 102. It is true that *it* (of P. 7. 1. 100) remains unmentioned. But, while *tad* does not make any sense, *ut* at least can be an *upalakṣaṇa* for *it* also.

(*p*. 31, *l*. 12) गुणवृद्ध्योरवर्णाप्रतिपत्तिः. This is a part of the *Vār*. 2 which now considers the other view. The *Vār*. and the *Mbh*. on it run as follows: अस्तु तर्ह्युः स्थानेऽण् चानण् च, अण् तु रपर इति। 'य उः स्थानेऽण् स रपर इति चेद् गुणवृद्ध्योरवर्णाप्रतिपत्तिः' (वा. २)। य उः स्थानेऽण् स रपर इति चेद् गुणवृद्ध्योरवर्णाप्रतिपत्तिः। कर्ता, हर्ता, वार्षगण्यः।

In the forms *kartā* and *hartā*, there is substitution of the Guṇa phoneme *a* in the place of the radical vowel *ṛ* by P. 7. 3. 84: सार्वधातुकार्धधातुकयोः. In *vārṣagaṇya* (a patronymic from *vṛṣagaṇa*, P. 4. 1. 105), there is substitution of the Vṛddhi phoneme *ā* by P. 7. 2. 117: तद्धितेष्वचामादेः. (In the *Vār*. अवर्ण means both *a* and *ā* by P. 1. 1. 69: अणुदित्सवर्णस्य ....) It is now claimed by the *Vār*. that if the present rule teaches merely *r*-suffixion to an *aṇ* which is already there (*bhūte*; that is, as a result of some other rule), then such *aṇ* (i. e. *ă*) will be difficult to get. (No reason is given for such a statement in the *Vār*. The whole thing becomes gradually clear in the course of the *Mbh*. to follow.)

(*p*. 31, *l*. 14) किं हि साधीयः ऋवर्णस्यासवर्णे. This is followed in the *Mbh*. by यदवर्णं स्यात्, न पुनरेङैचौ. This is the idea: There are three vowels which are named Guṇa, viz. *a*, *e*, and *o*. Similarly there are three vowels which are named Vṛddhi, viz. *ā*, *ai* and *au*. Now, if we give up the first interpretation according to which *aṇ* is laid down as a substitute, and accept the other interpretation which says that P. 1. 1. 51 teaches merely *r*-suffixion, then what guarantee is there that when a Guṇa is taught for *ṛ* (as in *kartā* for instance), *a* alone will come in and not *e* and *o* (*eṅ*) also? Since *aṇ* is no longer enjoined, there is nothing to bar *e* and *o*. Similarly in the case of Vṛddhi.

This question gains significance because *a* is as dissimilar (असवर्णे सदृशाभावे इत्यर्थः Nāg.) to *ṛ* as *e*/*o*, and *ā* also as dissimilar to it as *ai*/*au*. What is the speciality (*sādhīyaḥ*) in *a* and *ā* which would grant them preference over *e*/*o* and *ai*/*au*? — Incidentally, the word *sādhīyaḥ* is somewhat peculiar. Bhar. (second explanation) and Kaiy. take it as meaning साधुतरं कारणम्. In his

first explanation Bhar. seems to be taking it — rather arbitrarily — simply in the sense of कारणम्. (Our reconstruction किमस्ति कारणं for the MS किमंसिकरं is by no means absolutely certain. It could be any other one, e. g. किमधिकतरं.) One thing is more or less sure : It is the special quality or feature of $\breve{\bar{a}}$ which is demanded that would give it preference over *e/o* and *ai/au*.

(*p.* 31, *l.* 15) पूर्वस्मिन्नपि पक्षे एष दोषः. This is followed in the *Mbh.* by किं हि साधीयः, तत्रापि ऋवर्णस्थासवर्णे यद्वर्णं स्यात्, न पुनरिवर्णोवर्णौ ?

The defence by the advocate of the second alternative (*raparatvamātram*) consists merely in pointing out that the defect attributed to his view applies equally to the first view. In spite of the presence of *aṇ*, what guarantee is there, that $\breve{\bar{a}}$ alone will come in as Guṇa/Vṛddhi, and not *i* or *u* (which are equally *aṇ*) ? So, in the first view also, availability of $\breve{\bar{a}}$ is not invariable (*ekāntena*).

(*p.* 31, *l.* 18) अथ मतमेतत् — उः स्थाने... etc. The opponent (the advocate of the second view) continues his argument. The *Mbh.* runs thus : अथ मतमेतत्— उः स्थानेऽणश्चानणश्च प्रसङ्गे अणेव भवति, रपरश्चेति, सिद्धा ... etc.

The opponent anticipates an argument on the part of the advocate of the first view. The latter may say that he does not mean that P. 1. 1. 51 is an injunctive rule which supersedes others. The rule is to be looked upon as a sort of restrictive one, that is, when there is an occasion for both kinds of substitutes, *aṇ* and non-*aṇ*, this rule makes a restriction viz. that *aṇ* alone will realise. Now *i* and *u* have no claim to the designations Guṇa and Vṛddhi. So there is no occasion (*prasaṅga*) for *i* and *u* to be substitutes for *ṛ* in the formations *kartā* and *vārṣagaṇya* etc, even though they have an *aṇ* status. So, the opponent agrees, सिद्धा पूर्वस्मिन् पक्षे अवर्णस्य प्रतिपत्तिः. Kaiy. states the position thus : नानेनान्येषां बाधकोऽपूर्वोऽण् विधीयते। किं त्वणनणोः प्रसङ्गेऽणेव भवतीति नियमः क्रियते, स च रपरः। न च गुणवृद्धिप्रसङ्गे इकारोकारप्रसङ्गः। The *Uddy.* also is here worth quoting. Nāg. says : दोषपरिहारायाक्षेपवाद्येव 'अन्यनिवृत्त्यर्थम्' (वा. १) इत्यस्य नियमपरतया व्याख्यानमाशङ्क्य दूषयति भाष्ये 'अथ मतम्' इति। एतद् वक्ष्यमाणं नियमरूपत्वम्, अन्यनिवृत्त्यर्थमिति वदतो मतं संमतम्, विवक्षितमित्यर्थः। सिद्धा पूर्वस्मिन्निति। अन्यनिवृत्त्यर्थमिति पक्षे इत्यर्थः।

(*p.* 31, *l.* 18) यत् पूर्वमुपन्यस्तम् ... etc. The proponent of the first view admits that he is modifying now his view. He no longer regards P. 1. 1. 51 as an *apūrvavidhi*. It does not teach anything altogether new (excepting, of course, the *r*-suffixion). The import of this rule, he says, is restriction (*niyamyate*).

The *Dīp.* तत्र केचिद् वर्णयन्ति ... इदुतौ न भविष्यतः demonstrates one way in which this restriction is technically brought about. In the case of rules

teaching Guṇa and Vṛddhi, the words *guṇa* an *vṛddhi* are to be combined with P. 1. 1. 51 thus : ऋवर्णस्य स्थाने गुणः अण् रपरो भवति, वृद्धिरण् रपरो भवति, as the *Dīp.* shows. Here *aṇ* is qualified by *guṇa* and *vṛddhi*. So only that *aṇ* which has the designation Guṇa/Vṛddhi can come in as the substitute, not *e/o* or *ai/au*. (In *l.* 22, गुणः and वृद्धिः mean गुणसंज्ञः and वृद्धिसंज्ञः respectively. Also, since *r*-suffixion is a secondary addition, the *Dīp.* text गुणः अण् रपरो भवति should have been गुणः अण् भवति, स च रपरः. Similarly in the case of Vṛddhi also.)

(*p.* 31, *l.* 23) अथ वा, 'उरण् रपरः' इति ... etc. This *Dīp.* suggests an alternative technical device in order to achieve the same end. Here the word *guṇaḥ* is not brought in as a qualification. Instead, a word *prasajyamānānām* or *prasaktānam*[1] in a partitive sense (i. e. meaning 'from amongst those (substitutes) which become due' is understood after *sthāne* which is continued in P. 1. 1. 51 from the previous rule). This is what the *Dīp.* says in उः स्थाने ये प्रसक्तास्तत्राणेव भवति। अन्यो न भवति।

(*p.* 31, *l.* 27) य एव ह्यसौ पौरस्त्योऽपवाद ... etc. A reiteration of the modification of the stand taken by the proponent of the *nirvartaka* view. Cf. यत् पूर्वमुपन्यस्तम्...etc. (*p.* 31, *l.* 18). All that is done is that the *apavāda* 'supersession' (in other words *apūrvavidhi*) is now modified into *niyama*. — एवं च कृत्वा ... etc. (*p.* 32, *l.* 1). The *Dīp.* incidentally draws attention to the two readings in the *Mbh.* which explain उरण् of the Sū. Some read उः स्थानेऽण् भवति while others read अणेव (for अण्). The *Dīp.* remarks that the reading *aṇ* (without a following *eva*) is justified now on the supposition that the initial stand is that of an *apūrvavidhi*. The *Dīp.* further observes that an *apūrvavidhi* cannot, by itself, set aside other alternatives (न पूर्वस्मिन् [पक्षे] विधीयमानोऽन्यं निवर्तयति), for which a restrictive rule is necessary. That is why P. 1. 1. 51 is now being construed as a restrictive rule (*niyama*), like other *niyama* rules. Read Nāg. also : तत्र यद्यन्यनिवृत्त्यर्थत्वं नियामकत्वेन, तदा 'अथ मतमेतद्' इति वक्ष्यमाणस्य विशेषो न स्यादत आनुषङ्गिकं तद् ... ।

Observation : Here is a problem about Bhar.'s reading of the *Mbh.* The *Dīp.* केषांचित् पूर्वत्र ग्रन्थे एवकारो नास्ति leads one to think that Bhar. himself read एव there, i. e. he read the *Mbh.* as उः स्थानेऽणेव भवति. But our MS there (*p.* 30, *l.* 25) reads simply *aṇ* (without a following *eva*). Kaiy. also remarks that some read *aṇ* while others read *aṇ eva*. He further observes that *aṇ* looked upon as an *apūrvavidhi* can supersede others only on the basis of *sāmarthya* (विशेषविधेः सामान्यविधिबाधकत्वेनेत्यर्थः। न तु वाच्यवृत्त्यास्य नियमपरत्वमिति भावः, Nāg.), while the addition of *eva* merely helps to bring out the setting aside of others. Read : तत्र केषांचित् पाठो 'ऽण् भवति, रपरश्च' इति तत्रापूर्वोऽण्

1. Or in the Locative : *prasajyamāneṣu/prasakteṣu*.

विधीयमान आदेशान्तराणां बाधकः। अन्येषां तु पाठो 'ऽणेव भवति' इति। तत्र सामर्थ्याच्चान्यनिवृत्तिः। सैवैवकारेण प्रदर्श्यते।

(*p.* 32, *l.* 4) यत्तु तदुक्तम् — उदात्तादिषु दोषः ... etc. The advocate of the second view, admitting that there is no difficulty now in the case of Guṇa and Vṛddhi (सिद्धा पूर्वस्मिन् पक्षे ऽवर्णस्य प्रतिपत्तिः) on the modified *niyama*-view, draws his attention to the other defect which he had earlier pointed out in connection with the accent substitution. To indicate that जायते न जायते (*Mbh.*) is a question the *Dīp.* expressly says : प्रश्नेनोपक्रमते.

The *Dīp.* : अभिप्रायः।... भवति दोष इति brings out the point (अभिप्रायः) in asking this question. It says that if it is shown that the metarule **P. 1. 1. 50 :** स्थानेऽन्तरतमः ultimately prevails, then the opponent will have no difficulty. The *antaratama*, i. e. *ṛ* itself, will be first selected, thus barring the inconvenient *aṇ* (and thus *kṛti* etc. will be available). If, however, the metarule **P. 1. 1. 51 :** उरण् रपरः prevails, then *aṇ* will be unavoidable. Hence the question : स इह दोषो जायते, न जायते ?

अयं (*l.* 5) = नियमवादी. अचः उदात्तादयः (*l.* 6), and अच उदात्तः (*l.* 7) imply that this statement is made on the view that अचः [स्थाने] is valid in P. 6. 1. 197 etc.— आद्यमेव प्रसङ्गमधितिष्ठति (*l.* 7)=प्रथमप्राप्तं अन्तरतमं बाधते (अधितिष्ठति is here used in a rather unusual sense). — इतरः (*l.* 8) = आक्षेपकः. — अनन्तरतमेषु =अण्सु.

Observation : The MS here is corrupt in many places. We have made following emendations : (*l.* 5) अयं (MS य). — Here and also below (*l.* 8) परिभाषया (MS °भाषा). — (*l.* 6) उदात्तादयोऽन्तरतमा (MS °त्तोदन्तरतमो). — (*l.* 7) °भाषा अच (MS °भाआच्). — (*l.* 9) °मानोमुवे of the MS is a riddle. Similarly the Accusative in °परिभाषाम् is unaccountable.

(*p.* 32, *l.* 9) जायते स दोषः। कथम्? उदात्त इत्यनेन ... etc. Since *aṇ* also is capable of the Udātta accent (उदात्त इत्यनेनाणोऽपि प्रतिनिर्दिश्यन्ते), it threatens to come in in forms like *kṛti*. Nor can one say that *sthāne'ntaratamaḥ* will prevent such a dissimilar substitute. For there is no reason why P. 1. 1. 50 should be effective here and not **P. 1. 1. 51** (which does away with the necessity of a similarmost substitute in the case of *ṛ*)? The full text of the *Mbh.* is : कुतो न खल्वेतद्, द्वयोः परिभाषयोः सावकाशयोः समवस्थितयोः, — 'स्थानेऽन्तरतमः' इति, 'उरण् रपरः' इति च, 'स्थानेऽन्तरतमः' इत्यनया परिभाषया व्यवस्था भविष्यति, न पुनर् 'उरण् रपरः' इति ?

The *Dīp.* demonstrates the exclusive scope of the two Paribhāṣās. In the case of P. 6. 1. 101 : अकः सवर्णे दीर्घः, for example, **P. 1. 1. 50** alone applies; **P. 1. 1. 51** cannot apply there because, $\bar{r}$ ($r+r$; the long substitute) is not *aṇ*. When you form *kartā* etc., however, **P. 1. 1. 51** alone applies; **P. 1. 1. 50**

does not apply because the combination $ak+ak$ (*savarṇa*) is not there. The *Mbh.* suggests that this is the domain of P. 1. 1. 51 which is later in the order of the Aṣṭ. Hence the question raised there : कुतो ... 'स्थानेऽन्तरतमः' इत्यनया परिभाषया व्यवस्था भविष्यति, न पुनर् 'उरण् रपरः' इति (अनया)? The *Dīp.* calls स्थानेऽन्तरतमपरिभाषया व्यवस्था by the name of पूर्वविप्रतिषेध and the other one by परविप्रतिषेध.

The *Dīp.* अथ वा, 'अच उदात्तः' (*l.* 18) etc. gives an alternative paraphrase of the *Mbh.* According to this interpretation, the *Mbh.* asks : What makes you suppose that when P. 1. 1. 50 proceeds, P. 1. 1. 51 does not proceed simultaneously ? Why do you not suppose, that being later, P. 1. 1. 51 itself will restrain the operation of P. 1. 1. 50 from becoming due ?

(*p.* 32, *l.* 21) ये चाप्येते ऋवर्णस्येति. This *pratīka* represents the following *Mbh.* ये चाप्येते ऋवर्णस्य स्थाने प्रतिपदमादेशा उच्यन्ते, तेषु रपरत्वं न प्राप्नोति — 'ॠत इद्धातोः', 'उदोष्ठ्यपूर्वस्य' इति ।

Here the *Mbh.* is adding another point to its criticism of the revised view (*niyama*). So far it has explained the *Vār.* objection viz. गुणवृद्ध्योरवर्णाप्रतिपत्तिः. The *Mbh.* also pointed out, incidentally, that the same objection could be raised against the first view also, but added that if that view is modified into a *niyama* form, then that view would be immune against this objection. Still, the *Mbh.* further observed, that even that revised view is still open to the other objection, viz. उदात्तादिषु दोषः. Now the *Mbh.* points out another defect in the same view. It says that *r*-suffixion will not be available for the substitutes *i*(*t*) and *u*(*t*) which are taught for *ṝ* in P. 7. 1. 100 and 102 respectively.

The *Dīp.* यत्र हि प्रवृत्तिरन्यस्यास्ति ... etc. explains the argument thus. The rule उरण् रपरः consists of two parts : उः स्थानेऽण् (भवति) is the main part, while स च रपरः is the subordinate part. The function of the first part is to teach, by way of a *niyama*, the substitution of *aṇ* in the place of *ṛ*. Then secondarily the rule teaches that this substitute *aṇ* gets a *r*-suffixion. In the case of the two substitutes concerned, *it* and *ut*, they are taught specifically (*pratipada*). Since the main part of the restrictive rule : *aṇ* (alone) comes in as a substitute ' does not apply here, the subordinate part ' it is followed by *r* ' also naturally does not materialize. So the wrong forms (i. e. without *r*-suffixion) result. (For example, *r* in *girati* from √*gṝ* will not be available.) Cf. Kaiy. : ये चाप्येत इति । यत्र ह्यनियमप्रसङ्गस्तत्रानेन नियमः क्रियते तत्र तच्छेषभूतं रपरत्वं भवति, न त्वन्यत्र प्रतिपदविधावित्यर्थः ।

Observation : Here also the *Dīp.* is considerably corrupt. We suggest प्रवृत्तिर् (*l.* 21) for निवृत्तिर् and योगो (*l.* 22) for नियमो. Similarly, in *l.* 22 we

have corrected the MS चैकारैकार° to चेकारोकार°. In the case of the suggested emendation of निवृत्तिर् to प्रवृत्तिर्, we have done so in view of the following *Dīp.* : इह चेकारोकारयोरेव प्रवृत्तिरिति ... If, however, the emendation is felt to be too violent from an orthographical point of view, निवृत्तिर् may be retained. But then some such word as कर्तव्या 'to be executed' has to be understood. (And it would be difficult to point out its exact place in the sentence.) As regards the other suggestion, योगो for नियमो, we are more or less sure of it.

(*p.* 32, *l.* 25) सिद्धं तु प्रसङ्गे रपरत्वात् (वा. ३) This *Vār.* replies the objection taken in *Vār.* 2. It says that *r*-suffixion takes place just when *aṇ* is presenting itself. There are three phonemes called Guṇa, viz. *a*, *e*, and *o*. Of these the *aṇ* one, viz. *a*, presents itself already furnished with a suffixed *r*, i. e. as *ar*. Naturally *ar*, with its *r* element, is more similar to *ṛ* than *e* and *a* are. So, by P. 1. 1. 50, *ar* materializes, to the exclusion of *e* and *o*. A similar thing happens in the case of Vṛddhi. The threat pointed out in the *Vār.* 2 is thus warded off. (Also P. 1. 1. 51 has no quarrel now since the substitution of *aṇ* and its *r*-suffixion are also achieved.)

The significance of द्वे स्थानग्रहणे अत्रानुवर्तेते will be brought out later.

(*p.* 32, *l.* 26) यद्यपि द्वितीयः पक्षो ... etc. This *Dīp.* is a reply to the following anticipated question. When you say : सिद्धं तु प्रसङ्गे रपरत्वात्, are you not reverting to the second alternative (रपरत्वमात्रमनेन क्रियते)? That view was discarded, because of the defect of गुणवृद्ध्योरवर्णाप्रतिपत्तिः. Now when you resort to the *prasaṅga* view and say that what P. 1. 1. 51 means is that *aṇ* (become due as a Guṇa by P. 1. 1. 2 for *ṛ*) presents itself with a *r*-suffixion, are you not falling back on the रपरत्वमात्रमनेन क्रियते view? The *Dīp.* accepts the force of this argument, saying : यद्यपि द्वितीयः पक्षो ··· स एवायं पक्षः, and then proceeds to show the difference between the two in अयं तु विशेषः etc. The construction यद्यपि द्वितीयः पक्षः (to be read as द्वितीये पक्षे ?) is rather clumsy. — After °मात्रमनेन क्रियते, scil. न तु अण् विधीयते.

The difference, says the *Dīp.*, is in the consideration of the time-element. In the earlier view the precise time of *r*-suffixion is not stated; it is done in the present view. It is stressed that the two events, viz. the becoming due of *aṇ* (i. e. of *a* as Guṇa and of *ā* as Vṛddhi) is simultaneous with *r*-suffixion (य एव प्राप्त्या नियतकालः ... स एव रपरत्वकालः). In other words, what presents as Guṇa is already *ar* and as Vṛdhi *ār* (रपरः सन्नेव प्रवर्तते as the *Sidkau.* later says). The *Dīp.* says that even while the mind is thinking of the proper substitute, the *aṇ* is already furnished with a suffixed *r* (बुद्धिप्रवृत्तिकाल एवाणा लब्धं रपरत्वम्).

Two points are underlined by the *Dīp.* here : (i) Both the *niyama* view (the revised first view) and the *nirvṛtti* (otherwise called *apavāda* or the

apūrva-vidhi) are abandoned here (actually the latter was already abandoned) and a new view, *prasaṅga* or *prāpti* is now adopted (नियमं निवृत्तिं च परित्यज्य प्राप्तौ = प्रसङ्गे एव रपरत्वं). प्रसङ्ग or प्राप्ति means having an occasion, becoming due, and has a time connotation : the *r*-suffixion takes place simultaneously when there is an occasion for a Guṇa-substitution in the place of *ṛ*. (2) It was seen that the appearance of *ar* itself as one of the claimants for the substitution in the place of *ṛ* helps its selection ; it is preferred to the exclusion of *e* and *o*, the reason being that it contains a *r*-element (with retroflection) common with *ṛ*, which *e* and *o* lack. The furnishing of *r* thus itself furnishes an occasion to P. 1. 1. 50 to operate in the selection of the suitable substitute. The conflict between the two metarules ceases, and the two work in co-operation, P. 1. 1. 51 acting, in a way, as a subordinate part of P. 1. 1. 50 : स्थानेन्तरतमपरिभाषायाः … अङ्गत्वेनेयमुपप्लवते उरण्रपरपरिभाषेति.

उपप्लव means the individual or specific application of a rule, with modifications where necessary, to any particular example. Such an individual application is required by the statement : प्रतिलक्ष्यं लक्षणोपप्लवः.

(*p*. 33, *l*. 6) यद्येवमादेशोऽविशेषितो भवति. An objection against the above interpretation. The objection ' the substitute is not qualified ' means that there is no guarantee that the substitute *aṇ* with a suffixed *r* will take the position of, or will come in the place of, *ṛ*. It may precede or follow it. What is there to compel the substitute to come in the place of *ṛ* ?

The *Dīp*. एकं स्थानमनुवर्तते … etc. explains the argument (एवं मन्यते) implied in the objection. A word *sthāna* continues here from the previous rule. That explains the time element, viz. the simultaneousness of *aṇ* becoming due as Guṇa, and its *r*-suffixion.

So the word *sthāna* which we had at our disposal is now spent. There is no word which would have shown the place, i. e the relationship of the original and the substitute. The substitute may come *near* (either before or after) the original *ṛ*. There is nothing to show the exact place to be occupied by the substitute (आदेशोऽविशेषितो भवति).

The *Dīp*. यत्र हि षष्ठी भूत उपादीयते etc. replies an anticipated objection (against the objection itself which is just now explained). It could be argued thus : P. 1. 1. 51 : उरण् रपरः uses a Genitive, viz. *ur*. The metarule P. 1. 1. 49 : षष्ठी स्थानेयोगा teaches that when an unspecified Genitive is used, the word *sthāne* is understood, or to be supplied after it. Therefore, the word *sthāne* will be there in a rule which teaches a substitute like Guṇa for *ṛ*. Why do you worry that in the absence of a word *sthāne* in P. 1. 1. 51, आदेशोऽविशेषितो भवति ?

The *Dīp.* यत्र हि षष्ठी भूत (= भूते) ... etc. shows why the metarule P. 1. 1. 49: षष्ठी स्थानेयोगा does not apply here and consequently a word षष्ठी is not available. Bhar. obviously is referring to the idea (later worded as the Pari. : विधौ परिभाषोपतिष्ठते नानुवादे [93. 10]), according to which a metarule applies where an operation concerned is taught, and not where it is merely alluded to as something *bhūta*, a *fait accompli*.

The *Dīp.* cites the actual use of the word *sthāne* in P. 7. 3. 46 : उदीचामातः स्थाने ... as a clue which justifies the Pari. विधौ परिभाषोपतिष्ठते नानुवादे.

This Sū. says that according to the Northerners, *i* is substituted, when the fem. suffiix *āp* follows, *in the place of a* which has replaced *ā*, preceded by *y* or *k* and which is followed by a suffixal *k*. (Thus we have *caṭakikā* < *caṭakakā*. Here first *caṭakā*>*caṭaka* [P. 7. 4. 13 : केऽणः] when the suffix *ka* taught in P. 5. 3. 70 : प्रागिवात् कः follows.)

This *Jñāpaka* is to be explained thus : In P. 7. 3. 46, अतः (continued from 7. 3. 44) is the *uddeśya* and इत् is the *vidheya*. आतः स्थाने qualifies अत्. Now, if the Pari. विधौ परिभाषा ... etc. was not there, where was the need for actually reading the word स्थाने in P. 7. 3. 46 ? आतः would have automatically meant आतः स्थाने by P. 1. 1. 49 : षष्ठी स्थानेयोगा. The reading of स्थाने in P. 7. 3. 46 would then be superfluous. This apparent superfluousness can be explained only on the hypothesis that elsewhere a Pari. operates only in the *vidheya* part, not in the *uddeśya* or the *anuvāda* part of an injunctive rule. Cf. the *Kāś*. on this rule : स्थानग्रहणमनुवादेऽपि स्थानसंबन्धप्रतिपत्त्यर्थम्. On this the *Padam.* : स्थानग्रहणमनर्थकम्, 'षष्ठी स्थानेयोगा' इति सिद्धत्वादिति। अत आह — स्थानग्रहणमित्यादि। परिभाषाया विधिशेषत्वादनुवादे उपस्थानं न स्यादिति भावः।

Observations : (1) In his *Paribhāṣenduśekhara*, however, Nāg. has refuted this Pari. on the grounds that it has no support of the *Mbh.*, that it has many exceptions, and that the *jñāpaka* can be explained otherwise (Kiel. p. 177. *l*. 9–178. 3).

(2) Bhar. has expressed his view in the present matter already in the *Dīp.* on P. 1. 1. 5 (6. 24 — 7. 4).

(*p*. 33, *l*. 11) द्वितीयं स्थानग्रहणमनुवर्तते. The final solution. It does not matter if the metarule P. 1. 1. 49 is not available. We can have a word *sthāne* by another means. Both P. 1. 1. 49 and 50 contain one *sthāne* each. Let both of them continue into our rule. One will serve the purpose of time-element, and the other will indicate the place.

सप्तम्यन्तमिह ... अण् स्थान इति. This is the first explanation of द्वितीयं स्थानग्रहणम् proposed by some (केचिद् वर्णयन्ति) which Bhar. himself does not

favour. According to this interpretation, स्थान (i. e. स्थाने) is a Locative for Nominative. This has to be done perforce (सामर्थ्यात्), because स्थाने is to be made to give the sense of प्रसज्यमानः 'becoming due', which is to qualify *aṇ*. उः स्थाने स्थाने (= स्थानम्, i. e. प्रसज्यमानः) अण् रपरो भवति — that is the interpretation (which thus requires स्थाने > स्थानम्). Cf. Kaiy. : द्वितीयमिति। तच्चार्थात् प्रथमान्तं संपद्यते.

In वयं तु ब्रूमः ... etc. Bhar. gives his own view. He says that when Pat. paraphrases स्थाने by प्रसज्यमानः he is merely mentioning the final outcome. He is not saying that the Locative is to be actually turned into the Nominative. स्थाने is to be retained as it is, its meaning being काले. (स्थानपदेन प्रसङ्गकालो लक्ष्यत इति भावः as Nāg. says). What Bhar. says in a roundabout way (यस्मिन् काले ... रपरत्वमिति), Kaiy. says briefly and clearly : प्रसङ्ग एवात्राण् रपरो भवति. The upshot of both the views is that the *aṇ* is already furnished with a prefixed *r* before it takes the place of *ṛ*.

Incidentally, Bhar. and Kaiy. differ in their preferences. Bhar. refuses to actually transform the Locative into the Nominative. Kaiy. prefers it (not in so many words, but by giving it the first place).

(*p*. 33, *l*. 15) अपरः कल्पः. Another alternative. This is a suggestion by Bhar. himself made on his own. Although the passage is not very clear (particularly towards the end, which we have left untranslated), Bhar. seems to suggest that the suggestion द्वितीयं स्थानग्रहणमनुवर्तते made in the *Mbh*. should be combined with the two major views of the interpretation of P. 1. 1. 51 itself discussed so far, viz. (1) अपवाद, and (2) नियम. He seems to suggest that if this is done, then even those two views, which are rejected in the *Mbh*., can be valid.

Bhar. further seems to add that this validity is restricted, viz. to the province of the Guṇa and Vṛddhi substitution. If the condition द्वितीयं स्थानग्रहणमनुवर्तते is observed, then the defect गुणवृद्ध्योरवर्णाप्रतिपत्तिः becomes remedied. Bhar. implies that the other defect, उदात्तादिषु दोषः, however, still persists.

But, as said above, the concluding part of this passage is not clear to us and so we desist from making any comments on it. It is also noteworthy that Kaiy. has totally ignored this passage.

The first *adhikaraṇa* ends here. Kaiy. shows here how with the *prasaṅge raparatva* interpretation finally adopted, there is no difficulty now. Read : इदानीमुदात्तादिषु दोषो नास्ति, 'स्थानेऽन्तरतमः' इत्यनया परिभाषया 'कृतिः' इत्यादावृकारस्य ऋकार एव प्रवर्तते इत्यणः प्रसङ्ग एव नास्ति। गुणवृद्धी च ऋकारस्य विधीयमाने अरारावेवान्तरतम्याद् भवत इत्यवर्णप्रतिपत्तिरप्यस्ति।

Readings : (1) (*p.* 30, *ll.* 23-24) AL °विषयमात्रत्वम्. — (2) (*p.* 30, *l.* 24) MS (as usual) निवर्तं°. — (3) (*p.* 30, *l.* 24) MS निवर्त्यस्यवि, AL निर्वृत्तस्यापि (for निर्वर्त्यं [चा]स्यैव). — (4) (*p.* 30, *l.* 26) MSAL षष्ठ्यभावाद् (for षष्ठी[सद्]भावात्). — (5) (*p.* 31, *l.* 1) MS [अ]पूर्वमचिद्योगो; AL °मपि योगो. — (6) (*p.* 31, *l.* 1) MSAL °समानादेशान्(AL °देशं) (for °तमाना°). — (7) (*p.* 31, *l.* 1) MS निवर्तयति. — (8) (*p.* 31, *l.* 3) MSAL यतः (for य उः). — (9) (*p.* 31, *l.* 4) MS °ववापेक्षा; AL °वत्यपेक्षा (for °व[त्ये]वापेक्षा). —(10) (*p.* 31, *l.* 4) MSAL यतः (for य उः). — (11) (*p.* 31, *l.* 5) MSAL अण्भूत(AL °ताः) (for अणो भूताः). — (12) (*p.* 31, *l.* 7) AL दोषः । अधि°. — (13) (*p.* 31, *l.* 8) MS तृत्य इत्येतनुनुक्षार्थं; AL कृतिः । एतदुदात्तार्थं (for ?). — (14) (*p.* 31, *l.* 10) MS तदिति; AL त इति (for उदिति). — (15) (*p.* 31, *l.* 12) MS सूतवेदनेन; AL सूत्रवदनेन (for our suggested भूते चेद°). — (16) (*p.* 31, *l.* 13) MS अणो (for अण्). — (17) (*p.* 31, *l.* 14) MS किमंस्तिकरं (for किमस्ति कारणं as in AL). — (18) (*p.* 31, *l.* 19) AL तत्र (for तन्न). — (19) (*p.* 31, *l.* 22) AL वृद्धि ... रपरा. — (20) (*p.* 31, *l.* 23) MS था; AL तथा (for या). — (21) (*p.* 31, *l.* 24) MS तत्रापौन; AL °णो न (for °णेव).—(22) (*p.* 31, *l.* 25) MSAL भवत्. — (23) (*p.* 31, *l.* 25) AL °बद्धत्वमिति. — (23A) (*p.* 31, *l.* 26) MS शुयं; AL उः स्थानेष्वयं (for ?).—(24) (*p.* 31, *l.* 27) MS तिवृत्ति- (for निवृत्ति-).—(25) (*p.* 32, *l.* 5) MS य (for अयं as in AL). — (26) (*p.* 32, *l.* 6) MS उदात्तोदन्तरतमो (for °त्तादयोऽन्तरतमा as in AL). — (27) (*p.* 32, *l.* 7) MSAL अच् (for अच). — (28) (*p.* 32, *l.* 8) AL °स्थापिते अन्तरतमे प्रवर्त°. — (29) (*p.* 32, *ll.* 8-9) AL °मानामेव (for the MS °मानोमुवे(?)). — (30) (*p.* 32, *ll.* 11-12) MS अनंतरतम- (for अन्तरतम-). — (31) (*p.* 32, *l.* 13) MS इत्यवकाशः. — (32) (*p.* 32, *l.* 16) MS भवतिष्यति. — (33) (*p.* 32, *l.* 18) AL अच् (for अच). — (34) (*p.* 32, *l.* 18) MS प्रसंगेनांतरमे; AL °नान्तरतमे. — (35) (*p.* 32, *l.* 21) MSAL निवृत्तिर् (for our suggested emendation प्रवृत्तिर्). — (36) (*p.* 32, *l.* 22) MSAL नियमो (for our suggested emendation योगो). — (37) (*p.* 32, *l.* 22) MSAL चकारे(AL °रै)कारयोर्. — (38) (*p.* 32, *l.* 26) MSAL यत्तु (for ऽयं तु). — (39) (*p.* 32, *l.* 27–*p.* 33, *l.* 1) MS नियमो वृत्तिर्; AL °मो निवृत्तिर् (for our emendation न नियमो निर्वृत्तिर्). — (40) (*p.* 33, *l.* 1) MSAL निवृत्ति (for निर्वृ°). — (41) (*p.* 33, *l.* 8) MSAL षष्ठीभूतो(AL °त) (for षष्ठी भूत). — (42) (*p.* 33, *ll.* 8–9) MS स्थानमिति. — (43) (*p.* 33, *l.* 11) MS drops the *Mbh.* प्रकृतम्. — (44) (*p.* 33, *l.* 13) MS रपरश्चैवेदं; AL °रस्यैवेदं (for our emendation °रश्चैवं चेदं). — (45) (*p.* 33, *l.* 16) MSAL एव (for एवं). — (46) (*p.* 33, *l.* 17) MS तावपूर्वो; AL तावत् पूर्वो (for तावदपूर्वो). — (47) (*p.* 33, *ll.* 17–18) MS °यंतेतोप-; AL °यते । तेनाप- (for °यते । अतोऽप-).—(48) (*p.* 33, *l.* 18) AL ततः (for ऽतः). — (49) (*p.* 33, *l.* 18) AL गुणवृद्धीति. — (50) (*p.* 33, *l.* 22) AL सामर्थ्यात् प्रा°. —(51) (*p.* 33, *ll.* 22–23) AL -प्रसङ्गे तेषाम्. — (52) (*p.* 33, *l.* 24) AL दोषप्रति-.

[2]

This section discusses the question whether the word *aṇ* in P. 1. 1. 51 can be dispensed with. If the word *aṇ* is dropped, the rest of the rule will mean

that a substitute (*aṇ* or any other one) of *ṛ* gets a *r*-suffixion. What difference will it make? The *Mbh.* introduces this section thus :

अथाण्ग्रहणं किमर्थम् ? न ऊ रपरो भवतीत्येवोच्येत ? ' ऊ रपरः ' इतीयत्युच्यमाने क इदानीं रपरः स्यात् ? य उः स्थाने भवति । कश्च उः स्थाने भवति ? आदेशः ।

Then the *Mbh.* introduces the *Vār.* : आदेशो रपर इति चेत् etc. which enumerates the cases where *r*-suffixion will result undesirably because of the extension of the rule and suggests that prohibition will have to be made in their case. The *Dīp.* has this very brief introduction to this *Mbh.* : उत्तरप्रबन्धोपन्यासोऽयम्.

(*p.* 33, *l.* 25) पैतृष्वसेयः.

This is one of the examples where the resulting *r*-suffixion will have to be prohibited. The *Mbh.* reads :

'आदेशो रपर इति चेद्रीरिविधिषु रपरप्रतिषेधः' (वा. ४) । आदेशो रपर इति चेद्रीरिविधिषु रपरत्वस्य प्रतिषेधो वक्तव्यः । के पुना रीरिविधयः ? अकङ्लोपानङनङ्रीङ्रिङादेशाः । अकङ् — सौधातकिः । अकङ् ॥ लोप — पैतृष्वसेयः । लोप ॥ आनङ् — होतापोतारौ । आनङ् ॥ अनङ् — कर्ता । हर्ता । अनङ् ॥ रीङ् — मात्रीयति, पित्रीयति । रीङ् ॥ रिङ् — क्रियते, ह्रियते । रिङ् ॥

Of these Bhar. is interested only in पैतृष्वसेय and होतापोतारौ.

In पैतृष्वसेय 'son of the father's sister' (पितृष्वसृ+ढक् [= एय]), the final vowel *ṛ* of the stem is dropped by P. 4. 1. 133 : ढकि लोपः. Here, the *lopa* is the substitute (*ādeśa*) of *ṛ*. Therefore, by आदेशो रपरः view, there will have to be a *r*-suffixion after it (although there is no *aṇ* substitute). This will result in the wrong form **paitṛṣvasreya*. Hence the *Vār.* : रपरप्रतिषेधः. Bhar. does not explain this point, obviously because he thought it too simple to require an explanation. Instead, he examines a probable objection against inclusion of this case in the *Vār.* The objection is : लोपवचनं किमर्थम् ? This is what the objector is supposed to argue : Pāṇini's framing of the rule ढकि लोपः is already a sufficient clue to show that he does not want a *r* in *paitṛṣvaseya.* For, if he had wanted a *r* there, it was not necessary for him to do anything. He would simply have not read the rule ढकि लोपः. By mere *yaṇ-saṁdhi*, he would have **paitṛṣvasreya* from *pitṛṣvasṛ+eya.* The only purpose behind framing P. 4. 1. 133 : ढकि लोपः is to convey that the form is °*ṣvaseya*, and not °*ṣvasreya.* Pāṇini's intention being thus quite clear, there is now no need to include the example of *pitṛṣvaseya* in the present *Vār.* Read Nāg. : ननु लोपस्य रपरत्वे तं विनापि यणादेशेन तत्साध्यरूपसिद्धिरत आह — लोपेति (on the *Prad.* लोपवचनं सर्वादेशार्थं स्यात). This objection (लोपवचनं किमर्थम्) is replied in the *Dīp.* सर्वादेशार्थं, परादिपक्षे वा रत्वार्थमिति.

(1) सर्वादेशार्थम् — This is one explanation. Pāṇini's framing his rule 4. 1. 133 cannot necessarily be understood as being meant for indicating that there is no *r* in *paitṛṣvaseya*. It can be explained on another hypothesis also. For aught we know, Pāṇini may have intended to convey that the whole stem *pitṛṣvasṛ* is deleted (literally, replaced by *lopa*) !

This solution is repeated by Kaiy. also (as mentioned above), but Nāg. differs. Read : यदि सर्वादेशो लोपस्तदा उः स्थाने नेति कथं रपरत्वमितीदं चिन्त्यम् (*Uddy.*).

(2) परादिपक्षे वा रुत्वार्थमिति. Another alternative hypothesis. The teaching of the deletion of the final *ṛ* (P. 4. 1. 133) could be for ensuring a *ru*-substitution for *pitṛṣvas* (°*ṣvas* > °*ṣvar*) on the *parādi* view.

This is what is meant by the *parādi* view : here the *r* which is suffixed is regarded as the initial element of the following word-bit. (For the three different views in this matter, see section [4].) Thus, if Pāṇini had not framed his rule 4. 1. 133, then *pitṛṣvasṛ + eya* would give *paitṛṣvasr* (P. 6. 1. 77) + *eya* which, on the *parādi* view would be analysed as *paitṛṣvas + reya.* Since the suffix (*reya*) begins with a consonant, the word *paitṛṣvas* will be regarded as having the designation *pada* by P. 1. 4. 17 : स्वादिष्वसर्वनामस्थाने (and not *bha*, which would have been its designation, if the analysis had been *paitṛṣvasr-eya*). A result of this designation *pada* is that the final *s* of *paitṛṣvas* is replaced by *r*(*u*) according to P. 8. 2. 66 : ससजुषो रुः.

The point is that Pāṇini's framing of 4. 1. 133 can be explained on this hypothesis also, viz. that Pāṇini wanted a *ru*-substitution for the final of the stem. It does not necessarily prove that Pāṇini thereby wants to convey that there is no *r*-suffixion in *paitṛṣvaseya*.

Observation : Both the reasons (सर्वादेशार्थं ... रुत्वार्थं वा) appear, at least to us, fantastic. If worked out, they result into wrong forms. The grammarians cannot be said to be unaware of this fact. If, in spite of it, they advance such arguments, it is obviously because, as *lakṣaṇaikacakṣuṣka*, their sole, or at any rate major, concern seems to be to somehow defend the grammatical system against the attack of the opponent.

(P. 33, *l*. 26) होतापोतारौ । रेफस्य संयोगान्तलोपे ... etc.

This is a Dvandva compound (meaning two particular sacrificial priests) of *hotṛ + potṛ* where the first constituent first becomes *hotān* (P. 6. 3. 25 : आनङ् ऋतो द्वंद्वे) and subsequently *hotā* (with elision of final *n* by P. 8. 2. 7 : नलोपः प्रातिपदिकान्तस्य).

Here, says the objector, if आदेशो रपरः is followed, then we will get **hotān* in the first constituent. The final *r* is dropped by P. 8. 2. 23 : संयोगान्तस्य लोपः. After this the final *n* also is expected to go. But, technically, *n* is not final since the elision of *r* is *asiddha* (P. 8. 2. 1 : पूर्वत्रासिद्धम्) and so it is still *r*, and not *n*, which is final. In order to prevent the wrong form, the suffixion of *r* itself has to be laid down.

A parallel given is that of *pacan* (vocative sing. of the present participle *paca(n)t*), where also *n* is not deleted, since the following *t*, though deleted, is as good as present there, the *saṁyogāntalopa* being *asiddha*.

Kaiy. follows Bhar. (रेफस्य संयोगान्तलोपे कृते तस्यासिद्धत्वान्नलोपो न स्यात्), but Nāg. does not think that this is an insuperable difficulty. So, according to him the real defect is the appearance of *r* in the form (तस्माद्रेफश्रवणमेव दोषोऽत्रेति बाध्यम्).

[3]

(*p.* 34, *l.* 1) एकादेशस्योपसंख्यानम् (*Vār.* 6). Bhar. skips over *Vār.* 5 (उदात्तादृषु च). The *Mbh.* on the *Vār.* 6 reads thus : एकादेशस्योपसंख्यानं कर्तव्यम्। खट्वर्श्यः, मालर्श्यः। किं पुनः कारणं न सिध्यति? उः स्थानेऽण् प्रसज्यमान एव रपरो भवतीत्युच्यते। न चायमुरेव स्थानेऽण् शिष्यते। किं तर्हि? उश्चान्यस्य च।

This *Vār.* says that *r*-suffixion should be extended to those cases where an *aṇ* is a single substitute, which is taught not for a pure *ṛ*, but for a group : *ṛ*+some other phoneme, e. g. in *khaṭvarśya* (*khaṭvā*+*ṛśya*). The Guṇa (i. e. *a*) taught here as a substitute (P. 6. 1. 87 : आद् गुणः) replaces both the preceding *ā* and the following *ṛ* (P. 6. 1. 84 : एकः पूर्वपरयोः). Since the whole group (*ā*+*ṛ*) is the *sthānin*, and not *ṛ* alone, the present rule उरण् रपरः does not apply and *r* is not available, although desired. Hence the *Vār.* : एकादेशस्योपसंख्यानम्. Read. Kaiy. : पूर्वपरयोरिति समुदायस्य स्थानित्वेन चोदितत्वात् तस्य च ऋवर्णरूपत्वाभावादिति भावः. (Incidentally, Nāg. justifies समुदायस्य स्थानित्वेन चोदितत्वात् on the ground : द्वंद्वस्य सत्त्वात्.)

The *Dīp.* यथा कन्याप्रतिग्रहे ... etc. unnecessarily makes a simple point difficult. It seeks to illustrate the principle involved here by citing a practice, as mentioned in some Gṛhyasūtra, regarding the formal acceptance of the bride (कन्याप्रतिग्रहे) by the father of the bridegroom. The *Dīp.* seems to say that the ornaments and garment of the bride are not separately mentioned as being for Agni (*Agnaye*) and Bṛhaspati (*Bṛhaspataye*) respectively. The whole is declared to be for Prajāpati. Similarly the substitute here is for the whole group, not for any constituent of it separately.

(*p.* 34, *l.* 3) एवमिह 'पूर्वपरयोः' ... etc. The idea : Although the original is mentioned in the form of the two constituents (पूर्वपरयोः), the substitute is not for only one constitutent but for the whole group together. Only it is named after the parts (समुदायः ... पूर्वपरावयवत्वात् 'पूर्वपरयोः' इत्युच्यते).

After a parallel from the ritual, Bhar. gives a parallel from grammar in यथा प्रवणमिति ... etc. According to P. 8. 4. 4–5 (वनं पुरगा ...... ग्रेभ्यः। प्रनिरन्तः ... संज्ञायामपि) *n* becomes *ṇ* in the environments mentioned, one of which is प्र+ वन. Here although a single phoneme *n* gets *ṇ*-substitution, Pāṇini mentions the whole word *vana* as undergoing this substitution.

The parallel seems to be quite superficial, and has no deeper significance.

(P. 34, *l.* 6) अवयवग्रहणात् सिद्धम्. This is a part of the *Vār*. 7 (अवयवग्रहणात् सिद्धमिति चेदादेशे रान्तप्रतिषेधः) anticipated by Pat. The *Mbh.* on it runs as follows : यदत्र ऋवर्णं तदाश्रयं रपरत्वं भविष्यति। तद्यथा — माषा न भोक्तव्या इत्युक्ते मिश्रा अपि न भुज्यन्ते। A rule of eating, say prohibition of eating beans, applies not only to a dish consisting purely of beans, but equally to mixed dishes, where beans form only one of the ingredients. What applies to an *avayava* applies also to an *avayavin*. Similarly, what applies to an independent *ṛ* (*r*-substitution), applies equally to a group of which *ṛ* is a part. So *r*-substitution is established in the case of *khaṭvā+ṛśya* also. A separate provision (*upasaṁkhyāna*) is not necessary. The *Dīp*. अस्त्यस्मिन् समुदाये ... etc. discusses this *Mbh.* position. The *Dīp*. अस्त्यस्मिन् समुदाये ... न भुज्यन्ते merely explains the point raisd in the *Mbh.* while the *Dīp*. अयं तु न्यायो विरुध्यते ... etc. contains a criticism of it.

(*p.* 34, *l.* 8) अयं तु न्यायो विरुध्यते ... etc. An objection against अवयवग्रहणात् सिद्धम्. It is argued that such a procedure violates the maxim नाव्यपवृक्तस्यावयवे तद्विधिर्यथा द्रव्येषु laid down by Kāt. in his *Vār*. 9 on the Śiva-sūtras : एओङ्। ऐऔच्. According to this maxim, the rule which prohibits selling of ghee does not apply to selling of cows and the one which prohibits selling of oil does not apply to selling of mustard seeds. Similarly, says the *Dīp*., what applies to a substitute of an independent or pure *ṛ* should not apply to a combination of *ṛ*+another phoneme.

Observation : (1) The maxim नाव्यपवृक्तस्य ... applies to an integrated whole where parts are not felt to be separate, where the whole is *avyapavṛkta*. In our case, however, how the combination *ā+ṛ* (in *khaṭvā+ṛśya*), where the division is clearly felt, could be designated as *avyapavṛkta* and how the *Dīp*. could invoke that maxim, we do not know.

(2) Although the MS clearly reads विद्य(or °ध्य)ते (*p.* 34, *l.* 8), on a consideration of a similar passage in the *Dīp*. under the Śiva-sūtras *eoṅ/aiauc*

(mentioned above) we have emended it to विरुध्यते which suits the context well. To make the sense clear we have added a तु after अयं (which also occurs in that passage). That passage runs as : यथा तर्हि घृतं तैलमिति। एतदुक्तं भवति न संभवमात्रात् प्रतिपत्तिर्युक्ता। सत्यपि घृततैलसंभवे घृतशब्दस्य गोशब्देनानभिधानात्। तैलरूपस्य च सर्षपशब्देनानभिधानात् तयोर्विक्रयो भवति। एवं हि संभवमात्रे गोविक्रयी मांसविक्रय्यपि स्यात्। एष तु न्यायो विरुध्यते, माषा न भोक्तव्या इति। अनेन हि माषा हि व्यतिमिश्रा अपि न भुज्यन्ते। सुरापेयेति मिश्रा अपि न पीयते।

(*p.* 34, *l.* 10) एवं च सति सुरादीनाम् ... etc. A refutation of the above argument. The *Dīp.* continues discussion of the earlier example of beans, to which it now adds *surā* (wine). The scriptures do not permit eating of a mixed dish, even when beans form a very insignificant part of it. Similarly wine, however small a part it may form of other permitted drinks with which it may be mixed, is not permitted. This is so because there is no objective test to lay down that this much percentage is permissible and beyond that it is impermissible. The smallest percentage of such prohibited things impose their nature on the whole product. (The *Dīp.* adds that if, in spite of the prohibition of the scriptures, people indulge in such eating and drinking, that is because of the irresistible nature of the pleasures of the palate (अर्थित्वप्रसक्तम्)!)

Observation : The *Dīp.* एवं च सति ... नाम्नातम् is not clear. The MS सुरादीनामष्टत° is corrupt. We have tentatively emended it to °नां व्यपवृक्त°. Here the *Dīp.* perhaps means that sometimes even in the case of an *avyapavṛkta* whole, an operation applies to its parts. Nobody says wine is a separable or seperately felt part of mixed drinks. Sill prohibition of drinking wine applies to mixed drinks. A dish made of beans mixed with some other ingredient is *avyapavṛkta*. Still scriptures prohibit it. So नाव्यपवृक्तस्य ... etc. is not a universal rule.

In समुदाये च कार्यं (*l.* 13) ... etc., the *Dīp.* says that according to the *Mbh.* there is emphasis on the constituents of the compound पूर्वपरयोः (obviously because it is an *itaretara* Dvandva), and not on the whole. So no operation is taught for the whole ($\bar{a} + \d{r}$). It is the individual constituent that will receive the operation of *ṛ*-suffixion (समुदाये च कार्यं न किंचिदुपदिष्टमिति अवयवाश्रयो भवति व्यापारः).

Kaiy. uses a technical expression viz. उद्भूतावयवभेद to make the position clear. He says : पूर्वपरयोरित्यनेनोद्भूतावयवभेदः समुदायो निर्दिश्यते। अवयवावेव चापेक्षितपरस्परौ समुदाय इति भवत्ययम् ऋवर्णस्य स्थान इति भावः। On this, the *Uddy.* : उद्भूतेति। अत एव द्विवचननिर्देशः। तत्सामर्थ्यादेव प्रत्येकं स्थानित्वबुद्धिरिति भावः।

(*p.* 34, *l.* 15) एवं तु कल्प्यमान 'आदेशे रान्तप्रतिषेधः'. Here the *Vār.* and the *Mbh.* on it run as follows : 'अवयवग्रहणात् सिद्धमिति चेदादेशे रान्तप्रतिषेधः'

(वा॰ ७)। अवयवग्रहणात् सिद्धमिति चेदादेशे रान्तस्य प्रतिषेधो वक्तव्यः। होतापोतारौ। यथैव उश्चान्यस्य च स्थानेऽण् रपरो भवति, एवं य उः स्थानेऽण् चानण् च सोऽपि रपरः स्यात्।

Here the Vārttikakāra points out the defect which will follow if one relies on the argument अवयवग्रहणात् सिद्धम्. Just as there is a possibility of *ṛ* with some other phoneme in the *sthānin*, there is equally a possibility of *aṇ* + *anaṇ* in the substitute (the expression आदेशे in the *Vār.* means अणनण्घटिते आदेशे). The substitute *ān* (*aṅ*) (which we came across earlier in the case of होतापोतारौ) is one such case. It consists of an *aṇ* (viz. the initial *ā*) + an *anaṇ* (viz. the following *n*). On the view अवयवग्रहणात् सिद्धम्, आन्, a combination of *aṇ* + *anaṇ* will be regarded as *aṇ*, resulting into an undesired *r*-suffixion in होतापोतारौ. To avoid it, a prohibitive rule आदेशे रप्रतिषेधः will have to be made.

(*p.* 34, *l.* 17) कथं पुनः न्यायः परित्यज्यते. Here by *nyāya* obviously नाव्यपवृक्तस्यावयवे ... etc. is meant. (We have already said above that we cannot understand how the groups *ā* + *r* or *ān* could be regarded as *avyapavṛkta*.)

Both the text as it is in the MS and the idea it intends to convey are not very clear. Only a broad outline can be given. The *Dīp.* seems to say that since the opponent has chosen to adopt the view that the part in a whole can undergo the operation taught for (apparently) that element when it is independent, there is the original *ṛ*, in the primary sense of the term, and also the substitute *ā* (a part of *ān*) which is an *aṇ*, again in the primary sense of the term (*mukhyaḥ*). If the view that the whole replaces the whole (समुदाये ... निवर्तकत्वाच्च) had been accepted, then there would not be a difficulty in the case of *ān*. For here, then, it is the whole *ān* that is the substitute, and not *ā* (which could be regarded as a substitute only in a secondary sense of the term). Although an *aṇ*, *ā* would be rid of the undesired *r*-suffixion by the absence of its status as a substitute. If, however (*atha tu*), the opponent wants to stick to his stand that *ṛ* is the *sthānin* in *ā* + *ṛ* (because it is convenient to him in *khaṭvā* + *ṛśya*), by taking advantage of the literal meaning, then he has to face the situation in the case of the substitute *ān* where *r*-suffixion becomes inevitable on the *avayavagrahaṇa* argument.

The MS तुल्यारूपेतिग्रह (*p.* 34, *l.* 21) is corrupt. We cannot make out what the original reading could be.

(*p.* 34, *l.* 22) यदि पुनः ऋवर्णान्तस्य स्थानिनः. This *pratīka* represents the following *Mbh.*: यदि पुनरृवर्णान्तस्य स्थानिनो रपरत्वमुच्येत, खट्वर्श्यः, मालर्श्यः। नैवं शक्यम्। इह न प्रसज्येत — कर्ता, हर्ता। किरति, गिरति। ऋवर्णान्तस्येत्युच्यते, न चैतदृवर्णान्तम्।

The *avayavagrahaṇavādin* now suggests another way. By ṛ we can understand what ends in ṛ. In *khaṭvā* + *ṛśya* the group *ā* + ṛ ends in ṛ. So the Guṇa *a*, the substitute for both *ā* and ṛ, can have *r*-suffixion.

Bhar. mentions two views as to how *tadantavidhi* can be had here. According to some the word *anta* should be actually added to the rule, while according to others this can be secured on the basis of the rule P. 1. 1. 72: येन विधिस्तदन्तस्य.[1]

Kaiy. justifies the *tadantavidhi* by saying : उरिति वर्णग्रहणाद् वर्णग्रहणं च सर्वत्र तदन्तविधिं प्रयोजयतीति न्यायाद् ऋवर्णान्तस्य ग्रहणम्। खट्वर्श्य इत्यत्र च समुदाय ऋवर्णान्तो भवतीति सिद्धं रपरत्वम्। Nāg. explains this thus : शब्दशास्त्रप्रस्तावात् शब्दरूपं विशेष्यमादाय तदन्तविधिः (i. e. by P. 1. 1. 72: येन विधिस्तदन्तस्य) इति भावः।

Here is an interesting aspect of the problem involved. When *r*-suffixion in *khaṭvarśya* is sought to be accounted for on the basis of *tadantavidhi*, the *Mbh.* immediately refutes the argument, saying that in that way *r*-suffixion will not be available in *kartā* etc. where ṛ is a single, independent vowel. This is said on the assumption that the rule अङ्गस्य (P. 6. 4. 1) is to be interpreted as अङ्गस्य इको गुणः स्यात्. If, however, *ikaḥ* is made to qualify *aṅgasya* (i. e. इगन्ताङ्गस्य गुणः स्यात्), then similarly ṛ also can be made to qualify *aṅgasya* and consequently *tadantavidhi* becomes available. The *Mbh.* न चैतद्वर्णान्तं then cannot be accounted for. So Kaiy. says : 'अङ्गस्य' इति षष्ठी अन्त्यमल्मुपसंहरतेति ऋवर्णस्य गुणेन भाव्यम्। न च ऋवर्णम् ऋवर्णान्तो भवतीति दोषः। On this, Nāg.: नन्विकाङ्क्षे विशेष्यमाणे तदन्तविधेर्ऋवर्णान्तस्य गुणेन भाव्यम् ['तथा च भाष्यासंगतिः' *Chāyā*] अत आह — अङ्गस्येति।

Here the *Dīp.* considers a possibility where one may interpret the rules concerned as इगन्ताङ्गस्य योऽन्त्य ऋवर्णः तस्य गुणः. Here ṛ does not qualify *aṅgasya* and so *tadantavidhi*, though permitted, is not available in our example. So *r*-suffixion will not be available. In view of this possibility, says the *Dīp.*, the *Mbh.* has advanced the argument एतदपि व्यपदेशिवद्भावेन ... etc. as a solution.

अप्राप्तानुसंहारः (*l.* 24). There is a difference of opinion as to whether we can take उः in the sense of ऋकारान्तस्य on the strength of the तदन्तविधि. (1) The rule P. 1. 1. 72 requires some substantive, either expressly stated, or what can be easily understood. Here there is no such substantive. The other view, however, is that in a grammatical text, one can supply शब्दरूपम् as a substantive, wherever one is needed. (2) According to some, even supposing that a substantive is not required, the rule P. 1. 1. 72 does not apply here because उः is mentioned in the subject part of the rule (P. 1. 1. 51). The तदन्तविधि is not

1. Obviously so, though not so expressly stated in the *Dīp.*

available in view of the dictum, विधौ परिभाषोपतिष्ठते, नानुवादे. Others do not recognize this dictum.

Bhar. does not say anything specifically on these points. He simply makes a hypothetical statement : *yadi ... abhisambadhyate*.

(*p.* 35, *l.* 1) अर्थवता व्यपदेशिवद्भावः. This *pratīka* stands for the following *Mbh.* अर्थवता व्यपदेशिवद्भावः। न चैषोऽर्थवान्। तस्मान्नैवं शक्यम्।

The *Mbh.* says that *ṛ* cannot be looked upon as *ṛvarṇānta* on the strength of *vyapadeśivadhāva* (imagining difference in a thing which is a partless whole and establishing some sort of relationship between them). For, one can imagine a difference in a phoneme provided it is meaningful (अर्थवता व्यपदेशिवद्भावः). To take a concrete example : A phoneme *i* is, by itself, without a meaning. When looked upon as a root, however, it becomes meaningful (meaning ' to go ' etc.). In this case, therefore, we can say, by resorting to *vyapadeśivadbhāva*, that the verbal root *i* ends in the vowel *i*, or that root has a vowel *i*. By assuming meaningfulness (in one case : root) and meaninglessness (in another : phoneme), we can make such statements which are based on difference (... अर्थोपादानत्यागाभ्यां भेदः शक्यते कल्पयितुम्). If, not being a root etc. a phoneme is not capable of such meaning, as our *ṛ* in question, it cannot be subjected to *vyapadeśivabhāva*.

It may be noted, *en passant*, that the *Dīp.* अर्थोपादानत्यागाभ्याम् by itself is not clear. Its meaning is understood only when it is amplified in the *Prad.* thus : यथैवेयायेत्यत्रैकाच्त्वम्, अर्थस्य हि [1]त्यागोपादानाभ्यां वर्णरूपता धातुरूपता च व्यवस्थाप्यते।

A *laukika* counter-example for अर्थवता व्यपदेशिवद्भावः is घटस्य घटः. Like this, the *tadantavidhi* on the strength of *vyapadeśivadbhāva* is impossible in the case of *ṛ* also.

(*p.* 35, *l.* 2) इह च रपरत्वस्य प्रतिषेधो वक्तव्यः, मातुः पितुरिति. This is preceded in the *Mbh.* by : न चेदेवम्, उपसंख्यानं कर्तव्यम्। (इह च ... etc.).

Let us take a review of what has gone before. It was suggested in the *Vār.* (6) : एकादेशस्योपसंख्यानम् that since in cases like *khaṭvā* + *ṛśya* the single substitute *a* is not a substitute for *ṛ* alone, but for the group *ā* + *ṛ* P. 1. 1. 51 cannot apply and we cannot have the desired *r*-suffixion (*ar*) to arrive at the correct form *khaṭvarśya*, a special provision should be made for such cases involving an *ekādeśa*. This suggestion was opposed with a counter-proposal viz. that the presence of *ṛ* in the group *ā* + *ṛ* could suffice for the operation of

1. Bhar.'s अर्थोपादानत्यागाभ्यां violates P. 2. 2. 34 : अल्पाच्तरम्। Kaiy. rectifies the small error.

P. 1. 1. 51 on the parallel of the prohibition of eating of mixed beans. Apart from the doubtful veracity of the proposal (since it apparently conflicts with the dictum नाव्यपवृक्तस्यावयवे ... etc.), it was shown that it leads to a wrong *r*-suffixion in *hotāpotārau* etc. Then a second proposal was advanced. It was suggested that by *tadantavidhi*, the *ṛ* should be understood as what ends in *ṛ* (i. e. *ā*+*ṛ*). But, it was promptly pointed out by the opponent that this would make *r*-suffixion impossible in forms like *kartā* etc., since there is no group ending in *ṛ*. Even the summoning of help from *vyapadeśivadbhāva* is not possible, since this imagination of difference in a single entity is available where the phoneme is a meaningful unit (like a verbal root) which it is not in the present case. Since these alternative proposals are not found to be useful, the *Mbh*. returns to the original proposal (न चेदेवम्, उपसंख्यानं कर्तव्यम्).

But the *Mbh*. is also aware of over-extension involved in the *upasaṁkhyāna* (उपसंख्यानस्यातिव्याप्त्या, Kaiy.). There will be an undesired *r* suffixion in forms like *mātuḥ* (Abl., Gen. sing. of *mātṛ*.). But this difficulty can be averted by adding a prohibitive clause in the *upasaṁkhyāna* (इह च रपरत्वस्य प्रतिषेधो वक्तव्यः — मातुः, पितुरिति).

(*p*. 35, *l*. 3) एवं मन्यते ... etc. This *Dīp*. elaborates on the wrong form resulting in the case of *mātuḥ* etc. because of the *upasaṁkhyāna* by giving the *prakriyā* thus :

मातृ + अस्	
मात् + उ + स्	'ऋत उत्' (पा. ६. १. १११)
मात् + उर् + स्	'उरण् रपरः' (पा. १. १. ५१)
मात् + उर् + र्	'ससजुषो रुः' (पा. ८. २. ६६)
मात् + उ० + र्	'रो रि' (पा. ८. ३. १४)
मातूर्	'ढ्रलोपे पूर्वस्य दीर्घोऽणः' (पा. ६. ३. १११)
मातूः	'खरवसानयोर्विसर्जनीयः' (पा. ८. ३. १५)

Since a wrong form (with *ū*) results, the *r*-suffixion will have to be prohibited here. The rest of the *prakriyā* then will be :

मात् + उ + स्	
मात् + उ + र्	'ससजुषो रुः' (पा. ८. २. ६६)
मातुः	'खरवसानयोर्विसर्जनीयः' (पा. ८. ३. १५)

(*p*. 35, *l*. 6) उभयं न कर्तव्यम्. Here comes the final view of the *Mbh.* Both (i. e. the Upasaṁkhyāna and the prohibition of *r*-suffixion in *mātuḥ*, as the *Dīp*. supplies) are unnecessary. The *Mbh*. runs thus : उभयं न वक्तव्यम् । कथम् ?

यो द्वयोः षष्ठीनिर्दिष्टयोः प्रसङ्गे भवति, लभतेऽसावन्यतरतो व्यपदेशम्। तद्यथा — देवदत्तस्य पुत्रः, देवदत्तायाः पुत्र इति।

When a thing A is related to two other things, B and C, in one and the same property, there is nothing wrong in mentioning *only one* of the two (either B or C) as being related in that particular way with A. The son of Devadatta (father) and Devadattā (mother) can be mentioned simply as 'Devadatta's son' or 'Devadattā's son'. The combined designation is not always necessary. Similarly, although *a* may be the substitute of both *ā* and *ṛ* (in *khaṭvā+ṛśya*), it can be described simply as 'substitute of *ṛ*' (or even substitute of *ā*, if and when that is necessary). So no difficulty.

The *Dīp.* पूर्वपरयोरित्यनेन ... etc. says the same thing in a technical way. The ruls P. 6. 1. 84 : एकः पूर्वपरयोः mentions the two *sthānin*-s in their individual capacities, not as one integrated whole. This is so because प्रत्येकं वाक्यपरिसमाप्तिः is also an acknowledged view. (That is why all the three, *ā*, *ai* and *au*, are individually understood as being named *aic* in P. 1. 1. 1.) The *Dīp.* also discovers a clue for this argument, viz. the reading of the word *ekaḥ* in this rule (P. 6. 1. 84). If the whole group had been meant to be designated as *sthānin*, there would be no necessity for using *ekaḥ*. For, even otherwise, there would be only one substitute for one *sthānin*. The fact that Pāṇini specifically says 'a single (substitute)' indicates that he had foreseen the possibility of two such substitutes (e. g. *a a*) forcing themselves, which further implies that the dual *pūrvaparayoḥ* can be taken severally (लिङ्गं चैकग्रहणं स्थानभेदात् भेदो मा भूदिति). So there is nothing wrong in describing *a* as a substitute of *ṛ* (and in thus arriving at the form *khaṭvarśya*).

(*p.* 35, *l.* 10) 'रात् सस्य' इति सकारस्य लोपो .... This *pratīka* stands for the following *Mbh.* : कथं मातुः पितुरिति? अस्त्वत्र रपरत्वम्। का रूपसिद्धिः? 'रात् सस्य' इति सकारस्य लोपः। रेफस्य विसर्जनीयः। The *Mbh.* here takes up the case of the forms like *mātuḥ*. When the forms like *khaṭvarśya* are now accounted for on the parallel of *Devadattasya putraḥ*, a question is raised whether it is still necessary to prohibit *r*-substitution in their case. The *Mbh.* says that it does not matter even if *r*-substitution is there. The wrong form *mātūḥ* does not result because the suffixal *s* is deleted by P. 8. 2. 24 : रात् सस्य in the third stage मात्+उर्+स् and after this *r* is replaced by Visarga.

The *Dīp.* cites a similar case of *atsāḥ* (Aor. 2nd or 3rd sing. of √*tsar*, Parasmai.) from *aṭ+tsar* (>*tsār*) + *s*(*ic*) (deleted P. : 8. 2. 24) +*s*/*t*. The finite endings *s* and *t* are dropped by P. 6. 1. 68 : हल्ङ्याब्भ्यो ..., while the Aorist-sign *s* (Pāṇini's *sic*) is dropped by P. 8. 2. 24 as said above.

Nāg. clears one small grammatical point. At the stage मातृ + उर् + स, two operations concerning *s* become due : (1) Dropping of *s* (by P. 8. 2. 24 : रात् सस्य) and, (2) replacing of *s* by *r*(*u*) (P. 8. 2. 66 : ससजुषो रुः). Both of these are in the *asiddha* section. Therefore the prececing in order, viz. 8. 2. 24 supersedes the other one, which is later (सलोपे रुत्वस्यासिद्धत्वात्).

(*p*. 35, *l*. 11) 'अप्रत्ययविसर्जनीयस्य' इति षत्वं प्राप्नोति. This is a part of the *Mbh*. which refutes the above argument. It reads thus : नैतं शक्यम् । इह हि मातुः करोति, पितुः करोति, 'अप्रत्ययविसर्जनीयस्य' इति षत्वं प्राप्नोति.

The point made here is that if the above argument is accepted, it will result into the wrong form *मातुष्करोति (whereas the desired form is मातुः करोति).

This is the argument : The original case ending is (*ṅ*)*as*. The initial *a* of it is replaced (along with the stem final *ṛ*) by *u*(*r*). The initial *a* alone had no claim to the name *pratyaya*. Similarly its substitutes. Now P. 8. 3. 41 : इदुदुपधस्य चाप्रत्ययस्य teaches that the *Visarga*, when it does not have the name *pratyaya*, is replaced by *ṣ*, if it is preceded by *i*/*u* and followed by *k*, *kh*, *p* or *ph*. Accordingly in मातुः करोति, the cerebral *ṣ* threatens to replace the Visarga. As Bhar. says : समुदायाभिनिवेशिनी संज्ञा नाकारमास्कन्दति । तेन रेफः अप्रत्ययः इति । Here समुदायः = अस्. संज्ञा = 'प्रत्यय' संज्ञा. नाकारम् = न + अकारम्. रेफः = रेफादेशो विसर्गः. अप्रत्ययः = अविद्यमान'प्रत्यय'संज्ञः. Cf. Kaiy. : अस् इत्ययं समुदायः प्रत्ययो, न त्वकार, इति तदादेशोऽप्यप्रत्यय इति भावः.

(*p*. 35, *l*. 12) प्रत्ययविसर्जनीयश्चायम्. This *Mbh*. refutes the argument made above, on the ground that even a part of a *pratyaya* can be called a *pratyaya*. (योऽसावकारस्तस्य प्रत्ययावयवत्वात् प्रत्ययव्यपदेशः.) Since the *Visarga* can be called a *pratyaya*, there is no possibility of the application of P. 8. 3. 41 which would result into a *ṣ*-substitution. Nāg. remarks : सूत्रस्थप्रत्ययशब्दस्तदवयवे लाक्षणिकः.

(*p*. 35, *l*. 15) लुप्यतेऽत्र प्रत्ययविसर्जनीय इति. This is the final argument in favour of the objection (that *ṣ* will undesiredly replace the Visarga in मातुः करोति). The opponent claimed that the Visarga in place of *r* can be called *pratyayavisarjanīya*. This argument is now refuted. It is pointed out that *a* of *-as* has no designation *pratyaya* at the time when *u*-substitution is taught (i. e. at the stage *mātṛ* + *as*). Afterwards (*uttarakālam*, i. e. after the substitution of *u*(*r*)) the element *s* gets that designation. But that suffix *-s* is elided ('रात्सस्य'). Now after its elision (तद्विनिवृत्तौ), it is not proper to say that *u*(*r*) gets the designation *pratyaya*. This is so because its original, i. e. *a*, itself did not have it, as just said above. So the opponent's contention, viz.

प्रत्ययविसर्जनीयश्चायम्, is not correct. Since it is not a case of *pratyaya-visarjanīya*, the threat of ṣ-substitution is still there.

Observation : Whereas Bhar. reads the *Mbh*. here as लुप्यतेऽत्र प्रत्ययविसर्जनीय इति, Kaiy. quotes the *Mbh*. simply as लुप्यत इति. Kielhorn reads लुप्यतेऽत्र प्रत्ययो रात्सस्येति which may have been the reading of Kaiy. and Nāg. also. Nāg., however, knows the reading of the *Dīp*. also and quotes it as a v. l. thus : भाष्ये 'लुप्यतेऽत्र प्रत्ययविसर्जनीय' इति पाठे ....

(*p*. 35, *l*. 19) भ्रातुष्पुत्रग्रहणं ज्ञापकम् ... etc. The whole *Mbh*. reads thus : भ्रातुष्पुत्रग्रहणं ज्ञापकमेकादेशनिमित्तात् षत्वप्रतिषेधस्य। यदयं कस्कादिषु भ्रातुष्पुत्रशब्दं पठति, तज्ज्ञापयत्याचार्यः — नैकादेशनिमित्तात् षत्वं भवतीति ।

Other reasons having failed, now a *liṅga* (a suggestive procedure on the part of Pāṇini) is resorted to, in order to show that ṣ-substitution will not affect मातुः करोति. The inclusion of the word *bhrātuṣputra* in the *kaskādi* list (P. 8. 3. 48) is the *liṅga* spoken of.

This *gaṇa* lists those words where the Visarga is replaced by *s* (by *ṣ* if *i/u* precede) and which are not covered by the previous rules. The inclusion of that word would be superfluous if P. 8. 3. 41 : इदुदुपधस्य चाप्रत्ययस्य were to apply to it. Just as it does not apply to it, it does not apply to मातुः करोति also, because एकादेशात् षत्वं न भवति is the general rule inferred from the inclusion of *bhrātuṣputra* in the *kaskādi* list.

Readings : (1) (*p*. 34, *l*. 2) MSAL वा समश्च(MS °श्चा or °श्चा). — (2) (*p*. 34, *l*. 4) AL समुदायस्य. — (3) (*p*. 34, *l*. 8) MS विध्यते; AL विद्यते. — (4) (*p*. 34, *l*. 8) MS नाव्ययपृक्तस्य. — (5) (*p*. 34, *ll*. 10-11) MS °नां मघत-; AL °नामव्यपवृक्त .... — (6) (*p*. 34, *l*. 15) MS आदशेनांतप्रमातिषेधः (!). — (7) (*p*. 34, *l*. 16) MSAL वर्णरूपं. — (8) (*p*. 34, *l*. 17) MS अपि (for अणिति as in AL). — (9) (*p*. 34, *l*. 18) MS शब्दवात्; AL शब्दत्वात्. — (10) (*p*. 34, *l*. 20) MS -रूपतास्य-; AL -रूपत्वं तु. — (11) (*p*. 34, *l*. 21) MS तुद्यारूपेतिग्रह; AL बुद्ध्यारूपे विग्रह. — (12) (*p*. 34, *l*. 22) MS ऋवर्णांतरस्य. — (13) (*p*. 34, *l*. 22) Ed. वक्तव्यम् (for कर्तव्यम्). — (14) (*p*. 35, *l*. 8) MS तथैव (for य°). — (15) (*p*. 35, *l*. 13) MS सो (for यो). — (16) (*p*. 35, *l*. 14) MS प्रत्ययस्यपदेश्यते. — (17) (*p*. 35, *l*. 15) Ed. लुप्यतेऽत्र प्रत्ययो रात्सस्येति. — (18) (*p*. 35, *l*. 17) MSAL अकारो लब्धा(AL °ब्धो) (for our suggested emendation अकारेणालब्धा). — (19) (*p*. 35, *l*. 19) Ed. भ्रातुष्पुत्रग्रहणं ज्ञापकमेकादेशनिमित्तात् षत्वप्रतिषेधस्य.

[4]

किं पुनरयं पूर्वान्तः. This section discusses the question whether (1) the incoming *r* is the final part of what precedes, (2) the initial part of what follows, or (3) an independent element, not connected with either. The *Mbh*. reads as

follows : किं पुनरयं पूर्वान्तः, आहोस्वित् परादिः, आहोस्विदभक्तः ? कथं वायं पूर्वान्तः स्यात्, कथं वा परादिः, कथं वाभक्तः ? यदि 'अन्तः' इति वर्तते, ततः पूर्वान्तः। अथ 'आदिः' इति वर्तते ततः परादिः। अथोभयं निवृत्तम्, ततोऽभक्तः।

(*p.* 35, *l.* 21) कथं पुना रपर ... etc. The *Mbh.* quoted above says that if the word *anta* (P. 1. 1. 46: आद्यन्तौ टकितौ) is made to continue into our rule, then *r* becomes *pūrvānta* (उः स्थाने योऽण् स रपरो भवति, [रेफश्च पूर्वस्य] अन्तः). Here *r* is qualified by *anta*. Similarly, with the continuation of *ādi* from the same rule, *r* becomes *parādi* (... अण् ... रपरो भवति, [रेफश्च परस्य] आदिः), this time *r* being qualified by *ādi*. If neither is continued, *r* is *abhakta* 'independent'.

The *Dīp.* कथं पुना रपर takes objection to qualifying *r* by *anta*/*ādi*. A substantive can have a qualification only if it enjoys an independent position. Here *r* is itself subordinate to *aṇ*, since it is a constituent of a Bahuvrīhi compound (*rapara*) which qualifies *aṇ*. In the absence of an independent position how is *r* entitled to have a qualification ? — The *Dīp.* स्यान् मतम् ... anticipates a reply. The sole purpose of our rule (P. 1. 1. 51) is to teach *r*-suffixion. Being enjoined, it is the principal element (रेफासङ्ग ... प्राधान्यं रेफस्य). So it can be a *viśeṣya*. This reply is refuted in the following *Dīp.* : यद्यर्थक्रियायां ... भिन्नसंबन्धः. The *r* may have a principal position in the operation (*arthakriyā*). But what is required is a principal position syntactically, not semantically. Since the wording of the Sū (*śabdaḥ*) does not present it (*r*) in a syntactically principal form, it is not entitled to the qualifications (*ādi* and *anta*).

(*p.* 35, *l.* 24) The *Dīp.* तत्रैवं ब्रुवते ... etc. replies the above objection. The defect is proposed to be removed by deleting the word *para* from the rule (as it will be shown to be redundant). The Sū. will simply read as उरण् रः (अन्तः), or उरण् रः (आदिः) as the case may be. This gives the desired meaning and also *r* can now be qualified (by *anta*/*ādi*), as it is no longer subordinate.

The *Dīp.* पूर्वान्ते पक्षे ... 'अन्त' इति वर्तते spells out how the Sū. is to be interpreted on the *pūrvānta* view. Deleting -*para* as suggested above, the Sū. now stands as उरण् रः, to which we add अन्तः. The Sū. can then be expanded thus : उः स्थाने योऽण्, [तस्य] रः अन्तो भवति. (Here, although Bhar. does not say so expressly, *aṇ* has to be understood as *aṇaḥ* [Genitive sing.], an *avibhaktika-nirdeśa* as it is called.)

एवं परादिपक्षेऽपि (*l.* 26) means उरण् रः is the Sū. with आदिः understood by *anuvṛtti*. The *Dīp.* उरण् इति पञ्चमीपक्षे ... स त्वादिर्भवति explains the *parādi* view. Here अण् is Ablative (again an *avibhaktika nirdeśa*), which refers to what follows (P. 1. 1. 67 : तस्मादित्युत्तरस्य). With आदिः understood, the Sū. means : उः स्थाने योऽण् तस्मात् परस्य रः आदिर्भवति.

(*p.* 36, *l.* 7) यदा तु 'प्रसङ्गे रपरत्वम्' ... etc. This *Dīp.* asserts positively that there can be no question about *r* being an integral final part of what precedes when the view प्रसङ्गे रपरत्वम् is followed. For, here *aṇ* is unthinkable without its following appendage, the *r*. The moment you think of the substitute *aṇ*, what presents before you is *ar*. The *aṇ* and *r* being thus intergral parts of one and the same element on this view, the question : किं रेफः पूर्वान्तः, परादिः, अभक्तो वा simply does not arise.

The *Dīp.* gives a parallel of *ān*(*aṅ*) (P. 6. 3. 25) which is taught as a substitute for *ṛ*, the final of a first constituent in a Dvandva. Nobody asks here whether *n* (in *ān*) is independent or an initial element of what follows. It is understood automatically, that it is the final element of what precedes. Similarly here also *aṇ*+*r* is in no way different from *ān*.

In the *Dīp.*: शक्यते त्वस्मिन् पक्षेऽपि ... etc. Here Bhar. modifies his earlier view a bit. The reason for modification is the *anuvṛtti* of *ādi* (spoken of above). Actually this *anuvṛtti* is redundant. Since there is a mention of the Ablative (*ṛ*) and since the operation (*r*-affixion) concerns what follows, the word *ādi* was bound to be present on account of the Pari. *ādeḥ parasya* (P. 1. 1. 54). Still, *anuvṛtti* of *ādi* is resorted to here. So, to respect this *anuvṛtti* (आदिशब्दानुवृत्तिसामर्थ्यात्) even on the प्रसङ्गे रपरत्वम् view, *ādi* must play a role. So Bhar. effects a compromise like this : At the time of the substitution (the स्थानिनिवृत्तिकाले of the *Dīp.* presupposes an आदेशोपस्थितिकाले also), *r* is a final part ; at the time of subsequent operations, it is to be regarded as an initial part of what follows.

The *Dīp.* तत्र पूर्वान्त इति (*l.* 12) ... etc. clears one small point. The affixed *r*, when looked upon as *pūrvānta*, may be regarded either as the final part of the *aṇ*, or of the whole that precedes. Similarly, when *parādi*, it may be looked upon as the initial part of the suffix which follows (or suffixes which follow), or of the following whole.

[4. 1]

गीः । पूः ।

The *Mbh.* now takes up these three views for discussion. It introduces first the *Vār.* 8 which points out the drawbacks of the *abhakta* view. The *Mbh.* reads : कश्चात्र विशेषः ? 'अभक्ते दीर्घलत्वयगभ्यस्तस्वरहलादिशेषविसर्जनीयप्रतिषेधः, प्रत्ययाव्यवस्था च' (वा. ८)। यद्यभक्तः, दीर्घत्वं न प्राप्नोति — गीः । पूः । रेफवकारान्तस्य धातोरिति दीर्घत्वं न प्राप्नोति । The *Mbh.* says that if *r* is regarded as independent, and not the final part of *aṇ*, then lengthening in *gīḥ* (Nom. sing. of *gir* 'speech') is not available.

The noun form *gīḥ* is derived thus:

गॄ + क्विप् + सु
गि + ० + स् (पा. ७. १. १००; १. ३. ९; ६. १. ६७)
गिर् + स् (पा. १. १. ५१)
गिर् + ० (पा. ६. १. ६८)
गीर् (पा. ८. २. ७६)
गीः (पा. ८. ३. १५)

The rule P. 8. 2. 76 : र्वोरुपधाया दीर्घ इकः, by which lengthening takes place here, is explained thus : रेफवकारान्तस्य धातोः पदस्य उपधाया इको दीर्घो भवति (*Kāś.*). If *r* is *abhakta*, it is not *pūrvānta*; i. e. the root cannot be regarded as ending in *ṝ*. So P. 8. 2. 76 will not apply. Consequently, lengthening cannot be accomplished.

The same applies to *pūḥ* (Nom. sing, of *pur* 'city' from √*pṝ*), except that the radical *ṝ* is here replaced by *u* (P. 7. 1. 102 : उदोष्ठ्यपूर्वस्य), which is eventually lengthened. Hence the *Dīp.* अभक्ते ह्यनवयवोऽन्तव्यपदेशं न लभते. — अन्तव्यपदेशः=धात्वन्तत्व°.

निजेगिल्यते ।

On this the *Mbh.* comments : लत्व । लत्वं च न सिध्यति — निजेगिल्यते । 'ग्रो यङि' इति लत्वं न प्राप्नोति.

निजेगिल्यते is Intensive from the same root *gṝ* (with *ni* as a preverb), where *r* is replaced by *l* by P. 8. 2. 20 : ग्रो यङि. This rule (with रो लः continued from 18) means : गॄ इत्येतस्य धातो रेफस्य लकार आदेशो भवति यङि परतः (*Kāś.*). If *r* is *abhakta*, then it cannot belong to the root.

Bhar. says that such a Genitive *giraḥ* (i. e. *graḥ* of the Sū.), which has no connection with the part (viz. *r*) is difficult to imagine. If no connection with another object is denoted, the Genitive will cease to be a Genitive.

(*p.* 36, *l.* 17) गीर्यते स्वयमेव.

The *Mbh.* runs thus : यक्स्वर। यक्स्वरश्च न सिध्यति। गीर्यते स्वयमेव। पूर्यते स्वयमेव। 'अचः कर्तृयकि' इत्येष स्वरो न प्राप्नोति, रेफेण व्यवहितत्वात्।

Kāt. and Pat. have discussed the problem of accent of the reflexive (*karmakartari*) verb forms like *gīryate* ('a word utters itself' or some such thing), under P. 6. 1. 195 : अचः कर्तृयकि which teaches optional Udātta for the radical vowel in such forms. Two points may be mentioned about this discussion. (1) That discussion makes no mention whatever of the dictum which

the *Mbh.* here (under P. 1. 1. 51) takes recourse to viz. स्वरविधौ व्यञ्जनमविद्यमानवत्, to account for the Udātta in *gīryate* etc., although *gīr* does not end in a vowel when *ya(k)* follows (although so required by the rule). (2) Instead, they take resort to *upadeśa*, i. e. it suffices if the root ends in a vowel in the *upadeśa*, i.e. Dhātupāṭha (e.g. *gṝ*); it does not matter what form it takes afterwards (e.g. *gīr*). Bhar. here refers to this *upadeśa* device with disapproval. He is of the opinion that it does not suffice. For, he seems to think, the Locative used in P. 6. 1. 195 requires (by P. 1. 1. 66) that *yak* must immediately follow a vocalic root. Since here *r*, an independent element, intervenes, P. 6. 1. 195 cannot apply (रेफेण यको व्यवधाने, सत्यपि चोपदेशवचने न सिध्यति ...). So, Bhar. adds, if one is to follow the *abhakta* view, the Pari. स्वरविधौ व्यञ्जनमविद्यमानवत् has to be accepted. If, Bhar. goes on, some undesired forms result on account of this Pari., well! some remedy has to be found out. (Bhar. does not say where undesired forms are likely to result.)

(*p.* 36, *l.* 20) [हलादिशेष ।]

The *Mbh.* comments : हलादिशेषश्च न सिध्यति । ववृते, ववृधे । 'अभ्यासस्य' इति हलादिशेषो न प्राप्नोति ।

In the Perfect, forms like *vavṛte* (from √*vṛt*) are derived by deleting the final *r* of the reduplication (*var-vṛt-e*>*va-vṛt-e*) by P. 7. 4. 60 : हलादिः शेषः which teaches that only the initial consonant of reduplication survives, the other consonants go. On the *abhatka* view, *r* in (*var-vṛt-e*) does not belong to the reduplication. So it cannot be dropped undesiredly. Cf. Kaiy. : अभ्यासावयवस्यानादेर्हलो निवृत्त्या भाव्यमिति रेफस्य निवृत्त्यसिद्धिः.

In the *Dīp.*, a heading हलादिशेष is missing. Secondly, the text is rather laconic. यथाभूत and तथाभूत mean अवयव. एवम् and अस्यां कल्पनायां seem to mean अभक्तपक्षे. अहल् should mean 'not having a final consonant'. We do not know why अन्त is dropped. Finally, अनेकदेशत्वात् simply means अनवयवत्वात्.

(*p.* 36, *l.* 22) विसर्जनीयप्रतिषेधः. The *Mbh.* runs thus : विसर्जनीय । विसर्जनीयस्य प्रतिषेधो वक्तव्यः । नार्कुटो, नार्पत्यः । 'खरवसानयोर्विसर्जनीयः' इति विसर्जनीयः प्राप्नोति ।

In words like नार्कुट (meaning नृकुट्यां भवः, from नृकुटी+अण्) and नार्पत्य (meaning नृपतौ भवः, from नृपति+ण्य) there is a Vṛddhi substitute (*nṛ*>*nār*) in the initial constituent *nṛ* because of the following Taddhita suffix. After the final *r*, the case-ending *ṅas* is dropped. Since *r* now forms the Pada final (before the dropped case ending) by the Pari. यस्मात् सुप्तिङ्विधिः etc. ..., the Visarga (P. 8. 3. 15) threatens to replace *r* undesiredly. So, on the *abhakta* view, this Visarga substitution will have to be prohibited.

The Pari. यस्मात् सुप्तिङ्विधिः ... etc. states the two boundaries of the word element styled Pada. The word-element beginning with the base after which a case- or verb-ending is taught, and ending in that case- or verb-ending is technically known as Pada. This Paribhāṣā is derived by making यस्मात् प्रत्ययविधिस्तदादि (from P. 1. 4. 13) continued into 14 which defines a Pada: सुप्तिङन्तं पदम्. — The text of the Pari. as given by Kaiy. is identical with the one given by Bhar. here (which latter we have completed by supplying the word तिङन्तं from Kaiy.). In the *Paribhāṣenduśekhara*, however, the text of the Pari. 23, which makes the same statement, reads as: प्रत्ययग्रहणे यस्मात् स विहितस्तदादेस्तदन्तस्य ग्रहणम्.

Observation: The undesirable substitution of Visarga in नार्कुटः etc. is not the result of the *abhakta* view. It is a result of the Paribhāṣā (23). This undesirable result is common to the other views also. See the next section.

(*p.* 36, *l.* 23) प्रत्ययाव्यवस्था च. This *pratīka* stands for the following *Mbh.*: प्रत्ययाव्यवस्था च। प्रत्यये च व्यवस्था न प्रकल्पते। किरतः, गिरतः। रेफोऽप्यभक्तः, प्रत्ययोऽपि। तत्र व्यवस्था न प्रकल्पते।

This objection relates to the uncertainty of the place of the Vikaraṇa (*ś*)*a* (mentioned simply as *pratyaya* in the *Vār.*) in the 'weak' forms of roots like *kṝ*, *gṝ* belonging to the VIth (*tud*) class. A Vikaraṇa has to immediately follow the verbal root (P. 3. 1. 22: धातोः ...). In किर्+अ+तस्, if the *abhakta* view is followed the Vikaraṇa does not immediately follow the root (*ki*), which is a defect (रेफात् परस्य विकरणस्याधातुत्वं प्रसक्तम्). If, to avoid this, it is assumed that the Vikaraṇa follows the root (*ki*) and then comes *r* (कि+अ+र्+तस्), this results into a worse position. Firstly, *aṇ* (i. e. *i*) cannot be said to be *rapara* (as P. 1. 1. 51 lays down) and, secondly, the desired form does not result (रेफः ... अणः परो न भवतीति रूपाप्रसिद्धिश्च). So प्रत्ययाव्यवस्था (= विकरणस्य अव्यवस्था).

Bhar. does not come to this problem straightway. Instead he begins with a rather minor question, viz. why Pat. illustrates the problem by means of forms in dual instead of those in singular (को द्विवचनेनानुरोधाभिप्रायः?) and then in the course of discussion on this point he shows how the problem arises in dual, and not in singular.

The *Dīp.* किरतीत्यत्र ... etc. shows how there is no problem about the place of *r* in the singulars, *kirati* etc. In the position *kṝ*+*ti*, two operations become due: (1) the Vikaraṇa (*ś*)*a*, and (2) the operation regarding the *aṅga* viz. Guṇa (P. 7. 3. 84: सार्वधातुकार्धधातुकयोः). Of these two the Vikaraṇa (*ś*)*a* is obligatory, because it is bound to be there, whether the *aṅga*-operation concerned

takes place or not (कृताकृतप्रसङ्गि नित्यम् as it is usually said). On the other hand, the *aṅga* operation viz. Guṇa is not obligatory, for, if the Vikaraṇa is inserted first, then there is no Guṇa (P. 1. 2. 4 ; 1. 1. 5). So the *Dīp.* says : नित्यत्वाद्विकरणेन भवितव्यम् । आङ्गो हि गुणः अनित्यः । कृते विकरणे प्रतिषेधात् । So now with *kṝ* + (*ś*)*a*+*ti*, P. 7. 1. 100 supersedes P. 7. 3. 84 and we have *ki*+*r*+*a*+*ti* ultimately giving us *kirati* without any problem (साधुत्वस्याभ्यनुज्ञानात् नास्ति अव्यवस्था).

In the case of dual, however, the case is different. In the stage *kṝ*+*tas*, both the operations which become due are obligatory. The Vikaraṇa, as we saw above, is obligatory, whatever the *aṅga*-operation. But the *aṅga* operation now is also equally obligatory. It is going to be *ṝ*>*i*(*r*), whether you bring in the Vikaraṇa *ś* first or not. Both (*ś*)*a* and *tas* are *sārvadhātuka* (P. 3. 4. 113), both are *ṅit* as the code-letter *p* is not affixed to them (P. 1. 2. 4), and so both prohibit Guṇa (P. 1. 1. 5). So, with the Guṇa thus barred, there in now a full scope for P. 7. 1. 100 which makes *ṛ*>*i*(*r*) inevitable. Thus both the *aṅga* operations (*ṝ*>*i*(*r*)) and the Vikaraṇa (*ś*)*a*) being obligatory, and so equally powerful, the rule P. 1. 4. 2 : विप्रतिषेधे परं कार्यम् becomes operative and the later operation, viz. *ṛ*>*ir* takes place. When now you bring in the Vikaraṇa, its position becomes awkward as said above. If after *r*, it cannot be said to follow immediately the root (since *r* is not a part on the *abhakta* view), and if after *ki*, *aṇ* ceases to be *rapara*, then the desired form does not result. Since this awkward position of the Vikaraṇa on account of the *abhakta* view arises only in the dual, Pat. illustrated it by the dual (द्विवचन एव प्रत्ययाव्यवस्थोदाह्रियते), says Bhar.

[4. 2]

पूर्वान्ते चेदवधारणम्. This is a part of the *Vār*. (9) which runs as पूर्वान्ते चेदवधारणं विसर्जनीयप्रतिषेधो यक्स्वरश्च. The Vārttikakāra here takes up for discussion the *pūrvānta* view : *r* is an integral part, the final part, of what precedes. The *Mbh.* comments on the चेदवधारणं objection thus : यदि पूर्वान्तः, रोरवधारणं कर्तव्यम् – 'रोः सुपि'। रोरेव सुपि, नान्यस्य। सर्पिष्षु, धनुष्षु। इह मा भूत् – गीर्षु, पूर्षु।

This is what the चेदवधारण point of the criticism of the *pūrvānta* view means : According to P. 1. 4. 17 : स्वादिष्वसर्वनामस्थाने, what precedes the Loc. pl. ending -*su* is termed *pada*. According to P. 8. 3. 15 : खरवसानयोर्विसर्जनीयः, a *pada*-final *r* is replaced by Visarga (e. g. when a voiceless consonant follows). So from *sarpis*+*su* we have *sarpir*+*su* (P. 8. 2. 66), then *sarpiḥ*+*ṣu* (P. 8. 3. 15), optionally *sarpiṣṣu* (P. 8. 3. 36). Now, by the same logic, in *gir* (>*gīr*)+*su* (>*ṣu*), *r* should be replaced by Visarga (P. 8. 3. 15). But that results into the wrong form (**gīḥ°*). In order to avoid it

Pāṇini frames the further rule : रो: सुपि (P. 8. 3. 16), which restricts the Visarga substitution only to the *r* of *ru*, that is *r* which is the substitute of *s* etc. As *r* in *gir* does not come from *ru*, it remains intact.

The point of the argument is that the framing of the additional rule P. 8. 3. 16 is the result of the *pūrvānta* view. If you follow the *parādi* view, *r* becomes the initial part of the case ending, the preceding *pada* (*gī-*) no longer ends in *r*, thus doing away with need of framing P. 8. 3. 16. That will give you *lāghava*.

(*p.* 37, *l.* 6) अभक्तोऽपि तदादिवचनात् ... etc. This *Dīp.* refutes the above criticism on the ground that this is not a defect peculiar to the *pūrvānta* view. The other two views also suffer from the same defect. Thus, we saw above [4. 1] that in a similar form, *nārkuṭi*, the Visarga threatens to replace *r* on the *abhakta* view also, because of the Pari. : यस्मात् सुप्तिङ्विधि:— (here referred to by तदादिवचनात्).

The *Mbh.* परादावपि सत्यवधारणं कर्तव्यं चतुर्भिरित्येवमर्थम् points out that the restrictive rule (*avadhāraṇam*) P. 8. 3. 16 is necessary on the *parādi* view for the same reason in the case of *caturṣu* (Loc. pl. of *catur* 'four'). Here *r* is original (*svābhāvika* as the *Dīp.* says), an integral part of the word *catur*. It is beyond the controversy of *abhakta*, *pūrvānta* and *parādi*. Still that case also requires P. 8. 3. 16 for averting the undesired Visarga substitution. So framing of P, 8. 3. 16 is necessary irrespective of the present controversy. That is no argument agaist the *pūrvānta* view.

For तदादिविधि:, see Notes above [4. 1] on यस्मात् सुप्तिङ्विधि:. etc.

(*p.* 37, *l.* 8) नार्कल्पिरित्येवमर्थम्. This refers to the second point in the *Vār.*, viz. विसर्जनीयप्रतिषेध. The *Mbh.* reads : विसर्जनीयस्य च प्रतिषेधो वक्तव्य: — नार्कुट:, नार्पत्य: । 'खरवसानयोर्विसर्जनीय: ' इति विसर्जनीय: प्राप्नोति ।

It will be remembered that the same defect was pointed our in the same examples (*nārkuṭi* etc.) in the course of the discussion on the *abhakta* view [4. 1]. The *Mbh.* which follows says that a similar prohibition of Visarga substitution will be necessary on the *parādi* view also, in cases like *nārkalpi*. Read : परादावपि विसर्जनीयस्य प्रतिषेधो वक्तव्यो नार्कल्पिरित्येवमर्थम् । कल्पिपदसंघातभक्तोऽसौ नोत्सहतेऽवयवस्य पदान्ततां विहन्तुमिति कृत्वा विसर्जनीय: प्राप्नोति । So, if not for *nārkuṭa*, the prohibition will still be necessary for *nārkalpi*, even on the *parādi* view. Since this defect is common to other views also, the objection should not be taken against the *pūrvānta* view (तस्मात् पक्षत्रयेऽपि विसर्जनीयप्रतिषेधस्य वक्तव्यतया नायं दोष इति भाव: as Nāg. says). The *Dīp.* नृकल्पशब्दादिषि ... etc. explains the *Mbh.* argument.

The word *nārkalpi* ' a descendant of Nṛkalpa ' is formed from *nṛkalpa* + *i*(*ñ*) by P. 4. 1. 95 : अत इञ्. The word *nṛkalpa* itself is formed from *nṛ* + *kalpa* (P. 5. 3. 67 : ईषदसमाप्तौ कल्पब्देश्यदेशीयरः) in the sense ' almost a man '. The word *nārkalpi* thus contains two Taddhita suffixes, *kalpa*(*p*) and -*i*(*ñ*). Further, when the suffix -*i*(*ñ*) is added, there is a Vṛddhi substitute *ā* (P. 7. 2. 117 : तद्धितेष्वचामादेः), followed, of course, by *r*-suffixion (P. 1. 1. 51).

The argument which seeks to show that Visarga substitution threatens *r* in *nārkalpi* on the *parādi* view also is like this : Granted that on the *parādi* view the word *nārkalpi* is to be analysed as *nā-rkalpi*. Here *r* is the initial of the suffix cluster -*kalpi* ; it is not the final part of *nā*. So there is no *pada* final *r*, and consequently no threat of Visarga substitution. But what about the segment *nārkalpa* ? Here *r* cannot be looked upon as the initial part of -*kalpa* since *ār* comes in owing to *i*(*ñ*), not owing to -*kalpa*. So, since *nār* has already got the name *pada* because of the following suffix -*kalpa*, *r* becomes *pada*-final (of *nār*) by reason of the dictum (already quoted twice) तदादिग्रहण (i. e. यस्मात् सुप्तिङ्विधिः ... of Bhar. and Kaiy., and प्रत्ययग्रहणे यस्मात् स विहितः etc. of Nāg.; Pari. 23). Consequently, even on the *parādi* view, prohibition of Visarga substitution cannot be avoided. Why blame then the *pūrvānta* view for the same defect ?

In the *Mbh.* पदसंघात means प्रत्ययसंघात, the word *pada* being understood in the sense of *pratyaya* (cf. पदशब्देन च पद्यतेऽनेनार्थं इति प्रत्यय उच्यते, Kaiy.).

The word-element -*kalpi* is called a *padasaṁghāta* because it is a cluster of two suffixes (*pada*). This is rather an unusual meaning of *pada* !— अयं and अवयवस्य are really coreferential, since both refer to *r*. So अयं ... अवयवस्य means अयं रेफः अवयवभूतस्य आत्मनः पदान्ततां .. etc. (Read Kaiy. below.) — प्रत्ययसमुदायस्य : A paraphrase of पदसंघात of the *Mbh.* — समुदायं प्रति तदवयवो रेफो is rather a loose construction. समुदायस्य अवयवो रेफः would have been a straightforward construction. — अवयवोऽवयवान्तरात् = रेफरूपोऽवयवः कल्परूपात् अवयवान्तरात्. — अस्य = रेफस्य.

The following clear-cut extract from Kaiy. will make clear what Bhar. says in a rather loose way. Read : नृशब्दादिञि वृद्धौ च रेफः प्रत्ययसमुदायस्य कल्पिशब्दस्य भक्तत्वादवयवो न तु कल्पशब्दस्य । ततश्च नृशब्दस्य कल्पशब्दे परतः पदसंज्ञा विधीयमाना तदादौत्यधिकाराद् रेफान्तस्य भवतीति विसर्जनीयप्रसङ्गः । पदशब्देन च पद्यतेऽनेनार्थं इति प्रत्यय उच्यते । तेन प्रत्ययसमुदायभक्तो रेफः कल्पिशब्दे परतो व्यवस्थितो न कल्पशब्दस्यावयव इति तयोः पौर्वापर्यमस्त्येवेत्यवयवस्यात्मन एव पदान्ततां विहन्तुं नोत्सहत इत्यर्थः ।

(*p*. 37, *l*. 15) अन्येषां ग्रन्थः ... etc. Here the *Dīp.* cites a v. l. for the *Mbh.* कल्पिपदसंघात°. Unfortunately the MS is corrupt and what it gives is the same reading as the *Mbh.* text explained above. So, on the authority of

Kaiy. we propose to emend it to कल्पपदसंघात°. According to the *Dīp.*, कल्पपद is a (sort of मध्यमपदलोपिन्) Bahu. compound meaning कल्पावयवं पदम्. This adjectival compound refers to नार्कल्पि as its substantive. After कल्पपद, a word अवयव is understood which is coreferential with संघात. It means : a cluster (of suffixes) which is a part of *nārkalpi*, i. e. *kalpi* ! The only plus point of this breath-takingly complicated explanation is that it retains the normal meaning of the word *pada* here. — As usual Kaiy. presents it in a simplified and readily understandable form : क्वचित् कल्पपदसंघातभक्त इति पाठः। तत्रायमर्थः — कल्पशब्दस्य संबन्धि यत् पदं नार्कल्पिरिति तस्य पदस्य योऽवयवः प्रत्ययसंघातः कल्पिशब्दस्तद्भक्त इत्यर्थः।

The *Dīp.* is apparently not interested in the *Mbh.* on the *yaksvara* part of the *Vār.*

[4. 3]

धिनुतः। अत्राप्येकवचने ... etc.

The *Mbh.* has now taken up the third, i. e. the *parādi* view for discussion (अथ वा पुनरस्तु परादिः). The *Vār.* (10), which enumerates the weak points of this view, reads as : परादावकारलोपौत्वपुक्प्रतिषेधश्चङ्युपधाह्रस्वत्वमिटोऽव्यवस्थाभ्यासलोपोऽभ्यस्ततादिस्वरो दीर्घत्वं च. The *Mbh.* on the first point, viz. अकारलोप, runs thus : यदि परादिरकारलोपः प्रतिषेध्यः, कर्ता हर्ता। 'अतो लोपः' 'आर्धधातुके' इत्यकारलोपः प्राप्नोति। नैष दोषः। उपदेश इति वर्तते। यद्युपदेश इति वर्तते, धिनुतः कृणुतः — अत्र लोपो न प्राप्नोति। नोपदेशग्रहणेन प्रकृतिरभिसंबध्यते। किं तर्हि? आर्धधातुकमभिसंबध्यते। आर्धधातुकोपदेशकाले यदकारान्तमिति।

This is the defect about the *alopa* : P. 6. 4. 48 : अतो लोपः teaches the elision of an *aṅga*-final *a* before an *ārdhadhātuka* suffix. Now, the forms like *kartā*, *hartā*- etc. will have to be analysed as *ka-rtā*, *ha-rtā* as the *r* is now to be looked upon as the initial part of the following suffix (*-tā*). The result is that P. 6. 4. 48 : अतो लोपः will operate, resulting into an undesired elision of the radical *a*. If the *parādi* view is to be accepted, elision of *a* in *kartā* etc. will have to be prohibited (... अकारलोपः प्रतिषेध्यः, कर्ता ...).

The defendant holds that even on the *parādi* view there is no such threat of *alopa*. He argues that the word *upadeśa* continues in P. 6. 4. 48 from 37 : अनुदात्तोपदेश ... So only that *a* which is already there in the *upadeśa* (i. e. in the Dhātupāṭha) is elided by P. 6. 4. 48. The *a* in *kartā* is a result of Guṇa substitution. It does not belong to the *upadeśa*. As P. 6. 4. 48 does not operate here, *a* remains intact.

In the *Mbh.* यद्युपदेश इति वर्तते etc., the critic of the *parādi* view refutes this argument. He says that if *upadeśa* is brought in to save forms like

kartā, it will be harmful for forms like *dhinutaḥ* (**3.** du. pres. from *dhinv-*). It is desired that the stem final *a* be elided by P. 6, 4. 48 to arrive at the desired form. But the condition of the *upadeśa* will make this impossible, for *a* there does not belong to the *upadeśa*. Here is the process by which *dhinutaḥ* is arrived at :

धिन्व् + तस्
धिनूअ + उ + तस् (पा. ३. १. ८० : धिन्विकृण्व्योर च)
धिन् + उ + तस् (पा. ६. ४. ४८ : अतो लोपः)
धिनुतः (पा. ८. ३. १५ : खरवसानयोर्विसर्जनीयः)

But this process fails if it is held that *a* must belong to the *upadeśa* (i. e. Dhātupāṭha) if it is to be elided by P. 6. 4. 48.

The *Mbh.* नोपदेशग्रहणेन प्रकृतिरभिसंबध्यते ... etc. refutes this argument. Changing his previous stand somewhat, the advocate of the *parādi* view now says that the word *upadeśa* is to be connected with *ārdhadhātuka*, and not with *prakṛti* (i. e. *dhātu*). So P. 6. 4. 48 now means : A stem-final *a* which is there when the following *ārdhadhātuka* is taught (*upadeśa*), that (*a*) is elided. And as it happens the stem final *a* and the Vikaraṇa *u* (the *ārdhadhātuka*) are taught simultaneously (*saṁniyogaśiṣṭa*) in P. 3. 1. 80. Since *a* is there when the *ārdhadhātuka u* realizes (*pratipanna*), there is no bar to the operation of P. 6. 4. 48 here. धिनुतः is accounted for. The *parādi* view can stay (as far as *dhinutaḥ* is concerned).

प्रतिपत्ति means ' coming into being, realization '. — अनेन=धिन्विना, by the root *dhinv.* — संनियोगशिष्टयोरनयोः is probably to be taken as what is called सति सप्तमी (P. 2. 3. 37).

As earlier (*p.* 36, *l.* 24), here also being more interested in explaining Pat.'s preference for the dual *dhinutaḥ* (over the sing. *dhinoti*) than in clarifying the difficulty about *alopa* in *dhinutaḥ* which is the point at issue, the *Dīp.* starts with the the discussion of that topic. The justification given for the selection of the dual *dhinutaḥ* is that it does not matter for *dhinoti* whether *alopa* is there or not. It can be established both ways (... धिनोतीति लोपे सत्यसति वा नास्ति विशेषः). But not so with *dhinutaḥ*. You cannot arrive at this form if *alopa* is not there.

This can be shown by the following processes :

१. धिनोति with अलोप—

धिन्व् + ति
धिनूअ + उ + ति (as above)

धिन् + उ + ति (as above)
धिन् + ओ + ति (P. 7. 3. 84 : सार्वधातुका°)
धिनोति

२. धिनोति without अलोप —

This is achieved in two ways :

(१) धिन्व् + ति
धिनुअ + उ + ति
धिनोति (P. 6. 1. 87 ; आद् गुणः)

or, (२) after धिनुअ + उ + ति
धिन + ओ + ति (P. 7. 3. 84 : सार्वधातुका°)
धिनो + ति (P. 6. 1. 97 : अतो गुणे)
धिनोति

So the *Dīp.* says : आद् गुणे वा, विकरणस्य गुणे कृते वा ... etc.

पच is the Saṁdhi form of पचे (1. sing. Pre. Ātm.). This is just a parallel for *pararūpa* (from पच्+अ+ए [<इ by P. 3. 4. 79 : टित आत्मनेपदानां टेरे]).

Observations : (1) Pāṇini does not read a root *dhi-* in the fifth (*su-*) class. Instead, he derives forms like *dhinoti* from √*dhinv* read in *bhū-* class (I. 624) in the way shown above.

(2) The passage requires certain additions and emendations. (i) The *pratīka* धिनुतः itself is missing in the MS. (ii) The express statement as to how the form *dhinoti* can be arrived at in two ways by two kinds of Guṇa is missing in the *Dīp.*, although that possibility is hinted by *vā*. We have supplied the necessary text on the strength of the *Uddy.* We have similarly supplied *pararūpeṇa* which is clearly necessary. (iii) यस्मिन्कि° of the MS is emended to यस्मिन् हि, and similarly आर्धधातुकस्य to °धातुकं स्व-.

(*p.* 37, *l.* 25) निर्दिश्यमानस्यादेशा भवन्ति. After discussing the issue of अकारलोप, the *Mbh.* is now considering the next point, viz. औत्व i. e. औत्वप्रतिषेध. The *Mbh.* runs thus : औत्व । औत्वं च प्रतिषेध्यम् । चकार, जहार । 'आत औ णलः' इत्यौत्वं प्राप्नोति । नैष दोषः । 'निर्दिश्यमानस्यादेशा भवन्ति' इत्येवं न भविष्यति । यस्तर्हि निर्दिश्यते तस्य कस्मान्न भवति ? रेफेण व्यवहितत्वात् । औत्व ।

The forms like चकार (from √कृ, with the *Vṛddhi* substitute *ār* by P. 7. 2. 115 : अचो ञ्णिति and P. 1. 1. 51 : उरण् रपरः) are to be analysed, on the *parādi* view, as *cakā-ra.* Since now the suffix *ṇal* (with its prefix *r-*)

follows an *aṅga* in *ā*, that suffix will have to be replaced, undesiredly, by *au* (P. 7. 1. 34 : आत औ णलः). So, it will have to be prohibited (if the *parādi* view is to be accepted).

The *Mbh.* नैष दोषः ... etc. refutes this objection on the basis of the dictum : निर्दिश्यमानस्यादेशा भवन्ति (Pari. 12). This Pari., which specifies the form of the *sthānin* which is to be replaced, says that the word-element which is actually mentioned (in the Genitive) in the substitution rule is alone to be replaced. In the present case it is *ṇal* (i. e. *a*) which is so mentioned. *ṇal* with a prefixed part *r* (i. e. *ra*) is not mentioned. So there is no threat of *ra* getting a substitute *au*.

The *Dīp.* ननु चानुसंहारो बाध्यते raises two objections in connection with the application of two Paribhāṣās with reference to the present forms (*cakāra* etc.). The first Pari. is निर्दिश्यमानस्य ... itself. The word actually mentioned in P. 7. 1. 34 as *sthānin* is *ṇal*, not *a*. How do you then invoke that Pari. in order to defend the absence of the *au*-substitution ? The reply given is that there is no difference (*abhedāt*) between *ṇal* and *a*. After the removal of the code-letters, *ṇal* and *a* are identical (*ekatvādhyavasāya*) in form. So one can equally say that *a* is mentioned in the Genitive in P. 7. 1. 34. So the quality of *nirdiśyamānatā* is equally there in *a*. There is nothing wrong in invoking the Pari. निर्दिश्यमानस्य ...

The *Dīp.* अकाररूपं श्रुतिसंनिपाति ... etc. replies (an unexpressed) objection regarding the *anusaṁhāra* (integration of a Pari. with an injunctive rule) of the Pari. आदेः परस्य (P. 1. 1. 54). According to this Pari., when an operation is taught for some following word-element (the preceding word-element being mentioned in Ablative), the operation affects the initial phoneme of that following word-element. In P. 7. 1. 34 the *au*-substiution is taught for *ṇal* which follows an *aṅga* in *ā*. So the initial phoneme of *ra* (the suffix *ṇal* or *a* with the prefix *r*), i. e. *r* must be replaced by *au*.

The reply (अकाररूपं श्रुतिसंनिपाति ... etc.) is based on the argument that *a* (*ṇal*) is directly mentioned (lit. श्रुतिसंनिपाति means 'what meets the ear') in the rule; while *r* (mentioned as तद्भक्त:) is only inferred to be a part of *a*. It is secondary. So the Pari. आदेः परस्य cannot say that here *r* has to be replaced by *au*.

But the Pari. आदेः परस्य must take its course. Still, the initial part of *a* is *a* itself (on the व्यपदेशिवद्भाव). So *a* also will undergo the substitution. The *r* part will not be affected. The *Dīp.* does not say anything about the inevitability of the Pari. आदेः परस्य. But it must have accepted it.

Only, it affects *a* itself, and not its subsequent prefix, *r*. न भविष्यति means रेफस्य औकारेण आदेशेन निवृत्तिर्न भविष्यति.

(*p*. 38, *l*. 3) रेफेण व्यवहितत्वात्. On receiving the reply that because of the Pari. निर्दिश्यमानस्य ..., the suffix *ra* is not replaced by *au*, the objector shifts his attack. "Well, then", asks he, "how is it that the word element which is actually mentioned (यस्तर्हि निर्दिश्यते) viz. *ṇal*, remains there unreplaced?" रेफेण व्यवहित्वात् is the reply. P. 1. 1. 67: तस्मादित्युत्तरस्य requires that the item which undergoes some operation by reason of its following some other (preceding) item (which is mentioned in the Ablative), must follow it immediately (it should be वर्णान्तरेणाऽव्यवहित). Here, however, *r* intervenes between the stem final *ā* and the suffix *ṇal*. So no *au*-substitution.

The *Dīp*. adds that if Pāṇini had used *liṭaḥ* or *pratyayasya* instead of *ṇalaḥ*, it would have been difficult to prevent the *au*-substitution as there would have been no intervention between *ā* and the *liṭ*-suffix *-ra*.

(*p*. 38, *l*. 5) चङ्युपधाह्रस्वत्वम्. On this point the *Mbh*. comments: चङ्युपधाह्रस्वत्वं च न सिध्यति, अचीकरत् अजीहरत्। 'णौ चङ्युपधाया ह्रस्वः' इति ह्रस्वत्वं न प्राप्नोति.

This objection refers to reduplicated (*caṅ*) Aor. forms like अचीकरत् (from the causative √*kāri* [< √*kṛ*+*i*], where the Vṛddhi *ā* is shortened [> *kar*; *i* dropped, P, 6. 4. 51: णेरनिटि] by P. 7. 4. 1: णौ चङ्युपधाया ह्रस्वः). On the *parādi* view, *kāri* is looked upon as *kā-ri*. As *ā* is no longer penulitmate (*upadhā*), it cannot be shortened by P. 7. 4. 1, and a wrong form results.

The *Dīp*. does not explain the objection, obviously because it is quite simple. But it raises an objection against the *Mbh*. objection itself in ननु च ज्ञापकात्... etc., in defence of the *parādi* view.

The point made by the defender of the *parādi* view is that on the strength of a suggestive process (*jñāpaka*) followed by him it could be said that according to Pāṇini himself *kār* becomes *kar* even if *ā* does not have the position of the penultimate. So there is no difficulty regarding shortening. The *parādi* view can stand.

The *jñāpaka* advanced in this respect is the inclusion of √*dṝ* in the roots which, according to P. 7. 4. 95: अत् स्मृदृत्वर ... retain their *a* in the reduplication, which sets aside *i* taught by P. 7. 4. 79: सन्यतः and 93: सन्वल्लघुनि चङ्परेऽनग्लोपे. The form in question is, say, *adadarat* (Redupl. Aor. 3. sing. Parasmai from √*dṝ*). Here, the radical part दृ+इ(णिच्) > दार्+इ>दार् (णिज्लोप, P. 6. 4. 51) > दर्. In the reduplication first दि becomes due (as

said above) which finally is set aside (P. 7. 4. 95, as above), thus resulting into अददरत्.

The *jñāpaka* is to be explained thus: In *adadarat* etc. P. 7. 4. 49 teaches *a* as the reduplication vowel, superseding *i* which first becomes due by P. 7. 4. 79 and 93. This *i*-substitute (by *sanvadbhāva*) for *a* becomes due only if the following stem-final vowel is such as is designated *laghu*, in other words it has to be short (*hrasva*). The shortening of *dār* to *dar* laid down by P. 7. 4. 1 takes place only if the long vowel happens to be penultimate. On the *parādi* view, however, *ā* of *dār* is not penultimate of the *aṅga*. (It is final.) So there is no possibility of shortening of *ā* to *a*. As the short vowel does not follow, there is no possibility of P. 7. 4. 79 and 93 applying. So there is no *i* in the reduplication. Since the original *a* is intact, there was no reason for Pāṇini to include √*dṝ* in P. 7. 4. 95. Still he does it. That suggests that there is a possibility of a short stem final. This, in turn, means that the shortening can take place even when the long vowel in question is not penultimate. That is why Pāṇini had to include √*dṝ* in P. 7. 4. 95. The long and short of the whole argument is that Pāṇini's reading of *dṝ* in his rule 7. 4. 95 can be accounted for only on the hypothesis that there is a shortening even for a non-penultimate long vowel. (Otherwise it will be superfluous.)

Now, applying this *jñāpaka* argument to our present case, it can be maintained that in *acīkarat* the shortening (*kar* < *kār*) will take place, even for a non-penultimate, on the strength of the *jñāpaka* (ज्ञापकादनुपधास्थस्यापि स्यात्). No defect with *parādi* view on that score.

Observation: An argument based on some *jñāpaka* is usually regarded as consisting of the following four parts: (1) आदौ वैयर्थ्यम्, (2) इष्टार्थ-ज्ञापनम्, (3) स्वांशे चारितार्थ्यम्, and (4) अन्यत्र फलम्. They can be illustrated in the present case thus:

1. आदौ वैयर्थ्यम्. The reading of √*dṝ* in P. 7. 4. 95 becomes superfluous, if there is to be no *i* in reduplication because of the absence of shortening owing to the absence of the penultimate position.

2. इष्टार्थज्ञापनम्. This apparent superfluousness suggests that in our context there can be a shortening of the non-penultimate also (अनुपधास्थस्यापि ह्रस्वत्वम्) in *adadarat*.

3. स्वांशे चारितार्थ्यम्. Therefore, the reading of √*dṝ* in P. 7. 4. 95, is no longer superfluous; it is necessary to ward off the possible substitute *i*.

4. अन्यत्र फलम्. The application of the inference (इष्टार्थज्ञापनम्, 2 above) to the case in hand, viz., *acīkarat* by making the inference a universal one.

The *Dīp.* सत्यम्, एवमेतद् (*l.* 6)... admits that there is some truth in the objection, but argues that if the door is thus opened for shortening of a non-penultimate, there could be an undesired over-extension, resulting into wrong forms like **acikirtat* (for *acikīrtat*). The *parādi* view is no good.

Observation : Here also the text in the MS is corrupt at some places. न (*l.* 5) is evidently to be read as ननु, since the sentence represents an objection. It is not a reply to an anticipated objection. The reply to this objection, which partly concedes the force of the objection, begins with सत्यम्. — The obscure letters in the MS between दयम् and इत्यत्वं (which AL reconstruct as चङि अचः) are अत् स्मृदत्वर which is P. 7. 4. 95. — The MS text which looks like °मेत इतिप्र° (*ll.* 6–7) should be read as °मेतदतिप्र° (i. e. °मेतद्, अतिप्र°). — Finally we have accepted AL's emendation of स्यादय° (*l.* 5) into स्याद्यदय° (i.e. स्याद्, यदय°).

(*p.* 38, *l.* 8) इटश्च व्यवस्था न प्रकल्पते, आस्तरिता इति. This *pratīka* stands for the following *Mbh.* : इटोऽव्यवस्था। इटश्च व्यवस्था न प्रकल्पते, आस्तरिता निपरिता। इडपि परादी रेफोऽपि। इटोऽव्यवस्था।

Here the *Mbh.* simply seems to say that both elements, *r* (on the *parādi* view) and *iṭ* (P. 1. 1. 46 : आद्यन्तौ टकितौ) are to be the initial elements of the following constituent (e. g. *tā* in *āstaritā* from *ā-stṝ+tā*). There is nothing to decide whether the sequence of the two should be *-ri-* or *-ir-*. What guarantee is then there that the sequence *-ri-* alone will be established ? (Cf. the earlier discussion on *pratyayāvyavasthā* in the *abhakta* section [4.1].)

The *Dīp.* एवं मन्यते ... etc. brings out the technical difficulties which are not spelt out in the *Mbh.* There are two courses open at the initial stage : आस्तॄ+ता. — (1) Guṇa substitution for the stem-final ṝ (P. 7. 3. 84 : सार्वधातुकार्ध°), and (2) *iḍāgama* for *tā* (P. 7. 2. 35 ; आर्धधातुकस्येड् वलादेः). The preference is to be given to the Guṇa operation, both because it is a later operation (परत्वात), and also because it has to take place, *iṭ* or no *iṭ* (नित्यत्वात्). But once we arrive at *ā-star+tā* there is no possibility of the *iḍāgama*, for, on the *parādi* view, *-rtā* is the suffix, and the *iḍāgama* is prohibited when that *ārdhadhātuka* (*kṛt*) suffix begins, *inter alia*, with *r* by the rule नेड् वरमनादौ (which is a *Vār.* on P. 7. 2. 8 : नेड् वशि कृति and represents a revised form of the original rule नेड् वशि कृति). So here *avyavasthā* means non-availability of *iḍāgama* (अप्रवृत्तिरूपाऽव्यवस्था). If we somehow bring it in (प्रवृत्तौ सत्याम्), then since *r* has already become the initial part of the suffix *tā* the *iḍāgama* will have to precede *r* (रेफात् पूर्वं चेटः श्रवणम्), and so the undesired sequence (अनिष्टा व्यवस्था viz. *-ir-*) results.

The *Dīp.* adds that if we gave the *iḍāgama* preference over the Guṇa (although the latter is *para* and *nitya*), no difficulty crops up. The *Dīp.*

does not say how this is to be done in the face of the technical difficulties mentioned above. Nāg. however says that the word *upadeśe* be brought into P. 7. 2. 8 : नेड् वशि कृति from P. 7. 2. 10 : एकाच उपदेशेऽनुदात्तात् (by what is called *siṁhāvalokana* 'a lion's backward look'). This will ensure that the prohibition of the *iḍāgama* will take place only when the suffix begins with *r* etc. in the system — and not when a suffixed is regarded as beginning with *r* on the *parādi* view. Read : 'नेड् वशि कृति' इत्यत्र 'उपदेशे' इत्यपकृष्योपदेशे वशादेरेव निषेध इति भावः (Nāg.) ।

Observation : The MS नेत्वस्मानादौ इत्यवृत्तिरया is corrupt. AL read it as नैतस्मादादौ इट्प्रवृत्तिरूपा, which also does not make any sense. We have emended the text as 'नेड् वरमनादौ' इत्यप्रवृत्तिरूपा which certainly must have been the original text.

(*p*. 38, *l*. 13) दीर्घत्वं न प्राप्नोति, गीः पूः इति. This refers to the last point against the *parādi* view. The *Mbh*. reads : दीर्घः । दीर्घत्वं च न सिध्यति, गीः पूः । 'रेफवकारान्तस्य धातोः' इति दीर्घत्वं न प्राप्नोति । दीर्घः । The objector points out that in the position *gir* + *kvip* + *s*(*u*) etc., *r* becomes a part of the case ending. The root (**gi*) does not end in *r*. So P. 8. 2. 76 : र्वोरुपधायाः ... cannot operate, the result being an absence of the desired lengthening. (It will be remembered that the same objection was taken [4. 1] against the *abhakta* view also.)

As usual, the *Dīp*. (यदि तावत् अकृते ... etc.) delves into the details of the *prakriyā* left unspelt in the *Mbh*. The starting point is : गॄ+वि (<क्विप् after the elision of the two code letters *k* and *p* by P. 1. 3. 9 : तस्य लोपः)+सु. Here two courses are open : To effect first the stem operation, viz. गॄ > गिर् (अकृते विलोपे इदुत्वं रपरत्वं च, *Dīp*.). The difficulty here is that on the *parādi* view *r* becomes the initial part of the following suffix *vi* which latter — now ***rvi*** — ceases to be *apṛkta*. In the absence of the designation *apṛkta*, P. 6. 1. 67 : वेरपृक्तस्य cannot apply and then there is no elision of *vi*, thus resulting into a wrong form.

The *Dīp*. तस्मादन्तरङ्गत्वात् ... etc. puts forward the other course, viz. to get *vi* elided first and then to effect *i*/*u* substitution (along with the consequent *r*-substitution). The reason for this is that the *vi*-elision is an internal operation (since it is not dependent on any external factor), while *i*/*u*-substitution (followed by *r*-suffixion) is an external operation, since, being an *aṅga* opertion it requires a suffix to follow. (The expression *tasmāt* is meaningless. We do not give up the first alternative just because it leads to a wrong form. We have no choice. The *antaraṅga* principle demands the second course to be followed.)

Following the second course (of eliding *vi* first) we now arrive at गिर्+स् (to be looked upon as गि+र्स्). At this stage *r* is elided by P. 8. 2. 24: रात् सस्य. Since the root is now *gi*, without any final *r*, no lengthening can take place.

The expression अस्यां कल्पनायाम् (*l.* 16) (in सुप्युत्पन्ने यः परः, तस्यादिरयम् इत्यस्यां कल्पनायां) requires an explanation. Here the *padasaṁskāra* view is in mind. This view means, in the present context, that when a *pada* is derived, all the constituents, including the case-ending, have to be present there from the beginning, e g. गॄ+क्विप्+सु in the case of गीः. Otherwise, if one forms only the nominal stem (*prātipadika*) first (from गॄ+क्विप्), then, since *kvip* is a completely zero suffix, there will be nothing following of which *r* could be the initial part (*parādi*).

Readings: (1) (*p.* 35, *l.* 21) MS पुन; AL उरण् (for पुना). — (1a) (*p.* 35, *l.* 21) MS निर्देशो. — (2) (*p.* 35, *l.* 24) MSAL तदुक्तं. — (3) (*p.* 35, *l.* 25) AL उरण् इति. — (4) (*p.* 35, *l.* 25) MSAL अत (for अन्त). — (5) (*p.* 36, *l.* 1) MS वयं (for अयं). — (6) (*p.* 36, *ll.* 1-2) MS योक्तो; AL य उक्तो. — (7) (*p.* 36, *l.* 8) MSAL पदादिर् (for परा°). Similarly in *l.* 9. — (8) (*p.* 36, *l.* 9) MSAL असत्- (for अस्मिन्). — (9) (*p.* 36, *l.* 11) MS स्यादिवत्; AL स्यादादिवत्. — (10) (*p.* 36, *l.* 12) MS °दाया वा. — (11) (*p.* 36, *ll.* 10-14) MS repeats from नि कार्याणि तेष्वयं ... स्यादि[रि]ति twice. — (12) (*p.* 36, *l.* 16) MSAL इति एवा° (for इत्येषा). — (13) (*p.* 36, *l.* 17) MSAL -वचनेन. — (14) (*p.* 36, *l.* 20) AL पुनरुक्तः (for प्रयुक्तः). — (15) (*p.* 36, *l.* 20) AL निर्वर्तितव्यम्. — (16) (*p.* 36, *l.* 23) MS तदादिषु वर्तश्चेति (for °दि सुबन्तं तिङन्तं चेति). — (17) (*p.* 36, *l.* 24) MS किरते गिराते. — (18) (*p.* 36, *l.* 24) AL °रोधः। अभि°. — (19) (*p.* 36, *l.* 24) MS किरत्यत्र; AL किरति। अत्र (for किरतीत्यत्र). — (20) (*p.* 36, *l.* 26) MSAL अप्रतिषेधात्. — (21) (*p.* 36, *l.* 26) MS °मित्ते त्वे (or चे) त्वे; AL °मित्तेनेत्वे. — (22) (*p.* 36, *l.* 27) MS परश्चात्; AL पुरस्तात् (for परत्वात्). — (23) (*p.* 37, *l.* 2) MS परश्च (for परस्य). — (24) (*p.* 37, *l.* 5) MS गीःर्षु धूःर्षु. — (25) (*p.* 37, *l.* 7) MS परादावयित्यश्चातविकस्. — (26) (*p.* 37, *l.* 8) MS धरान्कल्पि°. — (27) (*p.* 37, *l.* 8) MS -संख्या- (for संघात-). — (28) (*p.* 37, *l.* 9) MS पदार्थतां. — (29) (*p.* 37, *l.* 13) MS पदांतत्वात् (for °त्वम्). — (30) (*p.* 37, *l.* 16) MS कल्पिपरम्. — (31) (*p.* 37, *l.* 17) AL °पदावयवः (for °पदम्। तस्य यः). — (32) (*p.* 37, *l.* 18) MS कल्पिता इति (for कल्पिरिति). — (34) (*p.* 37, *l.* 21) AL पचत (for पच). — (35) (*p.* 37, *l.* 22) AL drop हि. — (36) (*p.* 37, *l.* 23) MS °धातुकस्य रूपं; AL °कः स्वरूपं. — (37) (*p.* 37, *l.* 26) MS रल (for णल). — (38) (*p.* 37, *l.* 26) MSAL आदेशे. — (39) (*p.* 37, *l.* 27) MS °त्वाव्यवसाया; AL °त्वव्यवसाय. — (40) (*p.* 38, *l.* 1) MS आकारो (for औ°). — (41) (*p.* 38, *l.* 2) MS reads from इदमुच्यते (*p.* 37, *l.* 27) up to श्रुतिसं[निपाति] इति twice. — (42) (*p.* 38, *l.* 2) AL omit न भविष्यति 'आदेः परस्य' इति. — (43)

(*p*. 38, *l*. 3) MS तद्रूकप; AL तद्रूपं (for °पं च). — (44) (*p*. 38, *l*. 6) MS obscure; AL चङ्गि अचः (for अत् स्पृदत्वर). — (45) (*p*. 38, *ll*. 6-7) MS एतइति; AL एतदिति (for our emendation एतद्, अति-). — (46) (*p*. 38, *ll*. 9-10) MS नेत्वस्मानादौ इत्यवृत्तिरयाव्य°; AL नैतस्मादौ इद्प्रवृत्तिरूपा व्य° (for 'नेइ वरमनादौ' इत्यप्रवृत्तिरूपाव्य°). — (47) (*p*. 38, *l*. 13) MSAL ऽपि लोपे (for विलोपे). — (48) (*p*. 38, *l*. 14) MS उत्तरपरत्वं (for the emendation इदुत्त्वं रपरत्वं as in AL). — (49) (*p*. 38, *ll*. 14-15) MS अनंतरंगत्वात्. — (50) (*p*. 38, *l*. 15) MSAL ऽपि लोपे (for विलोपे). — (51) (*p*. 38, *l*. 15) MS उत्वे (for the emendation इदुत्त्वं).

* * *

alo 'ntyasya / P. 1. 1. 52

[1]

किमिदमल्ग्रहणम् .... This *prātika* represents the following *Mbh.* : किमिदमल्ग्रहणमन्त्यविशेषणम्, आहोस्विदादेशविशेषणम्?

To start with, the *Mbh.* here raises a question, on its own, about the syntactical connection of *alaḥ*. The reason for such a question is, as the *Dīp.* points out, the vagueness of the form *alaḥ*; theoretically, it can be both Nom. plural and also Genitive singular. (Of course it can be Accusative or Vocative plural, and Ablative singular. But they are ruled out, being impertinent here.) If Nominative plural, a substantive *ādeśāḥ* 'substitutes' has to be furnished, which *alaḥ* will qualify. If Genitive singular, it will qualify *antyasya*.

(*p*. 38, *l*. 20) द्वैतं समर्थयन्ते ... etc. The *Dīp.* says that both these alternatives are sought to be justified, and the following *Mbh.* (उत्तरं ग्रन्थम्) explained accordingly (by the commentators, of course). Although the *Mbh.* has here mentioned अन्त्यविशेषणं first, and आदेशविशेषणम् afterwards, the *Dīp.*, for what reason we do not know, reverses that order and mentions प्रथमाबहुवचनान्तम् (i. e. आदेशविशेषणम्) first, and षष्ठ्येकवचनम् (i. e. अन्त्यविशेषणम्) afterwards. That is why it clarifies *uttaraṁ grantham* by किं पुनर् 'अलन्त्यस्य' इति instead of by यद्यन्त्यविशेषणम् ... etc. which was expected in view of the *Mbh.* order.

यद्येवं व्याख्यायेत. व्याख्यायेत is the interpretation of उच्येत (*Mbh.*) by the *Dīp.* It says that Pat. is not suggesting that the Sū. be emended to अलन्त्यस्य. Pat. simply means, according to the *Dīp.*, that *ucyeta* 'be said' should be understood in the sense of *vijñāyeta* 'be interpreted or understood as'. (Incidentally, the *Dīp.* makes this observation below also, when it quotes [for the second time] the *Mbh.* यदि पुनर् 'अलन्त्यस्य' ... at its proper place.)—

अन्येषां त्वेवमेव ग्रन्थः means some read the *Mbh.* as व्याख्यायेत itself, instead of उच्येत.

प्रथमाबहुवचनान्तमेतद् ... etc. When one reads अलन्त्यस्य (i. e. अल् अन्त्यस्य), the expression अल् is Nominative alone. That suggests unmistakably (असंदिग्धेन पर्यायेण) that अलः in the rule is also Nominative (plural).

(*p.* 38, *l.* 22) किमिदमल्ग्रहणम् ... etc. The *Dīp.* completes the *Mbh.* sentence by adding एवं भवितुमर्हतीति 'because it deserves to be so'. The advocates of this view decide that *alaḥ* is coreferential with *antyasya*. Incidentally, अलिम् is a strange expression. Surely it is not a verbal root which could be referred to by *i* (*ik* of the grammarians). Perhaps the original reading was [अ]लित्य° instead of [अ]लिम°.

(*p.* 38, *l.* 23) यद्यप्यन्त्यविशेषणम् ... etc. This stands for the following *Mbh.* : यद्यन्त्यविशेषणम्, आदेशोऽविशेषितो भवति। तत्र को दोषः ? अनेकालप्यादेशोऽन्त्यस्य प्रसज्येत।

This *Mbh.* brings out a defect in the *antyaviśeṣaṇa* view. When *alaḥ* qualifies *antyasya*, then *ādeśa* remains unqualified (*aviśeṣitaḥ*). There is no restriction on it. So, the outcome of this view is that any substitute, whether *ekāl* (consisting of a single phoneme) or *anekāl* (consisting of a cluster of phonemes) will take the place of final. So a wrong form results in the case of an *anekāl* substitute, as it is expected to replace the whole (P. 1. 1. 55). In fact that is why P. 1. 1. 55 is framed (अस्मिन् पक्षे सूत्रमारब्धव्यम् 'अनेकाल्शित् सर्वस्य' इति). The suggestion is that the framing of P. 1. 1. 55 could have been avoided by Pāṇini, if he had followed the *ādeśaviśeṣaṇa* view.

(*p.* 38, *l.* 26) यदि पुनर् 'अलन्त्यस्य' ... etc. This represents the following *Mbh.* : यदि पुनर् 'अलन्त्यस्य' इत्युच्यते। तत्रायमप्यर्थः — 'अनेकाल्शित् सर्वस्य' इत्येतन्न वक्तव्यं भवति। इदं नियमार्थं भविष्यति — अलेवान्त्यस्य भवति, नान्यः।

Here it is pointed out in the *Mbh.* that there is a gain in the wording अलन्त्यस्य. With that reading, the *anekāl* part of P. 1. 1. 55 can be dispensed with. The substitute consisting of more than one phoneme (अनेकाल्) will naturally replace the whole (obviously by the dictum : निर्दिश्यमानस्यादेशा भवन्ति) automatically. This is what is meant : Pāṇini could simply frame his rule as अन्त्यस्य. This would have meant : Substitutes — whether *ekāl* or *anekāl* – take the place of the final. So a one-phoneme substitute also could automatically replace the final. Still Pāṇini reads the word *al* (meaning *ekāl*). So there is an emphasis. *Al* means *al* alone, nothing else. So *anekāl* is excluded. The object of preventing an *anekāl* substitute for the final is thus achieved incidentally. There is thus an economy, since *anekāl* in P. 1. 1. 55 can now be dropped without any harm.

But, curiously, instead of bringing out this implication of the *Mbh.* first, Bhar. launches into an attack on the *ādeśaviśeṣaṇa* view (which the *Mbh.* is pleading for here!) in the *Dīp.* beginning with एवं ह्याश्रीयमाणे आदेशरूपम् ... etc., relegating the job of explaining the *Mbh.* to a subsequent position. (But so also Kaiy., who faithfully follows him.) The opponent who objects to *al antyasya* (i. e. the *ādeśaviśeṣaṇa* view) understands *al* in the sense of *alātmaka* 'consisting of phonemes', contrasting it with *lopa* 'elision' which, by its very nature is devoid of phonemes. So he says that with such an interpretation of P. 1. 1. 52 a *lopa* (which is also a substitute) will undesirably replace the whole, and not final of the original as desired. For example, in a form like विरजीकरोति 'makes dustless' (from विरजस्+च्वि+कृ), instead of an elision of the final *s*, the whole *virajas* will have to be elided.

This is how the above undesired position results: we saw above that, according to the above *Mbh.* interpretation, *al* being otherwise superfluous serves the purpose of restriction, viz. *al* (or *alātmaka*)=*al eva*, and nothing else. An *anal* (non-*al*) was there taken in the sense of *anekāl*. But *anal* can also mean 'what does not consist of phoneme(s)', say, *lopa*. So like an *anekāl* substitute the *lopa* also will be equally prevented from taking the place of the final. It will threaten to replace the whole (e. g. *virajas* in *virajīkaroti*).

विरजीकरोति is formed thus:

विरजस् (with करोति etc. intended to follow)

विरजस्+च्वि	अभूततद्भावे; 'कृभ्वस्तियोगे संपद्यकर्तरि च्विः' पा. ५. ४. ५०
विरज+च्वि	'अरुर्मनश्चक्षुश्चेतोरहोरजसां लोपश्च' पा. ५. ४. ५१
विरज+०	'तस्य लोपः' पा. १. ३. ९; 'वेरपृक्तस्य' पा. ६. १. ६७
विरजी	'अस्य च्वौ' पा. ७. ४. ३२

विरजीकरोति

(*p.* 39, *l.* 3) किं चाल्समुदायश्चान्त्यस्य प्राप्नोति. Another objection (*kiṁ ca*) against the *ādeśaviśeṣaṇa* view now understanding *al* in the sense of *ekāl*. It is argued that on that view a substitute consisting of a cluster of phonemes (*al-samudāya*; otherwise called *adekāl*) will threaten to replace the final instead of the whole as desired. This is at first somewhat surprising, for, the *Mbh.* is here pleading for the *ādeśaviśeṣaṇa* view just for this purpose, viz. to prevent an *anekāl* substitute from replacing the final. On what grounds does the *Dīp.* then make this contrary claim? अन्यत्र वर्णग्रहणे जातेः प्रतिनिर्देशात्, says the *Dīp.* With all the pious aim expressed in the *Mbh.*, the undesired position cannot be prevented. For, elsewhere when a phoneme is mentioned in the *Aṣṭ.* it does not stand for itself only, but for the whole class. So *al* can mean the class of *al*, which

covers a cluster of phonemes also. Therefore even with *al antyasya* (on the *ādeśaviśeṣaṇa* view), *al* can mean *anekāl*. Hence the objection. The opponent (in the *Dīp.*) points out that the very purpose for which the *ādeśaviśeṣaṇa* view is being pleaded for is going to be defeated on the ground of *jātinirdeśa*.

(*p.* 39, *l.* 4) अल्ग्रहणमिदानीं किमर्थम् ... etc. The defendant poses a counter question. It was pointed out above, he means to say, that the purpose of reading *al* in the Sū. is to emphasize that *al* means *al* alone (i. e. *ekāl*), thus warding off an *anekāl* substitute. But if, as the objector says, the *anekāl* substitute is going to be there all the same, how will you explain the presence of *al* there ? It can be explained only on one hypothesis (*al*=*al* [i. e. *ekāl*] alone ; not *anekāl*). The defendant implies that he has already shown that the word *al* becomes superfluous otherwise. Hence his somewhat ironical question: अल्ग्रहणमिदानीं किमर्थम्? — लोपश्चान्त्यस्य मा भूदिति is the reply of the objector. O, yes, there *is* another hypothesis, says he. *Al* is there to prevent the *lopa* from replacing the final. The objector is making this argument on the strength of another meaning which he attaches to *al* and *anal*. By *anal* 'non-*al*' he does not understand *anekāl*, but 'what does not consist of phoneme(s) — one or many', i. e. which is not of the nature of phonemes at all. That is how he ultimately understands *lopa* 'elision or absence of phoneme(s)' from *anal*. *Al* will not be superfluous.

Observation : The victory which the objector has won, if it can be called a victory, is only pyrrhic. For, what is the gain if the *lopa* does not affect the final ? On the contrary it is a disadvantage, for, the elision of the final is desired in *virajīkaroti*, as said above.

(*p.* 39, *l.* 5) लिङ्गात् तु अयं न जातिनिर्देश ... etc. A reply of the defendant to the *jātinirdeśa* argument. He refutes the objector's argument on the ground that there is evidence (*liṅga*) to show that Pāṇini has not used the word *al* in its *jāti* capacity. What is the evidence ? The following rule ङिच्च (P. !. 1. 53) itself. That rule is meant to be an exception to P. 1. 1. 55: अनेकाल्शित् सर्वस्य and to restore even an *anekāl* substitute, when characterized with a code-letter *ṅ*, to the status of a substitute for the final. This rule (P. 1. 1. 53) would be superfluous if *al* had a *jāti* connotation. So there is no *jātinirdeśa* in *al*. The meaning of *al* is restricted to 'a single *al*' (इदं नियतसामर्थ्यं भविष्यति).

The result of this is: an *anekāl* substitute does not threaten to replace the final (and, consequently, the word *anekāl* can be dropped from P. 1. 1. 55). The *al antyasya*(or *ādeśaviśeṣaṇa*) view can stand.

Observation : The first objection taken in the *Dīp.*, that a *lopa* substitute will undesirably replace the whole, however, remains unanswered. So also in Kaiy.

(*p*. 39, *l*. 7) नियमफलत्वात् नियम इति ... etc. This is a comment on the *Mbh.* : इदं नियमार्थं भविष्यति. The *Dīp*. says that the *Mbh*. calls the use of *al* in the rule as *niyamārtha* 'for restriction' but technically it is not a *niyama*. It is just 'exclusion of *anal* (i. e. *anekāl*).' The use of the qualifying word *al* just serves to exclude '*anal*'. If Pāṇini had framed the rule merely as अन्त्यस्य, *anal* substitute also would have presented itself (along with an *al* one), being included (आक्षेपात्) in the substitutes. To avert this undesired result *al* has been specifically mentioned. The reading of *al* here serves the same purpose as a *niyama* and is therefore so called in the *Mbh*.

Observation : The *Dīp* अन्त्यस्यादेशा भवन्तीति अनेनानलोऽप्याक्षेपादल्ग्रहणमनलो व्यावृत्त्यर्थम् is comparable to the *Prad.* : अन्त्यस्यादेशा भवन्तीत्यलोऽप्याक्षेपादल्ग्रहणमनल्व्यावृत्त्यर्थम् which is almost identical with it, except that the *Prad.* reads अलो(ऽप्याक्षेपाद्) for अनलो (ऽप्याक्षेपाद्) of the *Dīp*. Whether this small difference is intentional or through oversight, we do not know. But it does make a world of difference. The *Dīp*. lookes at the position from the *anal* point of view. The mere reading of the Sū. as अन्त्यस्य would result in opening the door for *anal* also (along with *al*) to come in as a substitute for the final. It is undesired (in the *Dīp*. तस्य चानिष्टत्वात् or some such expression is understood after आक्षेपात्). To exclude it, *al* is specifically mentioned. This is the interpretation of the *Dīp*.

• Kaiy., on the other hand, looks at it from the *al* point of view. With mere अन्त्यस्य as the Sūtra, *al* can straightway come in as a substitute, without its specific mention. Still it is mentioned. Why ? for *niyama* (on the dictum : सिद्धे सति पुनर्ग्रहणं नियमार्थम्). So *al* means *al* alone, not *anal*. The ultimate result is the same, viz. exclusion of *anal* in both, but the technical position is different in both : In Kaiy. it can be technically a *niyama* (as shown above), but not so in the *Dīp*. Hence its remark : नियमफलत्वात् नियम इत्युच्यते.

(*p*. 39, *l*. 10) एवमप्यन्त्योऽविशेषितो भवति. The *Mbh*. represented by this *pratīka* is as follows : एवमप्यन्त्योऽविशेषितो भवति । तत्र को दोषः ? वाक्यस्यापि पदस्याप्यन्त्यस्य प्रसज्येत.

The *Mbh*. now points out a defect in the *ādeśaviśeṣaṇa* view. The substitute will now no longer replace the final phoneme alone, for *alaḥ* is no longer connected with *antyasya*. So every *sthānaṣaṣṭhī*, even if belonging to a sentence or a *pada*, will be replaced completely, if it is final of something. The *Dīp*. gives the example of *paramānaḍudbhyām* 'by two excellent bulls'. P. 8. 2. 72 : वसुस्रंसुध्वंस्वनडुहां दः teaches substitution of *d* in the place of the final (*h*) of *anaḍuh* when the latter is technically called *pada*, e. g. in *paramānaḍuh + bhyām* (P. 1. 4. 17 : स्वादिष्वसर्वनामस्थाने). Now *anaḍuh* forms the final constituent of the compound *paramānaḍuh*. So the whole of *anaḍuh*

there will have to be replaced undesirably by *d*. As regards the replacement of the sentence, Bhar. suggests that this part of the objection taken in the *Mbh.* is not to be taken seriously, for, there is no possibility of the potition where a sentence, mentioned with *sthānaṣaṣṭhī*, will be the final of something. If the disputant in the *Mbh.* mentions *vākyasya* also, it is just in the heat of the argument, where the disputant wants to find out some fault or another in the opponent's view (दोषपरत्वात्... निर्दिष्टमिति).

Both, the example *paramānaḍudbhyām* and the remark दोषपरत्वात्...etc., are repeated by Kaiy.

Here is a subtle syntactical point. In the finally accepted view (the Siddhānta) which takes *alaḥ* as a qualification of *antyasya*, the two Genitives *ṣaṣṭhīnirdiṣṭasya* and *antyasya* are not coreferential (*samānādhikaraṇa*). They mean : षष्ठीनिर्दिष्टस्य यः अन्त्यः अल् (तस्य स्थाने आदेशः) while in the *ādeśaviśeṣaṇa* view which we are discussing, the construction is : षष्ठीनिर्दिष्टः यः अन्त्यः (पदं वाक्यं वा, तस्य स्थाने) अल् (आदेशः).

(*p.* 39, *l.* 14) यदि खल्वप्येषोऽभिप्रायः. This *pratīka* represents the following *Mbh.* : यदि खल्वप्येषोऽभिप्रायः – तन्न क्रियेतेति, अन्त्यविशेषणेऽपि सति तन्न करिष्यते। कथम् ? 'ङिच्च' 'अलोऽन्त्यस्य' इत्येतन्नियमार्थं भविष्यति। ङिदेवानेकालन्त्यस्य भविष्यति, नान्य इति।

Having pointed out a defect in the *ādeśaviśeṣaṇa* view, the *antyaviśeṣaṇavādin* now shows that the so-called advantage of the *ādeśaviśeṣaṇa* view over the *antyaviśeṣaṇa* view, viz. that *anekāl* can be dropped (तन्न क्रियेत), is by no means peculiar to that view. This can be achieved in the *antyaviśeṣaṇa* view also (अन्त्य ... न करिष्यते). On that view there is no restriction on the substitute (यद्यन्त्यविशेषणम्, आदेशोऽविशेषितो भवति as the *Mbh.* says above). So even a *ṅit* substitute can automatically take the place of the final. P. 1. 1. 53 : ङिच्च is superfluous. Still Pāṇini frames it. This then serves the purpose of restriction, viz. only that *anekāl* substitute which is *ṅit* can replace the final, not any other *anekāl* one (ङिदेवानेकालन्त्यस्य ... etc.). The result of this will be that other *anekāl* substitutes (which are not *ṅit*) will automatically replace the whole. The inclusion of *anekāl* in P. 1. 1. 55 can be thus dispensed with. The *antyaviśeṣaṇa* view also is amenable to this economy.

Here also Bhar. does not explain the argument of the *Mbh.* (He may have thought it as too clear to require an explanation.) Instead he raises a new point which is not there in the *Mbh.* He says that in any case, in P. 1. 1. 55 the word अनेकाल् is absolutely essential (अवश्यकर्तव्योऽयं योगः). You cannot dispense with it. This is the reason : In cases like P. 7. 1. 9 : अतो भिस ऐस् two *apavāda* rules (which supersede the present rule P. 1. 1. 52) present

themselves : (1) P. 1. 1. 54 : आदेः परस्य (because *ais* is to be a substitute of ***bhis*** which follows [*para*] a stem in *a*) which demands substitution of *ais* in the place of the initial of *bhis*, i. e. *bh*; and (2) 55 : अनेकाल्शित् सर्वस्य (because *ais* is *anekāl*) which requires the replacement of the whole *bhis* by *ais*. Both rules are equally powerful. So, in this conflict of equally powerful rules P. 1. 4. 2 : विप्रतिषेधे परं कार्यम् becomes operative. Accordingly P. 1. 1. 55 : अनेकाल्शित् सर्वस्य, being later, supersedes the earlier rule आदेः परस्य. This becomes possible, says Bhar., because *anekāl* is actually included in P. 1. 1. 55. If it is not there (असति हि पाठे ... etc.), how can one say that its place is P. 1. 1. 55, thus later than P. 1. 1. 54 ? In the absence of the status of the later position (in fact in the absence of the earlier-later relation itself) how could it supersede P. 1. 1. 54 ? Bhar. says that P. 1. 1. 55 is a must.

This statement appears to be very strange, when it professes to bring out what Pat. means (एतत् प्रतिपादयति). For, as we have seen above, what Pat. means is one thing, and what Bhar. says is evidently quite another. Of course what Bhar. says is quite correct. Pat. himself has made the relative positions and the strength of the three rules clear in his commentary on the *Vār*. on P. 1. 1. 54. In fact what Bhar. says here is just a reproduction of what Pat. says here. So what Bhar. says here about the economy has to be understood as said without prejudice to the *Mbh*. statement under P. 1. 1. 54. In other words both the statements in the *Mbh*. here under P. 1. 1. 52, about economy being available on both views are, in the usual terminology, *ekadeśin*. One can have economy, but that will be only a penny wise and pound foolish policy, says Bhar. (Nāg., however, has a different view.)

Kaiy. follows Bhar. Read : अवश्यकर्तव्योऽसौ योगोऽपवादविप्रतिषेधार्थः। अथ लाघवमात्रे आदरस्तत्राप्युच्यते — अन्त्यविशेषणेऽपीति। On this, Nāg. : 'यदि खलु ...' इति पराभिप्रायं वदता सूचितमन्यादृशं स्वाभिप्रायं प्रकटयति — अवश्येति। असौ योगः = 'अनेकाल्शित्' इति योगः। 'अतो भिस ऐस्' इत्यादौ 'आदेः परस्य' इत्यादिबाधनार्थं इति भावः। नन्वस्यावश्यकत्वेऽन्त्यविशेषणेऽपीत्यादिग्रन्थोऽसंगतोऽत आह — अथेति।

[2]

(*p*. 39, *l*. 18) अलोऽन्त्यस्येति स्थाने ... etc. This *pratīka* represents the following *Mbh*. : 'अलोऽन्त्यस्येति स्थाने विज्ञातस्यानुसंहारः' (वा. १)। अलोऽन्त्यस्येत्युच्यते स्थाने विज्ञातस्यानुसंहारः क्रियते, स्थाने प्रसक्तस्येति। The *Mbh*. says that the present rule अलोऽन्त्यस्य is applicable only where there is a *sthānaṣaṣṭhī* (P. 1. 1. 49). So, only there where a Genitive is mentioned for teaching a substitute, the Genitive will be connected with the final alone. In other words, the substitute will replace the final only where there is a *sthānaṣaṣṭhī*.

The *Dīp.* 'षष्ठी स्थानेयोगा' इत्येष योगः ... etc. gives the technique by which the above object is achieved The rule षष्ठी स्थानेयोगा (P. 1. 1. 49) is to be understood as uttered with a Svarita. Armed with the Svarita, that rule gets the status of an *adhikāra* (P. 1. 3. 11 : स्वरितेनाधिकारः) and so it can continue in the present rule P. 1. 1. 52. By combining the two rules we get the following result : या षष्ठो स्थानेयोगत्वेन निर्ज्ञाता ... सान्त्यस्यालो भवति. (अतः य आदेशः विहितः स्यात्, सोऽन्त्यस्य अलः स्थाने भवति is to be supplied.)

The *Dīp.* परिच्छिन्ना ... पवादैः further clarifies the *sthānaṣaṣṭhī*. — By विषयान्तर, the *avayavaṣaṣṭhī* etc. are meant; by अपवाद, the augments, *ṭit*, *kit* etc.

The *Dīp.* which follows, reads : आदेशो वा यः स्थाने ... etc. continuously. Here we have to presume that there were some words after यः in the original which are lost in our MS. The reason for such a supposition is that there is no syntactical connection between आदेशो वा यः and स्थानेऽनुसंहारो ... etc. This is confirmed by the corresponding *Prad.* of Kaiy. which reads as आदेशो वा यो निश्चितः सोऽन्त्यस्यालः स्थाने इत्यनुसंह्रियते. The word *vā* indicates that two alternative forms of *anusaṁhāra* are mentioned in the *Dīp.* The one is : या षष्ठी स्थानेयोगत्वेन निर्ज्ञाता, सान्त्यस्य अलः स्थाने भवति. The other one, which is partly lost in our MS can be reconstructed on the strength of the *Uddy.* thus : आदेशो वा यो निश्चितः, सोऽन्त्यस्य अलः स्थाने भवति. The first alternative looks at the phenomenon from the point of view of the original while the latter looks at it from the point of view of the substitute. It is also possible that विज्ञातस्य in the *Vār.* does not go well with षष्ठ्याः on account of the difference in gender and so *ādeśa* was brought in as the substantive for *vijñātasya*. Cf. Nāg. : नन्वेवं विज्ञाताया इति वक्तुं युक्तमत आह — आदेश इति. He himself, however, has no objection to the syntax विज्ञातस्य षष्ठ्याः because by षष्ठ्याः he understands षष्ठीप्रत्ययस्य.

The sentence (अयं) यः स्थाने etc. also is corrupt. Besides supplying अयं at the beginning, we have added ऽनु before संहारो as अनुसंहार is the topic here. Besides, अनुसंहारोऽत्र (as the MS reads) न प्रवर्तते makes no sense. So we have emended ऽत्र to ऽन्यत्र. So the *Dīp.* after these emendations means that this *anusaṁhāra* (with the final *al*) does not apply elsewhere (अन्यत्र), viz. where there is no *sthānaṣaṣṭhī*. There the substitute may form either the initial or the final part, or the element taught may follow after the element mentioned in the Genitive as expressly said (यथाश्रुतस्य).

(*p.* 39, *l.* 23) इतरथा ह्यनिष्टप्रसङ्गः. This *pratīka* stands for the following *Mbh.* : 'इतरथा ह्यनिष्टप्रसङ्गः' (वा. २)। इतरथा ह्यनिष्टं प्रसज्येत। टित्-किन्-मितोऽप्यन्त्यस्य स्युः।

The *Vār.* says that if अलोऽन्त्यस्य is applied wherever there is Genitive (instead of restricting the *anusaṁhāra* to the *sthānaṣaṣṭhī*), then there will be an undesired result (*aniṣṭaprasaṅgaḥ*). The *Mbh.* names *ṭit, kit* and *mit* augments by way of illustration. All of them will replace the final, instead of prefixing, suffixing, and infixing (after the final vowel) respectively the elements (mentioned in Genitives) in connection with which they are taught.

The *Dīp.* यदि षष्ठीत्येतावन्मात्रं स्मर्यते brings out the sense of इतरथा of the *Vār.*: If the *ṣaṣṭhī* part of P. 1. 1. 49 alone is understood as Svarita. That alone will come down into P. 1. 1. 52, and finally there will be an *upasaṁhāra* with any and every Genitive (यदि षष्ठीमात्रमनुसंह्रियेत as Kaiy. says). The *Dīp.* illustrates the working of the rules (resulting into wrong forms) under this circumstance by citing the rule आर्धधातुकस्येड् वलादेः (P. 7. 2. 35). Firstly, आर्धधातुकस्य will not mean 'of an *ārdhadhātuka*', but 'of the final of an *ārdhadhātuka*' (because यावती षष्ठी व्याकरणे सा ... अन्त्यस्यालः). Secondly, both the Paribhāṣā rules, षष्ठी (P. 1. 1. 49) and अलोऽन्त्यस्य become subsidiary rules (*aṅga*) of P. 1. 1. 46: आद्यन्तौ टकितौ and 47: मिदचोऽन्त्यात् परः. Therefore, P. 7. 2. 35: आर्धधातुकस्य ... which is to be interpreted in conjunction with them, will have to be interpreted as आर्धधातुकस्य यः अन्त्यः अल्, तस्य इट् (आदिः) स्यात् (which will yield wrong forms as will be shown below).

The *Dīp.* सा तु यथार्थं प्रवर्तते ... etc. says that under the circumstances a twofold result will take place: (1) where the element to be added in connection with the word in Genitive is not *ṭit* etc., the relation will be that of original and substitute (क्वचित् स्थान्यादेशभावेन); (2) but where it is *ṭit* etc., this relationship will not be there (स्थान्यादेशोच्छेदेन), it will be that of prefix, suffix etc.

Observations: (1) The MS reads नपुंसकात् before समुदायस्य (*l.* 25), which we have dropped as it is irrelevant. (2) We have supplied the alternative क्वचित् स्थान्यादेशभावेन which is logically required but is somehow missing in the MS.

(*p.* 39, *l.* 27) टित्-कित्-मितोऽप्यन्त्यस्य स्युरिति. The *Dīp.* supplies the illustrations in that sequence.

(1) भविता. In the position भू+तृ(च्), the augment *i(ṭ)* is prefixed to the *ārdhadhātuka* suffix *tṛ* (P. 7. 2. 35: आर्धधातुकस्येड् वलादेः) and the suffix thus becomes *itṛ*. If, however, स्थाने विज्ञातस्यानुसंहारः is not recognized, then the *i(ṭ)* will have to be prefixed to the final (i.e. *ṛ*) of *tṛ* resulting in a wrong form.

(2) प्रणिदापयति. This causative form (meaning 'causes to give') is formed from प्र+नि (>णि)+दा+प् (पुक्) +इ (णि)+अ (शप्)+ति. Here the root दा gets an augment *p* (which, because of its code-letter *k*, is suffixed to

it : P. 1. 1. 46 : आद्यन्तौ टकितौ) by P. 7. 3. 36 : अर्तिह्रीव्ली°. The augment *p* is regarded as an integral (final) part of $\sqrt{}$*dā*. Therefore *dāp* is understood as being the same as $\sqrt{}$dā, and so *dāp* also gets the name *ghu* (P. 1. 1. 20 : दाधा घ्वदाप्). Finally, because of this name *ghu*, the *n* in *ni* is replaced by *ṇ* by नेर्गदनद्पतपद्घु° (P. 8. 4. 17), and we arrive at the from प्रणिदापयति.

But if the principle स्थाने विज्ञातस्यानुसंहारः is not followed, the *p* will be a suffixed augment of the phoneme *ā*, not of the whole, i. e. $\sqrt{}$*dā* (आकारस्यागमो न समुदायस्य). The *Dīp*. says that such a position will contradict what the *Mbh*. has said before. The *Vār*. 5 on P. 1. 1. 20 : दाधा घ्वदाप्, which reads as न वार्थवतो ह्यागमस्तद्गुणीभूतोऽर्थवद्ग्रहणेन गृह्यते ..., clearly states that an augment (*āgama*), like the *puk* under discussion, becomes a part of the element to which it is affixed, only when the latter is a meaningful unit. The phoneme *ā* in *dā* is not meaningful. So *dāp* cannot be comprehended by *dā*. Therefore *dāp* in our example does not have the name *ghu*. So P. 8. 4. 17 does not operate, with the result that *ṇ*-substitution is no longer available (प्रणिधापयतीति णत्वं न सिध्यति.)

(3) In the *Dīp*. तथा नुम् कस्य? अन्त्यस्य ... etc. the *Dīp*. is considering the fate of forms like कुण्डानि, वनानि (with the lengthening of the penultimate vowel) and the Vedic forms like त्री (for त्रीणि), ता ता (for तानि तानि) (with a similar lengthening and the dropping of the augment *n*) etc.

Forms like कुण्डानि are Nom. Pl. neuter fr. कुण्ड etc. with a *mit* augment *num* (i. e. *n*) after the final vowel by P. 7. 1. 72 : नपुंसकस्य झलचः, and the lengthening of the penultimate vowel by P. 6. 4. 7, 8 नोपधायाः। सर्वनामस्थाने चासंबुद्धौ (कुण्ड > कुण्डन् > कुण्डान्) before the case-ending *śi* (i. e. *i*).

Forms like त्री are derived from त्रि + न् (नुम्) (as above) + इ(शि), by the lengthening of त्रि > त्री by P. 6. 4. 7, 8 as above, elision of the suffixal *i* by P. 7. 1. 39 : सुपां सुलुक्° and that of the augment *n* by P. 1. 2. 7 : नलोपः प्रातिपदिकान्तस्य.

The *Dīp*. says that neither the lengthening (in both the above sets of forms) nor the elision of *n* (in त्री, or ता ता) will be available (नलोपो दीर्घत्वं च न प्राप्नोति) if the principle स्थाने विज्ञातस्यानुसंहारः is not followed.

Before we go into this question it is necessary to remember that, like *r* in the case of *ur aṇ raparaḥ* (P. 1. 1. 51), there are three views about the *num* also : whether the *n* to be added is *abhakta*, *parādi*, or *pūrvānta*. Bhar. raises this question first : नुम् कस्य? He then adds that even on the *pūrvānta* view (which faces minimum difficulties and is so usually accepted) elision of *n* and the desired lengthening will not be available. To explain : in *kuṇḍa* + *n* + *i* the augment *n* (being *mit*) follows the last vowel of *aṅga*, viz. *a* (P. 1. 1. 47). But it will not be the final of the *aṅga*, but just a final of the final *a* of the

aṅga, if स्थाने विज्ञातस्यानुसंहारः is not observed. So we do not have *kuṇḍan* (as *aṅga*)+*i*. As the *aṅga* does not end in *n*, and as *a* is also not penultimate, there is no lengthening (नुम् ... अङ्गस्य नेति ... तस्य दीर्घत्वं न).

The नलोप refers to forms like *trī*. Here, in त्री+न्+इ, the augment *n* belongs, for the same reason as above, to the final vowel of the *aṅga*, i. e. to *ī*, and not to the whole stem. So even after the elision of the ending (*ś*)*i* by P. 6. 1. 70 : शेश्छन्दसि बहुलम्, *n* cannot be dropped (by P. 8. 2. 7 : नलोपः प्रातिपदिकान्तस्य), as *n* is not the final phoneme of the nominal stem (also *pada*) *trī*.

[2. 1]

(*p*. 40, *l*. 5) यदि पुनरयं योगशेषो विज्ञायेत. This *Mbh.* is just meant to introduce the next *Vār.* : योगशेषे च (3) which refutes the *yogaśeṣa* view about the relationship between the rules षष्ठी स्थानेयोगा and अलोऽन्त्यस्य.

All that Bhar. says here (षष्ठी ... प्रतिपादयति) about the *yogaśeṣa* is that the previously refuted idea, viz. षष्ठीमात्रस्य अनुसंहारः (as against स्थाने विज्ञातस्य अनुसंहारः) is given up here, and the *yogaśeṣa* view is being considered. What positively the *yogaśeṣa* means is missing in the *Dīp*. (We are inclined to believe that some portion of the *Dīp*. is lost after 'अलोऽन्त्यस्य' इति.) So we have to rely on Kaiy., who explains thus : यदि पुनरिति। 'षष्ठी स्थानेयोगा' इत्यनेनास्यैकवाक्यता। अत्र तु प्रदेशे करणं 'ङिच्च' इत्यादेः संबन्धार्थम्। तत्रायमर्थो भवति — शास्त्रे या षष्ठी साऽन्त्येऽलि, सा च स्थानेयोगैवेति। न तु स्थाने विज्ञातस्य पश्चादनुसंहारः, प्रतिपत्तिगौरवप्रसङ्गादिति भावः। Kaiy. says that on the *yogaśeṣa* view the two rules षष्ठी स्थानेयोगा and अलोऽन्त्यस्य are to be regarded as a single rule consisting of two parts which are stated simultaneously. (If अलोऽन्त्यस्य is removed away from षष्ठी स्थानेयोगा, it is just for a technical purpose, viz. to facilitate its linking with rules like ङिच्च which follow.) The two co-ordinate statements are : (1) A Genitive in grammar means the Genitive of the final phoneme (of the word uttered in Genitive), and (2) the Genitive indicates the place (which the element taught is to occupy.)

We have suggested above that some portion of the *Dīp*. is lost after कथम्? इदं हि सूत्रम् 'अलोन्त्यस्य' इति. The words 'षष्ठी स्थानेयोगा' इत्यस्य शेषः may have completed the sentence in the original manuscript, followed by the two statements framed much on the same lines as in Kaiy. (rather, it would be the source of Kaiy.'s observations). As far as this first sentence (कथम् ... etc.) is concerned, कथम् need not form necessarily a one-word interrogative sentence. It could equally be connected with ... अस्य शेषः, the whole forming one sentence.

The *Vār*. 3 : योगशेषे च says that the same undesired forms in connection with *ṭit* etc. result on the *yogaśeṣa* view (so स्थाने विज्ञातस्य अनुसंहारः is alone the correct solution).

(*p.* 40, *l.* 7) The *Dīp.* आर्धधातुकस्येति षष्ठीरूपम् ... etc. explains the *Mbh.* statement (योगशेषे च) अनिष्टं प्रसज्येत। टित्-किन्-मितोऽप्यनन्त्यस्य स्युः। The *Dīp.* does it by showing two alternating ways in which the *apavāda* rules (*ādyantau ṭakitau* and *mid aco'ntyāt paraḥ*) can supersede the present rule: *ṣaṣṭhī sthāne-yogā/alo 'ntyasya.* They do it by overruling the one or the other of the two parts of the general rule mentioned above. Thus, (1) one may say that when the elements *ṭit* etc. are taught, the Genitive does *not* mean the final phoneme (of the word mentioned in the Genitive). Or (2), one may say that the Genitive does *not* indicate the place (किं षष्ठीरूपं बाधताम् ... अथ विषयनियमं बाधताम्). The *Dīp.* decides that the second alternative is reasonable. (Kaiy. justifies this by saying that this is so because an exception can supersede that general rule alone which is homogeneous: 'आद्यन्तौ टकितौ', 'मिदचोऽन्त्यात् पर' इत्येताभ्यां स्थानेयोगत्वमेव बाध्यते तुल्यजातीयत्वात्. The two *apavāda* rules supersede only षष्ठी स्थानेयोगा, because of the common subject, viz. teaching the place of the element taught; they do not supersede अलोऽन्त्यस्य because of difference in their subject matter.

In *l.* 7, आर्धधातुकस्य (referring to P. 7. 2. 35: आर्धधातुकस्येड् वलादेः) is only an illustration. It represents any Genitive in connection with which addition of a *ṭit*, *kit* or *mit* element is taught. — षष्ठीरूपमन्त्येऽलि व्यवस्थितम् means the Genitive (after the whole word) is to be understood as the Genitive of its final phoneme (by P. 1. 1. 52: अलोऽन्त्यस्य). (In the place of औत्पत्तिकेन, which is rather unusual in this context, we think औत्सर्गिकेण would fit in better.) — आदिष्टिद्भवतीति (our reconstruction of the MS °ष्टिद्वातीति) is illustrative of अन्त्यः किद्भवति etc. — In नेदमत्र सत्यन्त्यस्यालः, अत्र = अस्मिन् = टिदादौ सति. इदम् and अन्त्यस्यालः are co-ordinate. The sentence means: टिदादौ विहिते सति (विधीयमानः) अन्त्यस्यालः (स्थाने) इति न. — विषयनियमः = स्थाननियमः.

(*p.* 40, *l.* 10) उपसंहारान्तरमनुरूपमेव बाध्यते. This is the reason why अपवादः षष्ठीरूपमबाधमानो विषयं बाधते — why आद्यन्तौ टकितौ supersedes षष्ठी स्थानेयोगा, not अलोऽन्त्यस्य. A rule supersedes another only when the two are similar (*anurūpa*), i. e. belong to the same category or field. The general rule षष्ठी स्थानेयोगा says that an element taught in connection with a Genitive (uttered in the rule) takes the place of what is uttered in Genitive. The special rule आद्यन्तौ टकितौ says that a *ṭit* element comes before, or is prefixed to, what is denoted by the Genitive. Here both rules belong to the same category or field — both teach elements to be added, only their places differ — so the special rule आद्यन्तौ टकितौ supersedes the general rule षष्ठी स्थानेयोगा. The rule अलोऽन्त्यस्य, on the other hand, is of a different kind. It says that what is taught for a word mentioned in Genitive should be understood as taught for its final phoneme (not 'in the place of the final phoneme').

So it does not conflict with आद्यन्तौ टकितौ. The two can work hand in hand. So अलोऽन्त्यस्य is not superseded by आद्य°.

Observation : The following clause : न तु विषयः (*l.* 11) is confusing. This *Dīp.* should mean 'and not the *viṣaya*' i. e. 'the *viṣaya* is not superseded' which means that the rule P. 1. 1. 49 : षष्ठी स्थानेयोगा which teaches the domain of the Genitive, viz. the indication of place (of the augment etc.) is not superseded. This is in direct contradiction with what Bhar. has been saying all along. प्रवर्तमानोऽपवादः किं षष्ठीरूपं बाधताम् ... अथ विषयनियमं बाधताम् ? ... युक्तं यदत्र षष्ठीरूपमबाधमानो विषयं बाधेत । We do not know how to account for this clause : न तु विषयः.

Also, the following portion, viz. 'आदेः परस्य', 'अनेकाल्शित् सर्वस्य' has nothing to do here. We do not know how these words came here. So we have put them into bracket, as suspicious.

अस्मिन् पक्षे तुल्यो ... प्रसङ्गः इति reiterates the *Mbh.* position, according to which the defect is common in the *śeṣapakṣa* also, and so, स्थाने विज्ञातस्यानुसंहारः is the final view.

अयं चानुसंहारो (*l.* 13) ... is an incidental remark. The *Dīp.* says that P. 1. 1. 54 : आदेः परस्य supersedes षष्ठी स्थानेयोगा because of the conflict of the two. They cannot operate (*asaṁbhava*) together. Either the one operates or the other. But that is not the case with the other exception, viz. अनेकाल्शित् सर्वस्य. There is no impossibility of both the operating. What Bhar. means is not easy to understand. Perhaps what he means to say is that the *sarvādeśa* includes the *antyādeśa* also. Still it supersedes (सत्यपि संभवे बाधकम्).

This final argument in the *Mbh.* is not very clear, firstly, because the *Mbh.* does not say what the *Vār.* exactly means and, secondly, the *Dīp.*, partly because of its loose style, and partly because of some portion which is missing (and some misplaced ?), is not very clear. The *Prad.* of Kaiy., which probably reproduces the *Dīp.* (as it was available to it) is, as usual, very clear. It runs thus : अनिष्टमिति । 'आद्यन्तौ टकितौ', 'मिदचोऽन्त्यात् परः' इत्येताभ्यां स्थानेयोगत्वमेव (=the विषयनियम of the *Dīp.*) बाध्यते, तुल्यजातीयत्वात् संबन्धस्य संबन्धान्तरेण बाधोपपत्त्या (which corresponds to the *Dīp.* उपसंहारान्तरमनुरूपमेव बाध्यते)। षष्ठ्यास्तु यद् रूपं तदन्त्ये एवाव्यवस्थितमिति पूर्ववद्दोषप्रसङ्गः । अनुसंहारः पुनरनुसंहारान्तरेण 'आदेः परस्य' 'अनेकाल्शित् सर्वस्य' इत्यनेन बाध्यते ('न त्वाद्यन्तौ टकितौ' इत्यनेनेति भावः, adds Nāg.)

Readings : (1) (*p.* 38, *l.* 21) MS अल्यंतस्य. — (2) (*p.* 38, *l.* 23) AL अलः इति (for अलिम्). — (3) (*p.* 38, *l.* 24) MS अन्त्यादेशस्य. — (4) (*p.* 38, *l.* 26) MSAL आरब्धम्. — (5) (*p.* 39, *l.* 2) MS अवष्टांतम् ; AL अवष्टयन्तम् (for

our conjectural emendation अलात्मकम्). — (6) (*p*. 39, *l*. 7) MSAL इदं (for our इतीदं). — (7) (*p*. 39, *l*. 13) MS ननु (for न तु). — (8) (*p*. 39, *l*. 17) Ed. अन्त्यविशेषणेऽपि सति. — (9) (*p*. 39, *l*. 21) MS स्थानेसंहारो. — (10) (*p*. 39, *l*. 21) MSAL अत्र (for our अन्यत्र). — (11) (*p*. 39, *l*. 26) MS यथार्थो (for °र्थं as emended in AL). — (12) (*p*. 40, *l*. 3) MS तुमकस्य । अंत्यस्य ; AL लुगप्यङ्गस्य (for नुम् कस्य ? अन्त्यस्य). — (13) (*p* 40, *l*. 4) MS नेतस्य ; AL नान्तस्य (for नेति तस्य). — (14) (*p* 40, *l*. 5) MS विज्ञायते. — (15) (*p*. 40, *l*. 5) MS °मात्रनात ; AL °मात्रमनु- (for °मात्रं नानु-). — (16) (*p*. 40, *l*. 8) MS आदिष्टित्वातीति ; AL अनिर्दिष्टत्वादिति (for आदिष्टिद्वतीति) — (17) (*p*. 40, *l*. 10) AL युक्तम् । यत्र. — (18) (*p*. 40, *l*. 10) AL बाधते. — (19) (*p*. 40, *l*. 14) AL सर्वस्यापि तु ... बाधनमिति.

* * *

ṅic ca / P. 1. 1. 53

[1]

तातङि ङित्करणस्य ... etc. The *Mbh.* runs thus : तातङ् अन्त्यस्य स्थाने कस्मान्न भवति ? 'ङिच्चालोऽन्त्यस्य' इति प्राप्नोति । 'तातङि ङित्करणस्य सावकाशत्वाद् विप्रतिषेधात् सर्वादेशः' (वा.) । तातङि ङित्करणं सावकाशम् । कोऽवकाशः ? गुणवृद्धिप्रतिषेधार्थो ङकारः । तातङि ङित्करणस्य सावकाशत्वाद् विप्रतिषेधात् सर्वादेशो भविष्यति ।

A question is raised in connection with the ending *-tāt* (technically *tātaṅ*, with a benedictive sense) which optionally replaces the Imperative endings *hi* and *tu*. The present Sū. teaches that a *ṅit* substitute replaces the final of the original. Now, all *ṅit* substitutes consist of a plurality of phonemes. So, like other *anekāl* substitutes which are not *ṅit* they too come under the purview of P. 1. 1. 55 : अनेकाल्शित सर्वस्य, and consequently they must replace the whole. But then the purpose of the code-letter *ṅ* will be defeated. It will become superfluous. So a *ṅit* substitute is treated as an *apavāda* of *sarvādeśa* taught by P. 1. 1. 55. In accordance with this principle, *tātaṅ* also must be an *antyādesa.* It must, for example, replace the *i* only of *-hi*, and not the whole *-hi*. But in practice it replaces the whole. Why so ? तातङ् अन्त्यस्य स्थाने कस्मान्न भवति ? — asks the *Mbh.* The *Vār.* answers the question. The *Dīp.* does not explain this background. It straightway begins with the explanation of the *Vār.*

(*p*. 40, *l*. 16) अपवादोऽपि स्थानान्तरप्राप्त्या बाध्यते etc. P. 1. 1. 53 : ङिच्च is an *apavāda* of P. 1. 1. 55 as said above. So, it is true, that it is expected to supersede the general rule. However, in some special circumstances, an *apavāda* may not supersede the *utsarga*. To illustrate : If the elements to be operated on — the *kāryins* — happen to be different for the *utsarga* and the *apavāda*, then the

apavāda may not necessarily supersede. The *Dīp.* supports this argument by citing an example from the domain of accent. P. 6. 1. 223 : समासस्य teaches barytone of a compound in a general way (so *devadattaputrá*), while a special rule P. 6. 2. 148 : कारकात् ... etc. teaches that the final of *datta* in *devadatta* will have the Udātta (*devadattá*). When this *devadattá* forms a further compound with *putrá* the whole compound is accented on the final syllable (*devadattaputrá*). Similarly, for a different reason, the exception ङिच्च here does not supersede the general rule : अनेकाल्शित् सर्वस्य. The reason meant here is that the code-letter *ṅ* in *tātaṅ* could be regarded as intended for the prohibition of Guṇa and Vṛddhi (e. g. *kurutāt* and *mṛṣṭāt* repectively) by P. 1. 1. 5 : क्ङिति च. As it has found a scope here (*sāvakāśatvāt*), it cannot be so powerful as to supersede the utsarga.

(*p.* 40, *l.* 18) यद्यपि सर्वानुसंहारस्य बाधकम् ... etc. The process of the weakening of the *apavāda* rule ङिच्च is explained here. Initially it is admitted for the time being that because of the code-letter *ṅ* the substitute *tātaṅ* should set aside the *sarvādeśa* (यद्यपि ... बाधकम्). But it is immediately pointed out that since the code-letter *ṅ* of *tātaṅ* finds scope elsewhere also (अन्यार्थमपि संभवति) — viz. in prohibiting Guna and Vṛddhi — its capacity in favour of *antyādeśa* becomes doubtful when the place of the substitute comes to be determined. The result is that the rule ङिच्च itself comes to have a doubtful relevance in the present case and ultimately it loses its force (अपकृष्यमाणबलः); it stands on a par with P. 1. 1. 55 which teaches a *sarvādeśa*. Since both are now equally powerful (rather, equally powerless), the usual deciding rule, P. 1. 4. 2 : विप्रतिषेधे ... operates and, so the *sarvādeśa* supersedes the *antyādeśa*.

Kaiy. puts this position briefly thus : भाष्ये — कस्मान्न भवतीति । येन नाप्राप्तिन्यायेनास्यानेकाल्त्वियपवादत्वादिति भावः । ... ननु ... उत्सर्गापवादयोश्चायुक्तो विप्रतिषेधः । नैतदस्ति । ङित्वस्यान्यार्थत्वसंभवे सति दौर्बल्यात् संदिग्धोपस्थानोऽयं योगः (i. e. ङिच्च) इत्यपवादत्वमेवात्र विषये नास्ति ।

Bhaṭṭoji, in the *Sid-Kau* on P. 7. 1. 35, accepting the *Vār.* position as the final (in spite of the following *Mbh.* which refutes this argument), remarks : अनेकाल्त्वात् सर्वादेशः । यद्यपि 'ङिच्च' इत्ययमपवादस्तथाप्यनन्यार्थङित्त्वेष्वनङादिषु चरितार्थ इति गुणवृद्धिप्रतिषेधसंप्रसारणाद्यर्थतया संभवत्प्रयोजनङकारे तातङि मन्थरं प्रवृत्तः परेण बाध्यते, इहोत्सर्गापवादयोरपि समबलत्वात्.

[2]

प्रयोजनं नाम ... etc. This represents the following *Mbh.* : प्रयोजनं नाम तद्वक्तव्यम्, यन्नियोगतः स्यात् । यदि चायं नियोगतः सर्वादेशः स्यात्, तत एतत् प्रयोजनं स्यात् । कुतो नु खल्वेतत्, ङित्करणादयं सर्वादेशो भविष्यति, न पुनरन्त्यस्य स्यादिति ?

This *Mbh.* denies the argument made in the *Vār*. That argument can be analysed into the following parts: (1) The *sarvādeśa* is a certainty. (2) Therefore *ṅ* of *tātaṅ* must have some other purpose than the *antyādeśa*. Prohibition of Guṇa and Vṛddhi must be its purpose. (3) Since it has this other purpose, it is no longer keen on teaching *antyādeśa*. So it becomes a weak rule. (4) Therefore it cannot supersede the *sarvādeśa* rule. The *Mbh.* says that the very first part in this chain, viz. the basic assumption that *sarvādeśa* is a certainty is itself without any foundation. It's wrong to presuppose thus. (... यदा सर्वादेशत्वं लब्धं स्यात्तदा गुणवृद्धिप्रतिषेधार्थं भवेत् ङित्करणम्। तदेव तु दुःसंपादम् as the *Dīp.*, *p.* 40, *l.* 25, says.)

Since ङित्त्व cannot necessarily be understood as meant for *guṇavṛddhipratiṣedha*, there is no reason why it should not have a say in the matter of determining the place of the substitute. Its application is not doubtful (*saṁdigdhopasthāna*), as was believed. So there is no reason to suppose that it loses its strength and comes down to the level of the general rule (P. 1. 1. 55). It must, as *apavāda*, supersede it. The explanation furnished by the *Vār.* is not satisfactory, says the *Mbh.*

The first part of the *Dīp.* (न हि ... यथान्यनिरपेक्षं ... सावकाशत्वं, *p.* 40, *ll.* 22-24) cites a case of the opposite nature, where some other purpose can be legitimately suggested as that does not depend on anything else (*anyanirapekṣa*). It is self-authoritative. The case meant is that of P. 3. 1. 30: कमेर्णिङ्. The *ṅ* of *ṇiṅ* can indicate the Ātmanepada (P. 1. 3. 12: अनुदात्तङित आत्म°) by itself, without depending on any other factor. It can also similarly be for assuring the comprehension of *ṇiṅ* along with *ṇic*. (If Pāṇini had simply said *कमेर्णिः, this **ṇi* would alone have been comprehended by *ṇi* in P. 6. 4. 51: णेरनिटि and not the *ṇic* also.) This, too, does not depend on any other factor. Similarly *ṇ* of *ṇiṅ* can serve the same purpose: सामान्यग्रहणाविघात. That is why, says the *Dīp.*, the prefixion of *ṇ* as a code-letter in *ṇiṅ* can be said to have a scope (*sāvakāśa*) with reference to this सामान्यग्रहणाविघात. (Here the reference is to P. 3. 1. 30 *Vār.* 1: णिङि णित्करणस्य सावकाशत्वाद् वृद्धिप्रतिषेधप्रसङ्गः.) (The two code-letters *ṅ* and *ṇ* can also indicate some other things, but they are not *anyanirapekṣa*. They depend on some other factor which is not certain. The Vṛddhi-producing capacity of *ṇ* [P. 7. 2. 115: अचो ञ्णिति] and the Vṛddhi-prohibiting capacity of *ṅ* [P. 1. 1. 5] conflict with each other, and so are uncertain.)

Having given this dissimilar parallel (*vaidharmyeṇa dṛṣṭānta*) Bhar. turns to the matter in hand. The code letter *ṅ* has, let us say, two capacities: (1) of indicating that a *ṅit* substitute is for the final, and (2) of indicating absence of Guṇa and Vṛddhi. Of these the second utility depends upon the *sarvā-*

deśa (e. g. *kuru* + *hi* > *kuru* + *tāt*). If *sarvādeśa* is not there, there will be no prohibition of Guṇa, because, with *antyādeśa* the *ṅit* suffix does not immediately follow the stem (*kuru* + **htāt*). The suffix *tāt* is *ṅit*, but **htāt* is not. Nor can the part *tāt* lend its *ṅit* character to the whole (*-htāt*). Now, one cannot say that *sarvādeśa* will be there, for, there is the *apavāda* rule *ṅic ca*. In the absence of *sarvādeśa* the prohibition of Guṇa and Vṛddhi is out of question. So the only sure scope left for ङिच्च is the effecting of *antyādeśa*. It has no other scope and so its application does not become doubtful as regards the *antyādeśa*. Its force is not diminished. Consequently there is no reason why the *tātaṅ* replaces the whole, and not the final. (That is what the *Dīp.* means when it says : इह तु यदा सर्वादेशत्वं ... किमिति न प्रवर्तिष्यते ?). The reasoning of the *Vār.* is not convincing, says the *Mbh.*

Observation : The grammatical construction of the *Dīp.* beginning with न हि (*p.* 40, *l.* 22) is not clear. The words न हि seem to be out of place ; they should have been in the second part of the argument, i. e. in connection with इह तु. But इह तु begins a new sentence and so here too न हि would be out of place. Whether some words are missing in the MS after न हि (to indicate which we have placed dots), it is difficult to say. We really do not know whether it is a case of Homer nodding, or whether the MS is damaged, or whether we do not know how to interpret the text. Our interpretation — particularly of the *dṛṣṭānta* part — is tentative, subject to correction.

[3]

एवं तर्हि ... यदेतं ङितं करोति. The final argument in the *Mbh.*, showing that the substitute *tātaṅ* is not for the final. The full text of the *Mbh.* is as follows : एवं तर्हीतदेव ज्ञापयति — न तातङ्ङन्त्यस्य स्थाने भवतीति, यदेतं ङितं करोतीति। इतरथा हि लोट एरुप्रकरण एव ब्रूयात्, 'तिह्योस्तादाशिष्यन्यतरस्याम्' इति।

This is the argument : In P. 3. 4. 85–93 the endings of the Imperative (*loṭ*) are taught, by deriving them from the general set of personal endings (*tiptasjhi* ... P. 3. 4. 78). There 3. sing. & pl. ... *tu* and *jhu* (i. e. *-antu*) are derived from *ti* and *jhi* (= *anti*) respectively by means of the substitute *u* for the *final i* (लोटो ... एरुः, 85, 86) of *ti* and *jhi*. Now the *Mbh.* says that if Pāṇini had wanted to make *tātaṅ* (an equally *loṭ* ending) a substitute for the final of *-ti* and *-hi*, he would have framed a rule : *तिह्योस्तादाशिष्यन्यतरस्याम् just in this section, after एरुः. His object would have been achieved even without the code-letter *ṅ*. And, further, he would not have had to frame the rule तुह्योस्तातङ् ... in the *Aṣṭ.* 7. 1 (35). So his avoidance of the *Aṣṭ.* section 3. 4 where the *antyādeśa*-s for the *loṭ* are specifically taught, and his reading the rule about *tātaṅ* elsewhere (in 7. 1) definitely indicate that he does not want *tātaṅ* to be a substitute for the final (of *tu* and *hi*).

The next step from this is that if the code-letter *ṅ* is not for *antyādeśa*, it must be for the prohibition of Guṇa and Vṛddhi, since no other utility of *ṅ* is possible. And, further, as we have already seen, the prohibition of Guṇa and Vṛddhi is not possible unless there is a *sarvādeśa*. So actually the use of the code-letter *ṅ* for *tāt* turns out to be a means of indicating that *tāt* is a *sarvādeśa* (ङित्करणादेवायं सर्वादेशः स्यात् ... एतत् ङित्करणं गुणवृद्धिनिषेधार्थम् ... नासति सर्वादेशे संभवतीति सर्वादेशाभ्युपाय एव ङित्करणम् as the *Dīp*. says.)

Readings : (1) (*p*. 40, *ll*. 16-17) MS °वादोंधिस्थानांतरप्रास्यतान्तरप्राप्त्या ; AL °वादोऽपि स्थानान्तरप्राप्तः स्थानान्तरप्राप्त्या. — (2) (*p*. 40, *l*. 19) MSAL साधकम् (for our emendation बाधकम्). We have no doubt that the original बाधकम् became षाधकम् through the ignorance or carelessness of some copyist, which was subsequently 'corrected' to साधकम्, under the impression that this was a case of wrong cerebralisation. For a similar case see above, where प्रतिबद्धं became प्रतिषिद्धं (through an intermediary stage *प्रतिषद्धं, no doubt).—(3) (*p*. 40, *l*. 20) MS संदिह्योप°. — (4) (*p*. 40, *l*. 24) MS ङिकरणस्य ; AL ङित् करणस्य (for our emendation णित्°). — (5) (*p*. 40, *l*. 25) MS यथा (for यदा). — (6) (*p*. 41, *l*. 3) MS त्वात्यार्थं (for त्वन्त्यार्थं).

* * *

anekāl-śit sarvasya / P. 1. 1. 55

नैतदस्ति । शित्करणादेव सर्वादेशो भविष्यति । This *pratīka* stands for the following *Mbh*. : शित् सर्वस्येति किमुदाहरणम् ? 'इदम इश्' । इतः, इह । नैतदस्ति ... etc.

This Sū. says that a substitute which consists of more than one phoneme (*anekāl*), and the one which carries a code-letter *ś*, replace the whole word-element for which they are taught as substitutes.

This *Mbh*. raises a question about the necessity of including the *śit* part in the rule. The questioner has in the mind the idea that the *anekāl* part alone is necessary. That will take care of those cases which are supposed to be taken care of by the *śit* part of the rule. Hence his question : शित् सर्वस्येति किमुदाहरणम् ?

The opponent adduces इतः and इह as the examples which can be accounted for by the *śit* part of the rule. Both are derived from *idam* : the former by the addition of the suffix *tas*(*il*) (P. 5. 3. 7 : पञ्चम्यास्तसिल्), and the latter by that of *ha* (P. 5. 3. 11 : इदमो हः). They mean 'from here ; from this one' and 'here ; at this place' respectively. Here the base *idam* is replaced by *i*(*ś*) according to P. 5. 3. 3 : इदम इश्. As the substitute *i* is furnished with the

code-letter *ś*, it replaces the whole (*sarvam*) of the base *idam* when the *prāgdiśīya* suffixes *tasil* and *ha* follow. This is the purpose of including *śit* in the rule.

In the *Mbh.* नैतदस्ति। शित्करणात् ... etc. the objector reveals his hand. The very addition of the code-letter *ś* will turn any substitute — even a monophonic substitute like *i* — into poly-phonic. So, the substitute *iś* being *anekāl* will replace the whole original *idam* on account of its *anekāl* character itself. Where is then the need to add the *śit* part to the rule ?

The *Mbh.* शित्करणादेव सर्वादेशो भविष्यति is rather strange. Obviously one cannot challenge the inclusion of *śit* in the rule and say शित्करणाद् ... भविष्यति in the same breath. (Cf. Nāg. : ननु कथं शित्पदाभावे 'शित्करणादेव' इति भाष्यम् ...). So, what is really meant is : शित्करणजनितात् अनेकाल्त्वादेव सर्वादेशो भविष्यति. Hence the *Dīp.* : अनेकाल्त्वादित्यर्थः.

(*p.* 41, *l.* 8) ननु च शकारस्य ... etc. An objection against the above objection. If the code-letter is to be an integral part of the word-element to which it is affixed (in order to account for the *anekāl* character of the substitute), then it cannot be dropped, though technically an *it*. It will then gate-crash in the actual language also. (But according to the usually accepted view a code-letter is elided as soon as it is uttered in the rule. All operations are performed on the strength of its mere recollection.)

The *Dīp.* नैष दोषः ... etc. rejects this counter-objection. After all, a code-letter is meant only to help some operation and account for a form. It has no axe to grind. So the code-letter *ś* in our case will immediately and automatically withdraw, once the replacement of the entire original takes place. There is no danger of its lingering behind to the inconvenience of the speakers. This is what the *Dīp.* तत्र शकारस्येदं प्रयोजनं etc. says.

It is not possible to restore some seven letters damaged in the MS in *l.* 8.

(*p.* 41, *l.* 11) इदं तर्हि, 'अष्टाभ्य औश्' इति. With his first argument refuted by the objector, the protagonist of the Sū. points out another rule (P. 7. 1. 21) to justify the reading of *śit* in the rule. This rule teaches substitution of *au(ś)* in the place of *(j)as* (Nom. pl.) and *(ś)as* after the stem *aṣṭan* (>*aṣṭā*). Here the utility of the code-letter *ś* is obvious. For, otherwise the substitute *au(ś)* would have replaced only the initial *a* of *(j)as* and *(ś)as* by P. 1. 1. 54 : आदेः परस्य. With *śit* included in it, P. 1. 1. 55 supersedes P. 1. 1. 54 on account of its subsequent position and thus ensures the desired forms. Read the *Sid-Kau.* : 'अनेकाल्शित् सर्वस्य' (१. १. ५५) । ... अलोऽन्त्यसूत्रापवादः । 'अष्टाभ्य औश्' इत्यादौ 'आदेः परस्य' इत्येतदपि परत्वादनेन बाध्यते ।

What is exactly the difference between the two examples : इदम इश् and अष्टाभ्य औश्? For, the objector (in the *Mbh.*) has the same remark to offer, viz. ननु चात्रापि शित्करणादेव भविष्यति सर्वादेशो with regard to अष्टाभ्य औश् also. The *Dīp.* पूर्वत्र 'अलोऽन्त्यस्य' ... etc. makes two suggestions : (1) In the case of इदम इश्, it is अलोऽन्त्यस्य (P. 1. 1. 52) which is superseded by P. 1. 1. 55, while in the case of अष्टाभ्य औश्, it is आदेः परस्य (P. 1. 1. 54) that is superseded. (2) Just a possibility of another illustration (उदाहरणसंभवः) is stated.

(*p.* 41, *l.* 13) विशेषणार्थः शकारः. This *pratīka* stands for the following *Mbh.* : इदं तर्हि — 'जसः शी'। 'जश्शसोः शिः'। ननु चात्रापि शित्करणादेव सर्वादेशो भविष्यति। अस्त्यन्यच्छित्करणे प्रयोजनम्। किम् ? विशेषणार्थः शकारः। क्व विशेषणार्थेनार्थः? 'शि सर्वनामस्थानम्', 'विभाषा ङिश्योः' इति।

When अष्टाभ्य औश् also is refuted by the objector, two more rules, जसः शी (P. 7. 1. 17) and जश्शसोः शिः (P. 7. 1. 20) are cited in defence of the *śit* part of P. 1. 1. 55. If *śit* is not read there, *ś(ī)* will undesiredly replace only the final *s* of the Nom. pl. case-ending *jas* after *sarvanāman*-s ending in *a*. There is a similar difficulty in the case of *ś(i)*, the Nom. and Acc. pl. substitute of all neuter stems. When the objector comes out mechanically with the same reaction : ननु चात्रापि शित्करणादेव ... etc., the defendant now advances a new argument : There is another purpose which *ś* in *śī* and *śi* has to serve. It has to qualify the two substitute endings. Here is the necessity for such a qualification : In P. 1. 1. 42 : शि सर्वनामस्थानम् Pāṇini further assigns a name *sarvanāmasthāna* to *ś(i)*. Now, if Pāṇini does not use the code-letter *ś* in his rule, जश्शसोः शिः, he cannot use it in शि सर्वनामस्थानम् also. He will have to say *इ सर्वनामस्थानम्. But it will mean that any and every *i* is called सर्वनामस्थान which is of course absurd. So he has to use *ś* in P. 7. 1. 20, and then only he can use it in P. 1. 1. 42 which qualification helps the identification. Similarly in the case of जसः शी also.

(*p.* 41, *l.* 14) अन्यच्छकारस्य प्रयोजनमिति ... etc. This clarifies the significance of the *Mbh.* statement : विशेषणार्थः शकारः. It was argued by the objector thus : the word *śit* occurring in this rule can be dispensed with since *anekāl* is sufficient to take care of all cases. Even in the case of substitutes consisting of a single phoneme there is no difficulty, as it too can be looked upon as *anekāl* by counting the letter *ś*. As to the objection that a code-letter is elided as soon as uttered and so it cannot be counted for the *anekāl* purpose, it was suggested that it must be assumed that *ś* continues exercising its effect even after its elision (*bhūtapūrvagati* as Nāg. says), for otherwise its reading will be purposeless and so meaningless. It is now pointed out by the protagonist of the rule that it is not so. Even then *ś* does not become meaningless in suffixes like *śi*. It has a purpose to serve, viz. to qualify the suffixes like

Nom. pl. neuter *-i*. Something can be assumed only when it becomes otherwise meaningless. It is not the case here and so *bhūtapūrvagati* is not admissible. In other words the code-letter *ś* must be read in P. 1. 1. 55 to ensure replacement of the whole where it is desired in the case of mono-phonic substitutes.

Nāg. has put this idea very forcefully thus : एवं च तस्य सप्रयोजनत्वेन भूतपूर्वगत्याश्रयणे मानाभावेन नानेकाल्त्वात् सर्वादेशत्वम्, अपि तु शित्वादेवेति शिद्ग्रहणं सूत्रे कार्यमिति भावः।

(*p.* 41, *l.* 15) अंत्यस्यायं स्थाने भवन् ... etc.

This *pratīka* stands for the following *Mbh.* 'शित् सर्वस्य' इति शक्यमकर्तुम्। कथम्? अन्त्यस्यायं स्थाने भवन् न प्रत्ययः स्यात्। असत्यां प्रत्ययसंज्ञायामित्संज्ञा न स्यात्। असत्यामित्संज्ञायां लोपो न स्यात्। असति लोपेऽनेकाल्। यदानेकाल् तदा सर्वादेशः।

यदा सर्वादेशस्तदा प्रत्ययः। यदा प्रत्ययस्तदेत्संज्ञा। यदेत्संज्ञा तदा लोपः।

Having shown that the reading of *śit* in P. 1. 1. 55 is indispensable, Pat. now takes the other side and argues in favour of its dropping (शित् सर्वस्य इति शक्यमकर्तुम्।), without any harm resulting. Here, without saying so expressly, he makes a distinction between *śit* word-elements which are suffixes (*pratyaya* like *śi* [P. 7. 1. 20]) where the code-letter is a prefix and those which are not so (like *iś* P. 5. 3. 3) or the suffix *auś* (P. 7. 1. 21) which is a *pratyaya*, but *ś* is suffixed to it, not prefixed.

The argument runs as follows : In the case of, say, the *pratyaya* '*śi*', even if it does not replace the whole (*sarvādeśa*) (either *jas* or *śas*), ultimately it does become a *sarvādeśa*. Thus, supposing that it takes the place of the final (i. e. *-s*) (by P. 1. 1. 52) — अन्त्यस्यायं स्थाने भवन् as the *Dīp.* says — it cannot be called a *pratyaya*. For, it has replaced only a part of the original *pratyaya*, not the whole. When *śi* is not a *pratyaya*, *ś* does not get the same *it*, for, according to P. 1. 3. 8, the letter *ś*, joined to a grammatical element, is called *it* only when it is prefixed to a *pratyaya*. And when not an *it*, it cannot be dropped by P. 1. 1. 9. Thus *śi* continues to be whole, i. e. in other words, *anekāl*. And when *anekāl*, by that very fact, it becomes a *sarvādeśa*.[1] This is the first part of the argument (which secures the character of a *sarvādeśa* for *śi* even in the absence of *śit* in the rule).

Now the next part (which secures the elision of *ś* of *śi*). Being a *sarvādeśa*, now *śi* gets the designation *pratyaya*. Once a *pratyaya*, its initial *ś* is now called *it* and consequently it can be dropped. Thus the

1. Cf. the *Sid kau.* : 'जसः शी'। अदन्तात् सर्वनाम्नः परस्य जसः शी स्यात्। अनेकाल्त्वात् सर्वादेशः। न च 'अर्वणस्तृ' इत्यादाविव नानुबन्धकृतमनेकाल्त्वम्' इति वाच्यम्। सर्वादेशत्वात् प्रागित्संज्ञाया एवाभावात्।

sarvādeśa (and also the dropping of *ś*) is achieved even without reading *ś* in P. 1. 1. 55.

It is unfortunate that the *Dīp.* for this *Mbh.* is not available. The last sentence in the last available folio (No. 218, back side) is : नपुंसकादिति च विहितविशेषण. We have explained the *Mbh.* following Kaiy. and Nāg.

If the word *śit* is superfluous in P. 1. 1. 55, why does Pāṇini read it at all? To indicate the Pari. नानुबन्धकृतमनेकाल्त्वम्, says the *Mbh.* Read : एवं तर्हि सिद्धे सति यच्छित् सर्वस्येत्याह, तज्ज्ञापयत्याचार्योऽस्त्येषा परिभाषा नानुबन्धकृतमनेकाल्त्वं भवतीति. In determining the *anekāl* status of an element, the code-letters are not to be considered. If the real element, divested of its code-letters, is still *anekāl*, then it can be legitimately called *anekāl*. If, divested of code-letters, it consists of a single phoneme, it is not *anekāl*. Our ending *śi* is no longer *anekāl* on this Pari., for without the code-letter *ś* it consists of a single phoneme *i*. So it is not *anekāl*. Therefore *śi* will not become a *sarvādeśa if śit* is not included in P. 1. 1. 55.

There is a wider aspect of this discussion. There are two views about the code-letters (*anubandha*) : one is that they are an integral part of the word element to which they are affixed (एकान्ताः, Pari. 5), and the other is that they are not an integral part (अनेकान्ताः, Pari. 4). The whole discussion in the *Mbh.* has proceeded on the *ekānta* view about the code-letters. If one accepts the *anekānta* view then there is no problem.

Further, it goes without saying, that the Pari. नानुबन्धकृतमनेकाल्त्वम् is necessary only on the *ekānta* view. It is superfluous on the *anekānta* view. Read the *Prad.* : अनेकान्तेषु चानुबन्धेषु नास्त्येव 'नानुबन्धकृतमनेकाल्त्वम्' इति। एकान्तेषु च ज्ञापकेन प्रयोजनम्।

(*p.* 41, *l.* 15) कथमन्त्यस्य शिभावः ... etc. This *Dīp.* is here referring to the *Mbh.* अन्त्यस्य स्थाने भवन्. The *Dīp.* here takes an objection to that statement. How does the *Mbh.* say that the substitutes *śi* or *śī* take the place of the last phoneme of the original endings (viz. *jas/śas* and *jas*)? Here the point is that the word *sarvanāmnaḥ* (continued from P. 7. 1. 14) in P. 7. 1. 17 : जसः शी is in Ablative. Similarly the word *napuṁsakāt* (continued from P. 7. 1. 19) in P. 7. 1. 20 जश्शसोः शिः. When an operation is taught for something when it follows something (this latter mentioned in the Ablative in the rule which prescribes that operation), the operation applies to the initial phoneme of the following element according to P. 1. 1. 54 : आदेः परस्य. This rule is an exception to P. 1. 1. 52 : अलोऽन्त्यस्य. Read : 'आदेः परस्य'। परस्य यद्विहितं तत्तस्यादेर्बोध्यम्। 'अलोऽन्त्यस्य' इत्यस्यापवादः (*Sid-kau.* on P. 1. 1. 54). That is why the *Dīp.* says 'तत्र आदेः परस्य' इति प्रभवितव्यम्. So the substitutes *śi* and *śī* will replace the first element of *jas* and *śas*. How does Pat. say : अन्त्यस्य स्थाने भवन्?

The *Dīp.* एवं मन्यते gives the reply to this objection. It argues that *sarvanāmnaḥ* in P. 7. 1. 17 is not Ablative. It is Genitive, with 'connection' in a broad sense as its meaning (संबन्धषष्ठी). It means that '*jas* connected with a *sarvanāman* is replaced by *śī*'. As there is no Ablative, *jas* is taken as a *sthānaṣaṣṭhī* subject to अलोऽन्त्यस्य. There is no occasion for आदेः परस्य.

As regards the substitute *śi* for Neuter Nom. and Acc. pl. (P. 7. 1. 20), the *Dīp.* says that *napuṁsakāt* in that rule is not to be connected with any word like *parasya*. It is to be understood as qualifying a word *vihitasya* 'prescribed'. Of course the word *vihita-* is not there in the rule. But it is to be supplied. As nowhere a word *para* 'following' is intended, there is no scope for the rule आदेः परस्य. Consequently the objection falls to the ground.

As remarked above 'नपुंसकात्' इति च विहितविशेषण is the last sentence of the *Dīp.* available to us in the MS.